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Foreword
deep poverty. This year’s Global Monitor-
ing Report presents new and more intuitive 
measures of poverty that allow us to mea-
sure depth and help contribute to the policy 
dialogue and action agenda in this urgent 
area. 
•   We have seen progress in achieving shared 
prosperity, with a majority of countries reg-
istering solid income growth in the poorest 
40 percent of their income distributions. But 
in many countries, the incomes of the bot-
tom 40 percent declined, including in half 
of the high-income countries. Ensuring that 
income is shared more equitably should be 
a priority for all countries.   
•   Poverty  reduction  and  shared  prosperity 
are held back by unequal progress on the 
non-income dimensions of development, 
like access to essential services. We must 
urgently address the widespread inequali-
ties of opportunity in education, health, and 
other sectors. 
The thematic section of this report shows 
that advancing these critical challenges will 
take place against the background of major 
demographic changes. The global population 
is growing much slower in 2015 than at the 
beginning of the MDG period in 2000. It is 
also aging at record speed. 
There is significant cross-country hetero-
geneity because while some countries still 
This is a pivotal year for global development. 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
have guided countries and partners over the 
last 15 years in improving the living condi-
tions of the poor. We are now transitioning to 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
a new set of global targets that embrace eco-
nomic, social, and environmental priorities 
through 2030. 
As we reflect on the hard-fought progress 
since the launch of the MDGs, we have an 
opportunity to make important changes in 
how we approach development. We can cel-
ebrate that the MDGs mobilized the world 
behind an ambitious agenda, that many coun-
tries have reduced poverty and illness, and 
that more children today are in school than 
ever before.
Our mission, however, is far from complete. 
During the last quarter-century, more than 1 
billion people have lifted themselves out of 
extreme poverty. Yet, about one tenth of the 
global population still lives on less than $1.90 
a day—the updated international poverty line. 
Looking ahead, three critical challenges 
remain:
•   A  large percentage of  the remaining poor 
are deeply poor, with income levels far 
below the poverty line. Policy action and 
programs need to focus more directly on 
the men, women, and children that live in 
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maintain young and growing populations, 
particularly those where global poverty is 
concentrated, others are aging, especially the 
high- and middle-income countries. Projec-
tions for global growth over the SDG period 
trend down in line with the decrease in popu-
lation growth, but demographic change can 
also be a contributor to growth and develop-
ment if the right policies are adopted. 
To advance development amid demo-
graphic change, we must place our policies 
and financing behind three strategic priorities: 
grow economies in ways that are sustainable 
and create jobs; invest in people’s social and 
economic potential; and insure against ever-
changing risks, which tend to disproportion-
ately impact the poor. These policies will be 
tailored to each country’s demographic profile.
Moreover, the recent European refugee cri-
sis only further highlights the importance of 
making the best out of demographic change. 
Whether people migrate for more opportu-
nities in life or just a safer life, migration—
together with fertility and mortality—is a 
critical driver of demographic change. Along 
with capital flows and trade, it is also a key 
channel through which mutual benefits can be 
realized in response to diverse demographic 
trends across countries. Challenges must be 
managed, but international cooperation is key.
With the right policies in place, demo-
graphic change can contribute to the move-
ment to end extreme poverty, boost shared 
prosperity, and achieve the SDGs. This 
year’s Global Monitoring Report will help 
all countries—rich and poor alike—to navi-
gate the challenges and to take advantage of 
demographic change and advance on global 
development goals that will improve living 
standards around the world.
Jim Yong Kim Christine Lagarde
President of the Managing Director of the
World Bank Group International Monetary Fund
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Executive Summary
With 2015 marking the transition from the 
Millennium to the Sustainable Development 
Goals, the international community can cele-
brate many development successes since 2000. 
Despite the global financial crisis, economic 
growth was generally strong and robust. 
About 1 billion people rose out of extreme 
poverty. Most developing countries saw solid 
income growth for the bottom 40 percent of 
their income distribution. Millions of children 
who were unlikely to survive their fifth birth-
day passed beyond these critical years and 
went on to school in ever greater numbers. 
The incidence of preventable diseases such as 
AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis is falling. The 
share of those with access to clean water and 
better sanitation has risen. Overall, the Mil-
lennium Development Goals played an impor-
tant role in galvanizing the global development 
community, and that experience will help 
drive progress toward achievement of the Sus-
tainable Development Goals by 2030.  
Despite solid development gains, progress 
has been uneven, and significant work remains. 
With an estimated 900 million people in 2012 
living on less than $1.90 a day—the updated 
international poverty line—and a projected 
700 million in 2015, extreme poverty remains 
unacceptably high. It has also become more 
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia. Addressing moderate poverty and miti-
gating the vulnerability of falling back into 
poverty have become more pressing issues in 
many countries, including in those where the 
bottom 40 percent saw their incomes decline. 
Even in a world of single-digit extreme pov-
erty, non-income disparities, such as limited 
access to quality education and health services, 
pose a bottleneck to sustained poverty reduc-
tion and shared prosperity. Wider environ-
mental sustainability concerns are a major 
challenge throughout the world, in regard to 
climate change and its impact on the natural 
resources upon which many of the poorest 
depend, such as water. In sum, while develop-
ment progress was impressive, it has been 
uneven and a large unfinished agenda remains. 
Three key challenges stand out: the depth 
of remaining poverty, the unevenness in shared 
prosperity, and the persistent disparities in 
non-income dimensions of development. First, 
the policy discourse needs to focus more 
directly on the poorest among the poor. While 
pockets of ultra-poverty exist around the 
world, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to most 
of the deeply poor. To make depth a more 
central element in policy formulation, easy-to- 
communicate measures are needed—and this 
report attempts a step in this direction with 
person-equivalent measures of poverty. Sec-
ond, the eradication of poverty in all of its 
forms requires steady growth of the incomes 
of the bottom 40 percent. Yet, economic 
growth—a key driver of shared prosperity—
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may not be as buoyant as it was before the 
global financial crisis. Third, unequal progress 
in non-income dimensions of development 
requires addressing widespread inequality of 
opportunity, which transmits poverty across 
generations and erodes the pace and sustain-
ability of progress for the bottom 40. To meet 
these challenges, three ingredients are core to 
the policy agenda: sustaining broad-based 
growth, investing in human development, and 
insuring the poor and vulnerable against 
emerging risks. 
In view of these challenges, the Sustainable 
Development Goals aim to scale up impact in 
a changing world through a more integrated 
approach to development. Recognizing the 
interconnections between development objec-
tives, the SDGs embrace an ambitious and 
holistic vision to foster inclusive and sustain-
able development with scaled-up impact. 
Shared by all countries, they recognize that 
collective action is required. Global chal-
lenges—resilient financial systems, common 
resources, climate change—require interna-
tionally coordinated solutions. Meeting SDG 
investment needs will depend on shifting from 
“billions” in official development assistance to 
“trillions” in investments of all kinds, unlock-
ing, leveraging, and catalyzing public and pri-
vate resources. The SDGs will need to be 
pursued in a changing world, with new oppor-
tunities and challenges brought by evolving 
megatrends, including climate change, contin-
ued globalization, rapid urbanization, and, as 
discussed in the special theme of this report, 
demographic change.
Profound changes in global demography 
have the potential to alter the trajectory of 
global development over the SDG period. 
Global demography is at a turning point: the 
world’s population is growing more slowly 
and is aging at an unprecedented rate. These 
trends reflect past development successes—
women’s empowerment, improved education, 
better child, maternal and reproductive health, 
and increased longevity. The working-age 
share of the population peaked in 2012 and is 
now on the decline. Aging means that popula-
tion increases are reflected in larger numbers 
of older people. The global count of children 
is stabilizing at a plateau of 2 billion. Yet, 
underneath these global trends lies consider-
able diversity in the direction and pace of 
demographic change. Regional and subre-
gional patterns vary across and within coun-
tries. To frame the impact of diverse 
demographic trends on development across 
countries, this report lays out a new typology 
of demographic change, applied to the latest 
2015 UN population statistics.
The diversity of demographic change at the 
country level presents unique opportunities 
and challenges to the world’s centers of global 
poverty and engines of global growth. More 
than 90 percent of poverty is concentrated in 
pre- and early-dividend countries with swell-
ing working-age populations that lag in key 
human development indicators and continue 
to register rapid population growth. In these 
countries, the demographic transition to lower 
fertility creates a golden opportunity to raise 
living standards. Over 85 percent of global 
economic activity and 78 percent of global 
growth over the last 15 years can be attributed 
to late- and post-dividend countries, which 
have much-lower fertility rates and some of the 
highest shares of the elderly in the world. In 
these countries, population aging may weaken 
growth prospects. To be sure, demographic 
change is not inherently good or bad and pres-
ents opportunities and challenges everywhere. 
In each case, policies can make a critical differ-
ence in how demographic change affects prog-
ress toward the development goals. 
Navigating the dynamic implications of 
demographic change will require sound poli-
cies informed by a long-run perspective and 
tailored to a nation’s demographic context. To 
eradicate persistent poverty, the centers of 
global poverty need to accelerate their demo-
graphic transition, invest in their young and 
still-growing populations, and lay the founda-
tions for sustained growth. Among other pol-
icy initiatives, these goals require better 
education and health services, as well as greater 
empowerment of women. Facing weakening 
economic dynamism, the lower-fertility, richer 
countries that make up the current engines of 
global growth need to address headwinds aris-
ing from shrinking labor forces. They also 
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need to adapt their policies and institutions to 
foster healthy and productive aging. Selected 
policy priorities include mobilizing savings for 
productive investment in human and physical 
capital, as well as strengthening welfare sys-
tems—pensions, health care, and long-term 
care—while ensuring fiscal sustainability and 
protection for the elderly and vulnerable. 
Policy opportunities also exist to arbitrage 
demographic diversity across countries. The 
extent of demographic diversity across coun-
tries is starker than ever, with large and inevi-
table impacts on the global economy. Returns 
on capital and labor are affected. Comparative 
advantages in trade are altered. Given these 
implications, flows of capital, labor and goods 
and services will be affected and, together, they 
can help respond to growing demographic 
imbalances globally. Mutual benefits can be 
realized: capital can flow to rising consumer 
markets; older countries can benefit from legal 
immigration; younger countries can produce 
labor-intensive products. But challenges need 
to be managed and international cooperation 
is key. 
With effective policies, this era of intense 
demographic change may herald a period of 
sustained development progress. Global 
demography is changing and has the potential 
to alter the trajectory of global development 
profoundly. To speed up progress, countries 
need to step up efforts to sustain broad-based 
growth, invest in people, and insure the poor 
and vulnerable against ever-changing risks. 
However, they must undertake these measures 
by taking into account demographic change. 
Where possible, this requires capturing and 
harnessing demographic dividends. Elsewhere, 
it requires adaptation. Everywhere, it calls for 
turning demographic change into one of the 
most consequential development opportuni-
ties of our times.
Projections show that the global poverty  
rate may have fallen to single digits in 2015. 
Yet, the number of poor remains high.
While income poverty fell rapidly during the 
MDG-era, a large unfinished agenda remains 
for the SDGs with respect to non-income goals.
With extreme poverty concentrating in  
Sub-Saharan Africa, more focus is needed  
on the poorest among the poor.
Prosperity needs to be better shared with the 
bottom 40 percent of the income distribution, 
especially in high-income countries.
With less buoyant growth expected at the 
start of the SDG period, increased effort is 
needed to sustain broad-based growth.
We need to invest in people and protect them 
from risk with adequate human development 
policies and social protection.
MONITORING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS: A SNAPSHOT
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with countries facing different opportunities 
to capture demographic dividends.
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Global demographic change is intense: the 
working-age share peaked, the population 
grows much slower and ages at record speed.
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Overview
prosperity, and the persistent disparities in 
non-income dimensions of development. The 
MDGs were helpful in galvanizing global 
development progress—an experience that 
will help drive the achievement of the SDGs 
by 2030. 
The world is also at a crossroads for global 
demographic trends. Global population 
growth is slowing: the share of the working-
age population (15−64 years) peaked in 2012 
at 66 percent and is now falling, while the 
total number of children (ages below 15 years) 
will remain at a plateau of around 2 billion 
into the next decades. These trends reflect 
past successes in development—women’s 
empowerment, improved education, better 
reproductive health services, and increased 
longevity. But the direction and pace of 
demographic change vary starkly across 
countries, with sizable disparities between 
the centers of global poverty (marked by high 
fertility) and the engines of global growth 
(marked by rapid aging). The latter comprise 
almost all high-income and most middle-
income economies. In many cases, they have 
completely eliminated extreme income pov-
erty, but they continue to face challenges in 
sharing the benefits of increased prosperity, 
particularly if aging weakens their economic 
dynamism. The former include lower-income 
The world is at a global development cross-
roads, as 2015 marks the end of the 15-year 
window for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the begin-
ning of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The world met the MDG target of 
halving the global poverty rate in 2010, five 
years ahead of schedule. The latest data sug-
gest that extreme poverty has continued its 
decades-long descent. Still, poverty remains 
unacceptably high, with an estimated 900 
million people in 2012 living on less than 
$1.90 a day—the new international poverty 
line; the projected number for 2015 under the 
new line is 700 million people. Poverty also is 
becoming increasingly concentrated in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where its depth and breadth 
remain an overriding challenge. The MDGs 
were successful in reducing income poverty, 
but they were less successful in ameliorating 
non-income deprivations, such as access to 
quality education or to basic health services. 
Few countries have combined growth with 
reducing the level of environmental exter-
nalities and carbon emissions. Yet, increasing 
land degradation, overfishing, deforestation, 
extreme weather events, and urban air pollu-
tion endanger recent progress. Looking for-
ward, three challenges stand out: the depth of 
remaining poverty, the unevenness in shared 
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countries in earlier stages of demographic 
transition to lower fertility levels and longer 
life expectancy, making them the focus of the 
continuing battle against global poverty. 
Demographic change brings unique oppor-
tunities and challenges to further the post-
2015 development goals. But countries have 
very different starting lines and face stark 
differences in demographic characteristics 
and projected trends. The way forward, as 
underpinned by the SDGs, is a more synergis-
tic approach between the various dimensions 
of development. Three ingredients will frame 
the policy agenda: sustainable broad-based 
growth, investment in human development, 
and measures that insure the poor and vul-
nerable against evolving risks. These strate-
gies must be sensitive to demographics. The 
centers of global poverty need to accelerate 
their demographic transition, invest in their 
young and growing populations, and lay the 
foundations for sustained growth to capture 
demographic dividends. The engines of global 
growth need to address headwinds arising 
from shrinking labor forces and adapt their 
policies and institutions to foster healthy and 
productive aging. In addition, to eradicate 
poverty and invigorate economic dynamism, 
all countries must also grasp the opportuni-
ties and manage the challenges that arise 
from demographic imbalances at the global 
level—through capital flows, migration, and 
trade. With the right set of policies, this era 
of intense demographic change can be turned 
into one of sustained development progress.
Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016 
investigates these issues in two parts:
Part I—the global monitoring part—
examines global development progress, the 
unfinished agenda, and the policy opportuni-
ties looking ahead. Chapter 1 examines the 
progress made on sustainable poverty reduc-
tion and shared prosperity, as well as the pol-
icies that are needed to make further prog-
ress. With 2015 being a watershed year for 
global development goals, Chapter 2 reviews 
the development successes during the MDG 
period and examines the unfinished agenda 
left for the SDGs. Chapter 3 assesses the 
macroeconomic performance over the MDG 
period, provides the near- and medium-term 
outlook, and examines what the world might 
be like in 2030. 
Part II—the thematic part—examines how 
demographic change can be tilted in favor 
of the development goals. Chapter 4 char-
acterizes demographic change at the global, 
regional, and country levels. It also examines 
the drivers of demographic change that have 
shaped the diversity of demographic patterns 
and trends. Chapter 5 examines how demog-
raphy affects development. It develops a new 
global typology that ties demographic change 
to development potential and analyzes the 
various pathways through which demographic 
change affects the prosperity of nations. 
Chapter 6 analyzes how policies can leverage 
demographic change in support of the devel-
opment goals. It examines policy opportuni-
ties at both the country and the global levels. 
Part I:  Monitoring global 
development progress
Development progress over the  
MDG period has been impressive
In many ways, development has advanced 
more rapidly over the 15-year MDG era than 
at any other time in human history. Since the 
launch of the MDGs, economic growth has 
been rapid, aided by strong commodity prices 
and generally improved macroeconomic poli-
cies. Poverty reduction also has been rapid, 
particularly in East Asia and Pacific. Mil-
lions of children who were unlikely to survive 
to their fifth birthday have passed beyond 
these critical years and gone on to school 
in ever greater numbers, including many 
more girls than was the case 15 years ago. 
The incidence of preventable diseases such 
as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), malaria, and tuberculosis is falling, 
and the share of people with access to clean 
water and better sanitation has risen mark-
edly. The MDGs helped frame the broader 
goals of development and build a coalition of 
partners to work toward common goals.
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One of the most remarkable achievements 
during the MDG era was the significant 
decline in the share of the extremely poor 
in the global population. The first MDG 
target—cutting the extreme poverty rate to 
half its 1990 level by 2015—was met five 
years ahead of schedule. Poverty was on the 
decline before the MDG period, but prog-
ress was fastest in the 2000s (figures O.1a, 
O.1b). Particularly notable are the substantial 
reductions in poverty in East Asia and Pacific 
and South Asia, where the rapid growth 
and development of China and India helped 
lift millions of people out of poverty (fig-
ures O.1c and O.1d). As the number of poor 
declined, the average shortfall of income 
below the poverty line improved as well from 
13.2 percent in 1990 to 3.7 by 2012.
Based on the updated poverty line of $1.90 
a day, the estimate for 2012 puts the number 
of extremely poor people at 900 million, or 
12.8 percent of global population (table O.1). 
Global poverty estimates have been updated 
to reflect a re-estimated international poverty 
line of $1.90 a day, new 2011-based purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) prices, and revisions 
FIGure O.1 Global poverty declined, but Sub-Saharan Africa lagged
Source: PovcalNet 2015. 
Note: Estimates based on the $1.90 poverty line and 2011 PPP prices.
a. Given the production lags for household surveys, 2012 is the latest year for which the World Bank is able to produce regional and global poverty estimates. All numbers for 2015 
and beyond are statistical projections based on growth scenarios and distributional assumptions, and should be treated with considerable circumspection.
b. Regional aggregates for the Middle East and North Africa are omitted because of lack of sufficient observations.
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to complementary data (box O.1). The 2012 
estimate represents continued progress in 
poverty reduction as the revised headcount 
in 2011 was 987 million people (14.2 percent 
of global population). Comparison between 
2011 and 2012 reveals a modest decline in 
the number of poor in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
potentially heralding an era of poverty reduc-
tion not just in the share of the poor but also 
in their absolute number. 
Although the estimate for 2012 remains 
the most reliable recent estimate, World Bank 
projections suggest that global poverty may 
have reached 700 million, or 9.6 percent 
of global population, in 2015. For the first 
time, the global extreme poverty rate may 
have reached single digits. The projected 
decline between 2012 and 2015 is 200 mil-
lion people (some 80 million in South Asia, 
about 65 million in East Asia and Pacific, and 
close to 40 million in Sub-Saharan Africa). 
This projection is extrapolated from 2012 
based on growth scenarios and distributional 
assumptions. Given that the collection and 
processing of nationally representative house-
hold surveys—on which actual poverty esti-
mates are based—usually takes two to three 
years, the 2012 number remains the most 
reliable recent estimate. 
Turning to broader segments of the pop-
ulation, the bottom 40 percent (B40) of the 
income distribution in many countries has 
seen rising incomes over the past decade, 
yet progress was unequal. Considering five-
year periods starting around 2007 and end-
ing around 2012, B40 incomes grew in 65 of 
the 94 countries with adequate and com-
parable household data. Among them, 47 
countries registered a “shared prosper-
ity premium,” meaning that B40 incomes 
grew faster than the incomes of the aver-
age population (figure O.2). This premium 
ranged from less than 1 percentage point to 
well above 3 points, suggesting that growth 
in many countries has been considerably 
pro-poor. Progress on shared prosperity 
TAble O.1 Global poverty is assessed with the re-estimated poverty line 
 Historical Headline Projection
  Region 1990 1999 2011 2012 2015a
Share of population below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)
East Asia and Pacific 60.8 37.5 8.5 7.2 4.1
Europe and Central Asia 1.9 7.8 2.7 2.5 1.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 17.7 14.1 6.5 6.2 5.6
Middle East and North Africab — — — — —
South Asia 50.6 41.2 22.3 18.8 13.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.0 58.1 44.3 42.6 35.2
Developing world 44.3 34.2 16.6 15.0 11.9
World 37.1 29.0 14.2 12.8 9.6
Millions of people below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP)
East Asia and Pacific 999.3 689.7 173.1 147.2 82.6
Europe and Central Asia 9.0 36.6 12.7 12.0 4.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 78.0 72.2 37.7 37.1 29.7
Middle East and North Africab — — — — —
South Asia 574.5 560.1 362.3 309.2 231.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 284.0 375.4 393.5 388.5 347.1
World 1,958.5 1,746.6 987.4 902.0 702.1
Source: PovcalNet 2015.
Note: Poverty estimates based on the $1.90 poverty line and 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. Box O.1 explains how the global poverty 
estimates were calculated. Regional aggregates for the Middle East and North Africa are omitted because of lack of sufficient observations.
a.  Given the production lags for household surveys, 2012 is the latest year for which the World Bank is able to produce regional and global 
poverty estimates. All numbers for 2015 and beyond are statistical projections based on growth scenarios and distributional assumptions, 
and should be treated with considerable circumspection.
b.  Even though five countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are omitted from the database of country-level poverty estimates, 
poverty estimates for these countries are calculated for the purposes of global poverty estimation (see box O.1). The 2011 and 2012 poverty 
estimates for this region implied by these global estimates are 2.4 and 2.3 percent, respectively.
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bOx O.1 Drawing global poverty lines 
Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016 unveils poverty 
data based on a new $1.90 international poverty line, 
using 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP). To be com-
parable, the global poverty estimates are based on a 
common poverty line across all countries. As with the 
previous line of $1.25 a day, in 2005 prices, the new 
line is calculated by averaging the national poverty 
lines of the 15 poorest developing countries. It repre-
sents a very low threshold standard of living which is 
believed to correspond to the minimum costs of basic 
needs. Changes in this value over time thus reflect the 
increasing cost of obtaining these basic needs. 
A key driver behind the raising of the international 
poverty line to $1.90 is the release of the 2011 PPP 
index. Cross-country comparisons of poverty rates 
require PPP indexes, produced by the International 
Comparison Program. New rounds of PPP indexes 
estimate the cost of living across countries and pro-
vide price data for countries not covered by previous 
rounds. Introducing new PPPs typically require the 
re-estimation of the international poverty line and 
can involve, in some cases, significant changes in our 
understanding of poverty levels in some countries or 
the relative ranking of poverty across countries.
Including this year’s revision, there have been four 
major changes to the World Bank Group’s estimate 
of the international poverty line, reflecting different 
methodologies and PPP indexes. The revisions to PPP 
indexes in 1985, 1993, and 2005 corresponded to 
poverty lines of $1.01, $1.08, and $1.25, respectively. 
Different methods have been followed to estimate 
these lines. Beginning with the $1.25 line, the pov-
erty line was calculated by taking the average of the 
15 poorest countries (Chad, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tan-
zania, and Uganda). This same practice was followed 
for the $1.90 revision.
was especially significant in middle-income 
countries, where some 85 percent of coun-
tries in the sample registered an increase in 
B40 incomes. Among developing regions, 
Latin America and the Caribbean performed 
remarkably well. 
The evidence suggests that most of the vari-
ation in B40 income growth can be explained 
by growth in average incomes for the entire 
population. Over long periods of time (several 
decades), B40 income growth closely tracks 
average income growth. Historical data for 
151 high-income and developing countries 
shows that average income growth was the 
primary explanation for cross-country and 
over-time variations in B40 income growth. 
Yet, average income growth does not provide 
the only explanation. Changes in the income 
share of the B40 played an increased role 
especially during the 2000s, a period of par-
ticularly fast income growth for the B40. It 
also appears that for lower-income countries, 
as well as for the lower deciles of the income 
distribution in any country, average income 
growth offers diminished explanatory power. 
Despite solid development gains, 
significant work remains
A first key challenge is the depth of poverty, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The decline 
in poverty rates has been impressive. Yet, pov-
erty still remains unacceptably high—around 
900 million extremely poor people in 2012 
and a projected 700 million people in 2015. 
It is also becoming increasingly concentrated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the last decades, 
the vast majority (about 95 percent) of global 
poverty has been concentrated in three 
regions: East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (figure O.1c). Over 
time, the composition of global poverty across 
these three regions has shifted dramatically. 
East Asia and Pacific registered a spectacular 
decline. South Asia saw an initial increase and 
a later decline, with rates remaining high. Sub-
Saharan Africa saw a steady increase in its 
share and is now home to 43.0 percent of the 
global poor. The growing global share of Sub-
Saharan Africa reflects slower poverty reduc-
tion there amid rapid population growth: in 
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2012 the region’s poverty rate stood at 42.6 
percent, which is only 13 points lower than in 
1990 (figure O.1d). 
The policy discourse needs to focus more 
fully on the poorest among the poor. Poverty 
headcount statistics present distorted views 
of the spatial distribution of poverty and the 
pace of progress over time. Two countries 
could record the same poverty headcount 
rate, where in one country poverty is shallow 
Figure O.2 experiences on shared prosperity differ: While the majority of countries have seen solid growth in  
B40 incomes, many countries have not 
Annualized B40 income growth (bars with no black outline) and average population income growth (shown with a black outline) for a five-year period,  
percent (circa 2007–12)
Source: World Bank’s Global Database for Shared Prosperity.
Note: Data availability varies across countries. Shared prosperity estimates are provided only for comparable survey years. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 16 of the 48 countries have 
shared prosperity numbers even though more survey years exist. Starting points are about 2007 and end points are about 2012. B40 = bottom 40 percent.
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and in the other it is very deep. Similarly, a 
country may be successful in lifting its poor-
est citizens—the poorest of the poor—from 
abject poverty to a level just below the pov-
erty line. Such improvement would not show 
up in a poverty headcount measure. Measures 
that account for depth, such as the “poverty 
gap” (shortfall from the poverty line), are not 
as simple to grasp as headcount measures. To 
make “depth” a more central element of pol-
icy formulation, easy-to-communicate mea-
sures are needed—and this report attempts a 
step in this direction with the new “person-
equivalent” approach. It finds that, in person-
equivalent terms (a benchmark poor person 
with a typical income shortfall), the pov-
erty headcount ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa 
for 2012 rises from 42.6 to 46.3 percent, 
whereas that for South Asia falls from 18.8 
to 10.5 percent. 
With extreme poverty on the decline glob-
ally, a second key challenge is the unevenness 
in shared prosperity for the B40. The B40 
may include many possible populations. 
Among developing regions, the income of 
the richest person among the B40 makes that 
person either extremely or moderately poor, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts 
of East Asia, or vulnerable, primarily in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and parts of 
Europe and Central Asia (Map O.1). In coun-
tries where reducing poverty and vulnerability 
is key, the shared prosperity focus on the B40 
thus enhances that focus. Among richer coun-
tries, the B40 may encompass the relatively 
poor. Promoting healthy B40 income growth 
represents an ongoing challenge, as well as an 
opportunity to make the development process 
more inclusive and socially sustainable. 
In many countries, stepped-up effort is 
needed to sustainably build shared prosper-
ity. The latest comparable household data 
points to a decline in the growth of B40 
incomes over the period circa 2007−12. Half 
MAP O.1 The income of the richest person in the bottom 40 percent differs greatly across countries
Source: PovcalNet 2015.
Note: Based on the $1.25 poverty line and 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices, as full distributional data using 2011 PPP pricees was not yet available. 
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of the high-income countries and more than a 
third of low-income countries saw an actual 
outright decline in B40 incomes. The United 
States saw a decline in B40 incomes during 
the 2000s, perpetuating a trend of rising 
inequality between B40 and the rest of the 
population—a trend observed in several other 
high-income countries and exacerbated by the 
global financial crisis. Indeed, compared with 
the earlier period circa 2006−11—as reported 
in Global Monitoring Report 2014/2015—
the latest shared prosperity data suggest a 
significant deterioration. For countries with 
consistent time series, average B40 income 
growth slowed from 4.6 to 2.9 percent, 
whereas average income growth for the entire 
population declined from 3.0 to 1.7 percent. 
A third key challenge relates to the per-
sistent disparities in the non-income dimen-
sions of development. Compared with the 
MDG goal on income poverty, non-income 
goals saw more mixed success. Progress fell 
particularly short for targets related to health 
(maternal and infant mortality), nutrition 
(undernourishment and hunger), and sani-
tation (Kenny and Dykstra 2013). Close to 
one-fifth of all children under five remain 
undernourished, and some 860 million 
people continue to live in slums. Access to 
primary school education and literacy rates 
have improved, yet the quality of education 
remains a concern. Moreover, while the tide 
has turned on the incidence of major deadly 
diseases, a high number of preventable deaths 
persist. With the development of new medi-
cines, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
patients receiving treatment have nearly the 
same life expectancy as those without HIV. 
However, three-fifths of those people living 
with HIV, mostly in developing countries, 
lack access to antiretroviral drugs. Tubercu-
losis killed 1.5 million people in 2013, many 
in the prime of their productive lives. An esti-
mated 198 million cases of malaria were reg-
istered in 2013, claiming the lives of about 
453,000 children. 
In addition, little progress has been made 
in improving the long-term environmen-
tal sustainability of development. Although 
some countries have successfully “delinked” 
trends in environmental degradation from 
growth, most have not. The cost of environ-
mental degradation—externalities associated 
with outdoor and indoor air pollution, water 
pollution, deforestation, carbon emissions, 
and other environmental hazards—rose 
50 percent during 1990−2010. Furthermore, 
in 2013, over 5 billion people in developing 
countries were breathing polluted air with 
concentrations of particulate matter (PM) 2.5 
in excess of the guideline levels recommended 
by the World Health Organization, up 
42 percent since 1990 (Brauer et al. 2015). 
In 2010, between 11 and 21 percent of all 
deaths in developing countries were the result 
of pollution and other environmental risk 
factors. Only about 25 percent of the coun-
tries in the world, primarily high-income 
countries, have managed to grow economi-
cally while simultaneously decreasing their 
environmental externalities. Even fewer have 
managed to delink carbon emissions from 
growth, challenging the world’s ability to 
contain the impacts of future climate change 
to agreed-upon levels of acceptability. 
To sustainably end extreme poverty and 
promote shared prosperity, more attention 
is needed to the non-income dimensions of 
development. First, to “end poverty in all of its 
forms everywhere,” it must be recognized that 
poverty is multidimensional. Income poverty 
is typically accompanied by inadequate access 
to education, health, housing, employment, 
and personal security—areas where improve-
ments would increase the chances for escaping 
poverty. Second, the B40 consistently under-
perform in non-income dimensions. Children 
from B40 households are more likely to die 
before age five than children in the top 60 
percent (T60) households and are also more 
likely to be underweight. Access to improved 
water sources (piped water) and technol-
ogy (the Internet) is uneven, too. Despite 
rising enrollment rates in poorer countries, 
access to primary education remains inequi-
tably low. Third, greater efforts are needed 
to monitor the sustainability of development 
progress in its economic, environmental, and 
social aspects. Environmental sustainabil-
ity concerns, particularly regarding natural 
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resources, environmental health, and ecosys-
tem sustainability, need to enter more fully 
into economic decision making. 
Amid an uncertain outlook, stronger 
effort is needed to grow, invest, and 
insure
Sustained economic growth has been the 
key building block of poverty reduction and 
shared prosperity during the MDG era. After 
the launch of the MDGs in 2000 until the 
global financial crisis in 2009, developing 
economies grew on average by 6.6 percent 
a year, compared with just over 2 percent a 
year in advanced economies. Even during the 
depth of the financial crisis and its immedi-
ate aftermath, developing economies grew by 
5.5 percent, while advanced economies 
stalled. Moreover, this strong economic 
expansion was accompanied by greater 
income convergence. The global Gini coef-
ficient—a measure of inequality in income 
distribution—declined. The global per cap-
ita distribution of income exhibited greater 
global income convergence during 2000−15, 
in part thanks to rapid income growth in 
major economies like China and India.
Economic growth is expected to be less 
buoyant in the period ahead. Global growth 
is expected to trend down somewhat in 
2016–30 relative to the MDG period. This 
slowing may reflect weaker levels of invest-
ment and the gradually diminishing growth 
dividends from information and communi-
cation technology. Moreover, demographic 
trends in major advanced and emerging 
markets could be a drag on economy-wide 
growth—even if they also present significant 
opportunities to raise living standards. Lower 
growth prospects threaten the income conver-
gence of developing and high-income econo-
mies. Developing economies require strong 
growth to support the hard-won gains of the 
MDG era. Looking ahead, a number of risks 
remain as geopolitical tensions, the tightening 
of financial conditions, and lower commodity 
prices present sources of uncertainty.
Economic growth may not transmit into 
poverty reduction as easily as in the past. 
First, with global poverty at 37.1 percent 
in 1990, many poor people were just below 
the poverty line, leading to a large percent-
age point reduction in poverty for a given 
(distribution-neutral) increase in household 
income growth. Now that the headline rate is 
12.8 percent (latest most reliable estimate for 
2012), the same distribution-neutral increase 
in GDP is unlikely to produce as much poverty 
reduction since comparatively more people 
will be situated in the lower end of the income 
distribution. Second, the deepest pockets of 
poverty may be less readily reached through 
growth as many of the remaining poor live in 
narrowly diversified natural-resource-based 
economies and fragile and conflict-affected 
states. Poverty is less responsive to growth 
in such economies because the availability 
of jobs—the main channel through which 
growth uplifts the poor—is more limited. 
Capital-intensive, natural-resource sectors 
may generate growth but are likely to have 
weaker linkages to job creation. 
Given the unfinished agenda and the 
uncertain outlook, additional efforts are 
needed to promote broad-based growth, 
investment in people, and insurance against 
risks. These three priorities require a strategy 
that promotes competitive economies and 
stable business environments, thus ensur-
ing broad-based growth and income-earning 
opportunities to benefit the poor and the 
B40. Investment in human development is 
needed to tackle non-income deprivations and 
inequalities of opportunity so that these same 
groups can gain the capacity to benefit from 
and contribute to economic growth and pros-
perity (Fryer and Levitt 2004; Paxson and 
Schady 2007). And robust insurance mecha-
nisms are required so that people—although 
not necessarily jobs, firms, or industries—are 
protected against evolving risks for individu-
als, nations, and the world, all in the spirit of 
nurturing a competitive economy and foster-
ing an inclusive society. 
An environment that fosters sustain-
able growth—the first big priority—is com-
plex. Among economies that have sustained 
growth for extended periods, five character-
istics are key (figure O.3): effective leadership 
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and governance; macroeconomic stability so 
markets work; a market orientation to guide 
structural change; an outward orientation 
to achieve scale and impose discipline; and a 
future orientation to boost savings and meet 
investment needs (Commission on Growth 
and Development 2008). Sustained growth 
can bite deep into poverty and contribute 
to shared prosperity, but for that to happen 
it must create jobs (Gill and Revenga forth-
coming). Growth is most effective in reach-
ing low-income people when it leads to pro-
ductive employment. Policy makers must be 
mindful of the impacts of job creation and 
income growth on the extreme poor and the 
B40. That will require attention not only to 
the pace of economic growth but also to its 
pattern.
To leverage human resources to their full-
est potential—the second priority—focused 
investment is needed in human development. 
The capacity of households to promote their 
well-being depends on the assets they control, 
the returns on these assets, and how inten-
sively the assets can be used. Human capital 
assets have both intrinsic value (contributing 
to a person’s well-being) and instrumental 
value (raising a person’s capability to earn 
income). The unequal distribution of assets 
may prevent poorer households from bor-
rowing to accumulate human capital, thus 
perpetuating poverty and inequality. Poli-
cies that reduce inequalities of opportunity 
are crucial for enabling poorer households to 
invest in their human potential. As techno-
logical change increasingly affects the struc-
ture of economies, worker skills must evolve. 
Robust insurance mechanisms—the third 
priority—are needed to protect the extremely 
poor from destitution and the vulnerable 
against evolving risks, including climate 
change. These mechanisms can help families 
avoid irreversible losses and prevent them 
from having to make decisions with costly 
long-run implications. Noncontributory 
social assistance programs for the chronic or 
extremely poor protect them from destitution 
and promote investments in their children’s 
human capital. Social insurance programs 
prevent people from falling back into pov-
erty, whether from individual illness, tempo-
rary unemployment, or localized droughts. 
Generally, the poor in developing countries 
are disproportionally affected by shocks. 
One reason is that the poor have lower access 
to resources and savings to absorb the impact 
of shocks, whether they come from climate 
change or political, economic, or finan-
cial instability. Climate change may have a 
greater impact on the poor relative to other 
types of shocks because the poor tend to 
be more dependent on agriculture and have 
more perilous access to water. Insurance 
mechanisms are needed to help countries 
cope with systemic shocks. 
evolving circumstances demand a new 
approach—enter the SDGs 
Several “megatrends” are playing a critical 
role in framing what will be feasible through 
2030. These include the unprecedented 
increase in global connectedness, including 
the cross-border movements of trade, ser-
vices, capital, and people; the shift of the 
global economic center of gravity toward the 
East; the pace of technological change and 
adoption; the move toward urbanization; the 
evolution of demographic trends; the general 
failure of countries to secure long-term envi-
ronmental sustainability; and the impact of 
human activity on climate change. Trade, 
finance, communications, and migration are 
all expanding rapidly, bringing the world 
FIGure O.3 Five characteristics have been key among countries 
that sustained rapid growth
Source: GMR team adaptation from Commission on Growth and Development 2008. 
Eective
leadership and governance
Future orientation
to meet investment needs
Outward orientation
to leverage and discipline
Market orientation
to guide structural change
Macroeconomic stability
so markets work
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closer together and increasing economic inte-
gration (figure O.4).
These megatrends may help or hinder 
efforts to reach the development goals. On 
the positive side, the shift in the global eco-
nomic center of gravity to developing coun-
tries creates opportunities. The deepening 
of global trade and investment connections 
could help reverse slipping potential growth 
in some countries, and technological change 
is also proving to be a driver of productivity 
growth. On the other hand, increased con-
nectedness permits the rapid spreading of 
economic crises in one country to the rest of 
the world. Urbanization is associated with 
economic growth, but it can also give rise 
to urban slums and environmental damage. 
Lower fertility rates reflect improved health 
and labor market opportunities for women, 
yet falling shares of the working-age popula-
tion can produce headwinds to growth and 
put the fiscal sustainability of many public 
services at risk. 
Cognizant of these trends, the SDGs rep-
resent a greater level of ambition and a more 
holistic vision of sustainable development. 
By shifting focus to quality, the SDGs seek 
to address the unfinished agenda and scale 
up impact. The SDGs recognize that collec-
tive action is needed to address global chal-
lenges such as the need for more resilient 
international financial systems, the sharing of 
transboundary resources, and, most urgently, 
slowing and coping with climate change. 
Meeting the SDG investment needs requires 
a shift from “billions” in official develop-
ment assistance to “trillions” in investments 
to unlock, leverage, and catalyze domestic 
public resources and private capital flows. 
The SDGs need to be pursued in a changing 
world, with new opportunities and challenges 
brought by evolving global megatrends that 
shape development prospects. A central chal-
lenge in this respect is demographic change.
The SDGs recognize the interconnections 
between development objectives. There are 
important interactions between development 
goals, and they cannot be effectively pursued 
separately from each other. For example, 
progress on health goals depends on invest-
ments in infrastructure that provides access 
to safe water and improved sanitation. Simi-
larly, limiting carbon monoxide (CO2) emis-
sions to slow global warming requires the 
modernization of energy supplies. Hence, 
the SDGs explicitly articulate goals that are 
FIGure O.4 Communication and trade are increasing global economic integration
Source: Kose and Ozturk 2014.
Note: Trade integration reflects ratio of total imports and exports to 
global GDP. Financial integration is the ratio of total fi nancial in-flows and 
out-flows (including bank loans, direct investment, bonds, and equities) 
to global GDP.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Internet
Mobile phone 
a. Global trade and nance are now more integrated b. Internet and mobile phone use is skyrocketing
19
65
–7
4
19
75
–8
4
19
85
–9
4
19
95
–2
00
4
20
05
–1
4
Sh
ar
e 
of
 u
se
rs
 in
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(%
)
0
20
40
60
80
120
Sh
ar
e 
of
 G
D
P 
(%
)
Trade integration Financial integration
100
12  o v e r v i e w   G L o B A L  M o N i T o r i N G  r e P o r T  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
“integrated and indivisible and balance the 
three dimensions of sustainable development: 
the economic, social, and environmental.” 
(UN 2015f, 3.) The breadth of the SDGs has 
raised questions about whether the scale of 
the agenda will dilute focus, especially when 
some development exigencies are likely to 
be more pressing than others at the country 
level. Still, the SDGs are not simply a menu 
of development objectives, and policy mak-
ers and other stakeholders are called upon to 
pursue the goals as an integrated whole.
The World Bank Group (WBG) supports 
the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. 
In 2013, the WBG established clear goals to 
guide its own work: to end extreme poverty 
globally by 2030, promote shared prosperity 
in every country, and to do so in ways that 
sustainably secure the future of the planet 
and its resources, promote social inclusion, 
and limit the economic burdens that future 
generations inherit. These goals, conceptu-
ally and in practice, are fully aligned with the 
SDGs: end poverty, promote prosperity, and 
improve people’s well-being while protecting 
the environment. The WBG is committed to 
partnering closely with its client governments 
and its development partners to further the 
2030 agenda. Building on and learning from 
the experience of the MDGs, the WBG will 
help to secure financing; help to deliver devel-
opment solutions at the country, regional, 
and global levels; and work with partners to 
help convene, connect, and coordinate. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
actively participated in the debate on the 
new global development agenda and it is 
strongly committed, within the scope of its 
mandate, to support the SDGs. The IMF will 
help member countries achieve the SDGs by 
providing advice on strengthening macro-
economic policies, technical assistance on 
building capacity, and resources to boost eco-
nomic resilience against adverse shocks. New 
IMF initiatives in support of member coun-
tries’ development efforts include enhanc-
ing support for countries building domestic 
capacity in tax policy and administration; 
expanding assistance, through a package of 
tools, for countries seeking to address large 
infrastructure gaps without imperiling public 
debt sustainability; increasing access to IMF 
concessional resources to provide countries 
with a wider safety net should they encounter 
balance of payments pressures; and strength-
ening the effectiveness of the Fund’s engage-
ment with countries in post-conflict and 
fragile situations. The IMF is also deepening 
its focus on aspects of economic, social, and 
gender inclusion and environmental protec-
tion, which are core SDG objectives.
Part II: Development in an  
era of demographic change
Global demography is at a turning point
The world population is growing more slowly 
and aging at unprecedented speed. While the 
global population has tripled since the post-
war “baby boom” era (figure O.5a), popula-
tion growth is now slowing markedly (figure 
O.5b). After increasing for five decades, the 
proportion of people ages 15 to 64—the typi-
cal working-age population—reached a peak 
in 2012 and is now starting to fall (figure 
O.5c). The rise in the share of dependents is 
driven mainly by an increase in the share of 
elderly (figure O.5d). These global trends—
slower population growth and population 
aging—have been shaped by a steady decline 
in fertility rates and a rapid improvement in 
life expectancy. In the 1950s total fertility 
rates were more than 5 births per woman, 
but since then they have steadily declined to 
2.45 births per woman in 2015. A further 
decline is projected through 2050. In paral-
lel, average life expectancy at birth has risen 
from 47 years in 1950 to 72 years in 2015, 
while infant mortality has declined. The 
coming decades are expected to see further 
improvements in life expectancy, although at 
a slower pace than in the past. 
Global population dynamics are driven 
mainly by the demographic transition in 
developing countries. Falling mortality rates 
and still-high fertility led to a “child bulge” 
in developing countries in the 1960s and 
1970s, while population growth slowed in 
high-income countries. In most developing 
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FIGure O.5 Global demography is at a turning point: Slower growth, unprecedented aging
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Gl
ob
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(b
ill
io
ns
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
b. An unprecedented period of global
population growth has ended
An
nu
al
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
a. The global population has tripled since the 1950s
and is expected to reach over 9 billion by 2050
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
c. The working-age share of the global population 
is estimated to have peaked in 2012
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n,
 a
ge
s 1
5–
64
 (%
)
d. The aged share of the global population
is rising, while the child share is falling
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Children ages 0–14 Adults ages 65+ 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(%
)
e. Total fertility rates have declined, though less so 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
f. Half of global population growth between 2015 and
2050 will be in Sub-Saharan Africa
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
um
be
r o
f b
irt
hs
 p
er
 w
om
an
1950 20502015
High-
income
countries
East Asia
and
Pacic
Europe
and
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean
Middle
East and
North
Africa
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
South
Asia
60
50
40
30
20
10
0Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
gr
ow
th
 (%
)
1950–2015 2015–50
High-
income
countries 
East Asia 
and 
Pacic 
Europe
and 
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean 
Middle
East and
North 
Africa
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
South
Asia
14  o v e r v i e w   G L o B A L  M o N i T o r i N G  r e P o r T  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
countries (outside lower-fertility Europe and 
Central Asia), population growth picked 
up and age structures shifted, with the 
share of children rising. Population growth 
later slowed as fertility fell (figure O.5e). 
The working-age share rose and popula-
tions started to age rapidly, partly thanks 
to improved life expectancy, especially in 
East Asia and Pacific. By then, fertility rates 
had fallen dramatically in many develop-
ing regions, in some cases to levels below 
replacement fertility. Slower global popu-
lation growth ensued, with populations in 
several countries now expected to contract. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the exception among 
developing regions, with still high fertility 
and mortality rates, low life expectancies, 
and HIV/AIDS slowing progress. 
Demographic change has a profound 
impact on the share of the global population 
that lives in developing countries. In 1950, 32 
percent of the global population lived in high-
income countries. Developing East Asia and 
Pacific—the region with some of the most 
rapid fertility declines and life expectancy 
improvements in recent years—accounted for 
29 percent of the population, while Sub-Saha-
ran Africa—the region with the most modest 
improvements—accounted for only 7 percent. 
By 2015, this distribution had shifted substan-
tially: high-income countries accounted for 
just 17 percent of the global population and 
Sub-Saharan Africa for 14 percent; the share 
of developing East Asia and Pacific remained 
about the same. Looking further ahead, Sub-
Saharan Africa is expected to account for 
almost a quarter of the global population and 
half of the world’s population growth during 
2015−50 (figure O.5f).
Demographic change may alter the 
trajectory of global development
As fertility rates decline, countries are pre-
sented with the opportunity for two types 
of “demographic dividend” (Lee and Mason 
2006). Child dependency ratios fall both 
within households and within a popula-
tion, while the share of the working-age 
population rises and remains high for a few 
generations. A first demographic dividend 
is possible as the growing labor force sup-
ports fewer children. As changes in the age 
structure expand production and resources, 
a second demographic dividend may arise as 
savings build up and greater investment is 
possible in human and physical capital. The 
bonus provided by the first dividend is tran-
sitory, while the second dividend produces 
lasting benefits in the form of greater pro-
ductivity growth and enhanced sustainable 
development. Yet, these outcomes are not 
automatic—they depend on effective policies. 
The two demographic dividends thus repre-
sent an opportunity—and not a guarantee—
of greater prosperity and improved living 
standards.
A new typology is presented that distin-
guishes between countries in their ability to 
capture and harness demographic dividends. 
Underneath the global and regional averages 
lies considerable diversity in the direction 
and pace of demographic change across and 
even within countries. As a result, a coun-
try’s demographic characteristics and trends 
may in principle have more in common with 
countries in another continent than with its 
regional neighbor. Despite the diversity, there 
is considerable commonality across countries 
in their ability to capture the first and second 
demographic dividends. These common fac-
tors are captured in a new global typology 
that ties demographic change to development 
potential and is based on the latest revision 
of the United Nations (UN) population sta-
tistics of July 2015. 
Based on this typology, the world can be 
divided into four types of countries (figure 
O.6 and map O.2).
•  Pre-dividend countries are mostly low-
income countries, lagging in key human 
development indicators and with current 
fertility levels above four births per woman. 
They face very rapid population growth. 
Their high dependency ratios, however, are 
expected to decline as more and more chil-
dren reach working age. These countries 
need to lay the foundations for realizing 
the first demographic dividend. 
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Map O.2 The world through the lens of demography
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
FIGure O.6 Most of the global population lives 
in early- and late-dividend countries
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Note: Classifications are based on World Bank Group classifications.
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•  Early-dividend countries are mostly 
lower-middle-income countries further 
along the fertility transition. Fertility rates 
have fallen below four births per woman 
and the working-age share of the popula-
tion is likely rising considerably. These 
countries need to focus on capturing the 
first demographic dividend and laying the 
foundations for realizing the second demo-
graphic dividend.
•  Late-dividend countries are mostly upper-
middle-income countries where fertility 
rates are typically above replacement levels 
of 2.1 births per woman, but fertility con-
tinues to decline. Even though they have 
shrinking working-age shares, their overall 
age structures are still favorable for the first 
demographic dividend. However, they are 
experiencing very rapid aging, so reaping 
the second demographic dividend is crucial. 
•  Post-dividend countries are mostly high-
income countries where fertility has 
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transitioned below replacement levels. 
These countries continue to see shrinking 
working-age shares and have some of the 
highest shares of elderly in the world. While 
they are past the point of additional ben-
efits from the first demographic dividend, 
they can still reap the second dividend from 
rising savings and investments. 
The development characteristics among 
these demographic types vary consider-
ably, particularly among the pre- and early- 
dividend countries. Development successes 
are found mostly in countries with falling 
population growth, rising life expectancy, 
and declining infant mortality and fertility 
rates (figure O.7). Unfortunately, fewer than 
one-fifth of pre-dividend countries and only a 
quarter of early-dividend countries were able 
to reduce under-five child mortality rates by 
three-fourths in 1990–2011. Urbanization, 
which can play a role in reducing poverty, 
has been slow in pre-dividend countries and 
has not necessarily provided improved access 
to services. In these countries, less than one-
fourth of the population lives in urban areas, 
more than two-thirds of which live in slums. 
In contrast, early-dividend countries urban-
ized rapidly, almost doubling the urban share 
to half over the period, with roughly one-third 
living in urban slums. Education is another 
factor. Whereas lower secondary education 
completion rates are 72 percent for early- 
dividend countries, they are just half of that 
in pre-dividend countries. This disparity 
poses a challenge in the face of continued 
rapid population growth.
Pre- and early-dividend countries cur-
rently account for about 90 percent of global 
poverty (figure O.8). In pre-dividend coun-
tries, almost half the population lives below 
the poverty line. Although early-dividend 
countries have a much lower poverty rate, 
they still account for half of the global poor, 
largely because this group includes Bangla-
desh and India. Many pre-dividend countries 
have managed to reduce poverty headcount 
rates, but rapid population growth has lim-
ited the reduction in the number of the poor. 
While poverty is dominated by pre- and 
early-dividend countries, it should not be 
ignored in late-dividend countries like China, 
which accounts for a tenth of global poverty.
Late-dividend countries are experiencing 
demographic change at a much faster pace 
FIGure O.7 Countries are at different stages in 
the demographic transition 
Source: World Bank calculations based on data from UN 2015.
Note: The total fertility rate is the average number of births a woman in a 
given country has, assuming she lives to the end of her reproductive life.
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FIGure O.8 Pre-dividend and early-dividend 
countries account for most of global poverty
Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Data are for 2012 and are based on a poverty line of $1.90 a day 
and 2011 purchasing power prices. The average poverty headcount 
rate is the unweighted average across countries in a given group.
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than many post-dividend countries, poten-
tially resulting in headwinds to economic 
growth. In the 1950s, late-dividend countries 
had double the fertility rates of post-dividend 
countries, and life expectancies were shorter 
by nine years. Since then, late-dividend 
countries have made substantial improve-
ments in these metrics, with extremely rapid 
improvements in life expectancy. As a result, 
late-dividend countries will have the same 
age structure as post-dividend countries by 
2050. These trends are likely to present chal-
lenges to growth. The ongoing demographic 
changes are likely to further dampen the 
growth engine in these economies, particu-
larly in the absence of policy adjustments. 
Post-dividend countries’ contributions 
to global growth have also been slowing, 
with potential spillovers for other countries. 
These countries accounted for 42 percent 
of global GDP growth between 2000 and 
2014, and 60 percent of global economic 
activity in 2014 (figure O.9). Post-dividend 
economies are also the major export destina-
tions for early- and pre-dividend countries 
and account for two-thirds of global import 
demand. If growth in post-dividend coun-
tries slows, early- and pre-dividend countries 
will need to find alternative export markets. 
Also, as post-dividend economies age, their 
national savings rate is expected to fall, lead-
ing to a possible slowdown in capital flows to 
the rest of the world.
effective policies can leverage 
demographic change within countries
 Demographic dynamics can support develop-
ment if governments implement demography-
informed policies (table O.2). Countries mov-
ing from high to low fertility can benefit from 
a growing working-age population share. 
These countries have the potential to realize 
the first and second demographic dividends, 
which are beneficial to poverty reduction and 
shared prosperity as well as to overall growth 
and development. Half of the world’s popula-
tion—and most of the world’s poor—live in 
countries where the working-age population 
share is rising. Whether a rising working-age 
share is beneficial depends on the extent to 
which governments ensure that policies and 
institutions take advantage of these trends. 
The other half of the world’s population lives 
in countries where populations are aging and 
working-age shares are dwindling. In these 
countries, policies will need to be adapted 
to demographic change. Demographically 
informed policies can cover a wide range of 
areas, including human, private sector, and 
financial development, as well as improved 
governance. To be sure, demographic change 
is neither universally good nor bad, and 
presents opportunities as well as challenges 
everywhere. Policies can make a critical dif-
ference in tilting the impact of demographic 
change in favor of the development goals.
Navigating these dynamics requires sound 
policies that are tailored to a country’s demo-
graphic context. In pre-dividend countries, 
policies need to spark demographic transi-
tion by addressing human development chal-
lenges and speeding up the decline in fertility 
needed to raise the working-age population 
share and boost economic growth. In early-
dividend countries, the priority is to acceler-
ate job creation by investing in human capi-
tal and ensuring an enabling environment 
for private sector development to help realize 
FIGure O.9 Aging countries accounted for most of global growth 
during 2000−14
Sources: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015 and World Bank’s World  
Development Indicators.
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the first demographic dividend and lay the 
groundwork for the second dividend. In late-
dividend countries, where fertility rates are 
low and the working-age population share is 
high (but shrinking), the key challenge is to 
sustain productivity growth by mobilizing 
savings for productive investment, while also 
preparing for aging. Finally, in post-dividend 
countries the overriding policy priority is to 
adapt to aging through efforts to maintain 
welfare and accommodate changing demands 
for services while at the same time encourag-
ing a rise in fertility rates toward the replace-
ment level. 
Policy action focused on human develop-
ment may help pre-dividend countries prog-
ress to the next stage in the demographic 
transition. These policies include improv-
ing maternal and child health; expanding 
education, particularly for girls; and empow-
ering women in the household, in the labor 
force, and in the economy more generally 
(Bloom and others 2009; Soares and Falcão 
2008; World Bank 2015a). Given their poten-
tial to reduce total fertility rates and reduce 
child mortality, these three policy areas can 
be considered “interactive accelerators” that 
spark demographic transition, in addition to 
being important development goals in their 
own right. Concluding the unfinished MDG 
agenda related to these policies should be con-
sidered one of the priorities for pre-dividend 
countries.
To maximize demographic dividends, 
early-dividend countries need to focus on 
interventions that help absorb new workers 
into productive jobs. The first demographic 
dividend arises only to the extent an economy 
TAble O.2 Policy priorities that leverage demographic change at the country level
  Country type Policy priorities Recommendations
Pre-dividend Sparking demographic transition 
Improving human development outcomes to 
reduce fertility rates
Improve maternal and child health by strengthening provision of basic 
health care services. 
Expand education without letting girls fall behind. 
Empower women and give them access to comprehensive family 
planning services.
Early-dividend Accelerating job creation
Creating productive jobs for the growing share 
of the population in working age to reap the first 
demographic dividend 
Invest in human capital, including vocational and technical training.
Enhance labor market mobility.
Reduce barriers to female labor force participation.
Strengthen conditions conducive to savings and job creation (public 
services underpinning private sector activity, contract enforcement; 
financial inclusion; protection of labor rights).
Late-dividend Sustaining productivity growth 
Creating conditions necessary to reap the 
second demographic dividend and beginning 
to prepare for aging
Continue mobilization of savings for productive investment.
Ensure that public policies encourage labor force participation of  
both sexes.
Design cost-effective and sustainable systems for welfare and human 
development that address current needs (including health, child 
care, education, and support to the vulnerable elderly) and that can 
be adapted to meet the needs that emerge as aging proceeds.
 Post-dividend Adapting to aging 
Maintaining and improving welfare in the 
context of a declining working-age share and a 
growing old-age share
Complete reforms of welfare systems—including pensions, health care, 
and long-term care—that ensure fiscal sustainability and, as part 
of integrated approaches, protection of the vulnerable, elderly and 
others, and encouragement of work among those who are able.
Raise labor force participation and productivity (including incentives 
for participation targeted at women and older cohort; and lifelong 
learning for all).
Pursue policies that encourage higher birth rates by making it easier 
for men and women to combine child rearing and participation in 
the labor market.
Source: GMR team elaboration.
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is able to create productive jobs for the grow-
ing working-age population. In addition, 
early-dividend countries need to lay the 
foundation for the second demographic divi-
dend. There is a need to accelerate job cre-
ation, by ensuring that both the supply side 
(particularly human capital development) 
and the demand side (job-intensive eco-
nomic growth) of job creation are sufficient 
to absorb the labor force across income lev-
els (Fox and Sohnesen 2012; Lee and Mason 
2006; Troiano 2015; World Bank 2013b). 
These policies would also include the removal 
of barriers to female labor force participa-
tion, given persistent gender gaps in the labor 
market.
Late-dividend countries face the challenge 
of sustaining the first demographic dividend 
into the more durable second demographic 
dividend. How much of the second dividend 
these countries can realize will depend on the 
accumulation of physical and human capital. 
Capital accumulation is, in turn, affected by 
policies. For example, late-dividend countries 
need to implement sound financial sector pol-
icies to help mobilize private savings in sup-
port of investments. Given projected declines 
in the share of the population that is of work-
ing age, a more capital-intensive development 
path is often needed to support growth. Poli-
cies that encourage the geographic expansion 
of the financial sector and broaden access to 
banks and other intermediating institutions 
may help channel savings to investments in 
small and medium enterprises, as well as 
underserved regions. 
In post-dividend countries, the challenge 
is to maintain and improve living standards 
in the face of shrinking labor supply and ris-
ing proportions of the elderly. The decline in 
the working-age population share could be 
partly offset by family-friendly measures that 
facilitate a rebound in fertility rates to near 
replacement levels. Raising the labor force 
participation and employment prospects of 
older people will become increasingly press-
ing as population aging progresses. A more 
inclusive labor market requires adequate 
incentives to sustain human capital invest-
ment through the life cycle, more flexible 
work arrangements, lifelong learning pro-
grams, and improved incentives in the social 
protection systems to continue working in 
old age (Bussolo, Koettl, and Sinnott 2015). 
In addition, adjustments to fiscal and 
social protection systems will generally be 
necessary to address the challenges posed by 
demographic changes in aging countries (par-
ticularly those in the late- and post-dividend 
stages). Given the growing need for spending 
on the aged, tax increases may not be a viable 
option, in view of likely price distortions and 
disincentives. Governments should strive to 
enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
of overall and aging-related spending. Pen-
sion reforms need to ensure a minimum level 
of protection for the vulnerable elderly. Low-
ering coverage and adequacy of pension sys-
tems may raise vulnerability among current 
and future elderly generations, whose private 
savings are limited. Pension systems, health 
care, and long-term care will have to be put 
on fiscally sustainable paths without neglect-
ing the social safety nets that all those ser-
vices represent (Bussolo, Koettl, and Sinnott 
2015; World Bank 2015b). In particular, pop-
ulation aging will naturally bring about an 
increase in pension and health expenditure.
Opportunities exist to arbitrage 
demographic diversity across countries
In pursuing their domestic agendas, countries 
can also arbitrage and in the process lever-
age demographic change at the global level 
through cross-border capital flows, interna-
tional migration, and global trade. Differences 
in the demographic dynamics at the coun-
try level are producing important spillovers 
across countries, contributing to changes in 
comparative advantages underpinning trade, 
and in the returns earned by labor and capi-
tal. These changes require the implementation 
of policies to support enhanced trade in goods 
and services as well as greater factor mobility. 
This would encourage labor-intensive produc-
tion to shift from aging countries to younger 
societies or migration from countries with 
growing working-age populations to coun-
tries where the number of workers is falling, 
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thereby delivering non-tradable services such 
as elderly care (table O.3). International 
cooperation—in addition to domestic mea-
sures—is needed on trade facilitation, legal 
TAble O.3 Policy priorities that leverage the differences in demographic change across countries
  Area of focus Policy priorities Recommendations
International  
trade
Promoting foreign provision of education services 
to boost educational opportunities in countries 
with a high share of youths, or to facilitate 
lifelong learning for aging countries
Using foreign providers to meet demand for health 
services in aging countries
Supporting comparative advantage in producing 
labor-intensive products in labor-abundant 
countries
Ease visa requirements for the free flow of international students 
and academics; address qualification recognition issues; reduce 
limits on foreign ownership; and increase transparency of 
government education regulations
Address restrictions affecting the physical presence of foreign 
suppliers, foreign equity ceilings, or barriers on the movement of 
health care professionals across borders
Streamline customs, border and transit procedures; improve 
logistics and transport services and extend physical 
infrastructure; tackle remaining tariff and nontariff barriers on 
goods trade
Migration Promoting legal migration flows to counteract the 
decline in working-age populations in aging 
countries and to mitigate labor market pressures 
in labor-abundant countries
Reducing the burden of brain drain in sending 
countries
Formulate clear migration policies; enforce minimum wage laws; 
provide adequate information to migrants about their rights 
and obligations; facilitate their contribution to and benefits from 
social protection schemes and public services; sanction potential 
abuses by firms.
Develop comprehensive and targeted policies to retain, attract 
talent; encourage return migration.
International  
finance 
Attracting international capital flows to young, 
labor-abundant countries 
Addressing challenges posed by large and volatile 
capital flows to developing countries
Supporting opportunities for capital-abundant 
countries to increase returns and diversify 
investment portfolios
Create favorable investment climate; strengthen macroeconomic 
stability, the financial sector, and governance. 
Undertake measures to relax investment barriers at the domestic, 
regional, and global level.
Introduce macroeconomic policies to address risks from volatile 
capital inflows, supervision, regulation, strong institutions.
Provide investment guarantees or technical assistance.
FIGure O.10 early-dividend countries are more 
specialized in labor-intensive exports
Source: World Bank calculations.
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migration, and capital flows to ensure smooth 
adjustment to demographic change.
In coming decades, global trade flows are 
projected to continue shifting toward coun-
tries earlier in their demographic transition, 
possibly yielding substantial benefits for 
poorer countries. Differences in demographic 
change may lead to comparative advantages 
that influence trade patterns. Countries with 
slower population growth tend to become 
more capital-abundant over time, while coun-
tries with faster population growth become 
more labor-abundant (figure O.10). Trade 
can reduce poverty through faster growth, 
more economic diversification, and greater 
macroeconomic stability. It can also facilitate 
the technology transfers through knowledge 
embodied in goods and services production, 
boosting productivity and growth. Knowl-
edge transfers from trade in health and edu-
cation products and services, for instance, 
have contributed significantly to develop-
ment, while medical imports are associated 
with lower mortality rates. 
Source: GMR team elaboration.
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Trade policy measures can be powerful 
tools in enabling countries to adapt to the 
opportunities and challenges in demographic 
change. Agricultural trade is still distorted by 
high tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic 
support. Although average tariffs on manu-
factured goods have been declining over the 
years, substantial tariff and nontariff barri-
ers still affect the free flow of goods between 
countries (UNCTAD 2013; WTO 2012). 
Reductions in those barriers, coupled with 
improving trade facilitation, could encour-
age firms to relocate production to relatively 
more labor-abundant countries and allow 
developing countries to take full advantage of 
their growing labor forces. In pre- and early-
dividend countries, additional trade facilita-
tion measures may add to their comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive products and 
help create jobs. Trade can also help meet the 
demand for health services in aging countries 
and the demand for education services in 
young countries. Both health care and edu-
cation are traded only lightly across borders 
due to high barriers, so liberalizing trade in 
those areas could potentially yield substantial 
benefits. 
Migration can help countries’ adjust-
ment to uneven demographic change. Given 
the generally high level of restrictions on 
the movement of people across borders, the 
potential gains from expanding legal and safe 
migration are large (Borgy and others 2010; 
Tyers and Shi 2007; Walmsley, Winters, and 
Ahmed 2011; World Bank 2006). Demo-
graphic disparities can amplify those gains. 
While South–South migration flows have 
grown rapidly, substantial migration also 
takes place from younger developing countries 
to aging high-income countries (figure O.11). 
International migration flows can mitigate 
the decline in working-age population shares 
in aging countries. Younger immigrants can 
help ease the pressures of aging populations 
in late- and post-dividend countries, improve 
the growth prospects, and ensure the sustain-
ability of public finances in destination coun-
tries. But the impact of migration on both ori-
gin and destination countries depends on the 
skills of migrants, and socio-political chal-
lenges must be managed. 
A wide range of policies could potentially 
foster legal migration, with benefits to both 
sending and receiving countries. In the past 
10 years, many countries revised their migra-
tion laws in response to changes in demog-
raphy, labor market conditions, and political 
contexts (OECD 2013). Pre-departure orien-
tation and training, protecting the rights and 
preventing the abuse of migrants, lowering 
remittance costs, and removing regulatory 
and bureaucratic barriers to return migration 
are all actions that can enhance the net devel-
opment benefits. Migration not only benefits 
sending countries through remittances but 
also presents challenges (such as brain drains 
or “Dutch disease” effects), but these can be 
actively managed. Tackling the underlying 
push and pull factors of migration and tar-
geting interventions to retain, attract, or reat-
tract talent are essential.
Different trajectories of demographic 
change have important implications for 
capital flows. Countries early in their demo-
graphic transition need to boost invest-
ment, and those later in their transition must 
seek higher returns than may be available 
domestically. So demography can augment 
FIGure O.11 Post-dividend countries tend to 
receive the most migrants
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2013.
M
ig
ra
nt
 st
oc
k 
by
 d
es
tin
at
io
n,
 2
01
3 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
To pre-
dividend
countries 
To early-
dividend
countries
To late-
dividend
countries 
To post-
dividend
countries 
From pre-dividend countries 
From early-dividend countries 
From late-dividend countries 
From post-dividend countries 
22  o v e r v i e w   G L o B A L  M o N i T o r i N G  r e P o r T  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
the impetus for international capital flows. 
Facilitation of such flows would allow young, 
labor-abundant countries to attract much-
needed capital. In the initial stages of the 
demographic transition, investment demand 
exceeds savings, stimulating current account 
deficits. The opposite tends to be true for 
countries in later stages of demographic 
transition. Capital flows could generate an 
increase in labor productivity and wages, 
contributing to faster growth in young, labor-
abundant countries. For sending countries, 
increasing investment in young economies can 
provide opportunities to raise capital returns 
and diversify investment portfolios, especially 
if labor-abundant countries create favorable 
investment climates, ensure macroeconomic 
stability, deepen their financial sectors, and 
strengthen governance (World Bank 2013a). 
Improving institutional quality and devel-
oping the financial sector will attract capital 
flows to pre- and early-dividend countries. 
Countries early in their demographic transi-
tion can promote foreign direct investment 
by reducing the economic, political, and 
legal risks facing investors. Host countries 
can relax investment barriers, such as caps 
on foreign ownership and requirements for 
joint ventures. Home countries can facili-
tate outflows through investment guarantees 
and technical assistance. At the global level, 
reforms are needed to allow countries to take 
full advantage of international investment 
agreements, including by reforming invest-
ment dispute settlements. Macroeconomic 
policies need to address risks from volatile 
capital inflows in tandem with sound finan-
cial supervision and regulation. Minimum 
levels of financial and institutional develop-
ment are needed to reduce the riskiness of 
financial liberalization (Sahay and others 
2015). International regulatory coordination 
can bring bilateral and multilateral benefits, 
including by strengthening and institution-
alizing swap lines that provide liquidity for 
non-key currencies.
*  *  *
Strategies to sustainably end poverty 
and build shared prosperity need to keep 
demography in mind as countries pursue 
broad-based growth, invest in human devel-
opment, and insure against evolving risks. 
Each country’s demographic context mat-
ters greatly in setting priorities in these three 
areas, defining the opportunities and chal-
lenges for ending poverty and sharing pros-
perity. The centers of global poverty need 
to spark the transition to lower fertility and 
accelerate development by taking advantage 
of demographic shifts and absorbing youth 
bulges in the labor market. The engines of 
global growth need to address headwinds 
to growth and adapt institutions and poli-
cies to aging populations. Because the cen-
ters of global poverty continue to face sig-
nificant poverty reduction challenges and the 
engines of global growth are weakening, all 
countries must grasp the opportunities stem-
ming from cross-border capital flows, inter-
national migration, and global trade. With 
such strategies in place, the world stands a 
better chance of successfully ending extreme 
poverty by 2030 and lifting the well-being of 
lower-income people throughout the world. 
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Part I
Monitoring Global 
Development Progress
Development progress over the past 15 years has been impressive. Most developing countries 
grew at a sustained strong pace during the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) monitoring 
period, notwithstanding the negative impact from the 2009 global financial crisis. Together with 
strong per capita growth, income differences between countries were reduced, and about 1 bil-
lion people exited extreme poverty. The latest available data suggest that extreme poverty con-
tinued its descent and a majority of countries saw solid income growth for the bottom 40 percent 
of the income distribution. Progress was also observed in other dimensions. Millions of children 
who were unlikely to survive to their fifth birthday have passed beyond these critical years and 
gone on to school in ever greater proportions. The incidence of preventable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis is falling, and the share of people with access to clean water 
and  better sanitation has risen markedly. A few countries have succeeded in growing while 
simultaneously reducing the level of environmental externalities and carbon emissions—a virtu-
ous state of green growth.
Despite such development gains, significant work remains. MDG outcomes have been marked 
by significant heterogeneity in dimensions, across regions, and between urban and rural areas, 
resulting in unevenness in poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Extreme poverty remains 
unacceptably high and geographically concentrated in areas where both the depth and breadth 
of poverty are grave. Many countries—especially high-income ones—saw bottom 40 incomes 
decline in recent years, likely due to the recent crisis, while the bottom 40 persistently lag in their 
access to quality social services, such as education and health, due to inequality of opportunity. 
Sustainability concerns have risen, endangering recent progress. For example, in most coun-
tries, land degradation, overfishing, deforestation, and extreme weather events are increasingly 
impacting rural livelihoods and spurring migration, while urban air pollution has emerged as a 
leading cause of ill health in developing countries. 
At the same time, new opportunities and challenges are emerging in connection with chang-
ing prospects for growth and evolving global megatrends. For many countries, the near-to-
medium-term outlook suggests weakened economic dynamism. Moreover, global demographic 
trends—explored in part II—could weigh down on longer-term growth prospects. In rural areas 
where resource dependence is high and opportunities for economic diversification are limited, 
burgeoning cities offer both opportunities and create accelerating economic, social, and envi-
ronmental challenges. Further globalization can bring new opportunities to connect with global 
centers of dynamism, as can the ever-quickening pace of technological innovation and adoption. 
But a more connected world also means that crises can transmit more easily to poorer coun-
tries, while fragility and insecurity can be passed to richer countries. Climate change is bringing 
warmer and more extreme weather, requiring urgent mitigation and adaptation efforts. A rising 
frequency of humanitarian crises stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, war, conflict, and 
rising extremism may reverse development gains. 
Building on the MDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will scale up impact to 
address the unfinished development agenda in a changing world. The SDGs represent a greater 
level of ambition and a more holistic vision of sustainable development in a number of ways. 
They incorporate a greater focus on quality rather than quantity and more explicitly recognize the 
inter-connectedness of development challenges and hence the need for integrated multi sectoral 
approaches. They emphasize the need to protect the planet and leave no one behind. They are 
meant to be shared by all countries, rich and poor, recognizing the collective action needed to 
address global challenges, such as more resilient international financial systems, shared trans-
boundary resources, and most urgently, the central challenge facing the world today—climate 
change. Meeting the investment needs of the SDGs, the global community will need to move the 
discussion from “billions” in official development assistance to “trillions” in investments of all kinds 
and unlock, leverage, and catalyze both domestic public resources and private capital flows.
Part I of this report explores these themes in the following sequence:
•   Chapter 1 examines the progress made on sustainable poverty reduction and shared prosper-
ity, as well as the policies that are needed to make further progress.
•   Chapter 2 reviews the development successes during the MDG period and examines the 
 unfinished agenda left for the SDGs. 
•   Chapter 3 assesses the macroeconomic performance over the MDG period, provides the near- 
and medium-term outlook, and looks into the future toward 2030. 
Ending Extreme Poverty and 
Sharing Prosperity: 
Progress and Policies
indicators: a reduction in the global head-
count ratio of extreme poverty (the share of 
the population whose income is below the 
international poverty line) to 3 percent by 
2030, and the promotion of income growth 
in the bottom 40 (B40) percent of the income 
distribution in each country.1 
This chapter updates the assessment of 
progress toward these two goals in a sustain-
able manner. The poverty goal is examined 
through three lenses: the evolution of income 
poverty based on the new international pov-
erty line that has been re-estimated at $1.90 
To guide its work toward a “world free of 
poverty,” the World Bank Group in 2013 
established two clear goals: end extreme 
poverty by 2030, and promote shared pros-
perity. Along with the requirement to pur-
sue these goals sustainably—economically, 
environmentally, and socially—the two goals 
are comprehensive in nature. They are fully 
aligned to support the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations 
to replace the Millennium Development 
Goals (see chapter 2). To evaluate progress, 
the two goals are measured by two overall 
The world faces urgent and complex challenges to sustainably end extreme poverty and share 
prosperity. The latest data suggest that extreme poverty is continuing its three-decade-long 
descent. Yet it remains unacceptably high, deep, and concentrated in some regions, with the 
poor experiencing not only income shortfalls but also deprivations in multiple non-income 
dimensions. Many countries have seen solid progress in shared prosperity over the past decade 
as measured by income growth in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This 
progress has been uneven, however, with pronounced disparities in non-income indicators 
between the bottom 40 and the top 60 percent. Only a few countries have succeeded in grow-
ing while simultaneously reducing the level of environmental externalities in their economies, 
and environmental trends in the majority of countries are not sustainable. To sustainably end 
extreme poverty and share prosperity, additional policy efforts will be needed to cope with 
uncertainties about the pace of economic growth and its incidence, as well as contextual fac-
tors such as the difficulties of reaching the remaining poor. Key priorities will be to deliver sus-
tainable broad-based economic growth, invest in the human development potential of people, 
and insure the poor and vulnerable against evolving risks.
 27 
1
28  e n d i n g  e x t r e m e  p o v e r t y  a n d  s h a r i n g  p r o s p e r i t y   g L o B a L  m o n i t o r i n g  r e p o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
a day; an assessment of person-equivalent 
income poverty, a new intuitive indicator 
that combines the incidence with the depth of 
poverty; and a review of the breadth of pov-
erty, recognizing that income shortfalls often 
coexist with multiple non-income depriva-
tions. The shared prosperity goal is exam-
ined on the basis of the latest comparison of 
(comparable) household data on B40 income 
growth. As part of its analysis of the two 
goals, the chapter also comments on the sta-
tus of defining and monitoring sustainability 
in its economic, environmental, and social 
aspects.2 
When measured in all of its dimensions, 
progress in poverty reduction and shared 
prosperity has been significant but uneven. 
The latest data suggest that global poverty 
continued its three-decade descent, but it 
remains unacceptably high and geographi-
cally concentrated. Pockets of very deep and 
multidimensional poverty continue to per-
sist, leading to conflicting views about the 
extent and pace of progress over time and 
across space. As for shared prosperity, solid 
income growth was observed among the B40 
in many countries—at least until recently and 
subject to data caveats—but, again, experi-
ences differed. A large share of countries—
including half of high-income countries and 
a third of low-income countries in the sam-
ple—saw B40 incomes fall. Beyond income, 
the B40 lag persistently behind the national 
top 60 percent (T60) in various non-income 
indicators. 
Contextual factors and uncertainties pose 
a challenge to the economic and social sus-
tainability of recent trends. The structural 
characteristics of the poorest countries make 
it harder to reach the remaining poor. More-
over, average income growth, which has 
been a key driver of shared prosperity, may 
not be as buoyant as it was before the global 
financial crisis, in part owing to demograph-
ics—discussed in part 2 of this Report. In 
addition, factors that underpinned the recent 
rise in B40 income shares may turn out to be 
transitory or unsustainable. Continued high 
levels of inequality in both outcomes and 
opportunity in both income and non-income 
dimensions pose additional sustainability 
risks. 
Less progress has been made in improving 
the long-term environmental sustainability 
of development. Even though some countries 
have successfully “delinked” trends in envi-
ronmental degradation from growth, most 
have not. The annual cost of environmental 
degradation—resulting from externalities 
due to outdoor and indoor air pollution, 
water pollution, deforestation, carbon emis-
sions, and other environmental hazards—has 
gone up 50 percent from 1990 to 2010, in 
constant dollars. Only about 25 percent of 
the countries in the world, primarily high-
income countries, have managed to grow 
economically while simultaneously decreas-
ing their environmental externalities.3 Even 
fewer have managed to delink carbon emis-
sions from growth—a record that challenges 
the world’s ability to contain the impacts of 
future climate change to agreed-upon levels 
of acceptability. Therefore, while experience 
shows that sustainable economic develop-
ment is possible, the goal remains difficult to 
achieve.
This chapter also examines the policy 
actions and institutional interventions needed 
to accelerate progress on reducing poverty 
and sharing prosperity. While the two goals 
hold general relevance in promoting “growth 
with equity,” their immediate focus is on 
populations who are extremely poor and 
those who constitute the B40—two groups 
who may in some countries overlap signifi-
cantly and in others be distinct. Interven-
tions required to spur sustainable progress 
toward both goals interact in multiple ways. 
Although details and emphasis vary across 
countries, three common ingredients are key 
to an integrated strategy: sustaining broad-
based growth, investing in human develop-
ment, and insuring the poor and vulnerable 
against evolving risks. In designing integrated 
strategies, natural capital, environmental 
health, and ecosystem sustainability need to 
be fully incorporated into economic decision 
making.
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Extreme poverty: Updated 
numbers and remaining 
challenges
Ending extreme poverty by 2030 is the first 
of the World Bank Group’s goals. Ending 
extreme poverty is defined as reducing the 
share of the global population living below 
the international poverty line to below 3 per-
cent, with an interim target of 9 percent by 
2020. The goal requires a reduction of almost 
10 percentage points from the 2012 level of 
12.8 percent. Despite significant progress 
toward this goal, the updated global poverty 
statistics show that poverty levels remain 
high and that “business as usual” policies are 
unlikely to be sufficient to reach the goal. 
This section provides a textured under-
standing of extreme poverty, the progress 
that is being made in reducing it, and the 
remaining challenges that lie ahead. First, it 
analyzes the incidence of poverty—the share 
of the poor in the total population—and pro-
vides data based on updated 2011 purchasing 
power parity (PPP) prices and the reestimated 
international poverty line. Second, it offers 
complementary perspectives by analyzing 
the depth and breadth of poverty, taking into 
consideration how far a population is from 
the poverty threshold and in what aspects a 
population is disadvantaged other than in 
ways indicated by income. Third, it assesses 
the challenges in reaching the ambitious pov-
erty target by 2030.
Assessing the incidence of poverty
Global poverty estimates have been updated 
to reflect the re-estimated international pov-
erty line at $1.90 a day, new 2011-based 
PPP prices, and revisions to complementary 
data. Ensuring maximum comparability, the 
new poverty line is based on the 15 national 
poverty lines of the same countries that pre-
viously defined the $1.25 line. Because cur-
rency exchange rates fail to provide for a 
conversion that maintains equivalent costs 
of living across countries, PPP prices pro-
vide a unifying standard. Poverty updates 
also reflect revisions to complementary data, 
including population, inflation, and national 
income accounts. Box 1.1 discusses the 
Box 1.1 Global poverty estimates based on 2011 PPP data: Methods and challenges
World Bank estimates of global extreme poverty rely 
on many different data sources—among them are 
the price data that measure differences in the cost of 
purchasing a bundle of goods across countries. This 
measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) is used to 
ensure that the global poverty line reflects the same 
real standard of living across countries. In 2014 the 
International Comparison Program released PPP data 
from 2011, the first global update since the 2005 
round. New PPP data have implications for both the 
value of the global poverty line and the estimated 
number of people below this line in each country. The 
poverty estimates released in this Report are based on 
the new 2011 PPP data following an approach that 
emphasizes comparability with previous global pov-
erty estimates. 
The first issue faced in using the 2011 PPP data 
is that the global extreme poverty line needs to be 
expressed in 2011 PPP values rather than in 2005 
PPP values. World Bank (2015c) describes the various 
approaches that have been used in the past to estimate 
a value for the global poverty line, and, in all cases, 
the aim has been to estimate a value that reflects how 
the poorest countries in the world define minimum, 
basic needs. The earlier approach that resulted in the 
$1.25 global poverty line was based on taking the 
average value of national poverty lines from 15 of 
the poorest economies in the world (Chad, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, and Uganda). These 15 national 
poverty lines come from a sample of 74 national 
(box continues next page)
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Box 1.1 Global poverty estimates based on 2011 PPP data: Methods and challenges 
(continued)
poverty lines, and the lines were converted into 2005 
PPP dollars. The new $1.90 poverty line is based on 
the same 15 national poverty lines previously used, 
except these lines are now converted from local cur-
rency into U.S. dollars using the new 2011 PPP data. 
The average value of these lines in 2011 rounds to 
$1.90, which is the new extreme poverty line for 
global counts.a
 Although no new PPP data were collected for 
developing countries between 2005 and 2011, many 
global indicators have nonetheless been reported 
annually in PPP terms throughout this period. One 
method for handling the interim years, used by the 
World Development Indicators, is to estimate extrap-
olated PPP conversion factors by the relative rates 
of inflation between the United States and the local 
country. Global poverty estimates do not directly 
use the extrapolated PPP estimates but follow an 
approach that is conceptually equivalent to using 
the extrapolations. Specifically, the current value of 
consumption in local currency is brought back or 
forward to the relevant PPP benchmark year (such as 
2005 or 2011) by the national consumer price index 
(CPI), and then the benchmark year PPP conversion 
factor is applied to obtain the PPP U.S. dollar value 
of consumption. The poor are then identified as those 
whose consumption (or income for some countries) in 
PPP U.S. dollars is less than the global extreme pov-
erty line ($1.90 in 2011 PPP U.S. dollars).
An implication of the extrapolation approach is 
that one can estimate poverty based on either new 
PPP data or the extrapolated old PPP data for any 
given year. For example, when the 2005 PPP data 
were released, Chen and Ravallion (2010) used the 
new 2005 data to reestimate the global poverty line 
and headcount and observed significant changes in 
the poverty line and average value of consumption 
(relative to expectations based on the extrapolated 
PPP adjustment factors from the 1993 PPPs). Because 
of changes in the poverty line and the new PPP data, 
Chen and Ravallion’s analysis indicated that past esti-
mates of global poverty needed to be adjusted upward 
by 500 million persons. With the latest release of the 
global poverty estimates, an explicit rule was imposed 
to reduce the scope for large differences between the 
new poverty estimates based on the 2011 PPP data 
and the expected poverty estimates based on the 
extrapolated 2005 PPP data. This rule was based on 
comparing the rate of change in PPP factors (ΔPPP = 
PPP 2011 / PPP 2005 ) relative to the rate of change in 
domestic consumer price indexes (ΔCPI = CPI 2011 / 
CPI 2005 ) for each country. If these two ratios deviate 
significantly for a particular country, the 2011 PPP 
poverty estimates will likely differ significantly from 
the extrapolated 2005 PPP estimate for 2011. 
Because further investigation is needed for some 
countries, the poverty update for these countries will 
continue to be based on extrapolations of 2005 PPP 
data. When examining all countries that participated 
in both the 2005 and 2011 International Comparison 
Program, the standard deviation of the ratio ΔCPI/
ΔPPP is 0.3 and its simple average is 1.47. This aver-
age indicates that the change in price levels used for 
measuring inflation was typically greater than the 
change in PPP prices, which is also linked to the rel-
atively large increase in the global poverty line. The 
set of countries in PovcalNet for which this ratio is 
more than two standard deviations from the mean 
was examined.b For the purposes of global poverty 
estimation, large deviations in this ratio are inter-
preted as evidence that the price data (both CPI and 
PPP) require further investigation before the estimates 
are updated. Therefore, for these countries (Bangla-
desh, Cabo Verde, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, and the Republic of Yemen), the 2012 global 
poverty estimates are based not on the 2011 PPP data, 
but rather on the $1.25 poverty line and the extrapo-
lated 2005 PPP data. Countries where the ratio is more 
than one standard deviation from the mean were sub-
sequently examined on a case-by-case basis. For two 
of them (Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic), the exploratory analysis indicated that the 
poverty estimates based on 2005 PPPs are more consis-
tent with regional patterns than those suggested by the 
2011 PPPs. Therefore, the 2012 poverty estimates for 
Bangladesh, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Jordan, and Lao 
PDR are based on the extrapolated 2005 PPP data and 
not the new 2011 PPP data. 
A further complicating issue concerns estimating 
poverty for the Middle East and North Africa region. 
In particular, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
the Republic of Yemen are countries in protracted 
(box continues next page)
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methodology and challenges relating to the 
transition from 2005 to 2011 PPPs.
Global poverty continued its decades-long 
descent
The latest headline estimate for 2012 based 
on the new data suggests that close to 
900 million people (12.8 percent of global 
population) lived in extreme poverty (table 
1.1; figures 1.1a, 1.1b). Compared with 
2011—the year when PPPs were updated—
this number represents continued poverty 
reduction, because the headcount estimate for 
2011, using 2011 PPP data, was 987 million 
people (14.2 percent of global population). 
While broadly similar to the old estimate for 
2011 based on 2005 PPP data, this estimate 
is some 24 million people lower. Comparison 
of the 2011 and 2012 data reveals a (mod-
est) decline in the number of poor in Sub-
Saharan Africa, potentially heralding an era 
of continued reduction not just in the share 
of the poor but also in their absolute number. 
The recent decline of global poverty 
occurs against a backdrop of a decades-long 
descent. Comparisons with the data available 
for 1990 and 1999 confirm that the world 
has made rapid strides in poverty reduction 
since 1990 (see table 1.1). The proportion of 
global population living on less than $1.90 
Box 1.1 Global poverty estimates based on 2011 PPP data: Methods and challenges 
(continued)
conflict whose poverty estimates will unlikely reflect 
the true current state of poverty in these countries. 
The measure of well-being in Egypt is expected to be 
substantially revised in the near future in a way that 
will affect the poverty estimate, and it was decided to 
wait until release of the revised measure to report on 
poverty there. Algeria’s latest available household sur-
vey data (1995) are too old to produce reliable poverty 
estimates. Therefore, country-level poverty estimates 
for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and the Republic of 
Yemen are omitted. Consequently, for this region, 
poverty estimates are reported only for Djibouti, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tuni-
sia, and West Bank and Gaza. Given that these six 
account for only a small share of the region’s popula-
tion, and that poorer countries in the region are not 
included, regional poverty estimates for the Middle 
East and North Africa are not reported in table 1.1.c 
While PPPs are used to adjust for price differences 
between countries in the International Comparison 
Program base years, spatial price adjustments are used 
within some countries. Specifically, for China, India, 
and Indonesia, adjustments are made to reflect cost-
of-living differences between rural and urban areas. 
For these three countries, the global poverty line is 
converted to local currency units and then unpacked 
into implicit urban and rural poverty lines that are 
derived to be consistent with the urban-rural differen-
tial in the national poverty lines and the sectoral split 
of the International Comparison Program sample. In 
the case of India, an Expert Group constituted by the 
Government of India (2009) to examine India’s pov-
erty lines retained the prior official poverty line for 
urban areas but recommended a higher rural poverty 
line based on corrections for biases in past price defla-
tors. These new poverty lines imply nearly half the 
cost-of-living difference (22 percent in 2011) between 
urban and rural areas, as compared with the old pov-
erty lines. Estimates for India in this Report have been 
updated to reflect the lower urban-rural gap implicit 
in the new lines. 
a. See Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2009) for details 
on the sample of 74 countries and how the 15 were selected. 
See Jolliffe and Prydz (2015) for more discussion on meth-
odology for updating the global poverty line. Their line dif-
fers somewhat from $1.90 because of recent revisions to CPI 
data, but the methodology is the same.
b. See PovcalNet (iresearch.worldbank.org/povcalnet), 
the World Bank’s online tool for global poverty estimation.
c. Despite being excluded from country-level estima-
tion, these countries are included for the purpose of global 
poverty rate estimation. In this case, poverty estimates are 
calculated using 2005 PPP data and the $1.25 poverty line 
for the Arab Republic of Egypt, Iraq, and the Republic of 
Yemen and using the 2011 PPPs and $1.90 poverty line for 
Algeria and the Syrian Arab Republic.
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a day in 2012 was about a third of what it 
was in 1990.4 This finding confirms that the 
first Millennium Development Goal target—
cutting the extreme poverty rate to half of 
its 1990 level—was met well before its 2015 
target date. From a broader historical per-
spective, the global poverty rate has fallen 
by approximately 1 percentage point a year 
since 1990, with rapid poverty reduction in 
China and India playing a central role in this 
outcome. 
Tentative projections for global poverty 
in 2015 suggest that the global headcount 
may have reached 700 million, leading to a 
poverty rate of 9.6 percent. Compared with 
the headline estimate of 2012, poverty may 
thus have declined by a further 200 million 
people (some 80 million of whom were in 
South Asia, about 65 million in East Asia 
and Pacific, and close to 40 million in Sub- 
Saharan Africa). The projections extrapo-
late poverty estimates based on growth sce-
narios and distributional assumptions. Given 
that the data collection and processing for a 
nationally representative household survey, 
on which poverty estimates are based, usu-
ally take two to three years, the 2012 num-
ber remains the most reliable recent headline 
poverty estimate.
Global poverty remains high and 
concentrated
Poverty levels remain unacceptably high and 
are particularly concentrated in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. For several decades, 
three regions have accounted for some 95 per-
cent of global poverty: East Asia and Pacific, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The lat-
est 2012 estimates confirm this high degree of 
concentration (figure 1.1c, 1.1d). Yet the com-
position of global poverty across these three 
regions has shifted over the years. The share 
of Sub-Saharan Africa in global poverty has 
risen to 43 percent alongside a slower pace of 
poverty reduction in this region amid rapid 
population growth. The poverty rate fell only 
TABlE 1.1 Global poverty is assessed with the re-estimated poverty line 
 Historical Headline Projection
  Region 1990 1999 2011 2012 2015a
Share of population below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)
East Asia and Pacific 60.8 37.5 8.5 7.2 4.1
Europe and Central Asia 1.9 7.8 2.7 2.5 1.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 17.7 14.1 6.5 6.2 5.6
Middle East and North Africab — — — — —
South Asia 50.6 41.2 22.3 18.8 13.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.0 58.1 44.3 42.6 35.2
Developing world 44.3 34.2 16.6 15.0 11.9
World 37.1 29.0 14.2 12.8 9.6
Millions of people below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP)
East Asia and Pacific 999.3 689.7 173.1 147.2 82.6
Europe and Central Asia 9.0 36.6 12.7 12.0 4.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 78.0 72.2 37.7 37.1 29.7
Middle East and North Africab — — — — —
South Asia 574.5 560.1 362.3 309.2 231.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 284.0 375.4 393.5 388.5 347.1
World 1,958.5 1,746.6 987.4 902.0 702.1
Source: PovcalNet 2015.
Note: Poverty estimates based on $1.90 poverty line and 2011 PPP prices. Box 1.1 explains how the global poverty estimates were calculated. 
Regional aggregates for the Middle East and North Africa are omitted because of lack of sufficient observations.
a.  Given the production lags for household surveys, 2012 is the latest year for which the World Bank is able to produce regional and global 
poverty estimates. All numbers for 2015 and beyond are statistical projections based on growth scenarios and distributional assumptions, 
and should be treated with considerable circumspection.
b.  Even though five countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are omitted from the database of country-level poverty estimates, 
poverty estimates for these countries are calculated for the purposes of global poverty estimation (see box 1.1). The 2011 and 2012 poverty 
estimates for this region implied by these global estimates are 2.4 and 2.3 percent, respectively.
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FiGUrE 1.1 Global poverty declined, but Sub-Saharan Africa lagged
Source: PovcalNet 2015. 
Note: Estimates based on the $1.90 poverty line and 2011 PPP prices. Panel f lists poverty rate as of the latest survey year, in parentheses: Bangladesh (2010); China (2012); Congo, 
Dem. Rep. (2012.4); Ethiopia (2010.5); India (2011/12); Indonesia (2012); Madagascar (2010); Mozambique (2008/09); Nigeria (2009.8); and Tanzania (2011.8). Estimates for Bangladesh 
are based on the $1.25 poverty line and 2005 PPP prices. 
a. Given the production lags for household surveys, 2012 is the latest year for which the World Bank is able to produce regional and global poverty estimates. All numbers for 2015 
and beyond are statistical projections based on growth scenarios and distributional assumptions, and should be treated with considerable circumspection.
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from 56.0 to 42.6 percent between 1990 and 
2012 (figure 1.1e). South Asia achieved more 
rapid poverty reduction over the past 30 
years, even though it is still home to about a 
third of the world’s poor.
Despite significant geographic concentra-
tion, the poverty rate varies widely across 
the 10 countries with the greatest number of 
poor people. The estimates for 2012 indicate 
that these 10 countries account for almost 70 
percent of global poverty. Yet their poverty 
rates (as of the latest household survey, that 
is, not necessarily 2012) vary from 6.5 per-
cent in China to 81.8 percent in Madagascar 
(figure 1.1f). India was home to the larg-
est number of poor in 2012, but its poverty 
rate is one of the lowest among those coun-
tries with the largest number of poor. A new 
methodology applied to household surveys in 
India suggests that its poverty rate could be 
even lower (box 1.2). 
Even though the rate of extreme poverty is 
much higher in low-income countries, most of 
the global poor live in lower-middle-income 
countries. The poverty rate in low-income 
countries averaged 43 percent in 2012, 
compared with 19 percent in lower-middle-
income countries. Yet lower-middle-income 
countries are home to about half of the global 
poor; another third live in low-income coun-
tries (figure 1.2a). Part of the reason is that 
four countries with the largest populations 
were once classified as low-income but have 
moved into the lower-middle-income cat-
egory: China (reclassified in 1999), India (in 
2007), and Indonesia and Nigeria (in 2011).5 
The combined share of the world’s poor 
living in natural resource–based (NRB) and 
fragile and conflict-affected countries in 
2011 was about 50 percent. About 37 per-
cent of the global poor lived in NRB econo-
mies, defined as countries where the share of 
Box 1.2 Why poverty in india could be even lower 
Poverty measures for India are based on the house-
hold expenditure surveys done as part of the National 
Sample Surveys (NSS). Since the survey began in the 
1950s, it has used 30-day recall for consumption of 
both food and nonfood items to measure expendi-
tures. These so-called “uniform reference period” 
(URP) consumption aggregates collected in every 
consumption survey (except 1999/2000) provide the 
longest consistent series for measuring poverty in 
India. Historically, these have been the basis of the 
World Bank’s poverty estimates for India at the inter-
national poverty line. 
Since 2015 is the target year for the Millennium 
Development Goals, the assessment of changes in 
poverty over time is best based on the URP method, 
which was used to set the baseline poverty rates for 
India in 1990. As reported in this Global Monitoring 
Report, for 2011/12, India’s poverty rate using URP-
based consumption was 21.2 percent.
The National Sample Survey Organization intro-
duced a new consumption series based on a “modified 
mixed reference period” (MMRP) in the 2009/10 sur-
vey. The MMRP series (which modified the 30-day 
recall to a 7-day recall for some food items and to a 
1-year recall for low-frequency nonfood consumption 
items) was recommended as a more accurate reflec-
tion of consumption expenditures, following experi-
mental rounds to examine nonsampling errors.a As 
a result of the shorter recall period for food items, 
MMRP-based consumption expenditures in both 
rural and urban areas are 10–12 percent larger than 
URP-based aggregates. These higher expenditures, 
combined with a high population density around the 
poverty line, translate to a significantly lower poverty 
rate of 12.4 percent for 2011/12.
The MMRP, which is available from 2009/10 
onward, is expected to be the consumption aggregate 
of choice for monitoring poverty in the future. This 
year’s MMRP-based estimate of 12.4 percent will set 
the baseline for future India and global poverty esti-
mates, one consequence of which will be a break in 
the global series. 
a. MMRP is a modified version of the mixed reference 
period, which has used two recall periods, 30 days for 
some items and 365 days for others; the NSS consumption 
surveys have used these two recall periods since the early 
1990s.
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NRB exports such as coffee, wood, cop-
per, and petroleum products was 30 per-
cent or higher, and at least 12 percent of 
the global poor lived in countries clas-
sified by the World Bank as fragile and 
conflict-affected states.6 Almost all fragile 
and conflict-affected countries were also 
NRB economies. 
Accounting for poverty’s depth and 
breadth
Are all extremely poor populations the same? 
No, conditions can vary significantly across 
extremely poor populations. The poor do not 
experience poverty as an “either-or” concept 
but as a continuum of intensities ranging 
from bad to far worse. This section captures 
these different intensities of poverty by look-
ing into its depth and breadth. 
Controlling for depth offers new 
perspectives
A new variety of poverty measures—person-
equivalent headcounts—tallies the number 
of poor while controlling for depth (box 
1.3). The new measures are closely related 
to poverty gap measures, but their numeri-
cal values have intuitive meanings as head-
counts that control for the conditions of the 
poor. Traditional headcounts can mislead 
when conditions of the poor change signifi-
cantly. Person-equivalent headcounts bench-
mark the initial conditions of the poor; this 
benchmark is then used as a measuring rod 
to count the number of standardized poor 
or person-equivalents (Castleman, Foster, 
and Smith 2015). A person who is twice as 
deeply poor as the standardized poor person 
is counted as two person-equivalents. Con-
versely, a person who is half as deeply poor 
would be counted as half a person-equivalent. 
The poverty headcount is then simply the sum 
of all person-equivalents. 
As did the traditional poverty rate, the 
person-equivalent poverty rate fell signifi-
cantly between 1990 and 2012, and much of 
this decline occurred during the 2000s (fig-
ure 1.3a). Benchmarked against the global 
average depth of poverty in 1990, the person-
equivalent headcount declined by more than 
the traditional poverty headcount as the aver-
age depth of poverty also fell over this period 
(figure 1.3b). While the global numbers are 
FiGUrE 1.2 Global poverty is concentrated in lower-middle-income countries and countries dependent on natural 
resources as well as fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS)
Sources: PovcalNet 2015, WITS 2014, and World Bank 2014 classification of fragile and conflict-affected states.
Note: Panel a is based on the World Bank income classification for the respective years using only countries for which household surveys are available. Panel b is based on the World 
Bank 2014 classification of fragile and conflict-affected states. In natural-resource-based economies, natural-resource exports account for more than 30 percent of total merchandise 
exports in 2011 (those with less than 30 percent are termed broad-based economies).
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by design the same in the benchmark year, 
by 2012 there were 743.4 million person-
equivalent headcounts, some 17.6 percent 
less than the traditional headcount of 901.9 
million. The same pattern holds for the pov-
erty rate—the headcount as a ratio of total 
population. By 2012, the global person-
equivalent poverty rate was 10.6 percent, 
some 2.2 percentage points lower than the 
traditional poverty rate. 
As indicated by the “depth elasticity,” the 
world registered different degrees of progress 
Box 1.3 Person-equivalent poverty: An intuitive headcount measure that controls for 
depth 
The traditional poverty headcount ratio is insensitive 
to the large variation in living standards among those 
living below the poverty line (Sen 1976). The head-
count ratio can present distorted views of the spatial 
distribution of poverty and the extent of progress on 
reducing poverty. Two countries could record the 
same poverty headcount rate, where in one country 
poverty is shallow and in the other it is very deep, 
well below the poverty line. Similarly, a country may 
be successful in lifting its poorest citizens—the poor-
est of the poor—from abject poverty to a level just 
below the poverty line. Such improvement would not 
show up in a poverty headcount measure. 
Accounting for depth of poverty ensures that 
poverty reduction efforts are targeted to those most 
deprived. With the global population around 9 billion 
by 2030, achievement of the global poverty target of 
3 percent would leave an estimated 270 million peo-
ple impoverished—including some of the most deeply 
deprived and difficult to reach. Just as worrying, 
relying solely on headcount measures may encour-
age policy makers to ignore the poorest of the poor 
and concentrate efforts on the richest of the poor to 
meet poverty targets (Bourguignon and Fields 1990). 
A focus is therefore needed not only on helping people 
to lift themselves out of poverty but also on the depth 
of deprivation of those left behind. 
The poverty gap ratio is a widely available mea-
sure that captures depth. The ratio measures the 
extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line 
as a proportion of the poverty line. Aside from being 
regularly provided and updated, this ratio has desir-
able properties, such as focus (poverty is independent 
of the incomes of the nonpoor), monotonicity (other 
things equal, a decrease in a poor person’s income 
increases the overall poverty level), and decompos-
ability (overall poverty is linked to subgroup poverty 
levels).
However, for many, the poverty gap measure lacks 
the simplicity of a headcount and as a result is often 
dismissed from the policy discourse as too “unintui-
tive” to have traction. The traditional headcount ratio 
is easy to understand but is insensitive to the depth 
of poverty. The poverty gap ratio is sensitive to the 
depth of poverty but is more difficult to understand. 
Accordingly, the poverty gap ratio has not been a 
central element of poverty policy formulation, even 
though measures of the depth of poverty have quite 
clearly helped shape policies in especially rich coun-
tries (the U.S. food stamp program being one such 
example, where the benefit level is linked to income).
The person-equivalent approach remedies this 
problem, while retaining all the desirable features 
of the poverty gap measures. The person-equivalent 
approach has the core simplicity of a headcount and 
yet accounts for the varying conditions of the poor. 
The approach developed by Castleman, Foster, and 
Smith (2015) can be compared to measuring full-time 
equivalent jobs relative to the standard of the 40-hour 
workweek: those working 20 hours are counted as 0.5 
of a full-time equivalent, whereas those working 60 
hours would count as 1.5 full-time equivalents. Thus, 
if in the benchmark year the average depth of poverty 
is 40 cents, then a person with a shortfall of 20 cents 
relative to the poverty line is considered half a person-
equivalent; conversely, a poor person with a gap of 
60 cents is one-and-a-half person-equivalents. The 
person-equivalent headcount measure is obtained by 
adding all the person-equivalents across a population.
An appealing feature of the person-equivalent 
headcount is that it attributes higher weights to the 
deeply poor and thus redistributes poverty toward 
areas where poverty is at its deepest. If a deeply poor 
person were to escape poverty, the impact on the 
person-equivalent headcount would be larger than 
if a marginally poor person did. The same change 
would likewise have a bigger impact on the poverty 
gap index (also known as P1 or FGT1) than it would 
on the conventional poverty headcount ratio (or P0 in 
the FGT class). 
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Sources: World Bank calculations, PovcalNet 2015.
Note: Estimates based on the $1.90 poverty line and 2011 PPP prices.
a. The increase in Latin America and the Caribbean reflects the sensitivity of the person-equivalent measure to the use of income-based (as opposed to consumption-based) poverty 
measures, which are prevalent within the region. See box 1.4 for more details.
FiGUrE 1.3 Person-equivalent poverty headcount measures offer supplementary perspectives on the patterns and trends 
of global poverty across countries
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in translating traditional poverty reduction 
into person-equivalent poverty reduction 
(figure 1.3c).7 The depth elasticity measures 
the percentage point reduction in the person-
equivalent headcount ratio as the result of 
a 1 percentage point reduction in the tradi-
tional headcount ratio. Globally, the depth 
elasticity between 1990 and 2012 was 1.18, 
suggesting that the reductions in traditional 
poverty rates were accompanied by even 
larger reductions in person-equivalent terms. 
The regional depth elasticities confirm that 
poverty reduction, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific, 
was accompanied by a much larger reduction 
in person-equivalent terms over this period. 
These findings reflect the good progress 
made over this longer period of time in reduc-
ing not only the number of poor but also the 
depth of poverty. 
The person-equivalent lens sheds a differ-
ent light on the geographical distribution of 
poverty as of 2012 (figure 1.3d, 1.3e, 1.3f). 
First, it suggests that, when accounting for 
depth, the person-equivalent poverty rate is 
much higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than the 
traditional poverty rate because the depth of 
poverty is large compared with other regions. 
South Asia’s person-equivalent poverty rate is 
lower than its traditional poverty rate, sug-
gesting that the depth of poverty is smaller rel-
ative to other parts of the world. The person- 
equivalent ratio in Latin American and the 
Caribbean is larger than the traditional 
headcount ratio, which is partially due to 
the prevalence of income-based household 
survey data in that region (box 1.4). Second, 
expressed as a share of global poverty, the 
geographical concentration of global pov-
erty shifts further to Sub-Saharan Africa 
under the person-equivalent measure, with 
the region accounting for some 56.7 percent 
of global poverty, whereas the relative impor-
tance of both South Asia and East Asia and 
Pacific declines. 
While these results provide insightful per-
spectives, they need to be interpreted with 
caution and complemented with additional 
analysis of observed patterns and trends. For 
example, greater poverty depth—and lower 
depth elasticity—may be linked to whether 
poverty is measured using income or con-
sumption data (again, see box 1.4). The esti-
mates for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
for example, are generally based on income 
data (see figure 1.3). Yet in the countries of 
the region where both income and consump-
tion data are available, the incidence, depth, 
and severity of poverty are greater for income 
than for consumption expenditure. Income 
data are more susceptible to measurement 
error and temporary fluctuation. Moreover, 
poor households have an incentive to employ 
some form of saving mechanism to smooth 
income shocks. 
Multidimensional assessments are 
complementary
Poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon. Cen-
tral to this phenomenon are income depriva-
tions that restrict an individual’s ability to 
consume certain basic goods. Yet, poverty 
goes beyond income and is often accompa-
nied by lack of access to education, health, 
housing, employment, personal security, and 
more (UNDP 1997; World Bank 2001). The 
association between the components of pov-
erty when measured in all of its dimensions 
is generally strong given that the poor tend 
to be simultaneously deprived in multiple 
dimensions (Ferreira and Lugo 2013). How-
ever, the strength of association varies across 
space and time. As a result, a person may be 
considered nonpoor according to the tradi-
tional income-based measure despite being 
subject to multiple deprivations in other 
dimensions. If this person does not have 
access to the basic services or personal secu-
rity that are an integral part of living without 
deprivations in basic human needs, can this 
person be considered to be free of poverty 
(Bourguignon et al. 2010)?
The goal of “ending poverty in all of its 
forms everywhere” is likely to lead to grow-
ing interest in the multidimensional mea-
surement of global poverty. The SDG1.2 
incorporates an explicitly multidimensional 
focus: “By 2030, reduce at least by half the 
proportion of men, women and children of 
all ages living in poverty in all its dimen-
sions according to national definitions.” The 
universal nature of the SDGs suggests that 
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as the post-2015 process unfolds, demand 
for harmonized multidimensional poverty 
assessments at the country and global lev-
els is likely to rise. Several countries have 
already implemented variants of multidi-
mensional poverty measures, including 
Bhutan, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the 
Philippines. 
Box 1.4 Poverty in latin America: income-based versus consumption-based estimates
Poverty incidence and depth measured by income 
data are susceptible to upward bias compared with 
consumption data. First, income differs from con-
sumption at a conceptual level, since income can be 
saved and consumption can be financed by borrow-
ing. Second, income surveys often exclude household 
production, and households are sometimes reluctant 
to disclose income information to survey enumera-
tors. Third, in developing countries, formal employ-
ment tends to be less common than in high-income 
countries, with households facing multiple and chang-
ing source of income (O’Donnell and others 2008; 
Ravallion 2003; Székely and others 2000). 
Given the reliance in Latin America on income sur-
veys, poverty numbers in this region are likely to be 
biased upward compared with the consumption alter-
native, as the case of Mexico confirms. To examine 
this discrepancy in consumption- and income-based 
poverty measures, Mexico’s case is useful because 
the same survey collects both types of data. As fig-
ure B1.4.1a suggests, the use of income data raises the 
headcount ratio and the poverty gap and results in a 
more persistent pattern of poverty.
While the issue also affects traditional headcount 
ratios, the person-equivalent headcount ratios may 
be especially affected. Because they rely on the same 
primary data, person-equivalent incidence mea-
sures tend to be lower when based on consumption 
data—just like traditional incidence measures. How-
ever, because person-equivalent indicators take into 
account the depth of poverty, and poverty is typically 
deeper when using income-based measures, person-
equivalent incidence measures may well amplify 
the difference. The example of Mexico is again 
instructive (figure B1.4.1b). If Mexico’s person-
equivalent rate were calculated based on income, it 
would be well above the traditional headcount ratio 
because the average gap among the poor is higher 
than the global average benchmark gap. However, 
if consumption data were used, Mexico’s person-
equivalent headcount ratio would be much lower 
than the traditional headcount ratio given that the 
average gap is much lower than the global bench-
mark gap.
FiGUrE B1.4.1 Poverty measures can be sensitive to the source of data collection
Sources: World Bank calculations and PovcalNet 2015.
Note: Estimates are based on the $1.25 poverty line and 2005 PPP prices.
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The Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI) is one possible implementation of this 
approach (boxes 1.5, 1.6).8 MPI decomposi-
tions identify the subnational regions and the 
dimensions that contribute most to multidi-
mensional poverty. The global MPI is avail-
able for 101 countries but is also calculated 
for 884 subnational regions, mostly in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia. The decom-
position analysis reveals pockets of poverty 
that national numbers might conceal. Coun-
try and subnational MPI levels can be bro-
ken down further into dimensional indicators 
whose profiles vary by region. For example, 
the profile of multidimensional poverty in 
Salamat—the poorest region in the world 
in southeast Chad—is different from that of 
Moyen Chari, a neighboring region; in par-
ticular, educational deprivations are much 
larger in Salamat than in Moyen Chari. 
Other regions that have lower MPIs than 
Salamat have higher individual components 
in their profile. Breaking down poverty by 
dimension provides policy makers with local-
ized information for reducing multidimen-
sional poverty.
The 2015 MPI counts 1.6 billion people 
as multidimensionally poor, with the largest 
global share in South Asia and the highest 
intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1.4). 
Some 54 percent of all the MPI poor live in 
South Asia and 31 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Most multidimensionally poor—70 
percent—live in low- and lower-middle-
income countries (Alkire, Jindra, et al. 2015). 
As for monetary poverty, MPI poverty inci-
dence is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is also the most intense as measured by 
the multiplicity of deprivations. South Asia 
follows second. While the MPI headcount is 
much lower in other regions, the breadth of 
deprivation among the multidimensionally 
poor is only slightly lower than that found in 
those two regions. Multidimensional poverty 
Box 1.5 Multidimensional poverty measurement: E pluribus unum? 
While poverty is widely accepted as a multidimen-
sional phenomenon, there is no universal consensus 
on whether and how to aggregate multiple dimensions 
of poverty into a single welfare measure. A simple 
way to categorize the various approaches is by aggre-
gating multiple measures into a single, scalar index 
or by laying out individual measures of each dimen-
sion to obtain a “dashboard” of separate vectors. The 
dashboard approach provides detailed information 
on the magnitudes of the constituent indicators and 
can readily draw on different data sources and dif-
ferent types of data. To the extent that dashboards 
avoid aggregation, they also avoid the difficult ques-
tion of whether aggregation is best done in the space 
of “attainments” weighted by prices, or “depriva-
tions” based on weights set by an analyst (Ravallion 
2010, 2011; World Bank 2015a).a Yet dashboards are 
unable to establish hierarchies among various dimen-
sions of poverty. Nor can dashboards reflect the joint 
distribution of various deprivations and thus measure 
the prevalence of individuals affected by deprivations 
in multiple dimensions at the same time. Dashboards 
also lack an identifiable poor population and a single 
headline figure that can be easily communicated and 
compared with income-based measures (Alkire and 
Foster 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009).
The salient feature of multidimensional poverty is 
the interdependence between dimensions. The dash-
board approach tends to overlook this interdepen-
dence by examining deprivations separately. Other 
methodological approaches that capture interdepen-
dency—such as the simple Venn of overlap of depri-
vations across dimensions, multivariate stochastic 
dominance analysis, and the analysis of copula func-
tions—may therefore complement the dashboard 
approach. Scalar multidimensional indexes allow 
for a complete ordering, with the ability to rank two 
years, countries, or regions, but need to deal with the 
increased complexity at the identification and aggre-
gation steps. 
Note: E pluribus unum is Latin for “out of many, one.”
a. Establishing weights is fundamentally difficult; for 
related discussions, see Alkire, Foster, et al. 2015. 
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Box 1.6 The Multidimensional Poverty index: An example 
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is an 
adjusted headcount indicator that measures the inci-
dence and breadth of those who are deprived in multi-
ple dimensions (table B1.6). The approach begins 
with a specification of the dimensions and indicators 
upon which poverty will be based. The MPI identifies 
3 dimensions: health, education, and standard of liv-
ing. These dimensions are measured using 10 indica-
tors: child mortality and nutrition (for health); years 
of schooling and school attendance (for education); 
and cooking fuel, toilet, water, electricity, floor, and 
assets (for living standards). Each dimension and each 
indicator within a dimension is equally weighted. 
For each of the indicators a deprivation cutoff is 
set: For example, for years of schooling, deprivation 
amounts to no household member having completed 
five years of schooling, whereas for electricity, depri-
vation means having no access to electricity. A per-
son is considered poor if he or she is deprived in at 
least a third of the weighted indicators. The multidi-
mensional headcount ratio measures the incidence of 
multi dimensional poverty by comparing the number 
of all those that are multidimensionally poor to the 
total population. The intensity of poverty denotes the 
proportion of indicators in which they are deprived. 
The adjusted headcount ratio is obtained by the prod-
uct of the multidimensional headcount ratio and the 
average intensity of poverty. 
The metric provides a complement to poverty mea-
sures based on income and traditional dashboards in 
monitoring and directing policies toward the poor. It 
directly measures the nature and magnitude of over-
lapping deprivations in health, education, and living 
standards at the household level. With the adjusted 
headcount ratio, overall poverty is directly linked to 
the poverty levels of population subgroups, a decom-
position property it shares with traditional monetary 
poverty indexes. This permits the construction of 
poverty profiles and can help in locating the poor. 
The multidimensional poverty measure can also be 
broken down into a dashboard of indicators, one for 
each dimension, to reveal the components of pov-
erty and help guide policy priorities. In this way, the 
adjusted headcount ratio and its dimensional indica-
tors form a coordinated dashboard for policy analy-
sis with a headline number for monitoring and com-
munication purposes and dimensional indicators for 
deeper analysis (Alkire, Foster, et al. 2015).
TABlE B1.6 illustration of MPi calculation across three persons
   Person Person  Person  
Dimension Indicator Weight A (%) B (%) C (%)
Education Years of schooling less than five? 1/6 0 0 0
 Not attending school up to class 8? 1/6 0 0 0
Health Any child has died in the family? 1/6 100 100 0
 Anyone malnourished?  1/6 0 100 0
Living No electricity?  1/18 0 100 0
standards  Sanitation facility not improved? Improved but shared with others? 1/18 0 100 0
 No or difficult access to safe drinking water? 1/18 0 0 100
 Dirt, sand or dung floor?  1/18 100 100 100
 Cooking with dung, wood or charcoal? 1/18 100 0 100
  Own no more than one of the following assets—radio, TV, phone,  1/18 100 0 100 
bike, motorcycle or fridge—and does not own a car or truck?
Weighted deprivation score   33 50 22
Status: Poor if intensity ≥ 33%   Poor Poor Not poor
Headcount ratio of MPI poor (H)  2/3 = 66%
Average intensity among the poor (A)  (33% + 50%) / 2 = 41%
MPI index (H x A)   66% x 41% = 27%
Source: GMR team elaboration.
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is significant among those living in fragile 
states. Just as in the case of income poverty, 
multidimensional poverty is most intense in 
fragile and conflict-affected states, with the 
extent of poverty varying with the intensity 
of fragility and conflict. The vast majority of 
these countries are located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. 
At the individual country level, the coun-
try with the highest rate of multidimen-
sional poverty is Niger. Niger also has very 
high fertility levels, as discussed in part 2. 
The country-level patterns of monetary and 
multidimensional poverty may deviate sig-
nificantly from each other. For example, in 
Zambia, the multidimensional poverty rate 
as measured by the MPI was 57 percent in 
2013–14, whereas the income-based poverty 
rate was 74 percent in 2010. For Pakistan the 
opposite was true, with the multidimensional 
poverty rate in 2013–14 of 44 percent, while 
the income-based poverty rate in 2010 was 
13 percent. Both comparisons indicate sig-
nificant differences in the poor populations 
identified by the two methods. Turning from 
international measures to national measures, 
Chile has two official poverty measures: an 
income-based measure and a multidimen-
sional measure. The poverty rates associ-
ated with the two in 2013 were 14.4 percent 
FiGUrE 1.4 The Multidimensional Poverty index (MPi) provides a complementary perspective to the poverty headcount
Source: Alkire, Jindra, et al. 2015.
Note: Panel d is based on the Failed States Index (FSI) provided by the Fund for Peace. The index uses several social economic and political indicators to classify countries from “Very 
High Alert” (most-fragile states) to “sustainable” (less-fragile states). The less-fragile countries in this figure are classified as “high warning.”
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(income) and 20.4 percent (multidimen-
sional); however, the share of the entire popu-
lation that is poor under both definitions is 
just 5.5 percent.
Decomposition of the MPI into the sub-
national level and its component indicators 
may shed light on patterns of intense depri-
vation. As noted, the poorest subnational 
region in the world is Salamat in southeast 
Chad. Nearly 98 percent of its 354,000 
inhabitants are MPI poor, and, on average, 
they are deprived in nearly 75 percent of the 
MPI dimensions, ensuring that Salamat also 
is the region with the greatest breadth of pov-
erty. Three of the five poorest subnational 
regions in the world are in Chad while two 
are in Burkina Faso. The profile of multidi-
mensional poverty may also reveal intense 
poverty in certain dimensions. Of the 884 
regions, the region with the highest dimen-
sional indicator for nutrition is Affar in Ethi-
opia; for child mortality it is Nord-Ouest in 
Côte d’Ivoire; and for sanitation, electricity, 
and assets it is Warap in South Sudan. Yet 
Salamat, which has high rates of deprivation 
in many dimensions at the same time, is the 
poorest by the MPI.
Multidimensional poverty measures may 
provide useful complementary perspectives 
on the dynamics of poverty over time. India, 
for example, exhibits a marked difference 
across its various states between the behav-
iors of the income-based and multidimen-
sional poverty rates through time. Figures 
1.5a and 1.5b plot the annualized absolute 
change in the poverty rate over a period of 
time against the initial value, for a multidi-
mensional poverty measure and an income-
based approach. The line in each graph is the 
linear regression of the annualized absolute 
change on the starting level. Clearly, the 
income poverty rates across states in India 
exhibit a classical converging pattern, where 
the reduction in the income-based poverty 
rate is higher in the states with the higher 
initial poverty values. For multidimensional 
poverty, the opposite is true: the states with 
low multidimensional poverty are making 
greater progress, whereas those with the 
highest poverty rates are lagging behind. 
These examples suggest a need to monitor 
multidimensional poverty directly. 
Aspiring to end poverty by 2030 
In light of the progress made and the chal-
lenges remaining, what does the future of 
poverty reduction look like? As argued below, 
the 2030 target is aspirational, and attain-
ing it will require fortuitous circumstances. 
FiGUrE 1.5 A multidimensional lens suggests slower poverty reduction progress in india
Source: Alkire and Seth 2013.
a. Monetary poverty incidence in India
converged across states
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Moreover, contextual factors arising from the 
changing nature of the poverty that remains 
are likely to make poverty reduction more 
challenging than it was in the past. Finally, 
even if the 2030 target of 3 percent poverty is 
met on average globally, deep pockets of mul-
tidimensional poverty are likely to persist.
While attainable, the 2030 target is 
aspirational
Although most regions continue to reduce 
poverty, meeting the global poverty target by 
2030 remains aspirational in all but the most 
optimistic of scenarios. Poverty scenarios 
depend on the assumptions on the pace and 
incidence of per capita household income (or 
consumption) growth over the next 15 years 
(World Bank 2015c). For example, one could 
assume that income growth will follow that 
of the 2000s, which was an extraordinary 
period of income growth for developing coun-
tries. If one adopts the optimistic scenario 
that per capita income growth in every devel-
oping country meets the developing-country 
average during the 2000s (4.4 percent in 
per capita national account aggregates, or 
3.9 percent in household incomes), and also 
assumes that the distribution of income and 
cross-country inequality remain constant, 
then the 3 percent headcount target can be 
met (the third scenario in figure 1.6). Even 
so, poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa would still 
remain at 14.4 percent. 
More pessimistic scenarios suggest that 
global poverty will continue to be a chal-
lenge in 2030, both globally and in specific 
countries. One cannot take for granted that 
the rapid growth rates of the 2000s will be 
repeated for the next decade and a half for all 
countries simultaneously. If developing coun-
tries realize the same country-specific per 
capita growth rates as observed during the 
10-year period 2004–13, the global 3 percent 
poverty target would be missed, and poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa would remain high at 
20.1 percent (the second scenario in figure 
1.6). Moreover, if incomes were to rise at the 
average growth rate observed at the country 
level over the 20-year period 1994–2013, the 
incidence of global poverty in 2030 would be 
5.7 percent (the first scenario in figure 1.6). 
South Asia would reduce its poverty rate to 
2.1 percent, but Sub-Saharan Africa’s would 
still stand at 26.9 percent.
The pursuit of shared prosperity can 
increase the chance of meeting the 3 percent 
poverty goal. This point is developed later in 
the chapter, but for now it suffices to high-
light that the simulations shown in figure 
1.6 assume distributionally neutral growth. 
If, however, the poor, or the B40 including 
the poor, were to experience income growth 
that was systematically higher than the mean 
income growth for the total population, 
then the poverty target would be more easily 
achieved. Simulations by Lakner, Negre, and 
Prydz (2014) show that if average economic 
growth rates are extrapolated from the early 
2000s, the extreme poverty target would not 
be met unless the growth rate among the B40 
is at least 2 percentage points higher than the 
mean.
FiGUrE 1.6 World poverty scenarios suggest that the poverty 
target is aspirational but attainable
Source: Staff estimations.
Note: Based on $1.90 poverty line (2011 PPP prices). The first scenario assumes that each country 
grows at the country-specific average growth rate observed over 1994–2013. The second scenario 
assumes that each country grows at the country-specific average growth rate observed over  
2004–13. The third scenario assumes that each country grows at 4.4 percent a year (national 
accounts) or 3.9 percent (household incomes). That is a scenario under which the 3 percent target for 
the Bank’s poverty reduction goal would be reached by 2030. Since per capita private consumption 
is missing for many countries, especially in Africa, per capita GDP growth rates are used for all coun-
tries instead. As in all previous cases, the within-country distribution neutrality assumption is used.
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Poverty reduction will meet new  
challenges
A further challenge is the possibility that 
future growth may not reach the poor as 
readily as in the past. As noted, global pov-
erty fell by about 1 percentage point a year in 
response to the average annual GDP growth 
rate of 4 percent. Even if the growth rate 
still averaged 4 percent from now to 2030, 
would poverty continue to fall by 1 percent-
age point a year? The distributional pattern 
of household income and consumption puts 
a relatively high proportion of the popula-
tion near the median income or consumption 
value, with small proportions at extremely 
high or low values (Battistin, Blundell, and 
Lewbel 2009). Thus, when the global pov-
erty rate was 36 percent in 2000, at the 
start of the Millennium Development Goals, 
many poor people were just below the pov-
erty line, leading to a large percentage point 
reduction in poverty for a given distribution-
neutral increase in GDP. With global poverty 
incidence at 12.8 percent in 2012, the same 
distribution-neutral increase in GDP will lead 
to less poverty reduction. Poverty’s respon-
siveness to distribution-neutral growth will 
continue to decline as the 3 percent target is 
approached (World Bank 2015c). In short, as 
the 3 percent target gets nearer, higher rates 
of income growth will be needed, and the dis-
tribution of that growth will need to be more 
favorable to those with the lowest incomes.
Ending poverty is also complicated by the 
structural characteristics of the most impov-
erished nations, particularly those in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Taking into account their 
demographic dynamics, by 2030 a larger 
share of the world’s impoverished will reside 
in NRB economies and fragile and conflict-
affected states, primarily in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Poverty is less responsive to growth 
in such economies because the availability 
of jobs—the main channel through which 
growth uplifts the poor—is limited (IMF 
2014b; Inchauste and Saavedra-Chanduvi 
2014; Inchauste et al. 2014; Loayza and Rad-
datz 2010; World Bank 1990). Capital-inten-
sive, natural-resource sectors may generate 
growth but are likely to have weak backward 
and forward links with the rest of the econ-
omy, even during commodity boom periods. 
In the fragile and conflict-affected states 
(which include several NRB countries), the 
poverty problem is even more complex. Con-
flicts, whether they arise because of contested 
natural resource wealth or are politically 
motivated, inevitably disrupt or even reverse 
growth. The impact of conflict is often felt 
long after peace is restored. 
Continued poverty reduction will require 
incorporating natural resources and natural 
capital in economic decision making. Land 
degradation and poverty are often deeply 
intertwined, with an estimated 42 percent of 
the world’s poorest living on land that is clas-
sified as degraded (Nachtergaele et al. 2010). 
About 1.3 billion people are reliant on for-
ests, and the majority of these are extremely 
poor. Their level of dependence on forests is 
surprisingly large and often equal in mag-
nitude to income obtained from agriculture 
(Angelsen et al. 2014; Shepherd, Kazoora, 
and Müller 2013). In addition, 1 billion peo-
ple in developing countries depend upon fish 
as their primary source of affordable protein. 
The rural poor often endure a litany of envi-
ronmental health risks too. Illness, disability, 
and early death from environmental risks, 
such as household air pollution from wood 
burning in primitive stoves, remain a major 
cause of child mortality in the developing 
world, followed by inadequate sanitation.
Climate change may become another 
important drag on poverty reduction in many 
countries (Field 2014; Hertel and Rosch 
2010; Leichenko and Silva 2014; Skoufias, 
Rabassa, and Olivieri 2012). Global estimates 
suggest that climate change could account for 
10.1 million additional poor by mid-century 
in the absence of comprehensive and successful 
greenhouse gas emissions abatement. The size 
and incidence of the impact of climate change 
on a given country depends on country- 
specific factors related to its exposure to cli-
mate shocks and the country’s ability to adapt 
(Füssel and Klein 2006; Yohe and Tol 2009). 
Generally, the poor in developing countries 
are disproportionally affected. One reason 
is that the poor have less access to resources 
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and savings to absorb the impact of shocks, 
whether they come from climate change or 
from political, economic, or financial insta-
bility. Climate change may have a greater 
impact on the poor relative to other types 
of shocks because the poor tend to be more 
dependent on agriculture and have more per-
ilous access to water (World Bank 2012).
Deep pockets of dimensionally broad 
poverty will likely remain
Even if the aggregate 3 percent poverty target 
is reached, the distribution of poverty reduc-
tion within countries will be uneven, and deep 
pockets of impoverishment will remain. Just 
as poverty reduction occurs at vastly different 
rates across countries and global regions, pov-
erty reduction within countries is normally 
a spatially uneven process. Deep pockets of 
poverty can persist even in countries that, at 
the aggregate level, are experiencing rapid 
poverty reduction. Country-level poverty 
assessments regularly identify specific areas 
or groups of people with particular character-
istics experiencing higher-than-average prob-
abilities of being poor. They may be locked in 
poverty traps or other low-level equilibriums 
in which aggregate economic growth does not 
translate into employment income or trans-
fers for them. These groups may be defined 
by education, ethnicity, or region of residence. 
In particular, there is evidence that pockets of 
poverty cluster geographically in rural areas 
that are poorly connected to urban centers of 
growth, where the poor may become trapped 
in low-productivity jobs (Kraay and McKen-
zie 2014). For example, although China’s rate 
of poverty reduction has been rapid, poverty 
is higher in rural areas where the productiv-
ity of farmers’ investments is lower (Jalan and 
Ravallion 2001).
Shared prosperity: Conceptual 
issues and recent trends
The second of the World Bank Group goals 
articulates the commitment to promote 
“shared prosperity,” defined as seeking to 
sustainably raise the well-being of the poorer 
segments of society. The goal reflects a prac-
tical compromise between the single-minded 
pursuit of prosperity in the aggregate and an 
equity concern about the ability of the less 
well-off in society to improve their well-being 
by participating in a country’s prosperity. 
The goal thus gives more explicit attention to 
inclusive development and growth than has 
been the case in the past and paves the way 
for a focus on inequality. The goal is mea-
sured by the pace of real income or consump-
tion growth at the household level, on aver-
age and over time, for the B40 of the income 
distribution in each country.9 
This section sheds further light on the 
concept of shared prosperity and examines 
its recent trends. It explores in some depth 
conceptual questions relating to the goal and 
indicator of shared prosperity. Specifically, 
it examines the connections between shared 
prosperity and non-income dimensions of 
well-being, links with equity (“justness”), and 
connections to equality (“the state of being 
equal”). Second, it analyzes recent trends in 
shared prosperity, underlying drivers, and 
continuing disparities, and assesses whether 
recent trends can be sustained.
revisiting the concept of shared 
prosperity
What is shared prosperity? While the shared 
prosperity concept is not new, the effort to 
promote it through the B40 indicator has 
raised interest in how the goal of shared 
prosperity should be interpreted.10 The con-
cept of shared prosperity, with its focus on 
the B40, has been around at least as long as 
the early use of the term by the economist 
Simon Kuznets in discussions on growth 
and inequality (Kuznets 1955) and its invo-
cation by World Bank president Robert S. 
McNamara in 1972 (box 1.7).11 However, 
the approach of seeking to raise the average 
income growth of the B40 in absolute terms 
has raised interest in the role of non-income 
dimensions and the connections of the con-
cept with equity and equality.
Shared prosperity means multidimensional 
development 
The shared prosperity goal recognizes that 
the pursuit of well-being among the most 
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vulnerable in a society is a key development 
objective. Thus, while the average income 
growth among the B40 has become the 
agreed-upon indicator of shared prosper-
ity, the goal itself is much broader in that it 
aspires to sustainably elevate the well-being 
of the poorer segments of society. Embedded 
in the goal, therefore, are both intertemporal 
and multidimensional objectives: shared pros-
perity requires well-being to be shared across 
individuals over time. This multidimensional 
aspect of the goal points to the need for a 
focus on non-income dimensions of prosper-
ity such as education, health, nutrition, and 
access to essential infrastructure, as well as on 
enhancing the voice and participation of all 
segments of society in the economic, social, 
and political spheres (World Bank 2013b). 
The broad focus of the shared pros-
perity goal is in keeping with the call for 
development goals that go beyond access to 
or ownership of material goods. Amartya 
Sen (1983, 1985, 1999)—a key proponent—
has called for income to be viewed not as 
the sole end to development but rather as a 
gauge of what a person is able to do (capa-
bility) and manages to do (functioning). This 
broader perspective of development has been 
influential in the literature on broad-based 
growth and has led first to efforts to measure 
the non-income dimensions of development 
and then to work on inclusive growth that 
examines how growth trickles down to the 
poor. That work, in turn, has led, through 
the introduction of multidimensionality, to 
the notion of “inclusive development.”12 
While the chosen indicator of shared 
prosperity is an income-based metric, 
the non-income dimensions of the shared 
prosperity goal are important (Narayan, 
Box 1.7 Back to “Basics”: McNamara’s prescient 1972 speech on shared prosperity
At the Annual Meetings in Nairobi in September 
1972, World Bank President Robert S. McNamara 
addressed the Board of Governors with a speech 
that linked the growth imperative to social justice. 
The speech demarcated the so-called basic needs 
approach. It contained various references—some 
of them little-known at the time—to the concept 
of “shared prosperity” that the World Bank Group 
would institute as one of its corporate objectives some 
four decades later. The interpretations that he offered 
remain pertinent today and offer apt perspectives on 
how shared prosperity relates to social equity, social 
sustainability, inequality, and multidimensionality. 
•   Social equity and social sustainability. “We know, 
in effect, that there is no rational alternative to 
moving toward policies of greater social equity. 
When the highly privileged are few and the desper-
ately poor are many—and when the gap between 
them is worsening rather than improving—it is only 
a question of time before a decisive choice must be 
made between the political costs of reform and the 
political risks of rebellion. That is why policies spe-
cifically designed to reduce the deprivation among 
the poorest 40 percent in developing countries are 
prescriptions not only of principle but of prudence. 
Social justice is not merely a moral imperative. It is 
a political imperative as well.”
•   Income inequality. “The first step should be to 
establish specific targets, within the development 
plans of individual countries, for income growth 
among the poorest 40 percent of the population. 
I suggest that our goal should be to increase the 
income of the poorest sections of society in the 
short run—in five years—at least as fast as the 
national average. In the longer run—ten years—the 
goal should be to increase this growth significantly 
faster than the national average.”
•   Multidimensionality. “The task, then, for the gov-
ernments of the developing countries is to reori-
ent their development policies in order to attack 
directly the personal poverty of the most deprived 
40 percent of their populations. This the govern-
ments can do without abandoning their goals of 
vigorous overall economic growth. But they must 
be prepared to give greater priority to establishing 
growth targets in terms of essential human needs: 
in terms of nutrition, housing, health, literacy, 
and employment—even if it be at the cost of some 
reduction in the pace of advance in certain narrow 
and highly privileged sectors whose benefits accrue 
to the few.”
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Saavedra-Chanduvi, and Tiwari 2013). The 
use of a relatively simple indicator—growth 
in the real value of income or consumption 
(depending on the methodology of the house-
hold surveys on which the concept is based) 
for the B40—does not mean that non-income 
aspects of well-being should be disregarded.13 
The B40 income-based indicator is a first step 
toward making a critical point: growth in 
an economy should not be assumed to mean 
that development progress is automatically 
occurring. It is also necessary for this growth 
to reach the less well-off in society. Beyond 
that, however, development progress should 
be assessed in all of its dimensions. The sec-
ond step, therefore, is to consider explicitly 
how, given their synergies, the income and 
non-income aspects of shared prosperity feed 
into each other and together can produce 
greater well-being for the poorer segments of 
society.14 
Equality of opportunity underpins shared 
prosperity 
Equity is a fundamental building block of 
shared prosperity. As Mahatma Gandhi 
famously noted, “A nation’s greatness is mea-
sured by how it treats its weakest members.” 
Yet, as societal preferences have evolved 
and moral philosophies have changed, con-
cerns about the less well-off have varied. For 
example, Bentham’s utilitarian preference 
for the “greatest happiness for the great-
est number,” first published in the 1780s, is 
devoid of any distributional concern, while 
Rawls’s principle of maximizing opportunity 
for the “least privileged,” published nearly 
200 years later, takes a radically opposite 
view (Bentham [1789] 2000; Rawls 1971). 
The World Bank Group’s institutional objec-
tive of promoting shared prosperity targets 
the B40 as an anonymous group irrespective 
of the identity of its members.15 This strong 
focus on the less privileged places equity at 
the very heart of the goal and the indicator 
of shared prosperity.16 
Underpinned by equity, the shared prosper-
ity concept is intricately related to the inequal-
ity of opportunity. World Bank (2013b) high-
lights that even though the shared prosperity 
indicator is focused on outcomes, the require-
ment to pursue shared prosperity in a socially 
sustainable fashion ties the concept to the pro-
motion of equality of opportunity. This focus 
is also present in modern theories of social 
equity, which, like Rawls’s, build on Har-
sanyi’s (1955) “veil of ignorance argument”: 
an equitable resource allocation should 
reflect what all prospective members of soci-
ety would agree on before they knew which 
position they would occupy in that society. 
Accordingly, while modern theories of equity 
remain concerned that individuals be spared 
from extreme deprivation in outcomes, they 
emphasize the importance of ensuring equal 
opportunities for individuals to pursue a life 
of their choosing.17 The outcome of a person’s 
life, in its many dimensions, should reflect 
efforts and talents, and not predetermined 
circumstances—such as family origins, race, 
gender, or place of birth—or the social groups 
a person is born into. 
In and of itself, however, the shared 
prosperity goal is not aimed at reducing the 
inequality of outcome. Considerable hetero-
geneity exists in the opinions of individuals 
about whether inequality is good or bad and 
should be reduced or not. The most recent 
wave of the World Value Survey illustrates 
the degree of polarization in views around 
the world and also how the preference for 
inequality gradually rises across the income 
distribution, with large differences across 
regions (figure 1.7). Reflecting these differ-
ences of views, the shared prosperity concept 
does not directly link to outcome inequality. 
Positive B40 income growth may indeed be 
avoided with rising inequality, both within 
the B40 and between groups. First, inequal-
ity may rise within the B40 by virtue of the 
mean indicator, in which positive growth 
may occur at the expense of the poorest.18 
Second, absolute income growth of the B40 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for lower 
inequality between the B40 and other income 
groups. Negative B40 income growth could 
lower inequality if T60 growth does even 
worse, but positive B40 income growth might 
not prevent a rise in inequality if T60 growth 
does even better. 
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Consistent, sustainable effort may reduce 
inequality of outcome
A consistent focus on boosting B40 incomes 
will always lead to (weakly) lower inequal-
ity compared to the counterfactual of boost-
ing average incomes. Figure 1.8a illustrates 
the decision problem of choosing between 
two hypothetical scenarios or plans. Plan 
A would produce rapid B40 income growth 
but much slower T60 growth. Plan B would 
produce rapid T60 income growth but much 
slower B40 growth. A policy maker who 
maximizes B40 incomes between these two 
choices will choose plan A,19 whereas a 
FiGUrE 1.7 Views of income inequality vary across regions and income deciles
Source: World Bank calculations based on World Value Survey.
Note: Calculations are based on data for the 2010–14 “wave.” Preference for inequality ranges from agreement with (1), “Income should be more equal,” to agreement with (10), “We 
need larger income differences as incentives.” The survey question, “whether income should be made more equal or we need larger income differences as incentives for individual 
effort,” was asked to surveyors from 60 countries.
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policy maker focused on maximizing average 
income growth will choose plan B. Clearly, a 
B40 focus in this case helps reverse the rise 
in inequality relative to the counterfactual 
of maximizing average income growth. Fig-
ure 1.8b illustrates a similar decision prob-
lem with different parameter values, show-
ing that a B40 focus helps dampen the rise 
in inequality relative to the counterfactual. 
Other examples can be construed that do 
not entail a growth-inequality trade-off and 
where both policy makers would choose the 
same. In all of the above, however, when the 
B40 is targeted, inequality will be lower—or 
at least not higher—relative to the alternative 
of pursuing average growth. 
Moreover, if shared prosperity is pursued 
sustainably—an underlying requirement of 
the goal—the connections with outcome 
inequality are further tightened. The World 
Bank Group goals need to be pursued sustain-
ably—economically, environmentally, and 
socially—over time and across generations. 
The sustainability requirement imposes addi-
tional feasibility constraints on the socio-
economic strategies that policy makers may 
select as they pursue shared prosperity. Eco-
nomically, strategies that lead to the sustained 
underperformance of the B40 may eventually 
stifle the economy-wide growth process (Berg, 
Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2012; Easterly 2007). 
No country has transitioned beyond middle-
income status while maintaining high levels 
of inequality (World Bank 2013b). Environ-
mentally, if the B40 bears a disproportionate 
share of the cost of environmental degrada-
tion and pollution, a more environmentally 
sustainable growth model may strengthen 
the group’s capacity to participate in society’s 
prosperity. Socially, a continued rise in the 
gap between rich and poor may be socially 
unsustainable and incompatible with social 
equity in the longer term. All of these addi-
tional constraints impinge on the choice of 
optimal socioeconomic policies, which may 
result in outcomes of lower inequality.
FiGUrE 1.8 While inequality may still rise, a consistent focus on B40 income growth will always (weakly) 
lower inequality relative to the counterfactual of focusing on average income growth 
Source: GMR team elaboration.
Note: The example illustrates the choice between two illustrative “plans” of alternative growth rates for the B40 and T60 (the first two indicators). Derived 
from these are the average income growth rate (third indicator) and the difference between average and B40 income growth (fourth indicator), which is the 
opposite of the shared prosperity premium, and a measure of inequality.
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Assessing trends in shared prosperity
What are the recent trends in shared pros-
perity? While overall trends in B40 income 
growth appear generally positive, the hetero-
geneity and sustainability of these trends 
are a concern. Data availability and qual-
ity remain key challenges. However, the 
data consistently available and comparable 
through 2012 suggest that the B40 has in 
many parts of the world enjoyed a prolonged 
spell of solid income growth. Even so, signifi-
cant variation exists across regions and coun-
tries. In addition, the B40, both within and 
across countries, continues to lag significantly 
in non-income dimensions that are crucial to 
individual well-being and income-generating 
capacity. In light of generally healthy income 
growth but lagging non-income indicators, 
the sustainability of recent progress may be 
in question. 
Growth has become more pro-poor over the 
past decade
Rising incomes over the past decade have 
helped the B40 in many countries (figures 1.9, 
1.10). Considering five-year periods starting 
about 2007 and ending around 2012, B40 
incomes grew in 65 of the 94 countries with 
adequate and comparable data. Among them, 
47 countries registered a “shared prosperity 
premium,” with B40 incomes growing faster 
than the incomes of the average population, 
thus reducing income inequality between 
these groups. For these countries, the pre-
mium ranged from less than 1 percentage 
point to well above 3 points, suggesting that 
growth in many countries has been consid-
erably propoor. Indeed, the average shared 
prosperity premium stood at 1.7 percent. 
As with poverty reduction, not all coun-
tries made equal progress on shared pros-
perity. Incomes for the B40 grew in 65 
countries but declined in 29. For 20 of the 
latter, the shared prosperity premium was 
negative: not only did the incomes of the 
B40 decline, inequality also rose. For these 
countries, the premium ranged from zero 
to –3.1 percentage points, with an average 
around –1.2. Interestingly, whereas 72 per-
cent of the countries that registered positive 
B40 income growth registered a decline in 
inequality between the B40 and T60 groups, 
about 70 percent of those where B40 
incomes declined saw an increase in inequal-
ity between these groups. 
Interesting patterns stand out across 
regions and country groupings, with low- 
and especially high-income countries regis-
tering more mixed experiences. B40 incomes 
declined in half of the high-income countries 
and more than a third of the low-income 
ones. This pattern stands in stark contrast to 
middle-income countries, where some 85 per-
cent registered an increase in B40 incomes. 
Interestingly, all low-income countries that 
registered positive B40 income growth also 
registered a positive shared prosperity pre-
mium, whereas more than a third of high-
income countries with positive B40 growth 
saw a negative premium. Among developing 
regions, B40 income growth exceeded 5 per-
cent in eight countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, reducing income inequality 
between the B40 and the rest of the popula-
tion in all of them. Other regions saw a more 
mixed performance.
The more mixed performance on shared 
prosperity reported here is the result of a fun-
damental deterioration of B40 growth and 
a changing composition of the sample com-
pared with the last year’s Global Monitor-
ing Report. First, new comparable household 
data were available for 36 of the 66 countries 
that were included in both updates.20 Among 
these 36 countries, average B40 income 
growth (across sample periods) decelerated 
from 4.6 percent in last year’s Report to 
2.9 percent in this Report. Average income 
growth of the population decelerated from 
3.0 to 1.7 percent. As a result, the average 
shared prosperity premium declined from 1.6 
to 1.2 percent. Second, compared with last 
year’s Report, 28 new countries were added, 
of which 5 developing countries had solid 
growth in B40 incomes, on average, and 23 
high-income countries had a decline in B40 
incomes, on average. Third, 6 observations 
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were dropped in 2015–16 as the time peri-
ods for which data were available no longer 
matched the common reference period. In 
2014–15 these 6 countries had registered 
solid income growth.21 
The evolution of shared prosperity trends 
highlights further heterogeneity across coun-
tries, as illustrated by Chile and the United 
States (figure 1.11). In the United States, 
B40 incomes declined during the 2000s, 
Figure 1.9 experiences on shared prosperity differed: While the majority of countries saw solid growth in  
B40 incomes, many countries did not 
Annualized B40 income growth (bars with no black outline) and average population income growth (shown with a black outline) for a five-year period,  
percent (circa 2007–12)
Source: World Bank Global Database for Shared Prosperity.
Note: Data availability varies across countries. Shared prosperity estimates are provided only for comparable survey years. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 16 of the 48 countries have 
shared prosperity numbers even though more survey years exist. Starting points are about 2007 and end points are about 2012. See appendix C for precise periods by country. 
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perpetuating a trend of rising inequality (as 
measured by the B40 income share)—a trend 
also observed in several other high-income 
countries.22 Chile, on the other hand, expe-
rienced exactly the opposite. 
recent progress reflects changing drivers of 
shared prosperity
What explains the variation in shared pros-
perity across countries and over time: aver-
age income growth or changes in the income 
FiGUrE 1.10 Many but not all countries registered a shared prosperity premium
Source: World Bank Global Database for Shared Prosperity.
Note: See the classification of economies for the definition of income designations.
N
um
be
r o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s
0
10
20
30
40
Low-income
countries
Lower-middle-
income
countries
Upper-middle-
income
countries
High-income
countries
a. Many countries registered shared prosperity and many
did so at a premium of lower inequality b. Patterns of shared prosperity diered across countries 
Sh
ar
ed
 p
ro
sp
er
ity
 p
re
m
iu
m
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Annualized B40 growth rate (%)
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
–15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15
Positive B40 income growth and shared prosperity premium 
Positive B40 income growth and no shared prosperity premium
Negative B40 income growth and shared prosperity premium
Negative B40 income growth and no shared prosperity premium
4
4
7
7
7
13 15 12
2
2
3
11
61
FiGUrE 1.11 Countries have registered varied patterns of shared prosperity, with different implications 
for inequality
Source: World Bank PovcalNet database. 
Note: Cumulative growth of household consumption expenditure or income per capita in constant 2005 PPP prices. Historical series based on 2011 PPP 
prices are not yet fully available. 
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
,
ba
se
lin
e 
19
90
 (%
)
Pe
rc
en
t
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
,
ba
se
lin
e 
19
91
 (%
)
Pe
rc
en
t
1990 2000 2010
20
25
30
35
40
45
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
a. United States b. Chile
1990 2000 2010 
20
25
30
35
40
0
50
100
150
Bottom 40% (left axis) Population (left axis)
Income share of the bottom 40% (right axis)
54  e n d i n g  e x t r e m e  p o v e r t y  a n d  s h a r i n g  p r o s p e r i t y   g L o B a L  m o n i t o r i n g  r e p o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
share of the B40?23 Shared prosperity, or 
growth in average incomes of the B40, con-
sists of growth in average incomes plus 
growth in the income share of the B40. The 
variation of growth in average incomes of the 
B40 across countries and over time can be 
decomposed into the variation due to growth 
in average incomes, and the variation due 
to growth in the income share of the B40. 
Empirical analysis of the relative contribution 
of mean incomes and B40 shares provides a 
simple way to distinguish the underlying 
drivers of B40 income growth. 
The evidence suggests that most of the 
variation in B40 growth is due to variation in 
growth in average incomes. Over the recent 
period of 2007–12, average income growth 
tracked B40 income growth rather closely 
(figure 1.12a). Dollar, Kleineberg, and Kraay 
(2013, 2015) confirmed that this finding 
also held over the past four decades.24 Fig-
ure 1.12b shows that average income growth 
over this long time period was, in the aver-
age country and over the average five-year 
sample period, positive and larger than the 
change in the B40 income share, which was 
close to zero. It also shows that the variation 
of changes in B40 income shares across the 
sample of growth spells was much lower than 
that in average growth rates. These findings, 
taken together, show that average income 
growth clearly dominates in the explanation 
of B40 income growth.25 
Yet, average income growth is not the only 
driver of B40 income growth, as illustrated 
by subsamples of low-income countries for 
the most recent decade. A good illustration 
is the relationship in figure 1.12a, which 
shows significant variation from the trend for 
2005–12 that can be explained by changes 
in the B40 income share. Interestingly, the 
statistical properties of changes in the B40 
income share (figure 1.12b) differ markedly 
when the four-decade sample is split into sub-
samples according to income level or decen-
nial period. For example, the B40 changes 
are on average more positive and more vari-
able across the sample of growth spells in 
low-income countries than in higher-income 
countries (figure 1.12c). This pattern is also 
observed when comparing the 2000s with 
the 1980s (figure 1.12d). 
The explanatory power of average income 
growth is further diminished when examin-
ing the poorest income deciles, such as the 
B10 and the B20. Regardless of income clas-
sification, B20 and especially B10 incomes 
are much less responsive to average income 
growth than B40 incomes.26 In low-income 
countries, for example, average income 
growth explains less than a third of the total 
variation. But even for low- and middle-
income countries, the explanatory power 
remains well under half. Across decades, the 
explanatory power of average income growth 
diminishes significantly across all indicators, 
but the decline is most pronounced for the 
B10. All of this suggests that changes in the 
B40 income share have played a nontrivial 
role in explaining increases in B40 income 
growth (figures 1.12e, 1.12f). 
Given the increased importance of the rise 
in the income shares of the lower quintiles, 
it comes as no surprise that income inequal-
ity in many countries has declined since the 
2000s. Figure 1.13 shows that more coun-
tries experienced declining inequality than 
increasing inequality. Latin America has 
generally seen significant declines in inequal-
ity in virtually every country, which is con-
sistent with the good shared prosperity per-
formance in that region over that decade. 
Conversely, many high-income countries 
appeared to have registered an increase in 
inequality.
Significant disparities remain in non-income 
dimensions
To evaluate their well-being comprehen-
sively, it is important to examine how the 
B40 fared in non-income dimensions of well-
being. Doing so presents similar challenges 
as making a multidimensional assessment 
of poverty over time and space. As of now, 
few systematic attempts have been made to 
analyze how the B40 have performed in vari-
ous non-income indicators. A key question 
is whether such analysis is best undertaken 
with a dashboard (analyzing the dimensions 
separately) or an aggregate indicator (which 
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FiGUrE 1.12 The drivers of B40 income growth appear to have changed somewhat
Sources: World Bank Global Database for Shared Prosperity, around 2007–12 (panel a); Dollar, Kleineberg, and Kraay 2013, 2015 (panels b–f).
Note: In panels b–f, mean and standard deviations are reported for the distribution of minimum five-year spells of average income growth and change in the share of B10,  B20, or   
B40 in total income, distinguished by income level or decade. Unless period is specified, sample includes 1980s–2000s.
a. Income growth of the bottom 40% correlates well
with average income growth, 2007–12 
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requires identifying weights for the vari-
ous dimensions). Other questions relate to 
whether multi dimensional shared prosperity 
is analyzed over time (dynamically), across 
the income distribution (statically, comparing 
B40 and other segments), or both. Examples 
of various approaches are presented in the 
following discussion.
The evolution of living standards in 
countries belonging to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has seen marked cross-country 
differences over the past two decades. The 
OECD multidimensional living standards 
metric is one example of an aggregate mea-
sure that can be compared over time and 
across the income distribution. Figure 1.14 
shows the implementation of the measure for 
the B40 target group, where average house-
hold income growth and B40 inequality are 
considered together with aggregate mea-
sures for jobs (unemployment) and health 
(life expectancy).27 The measure suggests 
positive developments in many of the 18 
countries: reduced B40 inequality (14 coun-
tries), supportive employment conditions 
(11 countries), and rising life expectancy 
(all countries). At the same time, significant 
diversity is observed when the various dimen-
sions are considered jointly, with Finland and 
Australia registering living standard improve-
ments at an annualized rate over the past two 
decades of 4.3 and 4.1 percent, respectively, 
and the United States and Japan registering 
much smaller improvements at 1.5 and 1.1 
percent, respectively.
Despite robust income growth in devel-
oping countries, large disparities linger in 
the access of the B40 to education, health, 
and other non-income dimensions. Among 
developing countries, women in the B40 
group face more difficult access to health 
care compared with the T60, and their chil-
dren are more likely to die before age five 
(figures 1.15a, 1.15b). Many people around 
the world, especially those in the B40, report 
that they do not always have enough money 
to feed themselves or their families (figure 
1.15c). Unsurprisingly, their children are 
more likely to be underweight (figure 1.15d). 
Primary enrollment may have increased in 
many developing countries, but access to 
primary education remains unequal (World 
Bank 2014a, 2015c).28 Among lower-income 
countries, a larger share of children in B40 
families are out of school (figure 1.15e). 
These inequalities transmit to outcomes, as 
international test scores in math suggest (fig-
ure 1.15f, with the same results for science). 
The B40 appear to be disadvantaged in areas 
FiGUrE 1.13 income inequality declined over the 2000s in a small majority of countries
Source: Staff estimation based on World Development Indicators, Gini index.
Note: The time period varies depending on the availability of data. Typically, it is from late 1990s and early 2000s to later 2000s and early 2010s. The follow-
ing outliers are not shown for visualization purposes: Central African Republic (2.55), Niger (–2.52), and Seychelles (3.29). A Gini index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, whereas an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.
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other than health and education. Examples 
from Latin America suggest unequal access 
to the Internet and to basic services such as 
piped water (figure 1.15g, 1.15 h).
Intergenerational transmission of inequal-
ity of opportunity explains part of the per-
sistence of these disparities among the B40. 
Although the definition of “opportunities” 
is still being debated, a basic definition that 
most societies define them as: a set of basic 
goods and services in the early life of an indi-
vidual, which improve the probability of suc-
cess in life, and in most cases are considered 
basic economic and social rights (Barros et 
al. 2009). The “accident of birth” into a B40 
household that does not enjoy equal opportu-
nity in these important basic goods and ser-
vices is likely to be transmitted to the next 
generation. Indeed, the higher the inequality 
of opportunity, the greater the persistence in 
income inequality from one generation to the 
next (Brunori, Ferreira, and Peragine 2013).29 
These persistent socioeconomic dispari-
ties across the income distribution affect the 
income-generating capacity of the B40. Few 
of the B40 own capital assets, and, with the 
exception of transfers, most depend primar-
ily on labor earnings and income from self-
employment (World Bank 2014c). Most of 
them work in less skill-intensive sectors (such 
as agriculture, construction, or retail trade). 
A job in a dynamic, high-wage sector would 
be the B40’s passport to steady and rapid 
income growth, but the human capital levels 
of the B40 often limit such prospects. Those 
who are self-employed among the B40 also 
may have unequal access to financial capi-
tal or essential public inputs such as good-
quality infrastructure and efficient institu-
tions that connect workers, farms, and firms 
to markets. If they are to prosper and pass 
on this prosperity to the next generation, the 
B40 needs to be able to learn and compete 
alongside the T60 for the same jobs.
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FiGUrE 1.14 oECD countries have seen diverse developments in multidimensional living standards over 
the past two decades
Sources: OECD; Boarini, Murtin, and Schreyer, forthcoming.
Note: The stacked bars show contributions of average income growth, (adjusted for the bottom 40 percent income inequality), aggregate unemploy-
ment (jobs), and aggregate life expectancy (health) to the OECD’s multidimensional living standard measure for the bottom 40 percent (the dot within 
the stacked bars, which is compared with GDP per capita shown as another dot). The adjustments are implemented as y*(1-d_U-d_T )*[1-I(tau); where y is 
average household income, d_U is the correction for aggregate unemployment, d_T the correction for life expectancy, and I(tau) the correction for income 
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FiGUrE 1.15 Disparities in health, education, and nutrition are noteworthy
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Past trends may not be sustainable 
Average income growth—one key driver of 
shared prosperity—may not be as buoyant 
as it was before the global financial crisis. As 
chapter 3 elaborates, the medium-term out-
look is projecting weaker potential growth 
in many middle- and high-income economies 
compared with the precrisis period. Emerg-
ing markets face a structural slowdown, and 
potential growth in high-income economies 
is likely to recover to slightly lower levels 
than before. Demographic pressures in many 
countries dampen potential growth, whereas 
the sluggish recovery of investment since the 
crisis in some countries and the declining 
prospects for rapid productivity improvement 
in other countries pose further constraints. 
Barring policy adjustments, jobs and incomes 
are expected to be affected in these countries. 
The other factor that underpinned rising 
B40 incomes—the increase in the income 
share of the B40—may, likewise, not be as 
supportive as before. The 2000s saw a rise 
in the B40 income share unlike previous 
decades. Whether there is a reversal to more 
muted historical patterns remains to be seen. 
Surveys suggest that improvements in living 
standards are perceived as unequal and linked 
to perceptions about poverty reduction efforts 
(figure 1.16). The factors that supported the 
FiGUrE 1.16 Perceptions of improvements in 
living standards and poverty efforts are related
Source: Staff estimations based on Gallup World Poll 2014.
Note: These results refer to the following questions: “In this country, are 
you satisfied or dissatisfied with efforts to deal with the poor?” (vertical 
axis); “Right now, do you feel your standard of living is getting better or 
getting worse?” (horizontal axis).
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FiGUrE 1.15 Disparities in health, education, and nutrition are noteworthy (continued)
Source: DHS Surveys (panel e); Health Nutrition and Population Statistics by Wealth Quintile Database (panels a, b, and d); World Gallup Database (panel c, 
2014); OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) (panel f); World Bank (panels g and h).
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rise in the income share may turn out to have 
been transitory or unsustainable. For exam-
ple, if high commodity prices lifted wages in 
the labor-intensive services sector, the onset 
of a period of lower commodity prices may 
remove some of that impetus. Some countries 
have seen generous minimum wage develop-
ments that have lifted the incomes of the B40. 
To the extent that such policies produce nega-
tive fiscal implications or mounting unit labor 
costs, their sustainability is at risk. 
Continued elevated levels of inequality 
pose an additional sustainability risk
Elevated levels of income inequality may 
not be compatible with a sustained improve-
ment in shared prosperity if they damage the 
growth process. Indirect evidence for this 
statement is illustrated in figure 1.17, which 
shows that no country has moved beyond 
middle-income status while maintaining 
high levels of inequality (Ferreira and Rav-
allion 2011; World Bank 2013b). Too much 
inequality (whether vertically in income lev-
els, horizontally across groups, or dimension-
ally in aspects other than income) is bound 
to affect social sustainability. Too much 
inequality may also slow growth, as recent 
literature suggests. That in turn affects the 
ability of countries to sustainably climb the 
income ladder (Banerjee and Duflo 2003; 
Forbes 2000; Li and Zou 1998; Marrero and 
Rodriguez 2012, 2013; van der Weide and 
Milanovic 2014; Voitchovsky 2005). 
Persistent inequality of opportunity 
in non-income dimensions may eventu-
ally dampen the dynamism of B40 income 
growth. The B40 continues to exhibit large 
disparities with the rest of the population in 
its access to basic goods and services of good 
quality, reflecting in large part inequality of 
opportunity. The B40—and among them, 
especially women—is thus limited in making 
the best of their most important asset, labor, 
and in earning higher incomes reflective of 
their marginal productivity. To be sustain-
able, longer-term wage developments need to 
be underpinned by productivity.
Moreover, environmental aspects of recent 
development patterns are not sustainable. 
Trends for indicators showing the sustainable 
use of natural resources (land, water, for-
estry, fisheries, biodiversity), pollution (air, 
water, toxics, solid waste), and carbon emis-
sions are all going the wrong way.30 Conser-
vatively measured, the combined value of the 
associated environmental damages rose by 50 
percent between 1990 and 2010, mainly in 
developing countries. A broader indicator of 
growth sustainability is the “change in total 
wealth per capita.”31 This measure subtracts 
from a country’s gross national savings all 
forms of capital depreciation, including the 
loss of natural capital (that is, mineral deple-
tion and natural resources degradation). The 
results for 1990–2011 show that low- and 
lower-middle-income countries have fared 
the worst in terms of depleting per capita 
wealth (figure 1.18). Natural capital deple-
tion in the low-income countries has averaged 
about 6 percent of gross national income per 
capita since 1990. A regional breakdown 
shows that 84 percent of Sub-Saharan coun-
tries are depleting their capital, followed by 
42 percent in the Middle East and North 
Africa and 40 percent in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (figure 1.19).
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FiGUrE 1.17 income inequality in richer 
countries tends to be lower
Sources: Staff estimations; World Development Indicators.
Note: Each point refers to a pair of the Gini and GDP per capita for the 
same year for one country. The chart includes the most recent information 
available for all countries over the 2010–12 period and is based on the 
World Bank income classification (using the Atlas method). Because the 
latest income classification for 2015 is used, it is possible that the income 
levels shown for 2010–12 deviate slightly from the income groupings.
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FiGUrE 1.18 low- and lower-middle-income countries have fared 
the worst in depleting per capita wealth
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators and forthcoming update of World Bank 2011a.
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The rise in pollution is of particular con-
cern, especially in cities where much of the 
global population resides. Urban poverty, 
particularly in poor countries, typically starts 
as rural deprivation with migrants being 
driven by the lack of opportunity in rural 
areas. The irresistible pull of cities has done 
much to provide employment and propel 
growth, which is essential for alleviating pov-
erty, but urbanization has also brought new 
problems. Urban air pollution has emerged 
as a leading cause of ill health in developing 
countries—with more than triple the impact 
of malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis combined. 
The population exposed to ambient levels of 
unhealthy air pollution rose by more than a 
third in developing countries between 1990 
and 2013 (figure 1.20); the increase was 
around 40 percent in middle-income coun-
tries, and 98 percent in low-income coun-
tries. Virtually all developing countries thus 
face a double burden of environmental health 
risks: the impact of disease associated with 
underdevelopment, such as inadequate sani-
tation, and the impact of health risks derived 
from growth, such as ambient pollution and 
waste. While trends in “traditional” water 
and sanitation problems show great improve-
ment over the past 25 years, trends in “mod-
ern” problems of environmental management 
and sustainability point to the reverse.
Ending extreme poverty  
and sharing prosperity:  
Policy agenda 
Putting an end to extreme poverty and pro-
moting shared prosperity are ongoing chal-
lenges. Country circumstances and contexts 
differ, and so policy priorities will also vary 
across countries. For example, some countries 
have eradicated extreme poverty already and 
therefore the second goal on shared prosper-
ity is more relevant for them. In addition, sig-
nificant overlap exists in the types of policies 
needed to end poverty or share prosperity, 
and these common ingredients hold relevance 
for a broad set of countries. 
This section delineates the policy agenda 
and articulates key priorities that are of 
common interest to a wide range of countries. 
First, it examines the rationale for policy 
intervention, looks at the possible synergies 
between goals of ending extreme poverty and 
sharing prosperity, and explores how effi-
ciency and equity interact. Second, it spells 
out a three-component strategy that centers 
on growth, investment, and insurance. 
Delineating policy approaches
In light of country specifics, is there com-
mon ground among policy approaches that 
purport to end poverty and share prosperity? 
The answer is yes, but the policy mix needs 
to be sensitive to the complementarities and 
trade-offs between the two goals. 
Growth with equity is essential for meeting 
the two goals
The policy agenda underpinning the World 
Bank Group’s goals is “growth with equity.” 
Growth has played a key role in reducing 
extreme poverty and promoting shared pros-
perity and is critical to sustaining progress. 
Yet, aggregate growth by itself is not enough; 
it needs to be pursued with equity, comple-
mented by policies that enable the poorest 
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and the B40 to fully participate in and benefit 
from the growth process. To pursue growth 
without equity would be socially destabiliz-
ing and to pursue equity without growth 
would tend to “redistribute economic stagna-
tion,” as Robert McNamara stated in 1980.32 
The two aspects of equity that delineate 
the policy agenda are avoidance of absolute 
deprivation and equality of opportunity. The 
quest to end extreme poverty builds on the 
societal preference to avoid absolute depriva-
tion and protect the livelihoods of its poorest 
FiGUrE 1.19 The share of countries with evidence of unsustainable economies rose between 1995 and 2010
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators and forthcoming update of World Bank 2011a.
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FiGUrE 1.20 Exposure to urban pollution is on the rise
Source: Ambient PM2.5 exposure data from Brauer et al., forthcoming; both urban and rural areas 
are included. PM 2.5 refers to fine particulate matter.
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members regardless of whether the equal 
opportunity principle has been upheld. The 
quest to promote shared prosperity reflects 
the principle of equal opportunity, whereby 
the outcomes of a person’s life, in its many 
dimensions, should mostly reflect his or 
her efforts and talents, not his or her back-
ground. The notion of pursuing the World 
Bank Group’s goals in an economically, envi-
ronmentally, and socially sustainable manner 
in turn serves equity and equality of oppor-
tunity intertemporally, reaching future gen-
erations who too can then live lives without 
deprivation and full of opportunity.
The poverty and shared prosperity goals are 
mutually reinforcing
Country circumstances will determine the 
relative importance of the extreme poverty 
and shared prosperity goals, as the B40 may 
comprise many possible populations (box 
1.8). In countries where extreme poverty rates 
are around 40 percent, the two goals almost 
completely overlap: increasing the income 
growth of the B40 accelerates the reduction 
of poverty and promotes shared prosperity. 
In countries where extreme poverty rates are 
significantly greater than 40 percent (mostly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa), the shared prosper-
ity goal implies a focus on the poorest of 
the poor and therefore has a narrower scope 
than the poverty eradication goal. In other 
countries, where extreme poverty exists but 
at rates well below 40 percent, the shared 
prosperity objective is broader than the pov-
erty goal because it includes a potentially 
much larger group of those who are, in abso-
lute terms, moderately poor or vulnerable 
to falling into poverty. Finally, in countries 
where extreme poverty is no longer an issue, 
the shared prosperity objective focuses a lens 
on those who are relatively poor, a concept 
intrinsically connected to inequality. 
In countries where poverty reduction is 
a key priority, the shared prosperity lens 
enhances that effort. In some countries, 
shared prosperity may complement national 
poverty lines and strengthen the focus on the 
poor. In others, it may help broaden the focus 
of international poverty lines to whomever 
national authorities consider to be deprived 
based on the standards of their societies. In 
all of these circumstances, shared prosper-
ity is doubly good for the poor: first, effec-
tive shared prosperity strategies that expand 
the opportunities of the B40 through greater 
participation in the development process will 
affect poverty reduction directly if indeed 
many of the B40 are poor. Second, to the 
extent that shared prosperity reduces inequal-
ity, the poverty reduction power of future 
economic growth is likely to be enhanced, 
leading to a greater growth elasticity of pov-
erty reduction.33 
This reinforced focus on poverty reduc-
tion is essential if the world is to reach the 
ambitious goal of 3 percent global poverty by 
2030. As is argued in World Bank (2015c), 
meeting the poverty goal by 2030 requires 
both strong aggregate economic growth 
and an increase in the income share of the 
extremely poor. Reductions in inequality 
arising from higher income growth among 
the B40 can make the difference. One esti-
mate suggests that a shared prosperity pre-
mium of 2 percentage points, which requires 
B40 incomes to grow significantly faster 
than mean incomes, is necessary to achieve 
the poverty goal (Lakner, Negre, and Prydz 
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Box 1.8 Who is in the B40?
To assess trends in shared prosperity and calibrate 
policies, it is essential to understand the composition 
of the bottom 40 percent (B40). Just like the poor, the 
B40 is not a static subgroup of the population. Some 
people move in and out of the B40, whereas others 
are chronically at the lower end of the income distri-
bution. Yet, it is possible to characterize the B40 as a 
group. As shown below, the composition of the B40 
is very different across countries. These differences 
need to be taken into account when identifying strate-
gies to boost shared prosperity, which in some coun-
tries will overlap strongly with the struggle against 
extreme poverty, whereas in others the connections 
with reducing inequality will be stronger. 
The profile of the richest B40 person varies con-
siderably across countries. Map B1.8.1 illustrates the 
geographical distribution of the characteristics of the 
40th percentile, identifying whether the richest per-
son belonging to the B40 is extremely poor as defined 
by the international poverty line, moderately poor, 
vulnerable, or none of these but rather a member of 
the “middle class” or even rich. 
Most of the countries in which the richest among 
the B40 are still extremely poor are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In some places in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of 
East Asia and Pacific, and all of South Asia, the rich-
est of the B40 are moderately poor. The B40 in these 
countries thus consists entirely of populations that are 
either extremely poor or moderately poor. In most of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the richest among 
the B40 are vulnerable. Following impressive gains in 
shared prosperity that lifted many out of poverty, the 
richest B40 person in that region remains susceptible 
to falling back into poverty. 
Overall, the B40 group as a whole encompasses 
many different combinations of extreme poverty, 
MAP B.1.8.1 The income of the richest B40 person differs greatly across countries
Income status of the B40 of the income distribution in 2011
Source: PovcalNet database 2015.
Note: Estimates based on the $1.25 poverty line and 2005 purchasing power parity prices. The full distributional data using 2011 prices are still being developed.
(box continues next page)
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Box 1.8 Who is in the B40? (continued)
moderate poverty, and vulnerability. At the top of fig-
ure B1.8.1a are countries where extreme poverty rates 
exceed 40 percent, suggesting that a B40 focus in 
those countries would emphasize the poorest among 
the extremely poor and potentially overlook others in 
extreme poverty above the B40 cutoff but below the 
extreme proverty line. Directly below are countries 
where moderate poverty is becoming an increasing 
concern, since poverty rarely ends when a poor person 
climbs over the extreme poverty line. The lower half 
of the figure shows countries where extreme poverty 
has been mostly eradicated, but many people remain 
moderately poor and a significant share may be char-
acterized as vulnerable to falling back into poverty. 
At the bottom of the figure are richer countries, where 
most of the B40 have become middle class and have 
low risk of falling into extreme poverty. 
Among richer countries, where absolute poverty is 
of lesser concern, the B40 may encompass many of 
those who are considered to be relatively poor. Figure 
B1.8.1b shows that in OECD countries many of the 
less well-off are considered to be living in relative pov-
erty, even after taking transfers into account. They 
are seen to be unable to enjoy an acceptable standard 
of living relative to that of the majority of the popula-
tion. Given that the relative poverty measure is based 
on a poverty line set at 60 percent of median national 
income, the notion is more closely related to within-
country inequality. Yet, it does show that the focus 
on the B40 allows for flexibility in focusing on what 
societies care most about. 
FiGUrE B1.8.1 Whether viewed through the lens of absolute or relative deprivation, the B40 encompasses 
diverse populations that vary significantly across countries 
Sources: PovcalNet and OECD Income Distribution Database
Note: Panel a is ranked lexicographically according to the category of the 40th percentile, that is, first, all countries where the 40th percentile is extremely poor are  
displayed and sorted by the size of the group of extremely poor, followed by the same procedure for the moderately poor, the vulnerable, and the middle class and 
rich. Data based on 2005 PPPs and $1.25 poverty line. Panel b: The data for Canada are from 2011.
Extreme poor (< $1.25 a day) 
Moderate poor ($1.25–$4 a day) 
Vulnerable ($4–$10 a day) 
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0 20 40 60 80 100 
Madagascar
Sierra Leone
Comoros
Bangladesh
Senegal
Mauritania
Iraq
Sri Lanka
Fiji
Nicaragua
Kazakhstan
Ecuador
Paraguay
Panama
Latvia
Slovak Republic
Bottom 40% 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Poor after taxes and transfers 
Poor before taxes and transfers 
Non-poor 
Switzerland
Iceland
Norway
Netherlands
Mexico
Canada
Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
United States
United Kingdom
Estonia
Austria
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
Bottom 40% 
a. The bottom 40% includes the absolutely poor and 
vulnerable, to diering degrees, selected countries
b. The bottom 40% also includes a signicant share of those
considered to be relatively deprived, selected countries
Income status at each percentile, 2011 (There is data for 
123 countries, of which 16 countries are shown)
Income status at each percentile, 2012 (There is
data for 32 countries, of which 16 are shown)
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2014). This focus on raising the income 
share of the poor will be all the more nec-
essary given the ambitiousness of the pov-
erty target, the elevated poverty rates that 
are expected to persist in much of Sub- 
Saharan Africa, and the large number of 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
who are expected to continue experiencing 
multiple deprivations beyond income poverty. 
“More equitable” need not mean  
“less efficient” 
The equity–efficiency trade-off has for a long 
time animated the discussion on the feasibil-
ity and desirability of redistributive policies. 
Arthur Okun (1975) hypothesized that redis-
tributive policies intended to reduce inequal-
ity imply a “big trade-off,” where lower 
inequality can be achieved only at a great 
efficiency cost (the “leaky buckets” hypoth-
esis).34 The trade-off rests on the premise that 
markets work perfectly and that redistribu-
tion produces administrative costs, disincen-
tive effects, and productivity distortions. In 
the presence of market failures, however, the 
equity–efficiency trade-off need not always 
hold, a fact that gives rise to the possibility 
of redistributive policies that also enhance 
efficiency (World Bank 2005).35 While 
complementarities exist between equity and 
efficiency, this is not to say that the trade-
off does not exist anymore. In the presence 
of resource constraints, many investment 
and policy choices will likely need to con-
tend with a trade-off of some sort (where the 
time horizon plays a key role in assessing the 
trade-off). How the trade-off is resolved lies 
at the heart of how growth with equity is 
operationalized in the real world. 
Given that such a trade-off need not 
always hold, policies may be able to simulta-
neously improve growth and equity. Growth 
and its incidence across the income distribu-
tion are determined jointly and therefore pol-
icies that affect one will also affect the other. 
An equity component need not be embed-
ded in each policy. It suffices that the overall 
package is consistent with growth and equity 
and that the underlying process is fair (World 
Bank 2005). Moreover, there is a substantial 
reform agenda that comprises policies that 
can simultaneously raise growth and equity. 
Such synergistic, win-win policies address 
equality of opportunity and help broaden 
participation in the process of growth; exam-
ples are policies that improve access to mar-
kets, level the playing field for firms large and 
small, build human capabilities, and remove 
barriers to job creation (Qureshi 2015). 
Growth gives governments the fiscal space 
to implement redistributive policies that raise 
the incomes and welfare of the poor and the 
B40. In the presence of significant failures 
in credit, insurance, labor, or land markets, 
where market outcomes may not be effi-
cient, there is scope for efficient and equitable 
redistributive policies. Policies that redis-
tribute wealth can help poorer people over-
come credit constraints to invest in human 
capital or can effectively insure them against 
transient shocks; targeted safety nets have 
dynamic efficiency effects that ultimately sup-
port growth and enhance its sustainability. 
More sustainable development does not 
imply lower growth
The promise of sustainable development 
requires greater commitment to green growth 
policies. Such policies typically have the 
broad objectives of protecting and ensuring 
the sustainable use of natural capital, improv-
ing environmental quality, and advancing 
lower carbon and more resilient growth in 
the face of a changing climate. Green growth 
policies not only reduce large welfare costs 
and environmental externalities. They can 
contribute directly to economic growth and 
the well-being of the poor in several ways, 
including by promoting efficiency gains that 
are cost-effective, reduce energy and materi-
als use, and increase private sector profits; 
reducing future costs of natural resources, 
such as water, through improved manage-
ment; improving the health and productiv-
ity of the workforce and lowering health 
expenses in the state budget; promoting the 
expansion of new industries and technolo-
gies that offset losses in sunset industries; 
Responding to changes in consumer prefer-
ences through expansion of less-polluting 
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and energy-intensive service industries (often 
including realizing opportunities that would 
otherwise be lost, such as tourism); and 
proactively adapting to disaster risks in ways 
that reduce the impact of those risks, reduce 
costs, and improve knowledge.
identifying key policy ingredients
To sustainably end extreme poverty and 
boost shared prosperity, three policy ingredi-
ents are needed in any strategy.36
•  Sustaining broad-based growth. Economic 
growth has been the main building block 
of poverty reduction and shared prosperity 
over the past several decades. Among econ-
omies that have managed to sustain rapid 
growth for extended periods, five charac-
teristics are common: effective leadership 
and governance, macroeconomic stability, 
a market orientation to guide structural 
change, an outward orientation for domes-
tic and external discipline, and a future ori-
entation to boost savings and meet invest-
ment needs. Growth is not an end in itself, 
however. It is a means for increasing the 
incomes and well-being of people, and it is 
most effective in reaching low-income peo-
ple when it increases their labor incomes by 
supporting productive employment. Policy 
makers must keep in mind the effects of 
interventions on job creation and income 
growth for the extreme poor and the B40.
•  Investing in human development. Human 
development is essential to remedying the 
multidimensional deprivations of the poor 
and the B40, and a requirement for broad-
based economic growth. Vital human 
development investments include educa-
tion, health and population programs, safe 
water, and sanitation. These services are 
especially important for children, whose 
opportunities early in life determine their 
future lives as adults. The quality of ser-
vices is also important. It is not enough 
to get children to school: teachers need to 
show up, textbooks need to arrive, and 
children need to be taught in ways that 
enable them to learn. Health clinics need to 
be staffed with trained personnel, stocked, 
and able to provide adequate services. 
Effective service delivery, in turn, requires 
effective, accountable, and transparent 
mechanisms and institutions.
•  Insuring against risks. Social policies can 
protect the extremely poor from destitu-
tion and protect the vulnerable against 
risks. They can help families avoid irrevers-
ible losses and prevent them from having 
to make decisions with costly long-run 
implications. Good social programs sup-
port growth and human development and 
come in three kinds. Noncontributory 
social assistance programs for the chronic 
or extreme poor protect them from desti-
tution and promote investments in their 
children’s human capital. Social insurance 
programs prevent people falling back into 
poverty, whether caused by individual ill-
ness, temporary unemployment, or local-
ized droughts. And global insurance mech-
anisms help countries cope with massive 
natural disasters or pandemics. To design 
such programs, a dynamic understanding 
of poverty and vulnerability is essential. 
In all of the above, it is essential that natu-
ral capital, environmental health, and eco-
system sustainability concerns are integrated 
into economic decision making. In both rural 
and urban areas, poverty alleviation strategies 
need to give greater attention to the environ-
mental and resource dimensions of poverty 
because the number of people involved is 
large and the consequences of neglect signifi-
cant. Where resource dependence is high and 
opportunities for economic diversification are 
limited, it is unlikely that policies can elimi-
nate poverty without acknowledging the criti-
cal role of natural resources in supporting the 
poor. Natural resources are often the only 
significant assets that the poor have access to, 
and if managed efficiently they could provide 
a sustainable foundation for economic viabil-
ity. If not, however, the loss of natural capital 
through weaknesses in property rights, poor 
local knowledge, price distortions, or poor 
infrastructure means that eradicating poverty 
over the longer term will be unachievable. 
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Broad-based growth must be sustained  
over time 
Continued progress in poverty reduction and 
shared prosperity requires economic dyna-
mism to generate income-earning opportu-
nities for broad segments of society. As part 
of this endeavor, economic growth—both its 
pace and pattern—is critical. In very poor 
countries, it is arithmetically impossible to 
reduce poverty significantly without growth 
because the pool to redistribute from is very 
small. In richer countries, growth again is 
key because it explains most of the varia-
tion in income among the B40. In addition 
to the pace of growth, its pattern also mat-
ters. Some kinds of growth benefit the poor 
or the B40 more effectively than other kinds. 
The expansion of smallholder farming or 
labor-intensive manufacturing, for example, 
may convey greater benefits to the poor than 
the expansion of capital-intensive mining 
does. Moreover, for growth to have a last-
ing impact, it must be sustained over a long 
period of time. Sustained growth results in 
mass job creation, making labor more scarce 
and valuable and thereby lifting incomes. 
Growth can thereby bite deeply into poverty 
and contribute to prosperity by being shared 
within and between generations. 
Fast growth in labor-intensive sectors 
will help reduce poverty and share prosper-
ity, especially when coupled with efforts to 
increase labor force participation. Two dis-
tinct, but not mutually exclusive, pathways 
for boosting labor incomes exist: fuller 
employment and higher returns to employ-
ment. Growth in labor incomes was the 
foundation of the rapid reduction in poverty 
in East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, 
as well as in the developing countries that 
were most successful at reducing poverty in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Much of the recovery 
since the 2008 economic crisis has been in 
the form of jobless growth, which has damp-
ened the benefits of growth for lower-income 
groups.
The Commission on Growth and Devel-
opment (2008) has highlighted five charac-
teristics as key to rapid and sustained growth 
(figure 1.21). The Commission identified 
13 economies that since 1950 have grown 
at an average rate of 7 percent or more for 
25 years or longer.37 Despite the differences 
between them, these economies all exhibited 
the following: they had committed, credible, 
and capable governments; they maintained 
macroeconomic stability; they let markets 
allocate resources; they fully “exploited” the 
world economy; and they mustered high rates 
of saving and investment.
Effective leadership and governance
Sustained growth requires committed, cred-
ible, and capable governments. Growth does 
not “just happen.” It requires a decades-long 
commitment to the credible implementa-
tion of enabling policies that are designed 
by capable governments. The effectiveness 
of governments depends in the first place on 
the talent of their workforce, the incentives 
they foster, the vigor of their debates, and the 
organizational structure they impose (Com-
mission on Growth and Development 2008). 
Governments are not only policy makers but 
also service providers, investors, arbitrators, 
and employers, requiring good governance 
in all of these roles. Good governance also 
requires strong accountability measures 
between policy makers and people, to raise 
the voices of the ultimate beneficiaries of gov-
ernment policy, especially the marginalized 
and the poor, and between policy makers 
FiGUrE 1.21 Five characteristics have been key among countries 
that sustained rapid growth
Source: GMR team adaptation from Commission on Growth and Development 2008. 
Eective
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to guide structural change
Macroeconomic stability
so markets work
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and providers, so as to raise the quality of 
service delivery (World Bank 2003).
Macroeconomic stability so markets work
Macroeconomic stability is a key prerequisite 
for growth to flourish. Instability in price lev-
els, interest rates, the exchange rate, or the 
tax burden deters private investment. Sound 
macroeconomic policies reduce distortions 
in relative prices and returns to assets and 
encourage investments in productive sectors. 
Macroeconomic stability also ensures that fis-
cal resources are productively used to finance 
critical expenditures, including in education, 
health, and infrastructure, rather than merely 
servicing the debt (Commission on Growth 
and Development 2008). The recent financial 
crisis has brought to the fore the damaging 
consequences of macroeconomic instability 
on economic growth and living standards, 
contributing to job losses, rising poverty lev-
els, and thereby endangering progress toward 
poverty reduction and shared prosperity. 
Market orientation to guide structural 
change
Microeconomic dynamism is a necessary 
feature of an adaptive economy and, guided 
by the market mechanism, a key driver of 
structural change. Growth entails struc-
tural transformation within and across sec-
tors.38 Within sectors, opportunities arise to 
deepen comparative advantages and boost 
productivity by operating more efficiently 
and moving up the value chain. As compara-
tive advantages evolve, structural shifts occur 
between sectors, from agriculture to industry 
and services, from rural to urban areas, and 
from informal to formal activities. Well-func-
tioning markets are essential to guide these 
processes. Their price signals ration scarce 
resources to their most productive uses. This 
rationing is accomplished through competi-
tion, buttressed by contestability in product 
markets and mobility in capital and labor 
markets.39 The negative impact of inefficient 
resource allocation may not be immediately 
visible, but it will slowly accrue over time. 
Recent evidence from Latin America sug-
gests, for example, that 80 percent of the 
efficiency gap between the region and the 
United States is explained by misallocation 
of resources, where the efficiency gap itself 
explains about half of the income gap (Araujo 
et al. 2015). Key priorities are the following: 
•  Accelerating productivity growth in agri-
culture. Increased agricultural productivity 
growth is important because the majority 
of the poor continue to live in rural areas 
where agriculture is central to their liveli-
hoods. Special consideration is needed for 
women, who make up over 43 percent 
of the global agricultural labor force, yet 
continue to face major constraints reduc-
ing their productivity (O’Sullivan et al. 
2014). Experience in all regions has shown 
that improving the living conditions of 
the extremely and moderately poor hinges 
on the creation of a dynamic agricultural 
sector. Despite some inroads into produc-
tivity-enhancing agricultural technology, 
agricultural success stories in Africa are 
few compared with the experiences in Asia 
and Latin America, and yields per hectare 
in Africa are about the same as they were 
in 1970. Better output prices through more 
open trade (as seen in Cambodia, Ethio-
pia, and Rwanda, among others) provide 
necessary incentives to adopt fertilizer and 
improved seed varieties, especially when 
reinforced by complementary policies to 
reduce the cost of inputs, such as improved 
infrastructure and access to finance and 
insurance. Institutional measures such as 
land reform, market infrastructure, and 
more effective producers’ organizations 
can catalyze investment in agriculture (Gill 
and Revenga forthcoming). 
•  Widening the economic footprint of natu-
ral resources. Many countries have oppor-
tunities to enhance the economywide 
potential of the natural resource sector. 
Depending on the location, suitable poli-
cies may include improved rural-to-urban 
connectivity, stronger value-chains, rural 
finance, protection of community and 
indigenous property rights, and environ-
mental regulation. The potential pitfalls of 
NRB growth are well understood, both at 
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the microeconomic level (resource degra-
dation) and macroeconomic level (possible 
real exchange rate appreciation that may 
render the manufacturing sector uncom-
petitive, and heightened volatility due to 
commodity prices). At the micro-level, the 
appropriate response to these potential 
negative effects is very location specific but 
often has to do with property rights, access, 
and fostering alternatives to traditional 
practices. At the macro-level, appropriate 
policies include not limiting commodity 
exports or erecting costly import barriers 
to protect domestic industries. Instead, 
policies should alleviate demand and sup-
ply constraints on productivity activity by 
improving infrastructure, creating a con-
ducive investment climate, and facilitating 
private sector access to capital, skills, tech-
nology, and markets (Chandra, Lin, and 
Wang 2012; De Cavalcanti, Mohaddes, 
and Raissi 2012; IMF 2011). 
•  Sustaining competitiveness in manufactur-
ing. In other countries, structural transfor-
mation of the manufacturing sector will 
be a key priority. Competitive pressure has 
transformed the landscape of manufactur-
ing industries worldwide, placing a high 
premium on maintaining a competitive 
edge in line with a country’s comparative 
advantage. For poorer countries, where the 
fields are still so oversupplied with labor 
that the marginal productivity of agricul-
tural labor is low, the objective will be to 
efficiently produce low-cost, high-volume, 
labor-intensive manufacturing goods, help-
ing absorb low-skilled labor in higher-
value-added activities. For others, the 
objective is to move up the value chain into 
more skill-intensive and innovation-driven 
manufacturing, and in the process to 
develop new competitive niches, generat-
ing jobs and lifting incomes along the way. 
In both cases, exposure to internal and 
external competition is key so that market 
forces can help firms explore and develop 
their comparative advantages (World Bank 
2010a, 2014c). 
•  Raising the efficiency and quality of ser-
vices. Many countries grapple with inef-
ficiencies in segments of their services 
sectors, producing a loss in productiv-
ity. Large segments of the services sector 
remain informal, expensive, of low qual-
ity, or inefficient. Services play a key role 
in economic growth and job creation. 
Improvements in the productivity, quality, 
and range of services contribute to eco-
nomic growth directly but also indirectly, 
given the role of services as inputs into all 
other sectors. Services are typically labor 
intensive, and they may be skill intensive 
too. Increased job creation in services can 
contribute to poverty alleviation and B40 
income growth. Enhanced service deliv-
ery in the areas of education and health 
can also promote human capital develop-
ment to the benefit of longer-term growth 
prospects. A more dynamic services sector 
also allows countries to insert themselves 
more fully into the production of tradable 
services—a rapidly growing dimension of 
global trade (World Bank 2010b, 2014b). 
Outward orientation to leverage and 
discipline
Outward orientation—openness to the 
global economy—plays a distinct role in fos-
tering structural change and can contribute 
to growth in multiple ways. By leveraging the 
global economy, domestic firms are offered 
deep, elastic markets for exports, which may 
support job creation and income growth. 
Trade may also raise real incomes by low-
ering the prices of products. For example, 
imports of lower-priced consumption goods 
from China have helped expand Brazil’s 
“consumption frontier” (World Bank 2014b). 
Trade openness provides an economy the 
freedom to specialize in whatever it is best 
at producing, while also imposing discipline 
to use resources efficiently. Labor mobility 
across borders may contribute to remittances 
and beneficial return migration. Capital 
flows can complement domestic savings, alle-
viate credit constraints, and impose discipline 
on macroeconomic policies. Knowledge flows 
contribute to ideas, technologies, and know-
how that are all shared and augmented across 
borders.
However, the capacity of the poor and 
the B40 to benefit from a greater outward 
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orientation is not guaranteed, suggesting a 
role for complementary and compensatory 
policies. It is generally accepted that relatively 
open economies fare better in the aggregate 
than closed ones and that relatively open 
policies contribute considerably to devel-
opment. Yet, openness may lead to greater 
uncertainty, and greater openness may not 
always be positive for the poorest in the short 
run; even in the longer run, some people may 
be left behind in poverty (World Bank and 
WTO 2015). Various challenges may be pres-
ent, such as market barriers in agriculture, 
fragility and conflict, informality, and gender 
biases. Complementary policies may help the 
poor to extract maximum benefit. For exam-
ple, trade facilitation can be strengthened 
and connectivity can be improved to reduce 
remoteness from markets at the subnational 
level, broadening access for poor and small 
traders. Moreover, since trade liberalization 
can produce adjustment costs that raise pov-
erty, compensatory policies can be considered 
to mitigate this impact (Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay 2004). 
Future orientation to meet investment needs 
An orientation toward the future—the will-
ingness to postpone current consumption 
in return for higher consumption later—is 
essential to generate the savings needed to 
finance investment. The speed of growth, 
especially in early stages of development, is 
limited mainly by the pace of investment—
both public and private—which reflects the 
availability of both domestic and foreign 
savings. Future-oriented economies are char-
acterized by their ability to raise funds and 
invest them productively, generating lasting 
growth in the process. Investment needs are 
broad and cover infrastructure as well as 
education and health. Public infrastructure 
investment (in roads, ports, airports, and 
power) helps attract private investment and 
paves the way for diversification and struc-
tural transformation. Sufficient fiscal space 
is needed to finance infrastructure needs, but 
governments can also team up with the pri-
vate sector in public-private partnerships that 
share financial benefits and burdens while 
clearly delineating risks.
Access to infrastructure has potentially 
important effects on the ability of the poor to 
generate income. Connective infrastructure is 
a crucial means of linking the farms and firms 
where the poor live and work to markets. 
Electrification of poor areas in South Africa 
has resulted in a 9 percentage point increase 
in female labor force participation, consump-
tion, and earnings by allowing reallocation 
of time use within the household thanks to 
time-saving electric appliances (Dinkelman 
2011). Along the same lines, rural electrifica-
tion in India has caused changes in consump-
tion and earnings, with increases in the labor 
supply of both men and women, and it has 
promoted girls’ schooling by reallocating 
their time to tasks more conducive to school 
attendance. Investment in integration and 
connectedness through railroads in India has 
helped to reduce the exposure of agricultural 
prices and real income to rainfall shocks, and 
to diminish the famine and mortality risks 
associated with recurrent weather shocks 
(Burgess and Donaldson 2010). 
investment in human development is key
Achieving the ambitious World Bank Group 
goals will require leveraging human resources 
to their fullest potential. The capacity of 
households to contribute to overall growth 
and their own well-being depends on the 
assets they control, the returns to these assets, 
and how intensively the assets can be used 
(World Bank 2014c). The assets come in 
many forms, including human capital (edu-
cation, health, nutrition), financial capital, 
physical capital (land, machinery), and social 
capital. Many of these assets—especially 
human and social capital—have both intrin-
sic and instrumental value. They are goods in 
their own right and contribute to well-being, 
and they also increase a person’s income-
generating capabilities. The focus on inequal-
ity of opportunities rather than inequality of 
outcomes is motivated by the need to provide 
incentives to accumulate human and physi-
cal capital. However, the same inequality of 
outcomes may prevent poorer households 
from borrowing to accumulate human and 
physical capital, which perpetuates poverty 
and inequality. Policies that enable poorer 
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households to accumulate assets by reduc-
ing inequalities of opportunity are therefore 
crucial. 
Equitable access to quality social ser-
vices is key. To upgrade the human capital 
of lower-income groups, investments need 
to be made to ensure equality of access for 
critical basic social services, such as educa-
tion, health, water, and sanitation. These 
investments often take place over multiple 
periods, with critical windows and sensitive 
periods depending on the type of investment. 
For example, in low- and middle-income 
countries, policies targeted at promoting 
infant and child survival and those focused 
on investments in nutrition and stimulation 
during the first years of life have the highest 
potential returns. Addressing deprivations 
during the prenatal period is critical. Provid-
ing access to prenatal care and ensuring that 
births are managed by skilled professionals 
will reduce the odds of maternal and child 
mortality (Campbell and Graham 2006). 
Beyond birth and survival, early environ-
ments have a powerful influence on shaping 
long-term outcomes. Socioeconomic gaps in 
child development emerge early in life, before 
school begins; persist through childhood; and 
are strongly predictive of adult outcomes, 
shaping social and economic inequalities in 
the long run (Fryer and Levitt 2004; Paxson 
and Schady 2007). 
Access to quality education for all
Investments to increase access to education 
and vocational training and to improve edu-
cational quality are needed to equip poor 
people to take advantage of opportunities. 
Despite impressive gains in school enrollment 
over the past 25 years, 55 million primary-
school-age children do not attend school, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In some 
cases no school is nearby, but more often 
other obstacles prevent children from attend-
ing school. School fees may be prohibitively 
expensive for parents. Even schools that are 
nominally free may be unaffordable because 
of ancillary costs such as books, supplies, 
uniforms, or miscellaneous fees. The oppor-
tunity cost of attending school may be too 
high for children who are needed to attend to 
household chores such as collecting water or 
firewood, cooking, caring for younger chil-
dren, or helping with the family farm. Par-
ents may consider the financial and oppor-
tunity costs too high if they are unaware 
of the potential returns to investing in their 
children’s education, or they may rightly cal-
culate that the returns are low because absen-
tee teachers or lack of supplies deliver a low-
quality education.
In middle- and high-income countries, 
where the quantity of education has been 
more impressive than its results is a priority 
to ensure quality of education. Access to pri-
mary and secondary education is widespread 
or universal in richer countries, where indica-
tors of enrollment and years of schooling are 
generally good (see box 1.9 for the example 
of Chile). But important differences persist 
in the terms of access and outcomes (figure 
1.22). Students from poorer families often 
receive inferior-quality education, worsen-
ing their learning outcomes. For example, 
in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Indonesia, and Tunisia, the share of 
B40 students who demonstrate basic math 
competencies in the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment test is less than 
half that of top 20 percent students (World 
Bank 2015e). In South Asia, inequalities in 
educational outcomes appear to be increas-
ingly driven by differences in school quality 
rather than by access to schools (World Bank 
2015a). This situation is especially apparent 
in settings where higher-income households 
can turn to private schools when public 
schools are failing. 
Improvements in educational quality 
require that schools and teachers be held 
accountable for student performance. Build-
ing schools, training teachers, and procuring 
supplies are only the first steps. In addition to 
adequate resources, school systems and teach-
ers need to be accountable for using resources 
to deliver results according to established met-
rics. Not only must teachers show up but they 
also must be given the right incentives, as well 
as the complementary inputs and support, to 
teach effectively. Evidence from Kenya shows 
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how greater parental and parent-teacher asso-
ciation involvement in teacher selection and 
school governance can improve the qual-
ity of education and student performance 
(Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2015). Greater 
exposure to the quality of services available 
elsewhere may also help parents and teachers 
demand better educational quality. Despite 
Box 1.9 Chile’s growth-with-equity approach 
Chile’s growth-with-equity approach has produced 
substantial development progress. Infant mortality 
declined between 1990 and 2011 from 16 deaths per 
1,000 births to 7—the second-lowest level in Latin 
America. As measured by the Gini index, income 
inequality declined from 57.3 to 50.8 between 1990 
and 2011, and the income share held by the bottom 
40 percent (B40) rose from 9.9 to 12.7. Since 1990, 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth has 
averaged 3.9 percent a year. This progress can be asso-
ciated with policies that aligned growth with equity. 
The economy was opened to international trade and 
disciplined by fiscal prudence. Government expendi-
tures were directed toward programs that prioritized 
families’ investments in health and human capital to 
reduce the inequality of opportunity. Overall Chileans 
are healthier and better educated than they were in 
1990, and they enjoy higher standards of living.
The policies Chile undertook resulted in broad 
benefits for the B40. For instance, figure B1.9.1 shows 
increasing secondary completion rates for workers in 
the B40 across all sectors in the economy. As a result, 
the education gap between the B40 and the top 60 
percent, shown in figure B1.9.2, decreased steadily 
as Chile progressed toward universal secondary edu-
cation. Alongside these developments, national labor 
productivity increased from $12 to $28 for an hour of 
work.a 
More work, however, remains to be done. Chile’s 
level of inequality remains high compared with the 
region and Organisation for Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries. Chile’s inequality is also 
reflected in low intergenerational social mobility, 
which is largely caused by unequal access to quality 
education (Núñez and Miranda 2011). Social pub-
lic spending has risen significantly over the last two 
decades, especially on health and education, but still 
lags regional and OECD averages. The Chilean tax-
transfer system is characterized by low progressivity 
and has been less effective in reducing poverty and 
income inequality compared with the experience in 
the OECD (IMF 2014a).
FiGUrE B1.9.2 Educational catch-up  of the bottom  
40% went hand-in-hand with rising productivity
Source: World Bank calculations, using CASEN and data from the Conference Board.
Note: For productivity: Total Economy Database; share of workers by sector and level of skill from the B40 was calculated using household surveys (Encuesta de  
Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional) from Chile for the respective years. PPP = purchasing power parity.
FiGUrE B1.9.1 Across all sectors, Chilean B40 
workers are now better educated
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the pronounced gaps in educational perfor-
mance, people in the B40 express as much 
or more satisfaction with public education 
services than do those in the T20 percent in 
most regions; the main exceptions are South 
Asia and, to a lesser extent, Sub-Saharan 
Africa (figure 1.23).
Health care to meet evolving needs
In the health sector, investments are needed 
to strengthen the physical infrastructure, 
especially the systems that deliver health care. 
The quality of health care delivery needs to 
be upgraded, particularly in key areas such as 
primary care and maternal and child health. 
At the same time, health care services need 
to be extended to areas that are currently 
underserved, possibly through partnerships 
with the private sector and greater use of 
community-level providers. As in educa-
tion, increasing the accountability of the 
health system is crucial and can be achieved 
by better linking spending to results, as 
community-level monitoring has done in 
Uganda (Gill and Revenga forthcoming). 
Reducing the costs of health care for low-
income individuals is also needed, including 
better control of both official out-of-pocket 
payments and unofficial fees that are some-
times paid to speed delivery of services.
Richer countries, especially those whose 
populations are aging rapidly, need health 
systems that are equipped to meet the grow-
ing burden of chronic noncommunicable dis-
eases. Treatment of cardiovascular diseases, 
chronic respiratory diseases, cancer, and 
diabetes claims a rapidly growing share of 
national health care budgets. For low-income 
households without adequate health insur-
ance, these diseases also have a major impact 
on household budgets. The incidence of 
noncommunicable disease can be curbed by 
prevention-oriented policies such as dietary 
education, food price policies that do not 
effectively subsidize unhealthy foods, public 
funding for smoking-cessation programs, 
and programs to encourage more physically 
active lifestyles. Policies that contain the out-
of-pocket costs for low-income patients are 
also needed.
FiGUrE 1.22 Socioeconomic gaps are observed related to education
Sources: For panel a, ECAPOV 2015; for panel b, staff estimates based on OECD 2012. 
Note: For panel a, the age cohort for the estimates refers to youth ages 22–25 years for Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and the Russian Federation;  
ages 21–24 for Armenia and Ukraine; and ages 24–27 for Poland. All data are from 2012. For panel b, the PISA test score is for the share of students above 
level 2 in math.
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Water and sanitation for healthy 
environments
Creating an environment conducive to good 
public health is just as important as improving 
the health care system. Improving health and 
physical well-being begins with prevention. 
Lack of access to clean water and sanitation 
leaves poor people susceptible to infectious 
disease both in the rural countryside and in 
congested urban slums. Provision of piped 
water and latrines has been shown to reduce 
disease and child mortality. A healthy envi-
ronment has an intrinsic positive impact on 
the quality of life and an instrumental impact 
on productivity in the workplace and on full 
participation in society. Beyond the initial 
investment to install adequate water supply, 
sanitation, and drainage facilities, it is critical 
that the systems be maintained regularly.
The poor and vulnerable need robust 
insurance 
Robust mechanisms are needed to assist both 
those left behind in the development process 
and those whose well-being can be severely 
negatively affected by various shocks. Con-
trary to the general perception of social pro-
tection as a narrowly defined cash transfer 
program, a range of public interventions can 
protect the poor and vulnerable while pro-
moting competitiveness and growth. Social 
assistance and insurance schemes are key 
components of a social protection system. 
They combine with labor market policies and 
regulations to form the broader social protec-
tion system. A well-functioning social pro-
tection system also enhances people’s capac-
ity to manage risks, cushions the impact of 
crises or economic adjustments, and enables 
people to take greater advantage of economic 
opportunities. As cross-country experiences 
illustrate, social protection institutions are 
essential to address adversity and foster long-
term prosperity (World Bank 2010b).
Social assistance to address poverty
Effective social assistance programs can pro-
vide the poor with a floor that keeps them 
from destitution, as well as a ladder to help 
escape poverty. Noncontributory social 
transfers ensure that those who are not able 
to take advantage of opportunities in the 
labor market can still meet their basic needs. 
These transfers may also give poor house-
holds the financial breathing room to pursue 
investment opportunities, such as schooling 
for their children, which might otherwise be 
unaffordable. They also provide an element 
of protection from transient shocks. Fiscally 
efficient transfers are those that are both well 
targeted to the poor population (low errors of 
inclusion) and have good coverage (low errors 
of exclusion). The design of social assistance 
10
30
50
70
90
a. Satisfaction with access to public services for health care, 2014
East Asia
and
Pacic
High-
income
OECD
countries
Europe
and
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean
Middle
East and
North
Africa
South
Asia
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
w
ho
re
po
rt
ed
 sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(%
)
 
b. Satisfaction with access to public services for education, 2014
10
30
50
70
90
East Asia
and
Pacic
High-
income
OECD
countries
Europe
and
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean
Middle
East and
North
Africa
South
Asia
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
w
ho
re
po
rt
ed
 sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
(%
)
Top 20% of the population Bottom 40% of the population
FiGUrE 1.23 in several regions, satisfaction with access to public 
services for health care and education is low
Source: Staff estimations based on Gallup World Poll.
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policies is an important determinant of their 
effectiveness; avoiding disincentives to work, 
such as sharp reductions in benefits for rela-
tively small increases in earned income, is 
particularly important.
Conditional cash transfers provide ben-
efits to alleviate current poverty while simul-
taneously promoting behavior that is likely to 
provide a pathway out of poverty. Pioneered 
in Latin America and now in place around 
the globe, such programs provide cash or 
noncash benefits to families on the condition 
that they make investments in human capital, 
such as taking their children for vaccinations 
or other preventive health services or sending 
their children to school. The cash transfers 
received by households not only ease their 
poverty but also allow them to look beyond 
their immediate subsistence needs to invest in 
their children’s futures. 
Social insurance to deal with vulnerability
Individuals—especially those among the 
already poor and the B40—face a variety 
of risks that can have serious consequences 
for their well-being. External shocks, such 
as localized droughts or floods, and repeated 
shocks can drive households into (deeper) 
poverty. Commodity price volatility may 
depress income from agriculture and may 
hurt the vulnerable the most. Events specific 
to individuals, such as illness or poor health 
of the head of household, can have the same 
effect. In these cases it is not joblessness 
per se that pushes families into poverty but 
rather the destruction of personal and house-
hold assets. Even taking these shocks into 
account, however, job losses remain a criti-
cal factor sending people deeper into poverty. 
More generally, as countries pursue market-
oriented structural change and expose their 
economies to greater forces of competition, 
adjustment costs may arise in the near term 
even if over the longer term net positive ben-
efits may accrue. However, a competitive 
economy can coexist with an inclusive society 
if minimum levels of protection are provided 
against the risks of economic restructuring. 
Social insurance policies are an important 
mechanism for providing protection against 
such risks. Social insurance policies are 
not only designed to help families through 
idiosyncratic shocks but are also geared to 
keep people out of poverty from predictable 
events; contributory old-age pensions to pro-
vide income during retirement are one exam-
ple. The choice of policy instrument depends 
upon the nature of the risk being considered 
and the affordability of the intervention. Pre-
cautionary policies can cushion the vulner-
able against shocks to a limited extent. In 
developing countries, where farming and self-
employment are more prevalent and income 
support mechanisms more limited, macro-
economic instability caused by price shocks 
has less impact on open unemployment and 
more on earnings from work (World Bank 
2013b). Governments can adopt active social 
protection policies to mitigate the impact of 
shocks on the poor. Many countries have 
public unemployment insurance systems to 
help mitigate the risk of job loss. Many also 
have disability insurance to cover situations 
where illness or injury affects employment 
opportunities. 
Global insurance to absorb systemic shocks
Beyond assisting the destitute and insuring 
against individual risks, protection also needs 
to extend to large systemic shocks. Natural 
disasters or global pandemics are examples 
of systemic shocks that can set progress back 
for years. Natural and climate-related shocks 
appear to be growing in importance, with 
the poor in low-income countries the least 
prepared for managing such risks. To bet-
ter equip them to cope with these risks, a 
range of options exists that transcends bor-
ders. One option is to ensure that funding for 
disaster preparedness and disaster response 
is already available before such events occur. 
In this context, the World Bank Group has 
worked with donors and the private sector to 
develop a Disaster Risk Financing and Insur-
ance facility that does exactly this. A similar 
initiative, the Pandemic Emergency Facility, 
is being developed to quickly disburse sub-
stantial funding in response to objective epi-
demiological criteria. An additional goal of 
such initiatives is to stimulate greater country 
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investments in preparedness. These include 
early-warning systems, response planning, 
training of frontline professionals, and pre-
paredness equipment and logistics, as well 
as investments in health systems (Gill and 
Revenga forthcoming; World Bank 2013c.) 
Conclusion
Every country in the world—low-, middle-, 
and high-income—continues to grapple with 
poverty. In developing countries, extreme 
poverty remains a concern. As indicated by 
the new global poverty estimates, based on 
the 2011 PPP indexes, developing countries 
have made a great deal of progress in reducing 
extreme poverty. Yet the challenges remain 
vast. Reaching the World Bank’s target of 
reducing extreme poverty to 3 percent of 
the world’s population by 2030 is ambitious, 
particularly for NRB and conflicted-affected 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The lat-
est poverty estimates and projections show 
that, to meet the global target, policies must 
go beyond targeting rates of aggregate eco-
nomic growth, because growth alone will not 
be sufficient to achieve the goal. Economic 
growth has helped reduce poverty by about 
1 percentage point a year since the 1980s. 
Yet, in the absence of targeted and effective 
policies, it is likely that this rate will not be 
sustainable, particularly as the 3 percent tar-
get is approached. Unless extra efforts are 
made to ensure economic, environmental, 
and social sustainability, the pace of pov-
erty decline associated with a given rate of 
economic growth can be expected, at some 
point, to diminish markedly and possibly 
even reverse. 
Just as critically, ending global poverty 
requires more than reducing the number of 
people living below the extreme poverty line. 
Even if the 3 percent target were reached in 
the aggregate, many countries would still 
have high levels of poverty. Similarly, within 
countries deep pockets of poverty would 
remain, often in rural areas, where broader 
economic growth as a poverty eliminator 
may still not reach the poor. The deepening 
impact of climate change will contribute to 
such spatial concentrations of poverty by 
endangering agricultural output through dif-
ferent channels, including through negative 
effects on access to fresh water. Moreover, 
poverty is not just about income: the lev-
els and trends in income-based poverty are 
imperfectly correlated with other basic vari-
ables such as under-five mortality, primary 
education, and undernourishment. It is pos-
sible that even if the first goal of eradicating 
extreme poverty were achieved in income-
based terms, acute multidimensional poverty 
could still be prevalent. 
Many countries—including high-income 
countries—have seen robust income growth 
among the poorer segments of the popu-
lation, but progress has been uneven and 
challenges remain. Persistent inequalities in 
opportunities continue, constraining not only 
the well-being of those affected but also their 
income-generating capacity and thereby the 
prospects for broad-based economic growth 
that benefits everyone. New challenges are 
also appearing. In a range of countries, 
growth—a key driver of shared prosperity—
may be less buoyant than it was before the 
global financial crisis. Further constraints 
may arise if the underlying factors that led to 
an increase in the B40 income share in many 
countries turn out to be transitory or unsus-
tainable. In light of these factors, further pol-
icy efforts will be needed not only to advance 
the agenda where progress has remained 
incomplete or uneven but also to preserve the 
gains of the past. 
The policy approaches for sustainably end-
ing global poverty and boosting shared pros-
perity are similar in spirit. Complementary 
policies are needed to foster economic growth 
while also lifting the incomes of those on the 
bottom rungs of the economic ladder. Good 
identification methods are needed to assess 
poverty in all its dimensions. Efforts can 
be targeted geographically to regions (par-
ticularly Sub-Saharan Africa), to individual 
countries, and to locations within countries. 
Countries also would do well to pursue a 
comprehensive strategy focused on generat-
ing broad-based growth, investing in human 
development, and providing robust social 
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protection mechanisms. Throughout, such 
strategy needs to be mindful of sustainabil-
ity—economic, social, and environmen-
tal. With such strategies in place, the world 
stands a better chance of ending extreme 
poverty by 2030 and lifting the well-being of 
lower-income people in every country of the 
world. 
Notes
 1.  Monetary poverty measures are based on 
household surveys that measure deprivation 
on the basis of either income or consump-
tion data. To simplify, this Report refers to 
“income” poverty for both cases. In a simi-
lar vein, most references to poverty, unless 
explicitly stated otherwise, mean “extreme” 
poverty.
 2.  The availability and the quality of data 
remain a concern in the assessment of both 
goals, and the robustness of underlying meth-
odologies will require continued scrutiny. 
Increasing the availability and quality of data 
is a key priority to strengthen analysis, pol-
icy formulation, and policy implementation 
(World Bank 2015d).
 3.  Forthcoming update of World Bank 2011a. 
Furthermore, 7.0 million deaths in develop-
ing countries in 2010, or 18 percent of total 
deaths, were due to pollution (IHME 2010).
 4.  Based on the international poverty line of 
$1.90 a day (2011 PPP). A similar trend is 
observed when comparing 1990 with 2011 
using a poverty line of $1.25 a day (2005 PPP).
 5.  China became an upper-middle-income coun-
try in 2010.
 6.  Because poverty data for several fragile and 
conflict-affected states are unavailable, the 
actual numbers of poor living in these coun-
tries could be much higher.
 7.  To evaluate the inclusiveness of growth, it 
is useful to examine how the rate of average 
income growth transmits into changes in pov-
erty alleviation. The depth elasticity compares 
the growth elasticities of the person-equivalent 
and traditional headcount ratios. It also indi-
cates how well changes in the traditional head-
count predict changes in the person-equivalent 
measure (Castleman, Foster, and Smith 2015). 
 8.  The MPI is calculated and reported yearly by 
the Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (Alkire and Foster 2011; 
Alkire and Santos 2013).
 9.  While household surveys may track con-
sumption or income, reference is made just to 
income for convenience. 
10.  The second of the World Bank Group’s goals 
has been extensively discussed in World Bank 
(2013b, 2015c). The discussion in this Report 
builds on these publications, focusing selec-
tively on only two aspects: links to equity and 
inequality, and the non-income dimension. 
11.  See also the influential book on redistribu-
tion with growth (Chenery et al. 1974) and 
the broad-based growth discussion in World 
Bank (1990).
12.  Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) provide an 
example of the latter, which closely connects 
to examining how shared prosperity, when 
measured in all of its dimensions, benefits the 
less well-off. 
13.  In some respects, the indicator is itself a 
multidimensional amalgamation because it 
summarizes the ability to obtain goods and 
services critical for welfare through market 
transactions.
14.  Basu (2001, 2006) noted that income indica-
tors focusing on the poorer income deciles 
may correlate more strongly than average 
incomes with non-income indicators of well-
being, such as greater life expectancy and 
higher literacy.
15.  If the shared prosperity objective were illus-
trated by a social welfare function, it would 
attach positive weights through the 40th per-
centile but zero weight thereafter. A singular 
focus on the B40, however, would conflict 
with the poverty goal (given that in many 
countries extreme poverty incidence is well 
above 40 percent); it would also be inconsis-
tent with the requirement of social sustain-
ability (which requires that the interest of 
the B40 cannot be considered with total dis-
regard to or independently of the rest of the 
income distribution).
16.  Derived from “prosperitas” or “doing well” 
in Latin, prosperity can be defined as a state, 
the optimal distribution of which over a 
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given population inevitably involves norma-
tive questions about social equity. Therefore, 
shared prosperity—or “prosperitas vulgaris” 
(that is, prosperity shared by all)—intrinsi-
cally reflects a societal value judgment about 
the equitable distribution of resources as 
articulated through a process of social choice.
17.  World Bank (2005) refers to the theories by 
John Rawls (1971), Amartya Sen (1985), 
Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), and John 
Roemer (1998). 
18.  Indicators based on mean income growth 
tend to penalize the less well-off. Since aver-
age income weights the incomes of everyone 
equally, it assigns a greater weight to those in 
richer percentiles of the income distribution, 
since richer percentiles have higher incomes 
(World Bank 2015b).
19.  Such a strategy is indicated in World Bank 
(2013b, 19), where the shared prosperity 
objective is articulated “to achieve the maxi-
mum possible increase in living standards of 
the less well-off.” Other references, however, 
such as World Bank (2015c, 1) suggest that 
the objective merely entails “increasing the 
average incomes of the bottom 40 percent of 
the population in each country.”
20.  The 2014–15 GMR assesses the shared 
prosperity performance of countries around 
2006–11, whereas the 2015–16 Report exam-
ines the period around 2007–12. 
21.  Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicara-
gua, Tajikistan, and West Bank and Gaza.
22.  Today, the richest 10 percent of the popu-
lation in Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development countries earns 
9.5 times the income of the poorest 10 per-
cent; in the 1980s this ratio stood at 7:1, and 
it has been rising ever since (Cingano 2014).
23.  The previous section examined B40 income 
growth and its implications for the B40 per-
cent income share, a measure of inequality of 
independent interest, with a view to illustrate 
different patterns across countries. In this sec-
tion, the B40 income growth is explained by 
the constituent components that are thought 
to drive the explanatory variable: average 
income growth and its elasticity with respect 
to the B40 (the change in the B40 income 
share), where the latter measure of inequality 
is treated as an instrument rather than an end 
in itself. 
24.  The authors examine the relationship through 
the lens of the social welfare function that 
corresponds to the shared prosperity concept, 
which coincides with the average income of 
the B40 group. 
25.  The observation also appears to hold within 
countries. Skoufias, Tiwari, and Shidiq (2014) 
find a strong positive correlation between 
overall consumption growth and B40 growth 
across provinces in Thailand.
26.  The role of growth in accounting for changes 
in social welfare appears to be smaller for 
bottom-sensitive social welfare functions, 
mainly because the growth rate of the income 
shares of the poorest deciles exhibits the 
highest volatility between spells. This vola-
tility is amplified by social welfare functions 
that place a high weight on the poor. Dol-
lar, Kleineberg, and Kraay (2013) argue that 
part of this variation may be due to sampling 
variation.
27.  Efforts are under way to incorporate inequal-
ity in longevity and unemployment across 
educational groups.
28.  Primary completion rates in low-income coun-
tries are 20–30 percent for the B40 (70–100 
percent for the T20). Even in middle-income 
countries, such as Albania, Lesotho, Nicara-
gua, and Nigeria, the gaps are significant.
29.  For example, among 41 countries, the index 
of the inequality of opportunity is 2 percent 
in Norway compared with 34 percent in 
Guatemala.
30.  World Development Indicators, World Bank, 
July 2015.
31.  The concept of change in total wealth per 
capita rests upon the premise of three forms 
of capital—natural, human, and physical. 
Transformation of one form of capital into 
another is possible. Thus, education expendi-
tures are added to gross natural savings and 
partly offset the depletion of natural capital 
(World Bank 2014a, 124–29).
32.  Specifically, McNamara said: “The two goals 
are intrinsically related, though governments 
are often tempted to pursue one without ade-
quate attention to the other. But from a devel-
opment point of view that approach always 
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fails in the end. For the pursuit of growth 
without a reasonable concern for equity is 
ultimately socially destabilizing, and often 
violently so. And the pursuit of equity without 
a reasonable concern for growth merely tends 
to redistribute economic stagnation. Neither 
pursuit, taken by itself, can lead to sustained, 
successful development.” (McNamara 1980).
33.  World Bank (2005) finds that this elasticity 
is close to zero in countries with high income 
inequality. 
34.  The year 2015 marks the 40th anniversary 
of publication of Arthur M. Okun’s famous 
book, Equality and Efficiency: The Big 
Trade-Off. One of the original supply-side 
economists, Okun introduced the meta-
phor of the leaky bucket, which has become 
famous among economists: “The money 
must be carried from the rich to the poor in 
a leaky bucket. Some of it will simply disap-
pear in transit, so the poor will not receive all 
the money that is taken from the rich” (Okun 
1975, 91). 
35.  Some financial inclusion policies, such as 
broadening credit access (in government’s 
efforts toward achieving equitable opportu-
nities), could entail a trade-off with macro-
economic stability even if they achieve higher 
growth (Sahay et al. 2015).
36.  This section builds on Gill and Revenga 
(forthcoming) and World Bank (2010b, 
2010c, 2014c). 
37.  These economies were Botswana; Brazil; 
China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indone-
sia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; 
Malta; Oman; Singapore; Taiwan, China; 
and Thailand. 
38.  Commission on Growth and Development 
(2008) notes: “The growth of GDP may be 
measured up in the macroeconomic treetops, 
but all the action is in the microeconomic 
undergrowth, where new limbs sprout, and 
dead wood is cleared away.”
39.  Howitt 2009. Aghion, Harris, and Howitt 
(2001) find, however, that greater competi-
tion does not automatically lead to faster 
productivity growth, because preconditions 
need to be satisfied so that firms are suffi-
ciently enabled to innovate. For competition 
to effectively spur innovation, elementary risk 
mitigation and coping mechanisms need to be 
in place to protect individuals—though not 
necessarily industries, firms, or jobs—from 
the downside risks of failure.
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Scaling Up Impact: Transitioning 
from Millennium to Sustainable 
Development Goals 
well-being. Still, the wide variation in out-
comes translates into a substantial unfin-
ished development agenda. With over 900 
million people still living in poverty in 2012 
(defined as living on less than $1.90 a day, 
2011 purchasing power parity), persistent 
and increasingly concentrated deprivations 
urgently need to be addressed (chapter 1). At 
the same time, the importance of environ-
mental sustainability has moved to the fore, 
and new patterns of eco-friendly production 
and consumption are necessary to ensure 
continued development progress.
The MDGs played an important role in 
galvanizing global efforts for development. 
Given the complexity of development, the 
gains of recent decades cannot be attributed 
to any single factor or process. Nonethe-
less, the MDGs helped frame the broader 
goals of development and build a coalition 
With 2015 marking a watershed between the MDGs and the SDGs, the world can celebrate 
the many development achievements since 2000. Still, outcomes vary substantially between 
regions, across the rural-urban divide, and by demographic characteristics. Even where good 
progress has been made, deprivations persist, leaving a substantial unfinished agenda. In 
a context of megatrends that are reshaping challenges and opportunities, the SDGs forge a 
global compact for transformational human progress while safeguarding the environment. The 
MDG experience highlights the importance of inclusiveness and country ownership, effective 
monitoring, and strong implementation, supported by enhanced financing for development.
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Building on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) experience, the transition to 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
framework in 2015 reflects a welcome move 
into a more comprehensive, multidimensional 
approach to development. During this water-
shed year, with the MDGs expiring and the 
SDGs being adopted, it is worth reflecting on 
what has been accomplished during the past 
15 years, and how the SDGs can best carry 
the development agenda forward over the 
coming 15 years.
Substantial progress has been made in 
recent decades, although there is much het-
erogeneity among regions, between rural and 
urban areas, and in demographic features. 
In many ways, development has advanced 
more rapidly over the past 15 years than at 
any other time in human history. Millions of 
people have realized major improvements in 
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of partners—international agencies, national 
entities, philanthropic and civil society orga-
nizations, academic institutions, and private 
sector representatives—to work toward com-
mon goals.
In sync with the megatrends reshaping the 
world, the SDGs represent a new, more com-
prehensive approach for scaled-up impact. 
These megatrends—rising global connected-
ness, the importance of the dynamic econo-
mies in the East, the increasing pace of tech-
nological change and adoption, accelerating 
urbanization, changing global demographic 
trends, and the growing impact of human 
activity on environmental degradation and 
climate change—have all emerged over the 
past two decades and are having profound 
effects on the evolution of development out-
comes. Whereas the MDGs of the Millen-
nium Declaration were conceived as a frame-
work committing nations to reduce extreme 
poverty through enhanced assistance to 
developing countries, the SDGs represent a 
global compact that is applicable to all coun-
tries, so that all may benefit more from global 
interconnections while safeguarding the envi-
ronment and the global commons.
The SDGs seek to accelerate progress with 
a strong focus on implementation. The SDGs 
reflect learning from the MDG experience. 
Better implementation, based on strength-
ened policies and institutions, as well as 
resource mobilization, will be essential to 
accelerate progress between now and 2030.
The Millennium Development 
Goals: Current status
Development progress over the past 15 years 
has been impressive. Millions of children 
who were unlikely to survive to their fifth 
birthday have passed beyond these critical 
years and gone on to school in ever greater 
proportions, including many more girls than 
was the case 15 years ago. The incidence of 
preventable diseases such as AIDS (acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome), malaria, and 
tuberculosis is falling, and the share of people 
with access to clean water and better sanita-
tion has risen markedly (see figure 2.1 and 
the MDG Report Card in appendix A for 
details). Overall, the MDGs played an impor-
tant role in helping to galvanize the develop-
ment community (McArthur 2013), and that 
experience will serve the achievement of the 
newly endorsed SDGs well.
The MDG period saw substantial 
development progress
The proportion of people facing extreme 
 poverty has declined sharply (detailed in 
chapter 1). The world met the global MDG 
1 target of halving the proportion of the 
population living in extreme poverty five 
years ahead of the 2015 deadline (World 
Bank 2014). China contributed the bulk of 
this decline. Even excluding China, progress 
in reducing extreme poverty has been good, 
and more than two-thirds of countries have 
reached, or are close to achieving, the target 
of halving extreme poverty. With the incomes 
of households in the lowest quintiles (at the 
national level) rising together with average 
incomes, the accelerated growth of develop-
ing countries in recent decades relative to pre-
vious ones made an important contribution 
to the reduction in extreme poverty (Dollar 
and Kraay 2002, 2013).
Developing countries have made impres-
sive strides in reducing hunger and malnutri-
tion, although the target of halving the num-
ber of people living in hunger is unlikely to be 
reached by 2015. The prevalence of malnutri-
tion among children under age five dropped 
from 28 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 
2013. Several international nutrition initia-
tives, such as the “Nutrition for Growth” 
project and the “Zero Hunger Challenge,” as 
well as country-led efforts, have contributed 
to the improvement. Brazil remains a remark-
able success story. In 1990–92, it was home 
to some 22 million undernourished people, 
yet over the past decade it has reduced hun-
ger by some 80 percent. Poverty reduction 
efforts, support for family farmers, school 
feeding programs, social safety nets, and 
food access schemes were instrumental in 
reducing hunger in Brazil. Nonetheless, at the 
global level, one in eight people in the world 
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continues to go hungry because of interre-
lated factors such as low agricultural pro-
ductivity and unemployment (Sanchez and 
Swaminathan 2005).
Access to primary school education and 
literacy rates are increasing strongly. Educa-
tion is a goal in and of itself, but it is also 
a powerful driver of progress toward other 
FiGure 2.1 Stark variations exist in achievement of MDGs
Sources: World Development Indicators and Global Monitoring Report team estimates. 
Note: Progress is based on extrapolation of latest five-year annual growth rates for each country, except for MDG 5.0, which uses the latest three years. “Sufficient progress” indicates 
that an extrapolation of the last observed data point with the growth rate over the last observable five-year period shows that the MDG can be attained. “Insufficient progress” is 
defined as being able to meet the MDG between 2016 and 2020. “Moderately off target” indicates that the MDG can be met between 2020 and 2030. “Seriously off target” indicates 
that the MDG will not even be met by 2030. “Insufficient data” means that not enough data points are available to estimate progress or that the MDG’s starting value is missing 
(except for MDG 2 and MDG 3). In the poverty target, 11 of the 66 countries that have met the target have less than 2 percent of people living below $1.25 a day.
36 7 7 14 58 23 
Moderately o target (2020–30) 
Target met Sucient progress (by 2015) Insucient progress (2015–20) 
Seriously o target (after 2030) Insucient data 
71 11 2 27 27 7
35 8 13 52 33 4
40 12 17 40 25 11
67 10 11 28 22 7
38 18 37 34 2 16
15 3 20 88 8 11
67 5 2 12 40 19
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day. 
        Indicator 1.1—Proportion of population living below $1.25 (PPP) 
        a day 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
who suer from hunger.
        Indicator 1.9—Prevalence of undernourishment
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education. 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls 
alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. 
        Indicator 2.2—Primary completion rate
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women. 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no 
later than 2015
        Indicator 3.1—Ratio of girls to boys enrollment in primary and 
        secondary education 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality. 
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-ve 
mortality rate.
        Indicator 4.1—Under ve mortality rate 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality. 
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-ve 
mortality rate.
       Indicator 4.2—Mortality rate, infant 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health. 
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the 
maternal mortality ratio. 
       Indicator 5.1— Maternal mortality ratio, modeled estimates 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people  without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.
       Indicator 7.8—Access to an improved water source (% of population)
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.
       Indicator 7.9—Access to improved sanitation facilities 
Number of countries
34 4 18 33 54 2
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MDGs. Education builds what Amartya Sen 
(1999) refers to as “human capabilities—the 
essential and individual power to reflect, 
make better choices, seek a voice in society, 
and enjoy a better life.” Between 2000 and 
2012, the increase in primary school enroll-
ment in developing countries rose from 83 
percent to 90 percent, almost twice as fast as 
over the preceding 12 years. Consequently, 
the number of children not attending school 
dropped from 102 million to 57 million, not-
withstanding continued population growth. 
National programs that lowered barriers to 
accessing education and global initiatives, 
like the Global Partnership for Education 
(previously known as the Education for All—
Fast Track Initiative), helped to ramp up pri-
mary school enrollments rates (Bruns, Min-
gat, and Rakotomalala 2003; Riddell 2003). 
In addition to ongoing efforts to expand 
coverage to all children, attention is turning 
toward improving quality.
The promotion of gender equality and 
empowerment of women is moving forward, 
as evidenced by the remarkable progress 
toward eliminating gender disparities in edu-
cation. Almost two-thirds of countries have 
reached the target. Greater education for girls 
has long-term impacts: improving the health 
of infants and children, immunization rates, 
family nutrition, and the next generation’s 
schooling attainment (World Bank 2001). 
For every 100 boys who attended second-
ary school in 2000, there were only 90 girls. 
Focused attention to girls’ education at the 
country level, supported by global partner-
ships (such as the Girls Education Initiative), 
is helping promote gender parity in primary 
and secondary enrollment. Despite progress 
in school attendance, questions remain on 
the quality of education, and less progress is 
evident at the tertiary (postsecondary) level.1 
In addition, closing gender gaps is necessary 
but not sufficient for achieving the broader 
goal of gender equality and women’s empow-
erment (UN 2005). Wide gender disparities 
persist, acting as major hindrances to devel-
opment progress.
Many developing countries are achiev-
ing major reductions in child mortality. The 
number of children who die before their fifth 
birthday fell from 13 million in 1990 to just 
over 6 million in 2013, implying that 17,000 
fewer children die each day compared with 
1990. Examples of effective country-level 
interventions that have saved thousands of 
lives come from around the world, includ-
ing 10 low- and middle-income “fast-track” 
countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, 
Peru, Rwanda, and Vietnam (PMNCH 
et al. 2014). Contributing to the success were 
an increase in the provision of maternal and 
neonatal services (helped by cash incentives 
to use them), an expansion of immunization 
programs, greater use of mobile phones to 
promote health (including information on 
nutrition and breast-feeding), wider access 
to sanitation and safe water, and stronger 
data systems to inform policy (Roberts, Car-
nahan, and Gakidou 2013). Yet, at current 
trends, the target of reducing under-five mor-
tality rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 
2015 will not be met.
Maternal mortality has declined by nearly 
two-fifths since 2000. For every 100,000 
live births, 370 mothers perished in 2000. 
By 2013, this had fallen to 230—a rate of 
decline more than twice as fast as in the pre-
ceding decade. Progress hinged on expand-
ing access to both prenatal and postnatal 
care (such as increasing the share of births 
attended by skilled practitioners), strengthen-
ing patient referral networks, boosting fam-
ily planning, and expanding the education 
of girls (PMNCH et al. 2014). Enhancing 
the educational attainment of girls has been 
found to be especially effective—the risk of 
maternal death is 2.7 times higher among 
women with no education than among those 
who have completed 12 years of school, and 
2 times higher for women with 1 to 6 years 
of education (Karlsen et al. 2011). Despite the 
progress over the past decade, the target of 
reducing maternal mortality rates by three-
quarters will not be achieved.
The incidence of AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis has fallen sharply in recent 
decades. Since 2001, the number of people 
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newly infected with HIV (human immuno-
deficiency virus, the virus that causes AIDS) 
has declined by about 33 percent. In addi-
tion, access to antiretroviral medicines has 
increased to a record 9.7 million people. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, only 10,000 people 
had access in 2000. Likewise, the incidence 
of tuberculosis fell at an average rate of 1.5 
percent a year between 2000 and 2013, and 
deaths from malaria fell by some 26 per-
cent. It is estimated that since 2000, about 
1.1 million deaths from malaria have been 
averted. Complementing national plans, 
global initiatives such as the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the 
U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief initiative; the World Health Orga-
nization’s (WHO’s) “3 by 5” initiative; the 
MDG Health Alliance; and the “Malaria No 
More” campaign helped accelerate progress. 
Lower burdens of AIDS and noncommunica-
ble diseases have been associated with much 
greater progress toward reducing child mor-
tality (Stuckler, Basu, and McKee 2010).
The MDG targets on access to safe drink-
ing water and sanitation, and reducing the 
number of slum dwellers, have been reached. 
Between 1990 and 2011, about 1.9 billion 
people gained access to improved sanitation 
facilities, helping curb the incidence of illness 
associated with open defecation. The most 
progress occurred in East Asia and Pacific. 
Between 2000 and 2010, more than 200 mil-
lion slum dwellers gained access to improved 
water and sanitary conditions, well above 
the MDG target of 100 million. Yet with 
increased urbanization and rapid population 
growth in some regions, the overall number 
of slum dwellers increased from 650 million 
in 1990 to 863 million in 2012. More work 
needs to be done to reduce the absolute num-
ber of slum dwellers, despite the attainment 
of the MDG goals.
The MDG process helped strengthen 
global partnerships. In 2013, Develop-
ment Assistance Committee members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) increased devel-
opment aid disbursements to $134.7 bil-
lion, compared with about $80.0 billion in 
the mid-1990s. However, at 0.3 percent of 
GDP, official development assistance (ODA) 
remains well below the target of 0.7 percent 
of GDP. On the goal of access to Internet and 
communication technologies, there has been 
much progress. Spearheaded by private sec-
tor investments, mobile/cellular subscriptions 
have risen dramatically in developing coun-
tries since 2000, enabling a range of services 
such as cellphone banking and information 
sharing on market prices of agricultural pro-
duce. Nonetheless, broadband Internet access 
remains out of reach for many.
Synergies across the MDGs have helped 
progress
While progress on each of the MDGs is 
often considered separately, they are mutu-
ally reinforcing and interrelated. Income and 
non-income dimensions of poverty are closely 
intertwined, with several studies showing 
that households in the lowest income quin-
tiles also face deprivation on other dimen-
sions of development (as elaborated in chap-
ter 1). There are also strong correlations 
among non-income MDGs, such as female 
literacy and under-five mortality (figure 2.2). 
In some instances, these correlations are the 
result of common drivers, such as the quality 
of public institutions, the capacity to deliver 
social services, the extent of urbanization, 
and demographic trends. Nonetheless, strong 
causal relationships exist among various 
MDGs, such as between maternal health and 
school enrollment, gender gaps in education 
and infant mortality, and access to sanitation 
and stunting among children, highlighting 
areas that are mutually reinforcing.
The MDGs related to health are especially 
important in providing mutual reinforce-
ment. Improving maternal health has been 
critical for both neonatal and under-five mor-
tality, helping to reduce complications during 
pregnancy and at birth (King, Klasen, and 
Porter 2009). Interventions to expand immu-
nization and nutrition programs contributed 
to the fall in under-five mortality rates in 
several countries (Lay 2010). The increased 
rollout of antiretroviral drugs over the past 
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decade contributed to a reduction in mater-
nal mortality in regions where HIV preva-
lence was high (WHO et al. 2014). In addi-
tion, health-related MDGs matter for other 
MDGs. Fewer maternal deaths boosts school 
enrollment, since children whose mothers are 
absent are more likely to drop out of school.
Likewise, improvements in MDGs related 
to gender equality influence both income and 
non-income goals. Closing the gender gap in 
education is essential to boosting women’s 
voice and agency and appears to be the single 
most important driver for reducing poverty 
and child mortality, as well as for boosting 
the overall education of children (Klasen 
2005; Klugman and others 2014). Educa-
tion of girls can reduce infant and maternal 
mortality, because educated mothers are 
more likely to use available health services. 
The odds of children in Sub-Saharan Africa 
FiGure 2.2 Synergies across MDGs have helped progress
Source: World Bank.  
Note: The scatter plots use data on all available developing economies over the 2000–13 period. All the pairwise correlation coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. Robust-
ness checks with alternate conditional correlations were computed using the residuals from a regression equation conditioned on per capita income. The results remained similar.
a.  Pairwise correlation = –0.77. See Karlsen et al. 2011 for similar analyses and conclusions.
b.  Pairwise correlation = –0.83. See Klasen 2005 for similar analyses and conclusions.
c.  Pairwise correlation = –0.8. See Prüss et al. 2002 and Fay et al. 2005 for similar analyses and conclusions.
d.  Pairwise correlation = –0.79. See Andres et al. 2014 and Kumar and Vollmer 2013 for similar analyses and conclusions. 
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receiving the tuberculosis vaccine is 50 per-
cent higher among children of mothers with 
primary school education relative to those 
without (Lay and Robilliard 2009). While 
the availability of piped water reduced the 
overall incidence of child deaths in rural 
India, the effect was weaker among poorly 
educated mothers. Better education leads 
to higher earnings for women, which con-
tributes to lower child mortality as mothers 
are able to spend more on children’s health. 
As noted above, education for girls remains 
key to reducing maternal mortality through 
its effect on lowering adolescent pregnan-
cies and enhancing health-seeking behaviors. 
Education for girls and boys is also a strong 
preventive weapon against HIV/AIDS, and it 
contributes to better natural resource man-
agement, including the conservation of the 
tropical rain forest (Godoy and Contreras 
2001; World Bank 2003).
Expanding access to sanitation is essential 
to reducing stunting among children. Open 
defecation has a significant impact on the 
incidence of diarrhea and stunting among 
children (Hammer and Spears 2013; Spears 
2013). For example, after controlling for fac-
tors such as socioeconomic status, maternal 
education, and calorie availability, differences 
in open defecation still explain 35–55 percent 
of the statistical differences in rates of child-
hood stunting across different districts in 
India (Spears, Ghosh, and Cumming 2013). 
Sanitation still remains a major challenge in 
India, where more than half the population 
defecates in the open. In Cambodia, five-
year-old children were found to be 2.0–3.6 
centimeters shorter in communities where all 
households defecate openly than in communi-
ties where no one does (World Bank 2013b). 
Access to safe water, sanitation, women’s 
education, gender equality, and the quantity 
and quality of food available are key drivers 
of past reductions in stunting, with income 
growth and governance playing essential 
facilitating roles (Smith and Haddad 2015).
Strong institutions and economic growth 
enhance the synergies among the MDGs. The-
oretical and empirical evidence demonstrate 
how MDGs reinforce one another, but the 
effects vary. For example, in some instances 
there is little correlation between poverty 
reduction and non-income goals, such as 
under-five mortality or primary school 
completion rates (Bourguignon and others 
2008a). Among pairs of non-income MDGs, 
such as gender parity and child mortality, per-
formance varies significantly across develop-
ing countries (Klasen and Lo Bue 2013). Posi-
tive spillovers between MDGs are hampered 
by low-quality public services and weak polit-
ical commitment, as well as by violence and 
inequality. In contrast, countries exhibiting 
high rates of economic growth, strong insti-
tutions, and good governance tend to show 
stronger synergistic relationships among the 
MDGs, because these determinants mutually 
reinforce each other over time (Lo Bue 2013, 
2015; Klasen and Lo Bue 2013).
Progress toward the MDGs varied 
greatly
Despite the solid development gains in many 
areas, significant work remains, particularly 
regarding the non-income goals. The tide 
has turned on the incidence of major deadly 
diseases, but a high number of preventable 
deaths persist. With the development of new 
medicines, HIV patients receiving treatment 
have nearly the same life expectancy as those 
without HIV. However, about 63 percent of 
people living with HIV, mostly in develop-
ing countries, lack access to antiretroviral 
drugs. Tuberculosis killed 1.5 million people 
in 2013, many in the prime of their produc-
tive lives. An estimated 198 million cases of 
malaria were registered in 2013, claiming the 
lives of about 453,000 children a year and 
robbing Sub-Saharan economies of an esti-
mated $12 billion in lost economic activity. As 
noted, the global partnerships needed to help 
address these challenges are not reaching their 
potential, with ODA averaging well below the 
target set by the MDGs (Kenny and Dykstra 
2013). The heterogeneity of outcomes mani-
fests across regions, between urban and rural 
areas, and by demographic features.
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Variation across regions
While more than two-thirds of countries 
achieved the MDG target on halving extreme 
poverty—the highest success rate of all the 
MDGs—the decline in poverty across regions 
has been uneven.2 East Asia and Pacific real-
ized an unprecedented fall of extreme pov-
erty, led by China. In 1990, extreme poverty 
in the region was on par with Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and about a third higher than the 
average for all developing countries. China 
was a major driving force in the decline of the 
poverty rate of East Asia and Pacific. Buoyed 
by strong growth in India, poverty in South 
Asia fell rapidly during 1990–2012 reaching 
the MDG target.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region not 
on target to halve extreme poverty. There 
is substantial variation across Sub-Saharan 
Africa: 16 countries are expected to meet 
MDG 1 (based on the $1.25 income thresh-
old) by the end of 2015, but 21 countries 
are not expected to reach the target even by 
2030. Given that Sub-Saharan Africa started 
off the MDG period with the lowest average 
per capita income and exhibits a compara-
tively lower sensitivity of poverty to changes 
in growth (growth elasticity of poverty), the 
framing of the MDG benchmarks may place 
a greater onus on the region to achieve the 
goals (Clemens and Moss 2005; Easterly 
2007). Compared with the two preceding 
decades, where extreme poverty either rose 
or remained flat, trends in the post-2000 
period exhibited an acceleration of progress, 
with the $1.25 a day poverty head count 
ratio falling from about 60.0 percent in 2000 
to 46.8 percent in 2011. That is a meaningful 
achievement, but concern is growing in the 
development community that poverty will 
become increasingly concentrated in natural-
resource-based economies and fragile and 
conflict states, many in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(as discussed in chapter 1).
The three regions with better initial con-
ditions also made progress. Compared with 
other developing regions, Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
the Middle East and North Africa started off 
with relatively low levels of poverty and man-
aged to lower poverty further over the 1990 
to 2012 period. Nonetheless, wide dispari-
ties in poverty levels exist across and within 
countries in these regions.
Wide disparities in the non-income 
MDGs persist across and within regions. 
For example, the primary school comple-
tion rate in developing countries as a whole 
rose from about 79 percent in 1990 to 91 
percent in 2012, but only two regions, 
East Asia and Pacific and Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, have achieved or are close to the 
goal of 100 percent. Consider MDG 4, 
which aims to reduce the under-five mor-
tality rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 
2015. Only East Asia and Pacific and Latin 
America and the Caribbean have met the 
target, while 17 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and three countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa are seriously off 
track. Regarding HIV/AIDS, the number 
of people globally who are newly infected 
is falling, down 38 percent since 2000. 
Still, the epidemic remains centered in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, home to about 70 percent 
of the world’s adults living with HIV, with 
prevalence rates of 4.5 percent of the popula-
tion in 2013, compared with below 1 percent 
elsewhere. Non-income MDG performed 
unevenly across countries and regions, 
ref lecting initial conditions, economic 
growth, macro- and microeconomic policy, 
population dynamics, and effectiveness of 
government service delivery (Bourguignon, 
Diaz-Bonilla, and Lofgren 2008b).
Variation between urban and rural areas
Within countries, there are large dispari-
ties in development outcomes between bet-
ter performing urban centers and lagging 
rural areas. More than three-quarters of the 
world’s extreme poor live in rural areas in 
developing countries. While overall poverty 
and the gap between rural and urban areas 
has been falling, poverty rates in rural areas 
remain substantially higher than in urban 
areas, as more high-paying and productive 
jobs are created in urban centers. Households 
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in rural communities in East Asia and Pacific 
and Latin America and the Caribbean are 
more than four times as likely to be living 
in extreme poverty as those in urban areas 
(World Bank 2013a). Sub-Saharan Africa has 
the largest gap in absolute terms, with pov-
erty rates in rural areas of 29.4 percent in 
2008, compared with 11.6 percent in urban 
areas—a gap of 17.8 percentage points.
Similar rural-urban differences are 
observed for the non-income indicators, 
largely because of the higher unit cost of 
delivering services in rural areas. For exam-
ple, gaps in access to safe water and sanita-
tion are substantial between rural and urban 
areas (figure 2.3). In East Asia and Pacific, 
while 98 percent of people living in urban 
areas have access to improved water sources 
and 80 percent have access to improved sani-
tation facilities, the corresponding figures 
for rural communities are 85 percent and 59 
percent, respectively. The divergence is even 
wider in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the dif-
ference in access to improved water sources 
between urban and rural dwellers is more 
than 30 percentage points. Such disparities 
are also evident in other non-income dimen-
sions. For example, in Senegal, 83 percent 
of children in urban areas complete primary 
school, but in rural areas only 57 percent of 
children reach this critical stepping stone.
Urbanization varies substantially across 
regions and is associated with large differ-
ences in development progress. The three 
regions with the highest rates of urbaniza-
tion in 1990—Europe and Central Asia 
(74 percent), Latin America and the Carib-
bean (71 percent), and the Middle East and 
North Africa (55 percent)—also performed 
relatively better on both the income and non-
income dimensions of poverty. Indeed, only a 
few countries have transitioned from poverty 
to prosperity without urbanizing (Ciccone 
and Hall 1996; Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani 
2013; Glaeser and Maré 2001). Productivity 
and urban scale tend to go together (Melo, 
Graham, and Noland 2009; Puga 2010; 
Rosenthal and Strange 2004, 2010). How-
ever, urbanization stood at only 32.2 per-
cent in South Asia and 36.7 percent in Sub- 
Saharan Africa in 2013. This disparity sug-
gests substantial scope to reap development 
benefits from urbanization in terms of higher 
productivity from agglomeration economies 
and lower unit costs of service provision. 
Still, urbanization needs to be managed to 
FiGure 2.3 Large disparities exist between urban and rural areas
Source: World Bank.
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ensure adequate service provision. As noted, 
although the MDG of improving the lives of 
100 million slum dwellers was met, increased 
urbanization and population growth in some 
regions raised the overall number by one-
third between 1990 and 2012.
Variation across demographic patterns
Finally, progress on the MDGs differs mark-
edly depending on key demographic features. 
Of the countries deemed to be far from achiev-
ing the extreme poverty reduction target, 92 
percent are in a demographic phase character-
ized by high fertility rates exceeding four chil-
dren per woman, high ratios of dependents to 
people of working age, and rapid population 
growth. Countries in this demographic phase 
are also far from achieving most non-income 
MDG targets, including those on undernour-
ishment (74 percent), under-five mortality 
(77 percent), maternal mortality (74 percent), 
sanitation (82 percent), and access to safe 
water (74 percent). In other key areas, such 
as gender equality as reflected in the share 
of women in secondary education or in wage 
employment outside the agricultural sector, 
there are major data gaps and indications of 
large disparities (UNESCO 2015). Almost all 
countries still in this demographic phase are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (97 percent). (See part 
2 of this report for a detailed discussion of 
demographic dynamics and development).
Rapid population growth can make devel-
opment progress more difficult, and the 
MDG monitoring framework tends to mag-
nify the impact of population growth. Not 
only can rapid population growth complicate 
efforts to expand coverage of public services, 
many MDG targets are expressed relative to 
population (Hermann 2015). For instance, 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s school-age population 
increased by 70 percent during the MDG 
period, and while the overall numbers of out-
of-school children fell, the region is still lag-
ging behind the MDG targets on universal 
school enrollment, given the large increase 
in the absolute number of children attend-
ing school. In another example from Sub- 
Saharan Africa, the under-five malnutrition 
rate fell from 29.2 percent in 1992 to 21.0 
percent in 2013, but the number of mal-
nourished children increased by 4.8 million, 
because of a 70 percent increase in the under-
five population over this period.
Age structures also matter for the attain-
ment of development goals. Savings and 
investment tend to be lower in countries 
with higher total dependency ratios than in 
countries where more of the population is of 
working age and the economy is benefiting 
from the so-called “demographic dividend.”3 
Hence, countries with higher dependency 
ratios (often due to high fertility rates) gener-
ally have fewer domestic resources per capita 
to invest in social services, unless they are 
able to access international capital markets 
or receive substantial aid flows.
A large unfinished agenda remains
Taken together, disparities in MDG out-
comes mean that much remains to be done. 
None of the MDGs has been achieved by 
all developing countries. The largest gaps in 
MDG progress are increasingly concentrated 
in countries characterized by high fertility 
and rapid population growth, many of which 
are natural-resource-based economies and 
struggling with fragility and conflict situa-
tions. However, even for developing countries 
that have made good progress toward the 
MDGs, an unfinished agenda remains inter-
nally across spatial dimensions, particularly 
along the urban-rural divide. Further, for 
most developing countries, some of the great-
est challenges lie in meeting the non-income 
MDGs, in particular those related to health 
(maternal and infant mortality), nutrition 
(undernourishment and hunger), and envi-
ronmental sustainability, including forest 
cover, fish stocks and ecosystem protection, 
as well as limiting carbon emissions.4 Never-
theless, the unprecedented development gains 
made over the past decade and a half, in part 
supported by the MDG process (box 2.1), 
provide ample evidence that the trajectory 
of development progress can be bent toward 
accelerated achievement on this unfinished 
agenda, while also tackling the emerging 
challenges in a changing world.
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Box 2.1 The MDG process has played a generally positive role in supporting development
Did the process of setting development goals make 
a discernable difference? What might have hap-
pened in the absence of the MDGs? Several empirical 
approaches have been adopted to address these ques-
tions. One method of trying to evaluate the impact 
of the partnership and monitoring framework on 
development progress centers on estimating counter-
factuals, and then comparing how various indicators 
actually evolved (McArthur 2014). Another related 
approach is to analyze the trend of MDG indicators 
before and after the adoption of the MDGs and apply 
statistical tests aimed at discerning changes in their 
trajectories.
The evidence available shows that the MDG 
process had major impacts in some indicators but 
little direct effect in others. Under-five mortality 
(MDG 4), for example, has fallen dramatically in the 
poorest countries since the MDGs were agreed (McAr-
thur 2014). Controlling for various factors,  statistical 
methods applied to 19 MDG indicators checking for 
an interruption in the time series between 1992 and 
2008 found an acceleration (in progress on an indi-
cator like the primary enrollment ratio going up) or 
deceleration (in progress on an indicator like maternal 
mortality going down) in the trajectories after 2001 
in five indicators (Friedman 2013). For instance, the 
incidence of tuberculosis (Target 6C) began falling 
sharply in 2000, for HIV (Target 6A) the turning 
point is identified as 1996–97, and for the adolescent 
child birth rate (Target 5B) the marked fall began in 
2004. As for the proportion of children under age one 
immunized against measles (Target 4A), there was no 
statistically discernable change in the trajectory dur-
ing the time period under review. It is also worth not-
ing that these analyses abstract from what else could 
have been undertaken with the resources, if they had 
not been applied to achieving the MDGs.
Variations in how underlying trends of individual 
MDGs changed at the regional level are also notable 
(figure B2.1.1). For example, using pre-MDG data to 
generate linear counterfactual trends on the educa-
tion enrollment ratio for females and males, the post-
MDG enrollment rates were higher than what would 
have been expected in both South Asia and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. In South Asia, the statistically deter-
mined structural break occurred in 2003, a few 
years after the launch of the MDGs. In contrast, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa it occurred in 1997, before the 
commencement of the MDGs, suggesting that even 
though enrollment accelerated during the MDG 
period, some positive underlying factors providing 
support were already in place. Similar accelerations 
are observable for Europe and Central Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In East Asia and Pacific, 
however, where female-to-male enrollment ratios 
were already at very high levels, there has been no dis-
FiGure B2.1.1 Sample of actual progress compared with counterfactuals based on pre-MDG trends
b. Sub-Saharan Africaa. South Asia
Gender parity in primary school enrollment improved more quickly than before
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Box 2.1 The MDG process has played a generally positive role in supporting development 
(continued)
cernable acceleration. In the Middle East and North 
Africa, actuals were lower than pre-MDG trends, 
possibly because of conflict.
The overall impact of the MDGs depends on 
factors unique to each MDG, some of which are 
country specific. Each MDG has its own his-
tory, such as the establishment of implementation 
arrangements (including the timing and size of tar-
geted global funds, like the Education for All—Fast 
Track Initiative that was established in 2002), or of 
technical breakthroughs (like the development of 
antiretroviral drugs to combat AIDS). Even where 
the impact at the time of the Millennium Declaration 
in 2000 is not statistically discernable in outcomes, 
the MDG process has provided a valuable platform 
to galvanize coalitions of stakeholders seeking to 
address some of the world’s toughest development 
problems.
FiGure B2.1.1 Sample of actual progress compared with counterfactuals based on pre-MDG trends (continued)
Source: World Bank.
Note: The gray columns represent the year 2000, referencing the baseline situation before the adoption of the MDGs. The counterfactuals, represented by the orange 
lines, extend the 1990–2000 (pre-MDG) trends into the 2001–13 period, based on a regression including a trend and autoregressive terms. An alternate approach using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extend the pre-MDG trends into the MDG period was also used, generating similar results. The Bai-Perron methodology was used to test 
for the presence of structural breaks. For gender parity, the results confirmed the presence of a structural break for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 and 1997, 
respectively. For tuberculosis, the test results confirmed the presence of a structural break for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in 2004 and 2002, respectively. Struc-
tural breaks were observed for other MDG indicators including primary school enrollment and child mortality rates.
d. Sub-Saharan Africac. South Asia
Actual Counterfactual 
In
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 tu
be
rc
ul
os
is 
(p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
eo
pl
e)
In
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 tu
be
rc
ul
os
is 
(p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
eo
pl
e)
180
190
200
210
220
230
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
250
300
350
400
450
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Incidence of tuberculosis fell sharply compared to pre-MDG trends
The sustainable development 
goals: A new approach 
Scaling up impact to address the unfin-
ished development agenda depends on 
adopting new approaches that reflect ongo-
ing megatrends, as well as on learning 
from the MDGs. The post-2015 develop-
ment framework of the SDGs aims to seize 
the extraordinary opportunity offered by 
these megatrends to make transformational 
development progress. The framework is 
based on a more integrated partnership that 
emphasizes universality, responsibility, and 
accountability. So that all will benefit more 
from global interconnections, the SDGs 
apply universally to all countries as a global 
compact, based on shared responsibility 
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(especially for the global commons) and 
on improved accountability frameworks to 
monitor contributions and progress (Kharas 
and Zhang 2014). The SDGs are also able 
to build on the MDG experience, reflecting 
valuable learning on what worked and what 
was less effective in promoting development 
progress. The World Bank Group supports 
the SDGs, aligning its strategy for engage-
ment through the goals of ending poverty 
and promoting shared prosperity in a sus-
tainable manner (box 2.2).
Box 2.2 What is the relationship between the World Bank Group’s goals and the 
Sustainable Development Goals?
The World Bank Group’s goals anchor its overarching 
mission of a world free of poverty to two high-level 
objectives of ending extreme poverty and promoting 
shared prosperity, and doing so sustainably. They 
were established to bring focus and greater account-
ability to the organization’s own work. As the authors 
of the report setting out the goals (World Bank 
2013d, 9) point out: “The goals we have articulated 
are not solely for the World Bank Group to achieve but 
rather are goals that we hope are consistent with those 
of our 188 member countries.” The SDGs follow in the 
tradition of the Millennium Development Goals and 
are endorsed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations and speak to the breadth of the development 
challenge (UN 2015f).
The World Bank Group’s goals are embedded in 
the SDGs, with some minor differences in goals, tar-
gets and indicators. The poverty goal (TG1), for exam-
ple, calls for ending extreme poverty, which is defined 
as reducing the share of those living on less than $1.25 
poverty a day (in 2005 constant dollars) to 3 percent 
by 2030. The corresponding SDG goal is stronger in 
that it aspires to end poverty everywhere and in all of 
its forms, a goal that amounts to reducing the same 
indicator to zero by 2030 (SDG1.1). The shared pros-
perity goal (TG2) sets out to increase the well-being of 
the poorer segments of society, as measured by income 
growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in 
each country, without specifying a target (“fostering” 
and “promoting” income growth). The corresponding 
SDG goal is somewhat different; it aspires to reduce 
inequality within and among countries, defined as 
the extent to which, by 2030, countries progressively 
achieve and sustain income growth in the bottom 40 
percent in excess of the national average (SDG 10.1) 
without stipulating a specific target on the extent of 
this excess. The SDG goal is focused relatively more 
on inequality than the World Bank Group’s goal. 
A broader perspective that recognizes the multi-
dimensionality of the World Bank Group’s goals and 
the underlying sustainability requirement would, 
however, suggest that these goals and the SDGs are 
aligned. The World Bank Group’s goals need to be 
pursued in a manner that is economically, socially, 
and environmentally sustainable. The goals them-
selves are also inherently multidimensional, as 
elaborated in chapter 1, even if their monetary indi-
cators manifest themselves more narrowly. Yet, “end-
ing poverty and promoting shared prosperity are 
unequivocally also about progress in non-monetary 
dimensions of welfare including education, health, 
nutrition, and access to essential infrastructure, as 
well as about enhancing voice and participation of all 
segments of society in economic, social, and political 
spheres.” (World Bank 2013d, 8). Furthermore, the 
additional requirement that the World Bank Group’s 
goals be achieved in a sustainable manner raises the 
need for additional analysis, monitoring, and dia-
logue. Hence, the two sets of goals can be seen as very 
similar, even if they remain different with respect to 
their original intent and the level of aggregation at 
which they are presented. 
Recognizing that accelerating development is a 
shared endeavor, the World Bank Group fully sup-
ports the SDGs. The World Bank Group has worked 
closely with the United Nations on various aspects 
of the post-2015 agenda, among them financing for 
development and data issues, and is expected to con-
tinue to work with the UN on implementation. Realiz-
ing the extraordinary opportunity of ending extreme 
poverty in a generation and promoting shared pros-
perity more widely is feasible only through collective 
efforts of all stakeholders, most importantly through 
national initiative, supported by international entities. 
The global compact applies universally, to high- and 
low-income countries alike, and to national and inter-
national implementing agencies and financiers alike. 
The World Bank Group will benchmark its activities 
with a view to help accelerate progress on the post-
2015 agenda. 
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The highly inclusive and open SDG pro-
cess augurs well for sustaining the buy-in 
needed to accelerate progress. The SDGs 
emerged from wide-ranging stakeholder 
engagements, reflecting views from 193 gov-
ernments and more than 7 million respon-
dents to an online survey conducted by the 
United Nations (UN) (Bhattacharya and 
Kharas 2015; United Nations 2015e). They 
also benefited from the insights of a UN 
High Level Panel of Eminent Persons (from 
government, civil society, and the private 
sector), the Open Working Group of the UN 
General Assembly on Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (drawing on extensive thematic 
consultations), and the Intergovernmental 
Committee of Experts on Sustainable Devel-
opment Financing. The work of these and 
other key bodies reach important milestones 
in 2015 with the Financing for Develop-
ment Conference in Addis Ababa in July, 
the UN General Assembly meeting endors-
ing the SDGs in September, and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) Conference of the Par-
ties meeting in Paris in December. These are 
building critical momentum for action going 
forward. 
Changed circumstances demand a new 
approach 
Grounded in a global compact for human 
development and preservation of the planet, 
the SDGs represent a qualitative departure 
from previous frameworks (UN 2015f). With 
their emphasis on universality, responsibil-
ity, and accountability, the SDGs are more 
holistic in approach than the MDGS were, 
and in their very nature reflect and respond 
to several megatrends that are having a pro-
found impact on the trajectory of economic, 
social, and environmental progress around 
the world. Given the extensive progress to 
date, and the growing power of humanity 
to affect change, there is an extraordinary 
opportunity to end poverty in all of its forms, 
while safeguarding the environment and pur-
suing other development goals. Sustained 
advancement, however, will require con-
certed effort, including through the fuller 
participation of business and civil society. 
evolving context of development
Several megatrends are playing a critical role 
in framing what will be feasible over the SDG 
period to 2030. These include the unprec-
edented increase in global connectedness, the 
pace of technological change and adoption, 
the move toward urbanization, the evolution 
of demographic trends, and the impact of 
human activity on environmental degrada-
tion and climate change (Dobbs, Manyika, 
and Woetzel 2015; Singh 2012). Effective 
implementation of the SDGs will need to 
be mindful of these trends and their wide- 
ranging implications in order to mitigate risks 
and accelerate transformational development 
progress. 
Extraordinary and intensifying connect-
edness is changing the world. Trade, finance, 
communications, and migration are all 
expanding rapidly, bringing the world closer 
together. Between 1990 and 2015, global 
merchandise trade grew 1.4 to 2.4 times as 
fast as the world economy, rising to the equiv-
alent of around 60 percent of world GDP (fig-
ure 2.4a).5 Over the same period, financial 
flows—including foreign direct investment 
(FDI), official development aid, and private 
capital—rose from about $87 billion to $1.3 
trillion. The composition of financial flows 
has also undergone a major shift: in 1990 
FDI was $21 billion, less than half of ODA 
at $53 billion; by 2014, FDI reached $735 
billion and was more than five times larger 
than ODA flows of $135 billion. Global com-
munications have skyrocketed: for example, 
mobile subscriptions rose from 5 per million 
in 1980 to more than 90 for every 100 people 
today (figure 2.4b) (Kose and Ozturk 2014). 
People are also on the move, with 1 billion 
international tourists in 2013, and 232 mil-
lion international migrants (compared with 
154 million in 1990) (UN 2013b). Another 
750 million people have migrated internally. 
In seeking a global compact to address many 
of the world’s most difficult challenges, the 
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SDGs reflect the unprecedented connected-
ness of the present age. 
The global center of economic growth is 
rapidly moving toward emerging markets, 
but their comparatively faster growth needs 
to be supported by expanded investment. 
For almost 2000 years, the center of global 
growth moved slowly from a point between 
China and India, the world’s two most popu-
lous nations, toward industrializing Europe 
and North America (Dobbs, Manyika, and 
Woetzel 2015, 19). The process has reversed 
and is accelerating dramatically—from a 
position just north of Europe in 2000, the 
center of global economic growth could 
return to its origin in Asia in just 25 years. 
This trend is generally welcome, as more 
populous and poorer countries in the emerg-
ing South sustain high rates of growth and 
“catch up” with advanced countries. Realiz-
ing the potential for faster growth, however, 
depends on scaling up high-return investment 
in the emerging South, both public and pri-
vate. The SDGs reflect this imperative in their 
call for sustainable industrialization, greater 
infrastructure investment, and accelerated 
per capita income growth in low-income 
countries. 
Deepening global trade and investment 
connections could also help reverse slipping 
potential growth in high-income countries. 
Concerns about weakening growth prospects 
in high-income economies are reflected in 
the “secular stagnation” hypothesis, which 
highlights a chronic excess of savings over 
investment because interest rates are unable 
to adjust to equate savings with investment at 
full employment (Summers 2015). Low pro-
ductivity growth and an aging population in 
high-income countries may also be limiting 
investment opportunities and contributing to 
the excess of savings. In such circumstances, 
greater public investment in high-income 
countries is likely to lower the debt-to-GDP 
ratios. They also provide substantial scope 
for a debt-financed infrastructure push in 
emerging markets, both to increase high-
return public capital stock and to spur private 
investment (Arslanalp, Bornhorst, and Gupta 
2011; IMF 2014). Through expanded trade 
and investment links, greater public invest-
ment in emerging market economies can also 
FiGure 2.4 Global connectedness has increased through intensified trade and communications
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help generate opportunities for exports and 
boost growth in high-income countries. 
Progress is being supported by a quicken-
ing of technological innovation and adop-
tion, enabling more sustainable and efficient 
practices. Humankind will generate more 
data in the next five years than in the previ-
ous 5,000. The digital and data revolutions 
are driving technical change in a range of 
fields, and are expected to underpin accel-
erating technical change in next-generation 
genomics, materials science, energy stor-
age and renewables, advanced robotics, and 
information technologies, among others.6 
The adoption of new technologies is also 
accelerating (although developing countries 
sometimes have difficulty in using them 
effectively), largely because of the nature of 
offerings at almost zero cost, as well as the 
increased communications and greater con-
nectedness of the world. These trends and 
efforts to broaden access to technology are 
a central part of numerous SDGs, including 
boosting agricultural productivity, promot-
ing the empowerment of women, expanding 
access to clean energy, diversifying industry 
and breaking the link between carbon emis-
sions and economic growth. 
The urbanization megatrend brings great 
scope for accelerating development progress 
if key challenges can be met. The popula-
tion of cities in emerging economies is pro-
jected to double from 2 billion in 2000 to 4 
billion by 2030, and the footprint of urban 
areas is expected to triple from 200,000 to 
600,000 square kilometers (World Bank 
2013c). About 80 percent of the world’s 
GDP is generated in cities, attracting rapid 
inflows of people. While the economies of 
scale of urban agglomeration and lower unit 
costs of service provision generate prosper-
ity and improved well-being, the rapid pace 
of urbanization raises numerous challenges 
(also for rural areas losing people) that need 
to be addressed with effective planning, con-
necting, and financing, to ensure resilient 
and sustainable development (World Bank 
2013c). The SDGs give due emphasis to the 
critical role of the impulse toward urbaniza-
tion in development.
Demographic change is exerting a power-
ful influence on development trajectories. As 
discussed in more detail in part 2, several 
demographic changes, including the rise of 
the total dependency ratio at the global level 
for the first time since the 1960s, the cessa-
tion in the growth of the global youth popu-
lation (ages 0–15), and the aging of popula-
tions in many countries, are giving rise to 
new opportunities and challenges over the 
coming decades. In addition to promoting 
women’s empowerment and universal access 
to sexual and reproductive health as develop-
ment objectives in their own right, the SDGs 
are motivated by demographic pressures and 
the urgent need to prioritize sustainability.  
Global consumption is growing rapidly, 
especially in emerging market economies, 
and it will be essential to promote patterns 
that are environmentally sustainable. The 
global consuming class, defined as people 
with disposable income above $10 a day, is 
expected to exceed 4.2 billion by 2025, com-
pared with 1.2 billion in 1990, with most 
purchasing power garnered in emerging 
market economies (Dobbs, Manyika, and 
Woetzel 2015). On top of existing ecological 
challenges, the current trajectory of resource 
and energy intensity of production scaled to 
this future level of demand show impacts that 
are unsustainable in terms of water, forests, 
fish, pollution, and climate. The consuming 
class is benefiting greatly from new technolo-
gies, with information, applications, and 
online services that are increasingly avail-
able at extremely low or no cost. However, 
as emphasized in the SDGs, it will be para-
mount that emerging production and con-
sumption patterns be increasingly environ-
mentally and socially sustainable. The World 
Bank Group, among others, is promoting a 
conceptualization of development progress 
that goes beyond traditional measures of 
GDP to reflect changes in physical, human, 
and natural capital, which helps countries 
better estimate whether their growth is sus-
tainable (World Bank 2011).
Finally, climate change is bringing a warm-
ing world with more extreme weather events, 
and urgent mitigation as well as adaptation 
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is required if development gains are to be 
preserved (World Bank 2014). The science 
on global warming caused by human activ-
ity is unequivocal, and the signs are clear. 
Of the 15 hottest years since record keeping 
began 130 years ago, 14 occurred between 
2000 and 2015. The world may already be 
locked in to a warming of 1.5oC by midcen-
tury, and if a sharp course correction is not 
undertaken, 4oC by the end of the century. 
The focus of the SDGs on environmental sus-
tainability recognizes that ending extreme 
poverty, securing broader development gains, 
and lowering the risk of fragility and conflict 
will be very difficult in a +2oC world, and 
may not be possible at all in a +4oC world 
(Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015). 
A new approach
Mindful of these megatrends, the SDGs 
explicitly adopt a more universal approach 
spanning all countries, while recognizing that 
many key actions and policies are undertaken 
at the national level. The SDG framework 
applies to all countries and centers on the key 
elements needed to improve the future of the 
planet (UN 2015a, 10). Every country shares 
responsibility to contribute toward the trans-
formational change that is within reach. The 
SDGs’ enhanced monitoring framework also 
responds to the need for enhanced account-
ability, aimed at ensuring that all are doing 
their part both to keep their own houses in 
order and to contribute to the global com-
mons (Kharas 2015).
The framing of the SDGs emphasizes the 
interconnections between development objec-
tives in setting out an integrated development 
agenda. There are important interactions 
between development goals, and they can-
not be effectively pursued separately from 
each other (UN 2015c, 21). For example, 
progress on health goals depends on invest-
ments in infrastructure that gives everyone 
access to safe water and improved sanita-
tion. Similarly, limiting carbon dioxide emis-
sions to slow global warming requires the 
modernization of energy supplies. Hence, 
the SDGs explicitly articulate goals that are 
“integrated and indivisible and balance the 
three dimensions of sustainable development: 
the economic, social and environmental” 
(UN2015f, 3). The breadth of the SDGs has 
raised questions about whether the scale of 
the agenda will dilute focus, especially when 
some development exigencies are likely to 
be more pressing than others at the country 
level. Still, the SDGs are not simply a menu 
of development objectives, and policy mak-
ers and other stakeholders are called upon to 
pursue the goals as an integrated whole.
A more comprehensive agenda
The SDG agenda goes beyond the MDGs in 
scope, expanding into wider objectives for 
peaceful, well-governed, and inclusive societ-
ies.7 The commitment to the SDGs extends 
from the experience with the MDGs, and 
similarly aims to mobilize the international 
community toward common purpose on 
core elements of well-being by identifying 
compelling goals, specifying targets with set 
timeframes, and rendering them more con-
crete with indicators for monitoring (table 
2.1). While similarities with the MDGs are 
apparent, the transition from the MDGs with 
8 goals, 21 targets, and 60 indicators, to the 
SDGs with 17 goals, 169 targets, and 304 
indicators (at the time of writing), reflects a 
fuller recognition of the multidimensional 
nature of development. 
The commitment to ending extreme pov-
erty is the overarching goal and the first pillar 
of the MDGs, the World Bank Group’s goals, 
and the SDGs. The MDG goal to “eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger” has evolved 
into the SDG goal to “end poverty in all of 
its forms everywhere.” The recognition of the 
broad nature of deprivation is reflected in the 
associated targets of SDG1, covering both 
absolute poverty (as measured by the global 
poverty line of $1.25 a day) and national 
definitions, as well as in the call for provision 
of adequate social protection, access to basic 
services and economic resources, and miti-
gation of vulnerability to economic, social, 
and environmental shocks. The World Bank 
Group’s goal of reducing extreme poverty to 
less than 3 percent by 2030 at the global level 
is in the same vein.
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The hunger component of MDG 1 has 
been captured in a separate SDG 2. Reflect-
ing the complexity of food issues, SDG 2 aims 
to “end hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition, and promote sustainable 
agriculture.” Associated targets encompass 
not only hunger and nutrition but also efforts 
to boost agricultural productivity, ensure 
sustainable practices, remove distortionary 
trade restrictions in world food markets, and 
enhance the functioning of food commodity 
markets with better market information to 
help reduce volatility.
SDG 3 on health pulls together several 
related MDGs but is expanded to cover addi-
tional dimensions of healthy living. It seeks to 
“ensure healthy lives and promote well-being 
for all at all ages,” addressing MDGs 4, 5, 
and 6 on maternal and child health, as well 
as the key communicable diseases of malaria, 
tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. Both the 
MDGs and the SDGs include targets on uni-
versal access to reproductive health, which 
plays a key role in shaping demographic tra-
jectories. The expansions center on efforts to 
seek more investment in neglected tropical 
diseases, address the increasingly important 
issue of non-communicable diseases, ensure 
universal health coverage, reduce the number 
of deaths and illnesses from environmental 
contamination, and lower global deaths and 
injuries from road traffic accidents.
The SDGs on education and gender equal-
ity are broadened from the corresponding 
MDGs. SDG 4 builds on MDG 2’s focus on 
the achievement of universal primary educa-
tion and includes early childhood develop-
ment; equal access for women and men to 
technical, vocational, and tertiary educa-
tion; literacy among adults; and learning 
about sustainable development and lifestyles. 
SDG 5 aims to “achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls” by emphasiz-
ing additional dimensions of inequality in 
the treatment of females, including ending 
violence against all women and girls every-
where, eliminating harmful practices such as 
child, early, and forced marriage, and ending 
female genital mutilation. Ensuring universal 
access to sexual and reproductive health and 
rights is another component. Significantly, 
the SDGs recognize that reproductive health 
is also a critical rights issue. 
A major shift in the evolution of the 
commitment to development goals centers 
on the heightened focus of the SDGs on 
TABLe 2.1 The SDG agenda is centered on seventeen goals
SDG 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
SDG 2.  End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
SDG 3.  Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
SDG 4.  Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
SDG 5.  Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
SDG 6.  Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.
SDG 7.  Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
SDG 8.  Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work  
for all.
SDG 9.  Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
SDG 10.  Reduce inequality within and among countries.
SDG 11.  Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
SDG 12.  Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
SDG 13.  Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.*
SDG 14.  Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
SDG 15.  Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
SDG 16.  Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
SDG 17.  Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
*Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for 
negotiating the global response to climate change.
Source: UN 2015f.
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environmental issues. MDG 7 on ensur-
ing environmental sustainability has been 
expanded into five dedicated SDGs, includ-
ing SDG 6 on water and sanitation; SDG 12 
on ensuring sustainable consumption and 
production patterns; SDG 13 on the need to 
“take urgent action to combat climate change 
and its impacts”; SDG 14 on the oceans, 
seas, and marine resources; and SDG 15 on 
terrestrial ecosystems, including forests, des-
erts, and biodiversity. Environmental issues 
also feature prominently in several additional 
SDGs. These include SDG 2 on agricul-
ture; SDG 7 on energy (seeking to increase 
the share of renewable energy); SDG 8 on 
economic growth (referring to the need to 
“decouple economic growth from environ-
mental degradation”); SDG 9 on industrial-
ization (emphasizing “increased resource-use 
efficiency and greater adoption of clean and 
environmentally sound technologies”); and 
SDG 11 on human settlements (aiming to 
“reduce the adverse per capita environmen-
tal impact of cities” and implement “holistic 
disaster risk management”). These expan-
sions reflect growing concern about envi-
ronmental sustainability and the recognition 
that even the primary SDG 1 on poverty will 
not be reachable if the present trends of rural 
resource degradation and climate change 
continue.
The new monitoring framework places 
greater focus on income distribution, 
which is also reflected in the World Bank 
Group’s goal on shared prosperity. While 
MDG 1 noted the “share of poorest quintile 
in national consumption” as an indicator of 
the poverty target, it did not receive much 
attention in the development discourse dur-
ing the MDG period. In contrast, distribu-
tional issues have been elevated to a sepa-
rate goal, with SDG 10 aiming to “reduce 
inequality within and among countries.” This 
goal includes a tractable target of sustaining 
the “income growth of the bottom 40 percent 
of the population at a rate higher than the 
national average.” As detailed in chapter 1, 
the second of the World Bank Group’s goals 
is on shared prosperity, which emphasizes the 
income growth of the bottom 40 percent of 
the income distribution in each country, but 
it does not specify that it should be higher 
than the national average. Goals on inequal-
ity and shared prosperity are evidently uni-
versal, applying to all countries. 
The SDG framework includes several 
other new components, including SDG 7 on 
energy, and SDG 16 on promoting peaceful 
and inclusive societies. SDG 7 on ensuring 
universal access to affordable, reliable, and 
modern energy services is central to develop-
ment and underpins many other SDG goals. 
Similarly, SDG 16 recognizes that develop-
ment is thwarted or highly vulnerable in 
fragile and conflict situations, as well as in 
contexts where governance is weak. Years of 
development progress can rapidly be undone 
by the outbreak of conflict. And, poverty and 
deprivation are increasingly concentrated in 
countries characterized by fragility, violence, 
and limited institutional progress. SDG 16 
calls for promoting the rule of law and access 
to justice, reducing illicit arms flows, and 
lessening corruption and bribery in an effort 
to address the drivers of conflict.
Finally, SDG 17 focuses squarely on the 
key elements needed to ensure effective 
implementation. This goal focuses on arrang-
ing and facilitating sufficient financing, coop-
erating on technology, enhancing capacity-
building efforts, and promoting an open and 
equitable multilateral trading system. SDG 
17 also notes the need for greater policy and 
institutional coherence; multi-stakeholder 
partnerships; and enhanced data, monitor-
ing, and accountability. 
To accelerate progress, the SDGs can 
learn from the MDGs
To maximize the odds of success on the 
unfinished development agenda, it is impor-
tant to learn from the MDGs. Numerous les-
sons emerge from the MDG process (includ-
ing challenges faced; see Fehling, Nelson, 
and Venkatapuram 2013), some of which 
have already contributed to the framing of 
the SDGs and others that can help underpin 
development efforts between now and 2030 
(Kanie et al. 2014; UN 2012). These center 
106  t r a n s i t i o n i n g  f r o m  m D g s  t o  s D g s  g L o B a L  m o n i t o r i n g  r E P o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6
on ensuring inclusiveness and ownership 
at the country level; building on synergies 
between goals; specifying targets that can be 
monitored with good data and that are time 
bound; and supporting strong implementa-
tion, including ensuring adequate financing 
and effective use of resources.
inclusiveness and ownership
A key lesson is to adopt highly consultative 
goal-setting processes. Given that most of 
the critical actions required to make progress 
on the MDGs had to be implemented at the 
country level, inclusiveness and ownership 
were essential, extending to policy makers, 
representatives from the private sector and 
civil society, and other stakeholders. The 
SDG process has sought to reflect this lesson, 
and the proposals are built upon extensive 
consultations, facilitating adoption in coun-
try development programs. 
Synergies between development goals
Progress toward the MDGs was helped 
by synergies, and the effectiveness of SDG 
efforts will also depend on leveraging gains 
in one goal for advances in others. The links 
between MDGs on infant mortality and 
access to sanitation and safe water are well 
documented. The SDGs reflect this experi-
ence in their more integrated approach, and 
will benefit from synergies across numer-
ous SDGs. For example, progress toward 
SDG 5 on achieving gender equality would 
have a major impact on the prospects for 
lowering infant mortality, eliminating hun-
ger, and raising school attendance. SDG 16 
on promoting peaceful and inclusive societ-
ies has targets on reducing all forms of vio-
lence and corruption, both of which are key 
impediments to progress on all other SDGs. 
The scope for synergies is also an important 
consideration when prioritizing efforts on the 
SDGs at the country level. 
Sound monitoring 
Like the MDGs, the SDGs require sound 
monitoring, which in turn hinges on more 
and better data. Much of the success of the 
MDGs in moving the development agenda 
forward has been attributed to the specific-
ity of targets that were time bound. Progress 
was weaker on goals that were less specific 
and harder to monitor, and where good data 
were lacking. Building strong data systems 
is essential in this regard (box 2.3). With 
304 proposed indicators, some of which are 
difficult to monitor or have very little data 
coverage and availability, monitoring the 
SDGs will be challenging, and will entail 
large costs. Substantial work is needed to 
strengthen statistical systems at the national 
level and improve methodologies. About 
$1 billion a year may be needed in 77 low-
income countries to strengthen statistical 
systems to support and track the SDGs con-
sistently (SDSN 2015). Scaled-up data and 
monitoring will require enhancing global 
mechanisms and support. 
Strong implementation
Success or failure will hinge on implementa-
tion. Moving from goal setting to implemen-
tation requires analysis and tailoring of the 
targets to the country level. It also calls for 
enhanced accountability for financing and 
other key steps among development partners 
and the wider international community. In 
the case of several MDGs, implementation 
arrangements were effectively not in place 
until five to seven years after the Millennium 
Declaration, leading to significant delays. 
Building on MDG structures, the implemen-
tation of the SDGs is better placed, despite 
the added areas of focus. 
Still, several structural factors pose chal-
lenges that need to be confronted if the goals 
are to be met. As highlighted in chapter 1, 
the evolution of poverty points to an increas-
ing concentration of poverty in hard-to-reach 
places, such as in fragile and conflict situa-
tions, where governance is weak. In addi-
tion, the growth elasticity of poverty is fall-
ing, suggesting that the remaining pockets 
of poverty are less responsive to economic 
growth. Finally, the prospects for growth 
over the coming years are somewhat damp-
ened compared with the MDG period, when 
strong growth supported progress, as is dis-
cussed in chapter 3.
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As with the MDGs, demographic pat-
terns may also pose significant challenges 
to achieving the SDGs. The demographic 
trends projected over the coming decades 
will have a major impact on the trajectory 
of development (see part 2 of this report). 
For example, more than 2 billion babies 
will be born worldwide between now and 
2030 (UN 2015b). When comparing the 
coming 15 years with the past 15 years, 
Box 2.3 What gets measured gets done: The importance of data 
Data availability has improved under the MDG frame-
work. While setting goals remains a key step to solving 
development challenges, without critical data inputs 
measuring initial conditions and monitoring progress, 
effective policy making is hampered. One beneficial 
outcome of the MDG process has been the push for 
better data (Manning 2009) and its contribution to the 
ongoing data revolution (UN 2014b). In 2003, only 
four developing countries had two or more data points 
for at least 16 of the 22 MDG indicators. By 2013, 
129 countries met this metric of data availability. The 
improvement in data was greatly facilitated by the 
expansion of household surveys, a key data source for 
monitoring the MDGs. For instance, the average num-
ber of surveys produced each year in both Ethiopia 
and Ghana has almost doubled since 2000. Behind the 
increased availability of data lies enhanced national 
statistical capacity building, with data often collected 
in collaboration with international experts. 
Much more needs to be done to fill data gaps. 
Ongoing improvements in data notwithstanding, 
significant gaps remain for key MDG indicators. For 
instance, on the goal of maternal mortality, only 11 
percent of developing countries have available data. 
In part, that is because civil registration systems on 
births and deaths are incomplete, with coverage rang-
ing from 50 percent in Latin America to 25 percent 
in South Asia, and a mere 6 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Boerma and Stansfield 2007; Devarajan 2013; 
Murray, 2007). Another challenge is the lack of disag-
gregation by gender, income quintile, or disabilities, 
which complicates targeted policy formulation. Even 
when data are available, they often come with signifi-
cant lags, and there are concerns about consistency 
and reliability. For instance, less than 60 percent of 
developing countries report data with less than a two-
year lag on the MDGs related to health and education 
(including gender parity in education, maternal mor-
tality, and the prevalence of undernourishment), and 
in many cases broad assumptions were made in order 
to arrive at existing estimates (Sachs 2012).
Several factors account for the data challenges in 
the MDG process. The effort to generate the data 
needed to monitor the MDGs has often been driven 
by external actors, rather than being embedded in the 
priorities of national statistical offices. For instance, 
on the maternal mortality indicator, while some trend 
analysis can be carried out for about 80 percent of 
developing countries, this share drops to about 10 
percent when data collected from international 
organizations are excluded. In some cases, national 
statistical offices perceived the approach of interna-
tional actors as top-down and undermining their 
own efforts, especially when estimates differed from 
national ones. Finally, some of the MDGs were not 
readily quantifiable (such as “achieve full and pro-
ductive employment and decent work,” or “universal 
access to reproductive health”), making it difficult to 
generate relevant monitoring indicators. 
Governments and other stakeholders should invest 
more in statistical capacity building and a “smart 
data revolution.” Given the increased number of 
goals, targets, and indicators under the SDGs, the 
associated data challenges are even more onerous 
than those of the MDGs. It is important to invest in 
statistical capacity and build on existing mechanisms 
and systems to gather the micro-level data needed for 
monitoring the SDGs. Monitoring efforts, however, 
will benefit from the ongoing smart data revolution, 
which is filtering through all aspects of modern soci-
ety, such as elections managed with biometrics, for-
ests monitored by satellite imagery, banking under-
taken on smart phones, and medical x-rays sent for 
examination halfway around the world. The associ-
ated data revolution has the potential to reduce long 
lags and dramatically improve the quality of data. 
Between household survey years, national statistical 
offices could leverage the expertise of telecommunica-
tion companies and software developers to carry out 
real-time surveys on mortality rates and even poverty 
data. By one estimate this could reduce the cost of 
surveys by about 60 percent.
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relatively more births are expected in low-
income countries in Africa, where health 
systems are weak, coverage is incomplete, 
and maternal and infant mortality rates are 
high. Making progress on related SDG indi-
cators and expanding the coverage of health 
services when the underlying demand con-
tinues to increase is a major challenge. The 
same is true for the 2 billion children that 
are projected to reach school age over the 
next 15 years. Africa may see a 34 percent 
increase in school-age children (five-year-
olds), making it even harder to expand cov-
erage and increase the quality of schooling. 
More targeted approaches will be needed in 
these contexts. 
The challenges associated with the sheer 
scale and breadth of the SDGs require con-
certed effort and scaled-up financing. Ulti-
mately, the SDGs are the product of a deep 
political process. Sustaining support among 
political constituencies, especially when 
difficult and unpopular actions are required, 
hinges on leadership and continuing engage-
ment on core SDG issues. Building on the 
investment in implementation arrangements 
of the MDGs, the SDGs are better placed for 
scaled-up action. Still, more needs to be done 
to boost implementation capacity, including 
by mobilizing adequate financing (box 2.4). 
Some prioritization of SDG-related activities 
at both the global and the country levels will 
need to be reflected in spending plans (Lom-
borg and others 2014). The Outcome Docu-
ment from the Third International Financing 
for Development Conference in Addis Ababa 
emphasizes seven key areas (UN 2015e): 
•   Delivering social protection and essential 
public services, with a social compact for 
ensuring adequate service provision, sup-
ported by appropriate spending at the 
national level and augmented with interna-
tional resources.
Box 2.4 Mobilizing financing for development
Mobilizing adequate resources and ensuring their 
effective use is essential to making progress on the 
unfinished development agenda.a The renewed com-
mitment to development in 2015 is an important 
opportunity to strengthen enabling policies and 
institutions, as well as to mobilize needed resources. 
Experience shows that these elements are closely 
related, especially in a rapidly changing global con-
text, where more low- and middle-income coun-
tries are able to access international capital markets 
(more than 70 emerging market countries have bond 
ratings), and foreign direct investment in 2013 was 
more than five times larger than official development 
assistance (ODA). The 2002 Monterrey Consensus 
on the MDGs highlighted the importance of global 
development cooperation to mobilize and increase 
the effective use of financial resources. The post-
2015 financing framework will build on the lessons 
learned during the MDG era, emphasizing the need to 
mobilize domestic resources and ensure sound man-
agement of public expenditures, encourage private 
sector resources oriented toward development goals, 
and boost international public finance. More detailed 
financing plans need to be prepared at the country 
level (Kharas and McArthur 2014, 2015).
Domestic resources will continue to make up 
the bulk of public spending aimed directly at key 
development priorities. Only about half of develop-
ing countries are able to collect 15 percent of GDP 
or more in taxes (this figure is even lower in fragile 
and conflict states), a modest level given wide-ranging 
needs (IMF 2011). Improving the tax structure for 
domestic resource mobilization also remains a chal-
lenge. For example, policy makers are urged to avoid 
creating economic distortions through tax holidays, 
or discouraging trade openness with various tax mea-
sures. Increasing the quality and efficiency of public 
spending will help generate needed resources to meet 
key development goals. Around 8 percent of govern-
ment spending around the world, equivalent to $1.9 
trillion, is spent on subsidies in one form or another, 
with energy subsidies alone costing the public purse 
(box continues next page)
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Box 2.4 Mobilizing financing for development (continued)
about $300 billion (IMF 2014). The recent fall in 
oil prices presents a golden opportunity to elimi-
nate or dramatically reduce such subsidies. Expand-
ing the evidence base on the incidence of such sub-
sidies may encourage positive change. Strengthening 
public expenditure management systems, including 
enhanced independent oversight, multiyear budget-
ing, and fiscal responsibility laws, can also contribute 
meaningfully. 
Private resources play a central role, and efforts 
should focus on incentivizing flows. Private sources, 
including foreign direct investment, bank loans, 
capital markets, private transfers (such as workers’ 
remittances), and philanthropy, account for the bulk 
of external resource flows to emerging market econo-
mies. Given that much of these flows are motivated 
by risk/reward considerations, public policy needs to 
help lower and manage risk or increase the rewards 
associated with private investment. Development 
partners, such as the multilateral development banks 
and the International Monetary Fund, seek to serve 
as “leveraging machines,” catalyzing private sector 
flows (through both advice and policy-based lending), 
and by helping to underpin strong macroeconomic 
conditions and investment climates (World Bank 
2015b). Their agenda also includes the promotion 
of local capital markets for more effective resource 
intermediation. 
ODA is the foundation and catalyst for leverag-
ing greatly expanded public and private sector capi-
tal flows for development. ODA remains the largest 
source of external resources to low-income and frag-
ile and conflicted countries, where private investment 
and access to international capital markets is limited. 
However, current levels of ODA, which reached about 
$135 billion in 2013, will be insufficient to meet the 
SDGs. Indeed, ODA flows to Africa have fallen in 
real terms over the past few years. ODA would have 
to more than double to meet the 0.7 percent of gross 
national income target set by the Development Assis-
tance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. ODA needs to be 
used more intelligently to channel additional sources 
of financing towards development goals, leveraging 
“billions for trillions.” Issues of aid quality and effec-
tiveness, including predictability, alignment, harmo-
nization, and coherence with the World Bank’s goals 
and the SDG agenda, remain salient. A diverse group 
of countries has gained prominence in the aid land-
scape, including the BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Fed-
eration, India, China, and South Africa), the Republic 
of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Climate finance is a relatively new and growing 
source of funding available to developing countries 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation proj-
ects and programs. The term has been used in a nar-
rower sense to refer to transfers of public resources 
from developed to developing countries in light of UN 
Climate Convention obligations to provide “new and 
additional financial resources,” and in a wider sense 
to refer to all financial flows relating to climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Developed country governments 
currently provide between $10 billion to $20 billion 
per year of such funds, and at the 2009 UN climate 
change conference in Copenhagen, they committed to 
providing a collective $100 billion per year by 2020. 
While the focus of climate finance is clearly on climate 
mitigation and adaptation, many mitigation actions 
(investments in energy and resource efficiency), adap-
tation actions (public transit and sustainable cities), 
capacity building, and research and development also 
have national and local “co-benefits.” 
The multilateral development banks play a funda-
mental role not only as financial intermediaries lever-
aging shareholder contributions but also in support-
ing debt restructuring initiatives, strengthening public 
expenditure management, and crowding in private 
sector financing. The multilateral development banks 
and the IMF are committed to delivering financing 
solutions that will help countries achieve the SDGs, 
and they are exploring ways to increase available 
financial resources, expand policy guidance and tech-
nical assistance, promote and catalyze private invest-
ment, support international action on regional and 
global development issues, and improve coordina-
tion and alignment (World Bank 2015a, 23). Toward 
these ends, the World Bank Group and other multilat-
eral development banks have made commitments of 
over $400 billion for the three-year period 2016–18. 
Ongoing efforts emphasize additionality, efficiency, 
and effectiveness. The IMF has also increased access 
norms and limits across concessional facilities by 50 
percent for all eligible countries.
a.  The discussion in this section is based on World Bank 
2015a.
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•   Scaling up efforts to end hunger and mal-
nutrition, including by investing in sustain-
able agriculture and fisheries, especially the 
productivity of smallholder farmers. 
•   Establishing a new forum to bridge the 
infrastructure gap, increasing sustainable 
and inclusive infrastructure investment 
in developing countries, with additional 
finance, better technology, and elevated 
technical assistance.
•   Promoting inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization, which is essential for 
growth, economic diversification, innova-
tion, and high-value-addition jobs. 
•   Generating full and productive employ-
ment and decent work for all, promoting 
micro-, small, and medium enterprises, 
including credit and other financial ser-
vices, and creating an environment where 
the business sector plays a central role in 
generating employment and growth.
•   Protecting our ecosystems for all, through 
coherent policy, financing, trade, and tech-
nology that will be essential to mitigating 
and avoiding harmful activities.
•   Promoting peaceful and inclusive societ-
ies as the foundation of socially, economi-
cally, and environmentally sustainable 
development. 
Conclusion
As the world transitions from the MDGs to 
the SDGs, the opportunities presented by 
rapid global change hold great promise for 
transforming development while safeguard-
ing the environment. The MDGs shaped the 
development agenda since the turn of the 
century, with wide-ranging and impressive 
achievements. The SDGs are the next step in 
the global efforts to transform development: 
much broader in nature, with clear targets for 
monitoring and a sharpened focus on safe-
guarding the world’s fragile ecosystems. The 
lessons learned from the MDGs improve the 
likelihood of success of the more sweeping 
SDGs. Realizing the potential of the so-called 
“megatrends”—such as global connectedness 
and the shift of the global economic center 
of gravity toward dynamic economies in the 
East—can help facilitate progress toward 
reaching the SDGs. To achieve its promise, 
however, the SDGs require major commit-
ments regarding policy and institutional 
reform and mobilization of adequate financ-
ing. Achievement of the SDGs also requires 
meeting emerging economic challenges over 
the medium term, the subject of the next 
chapter.
Notes
1.  Empirical evidence suggests that what counts 
for economic growth is what students actually 
learn, not how many years of schooling they 
complete. While nearly all education systems 
are expanding quantitatively, many are failing 
in this fundamental purpose (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2007). For instance, in 2006, even 
though Brazil and Mexico were on track to 
meet the MDG target, a large share of Brazilian 
(78 percent) and Mexican youth (50 percent) 
lacked minimally adequate competencies in 
mathematics, and over 90 percent did not reach 
a reasonable global standard (Filmer, Hasan, 
and Pritchett 2006; Pritchett, Banerji, and 
Kenny 2013). Similarly, another study focusing 
on East Africa found that while primary enroll-
ment rates have risen significantly over the past 
15 years, children remain functionally illiter-
ate or innumerate, despite completing multiple 
years of schooling (Jones and others 2014). 
2.  See the MDG Report Card in appendix A for 
more detailed regional comparisons of each 
MDG and associated targets.
3.  The “total dependency ratio” is the sum of 
people ages 0–14 and 65 and over, divided by 
the number of people ages 15–64, multiplied 
by 100. 
4.  In addition to improved water, sanitation, and 
slums, MDG 7 (on ensuring environmental sus-
tainability) included indicators on the propor-
tion of land area covered by forest, the propor-
tion of fish stocks within safe biological limits, 
the proportion of total water resources used, 
the proportion of terrestrial and marine areas 
protected, the proportion of species threatened 
with extinction, the level of CO2 emissions per 
capita and per $1 GDP (PPP), and the con-
sumption of ozone-depleting substances.
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5.  Trade growth has slowed in the postcrisis 
years—in 2012 and 2013, trade grew more 
slowly than the world economy for the first time 
in four decades. This slowdown has sparked a 
debate about “peak trade”: while there may be 
scope for further growth in trade, structural 
changes in U.S. and Chinese supply chains, 
together with the end of the big push from the 
fragmentation of production networks, may 
signal that trade growth has peaked (Constan-
tinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta 2014).
6.  Dobbs, Manyika, and Woetzel 2015. See 
 Gordon 2014 for a skeptical view about 
“techno-optimism.” 
7.  U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon indicated 
that “the SDGs break new ground with goals 
on inequalities, economic growth, decent jobs, 
cities and human settlements, industrialization, 
energy, climate change, sustainable consump-
tion and production, peace, justice, and insti-
tutions. The environmental dimension of the 
agenda is articulated across the whole agenda. 
The SDGs are underpinned with a goal on 
global partnerships for the means of implemen-
tation” (UN 2014a). 
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Global Macroeconomic 
Performance and Outlook: 
Prospects for Growth
outlook have risen: They include risks from 
China’s growth transition, excessive finan-
cial market volatility and tightening of 
financial conditions, the impact of a sizable 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar on balance 
sheet exposures, even lower commodity 
prices, rising geopolitical risks, and lower 
potential growth.
•   Growth  in  advanced  economies  (AEs) 
is expected to continue to recover into 
2015–16, and accommodative monetary 
policy is appropriate to support this recov-
ery. Fiscal policy needs to be supportive 
where conditions allow, while many AEs 
need to establish credible medium-term fis-
cal frameworks and consolidation plans. 
Strengthening of regulation and supervi-
sion of rapidly expanding nonbank finan-
cial activities is also needed. Overall, given 
the weakened near- and medium-term 
growth  outlook  for many AEs,  raising 
actual and potential growth is a key eco-
nomic policy priority.
•   The 2015–16 growth outlook  for EMs 
is uneven and has weakened overall for 
many with the end of the commodity prices 
supercycle. Geopolitical tensions, tighten-
ing of financial conditions, and lower com-
modity prices weigh on the outlook for 
many countries. Overall, demand support 
This chapter includes an overview of recent 
macroeconomic developments, a short-term 
global economic outlook, and the risks fac-
ing the outlook, which draw on the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO).1 It also assesses the 
appropriateness of macroeconomic policies in 
advanced, emerging market, and low-income 
developing countries. With the year marking 
a shift in the objectives of the global develop-
ment agenda—with the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) replacing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of the past 15 
years—the chapter discusses the global eco-
nomic performance in a longer-term perspec-
tive, by also drawing on the key demographic 
trends that influence economic prospects of 
different groups of economies. The main mes-
sages are the following:
•   Overall, global growth in 2015 is projected 
to be lower than in 2014, with prospects 
across major countries and regions uneven. 
Domestic inflation is expected to remain 
subdued, in large part due to the significant 
weakening in global commodity prices, 
although inflation is projected to rise in 
some emerging market countries  (EMs) 
that have suffered from sizable exchange 
rate depreciations. Downside risks to  the 
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needs to be carefully weighed against the 
need to manage vulnerabilities. Those with 
policy flexibility should use it to the extent 
possible, for others the priority should be 
growth friendly fiscal rebalancing; finan-
cial buffers, where available, should be used 
to smooth the impact of lower commodity 
export prices. Lower commodity prices 
also call for a timely reform of energy sub-
sidies. As in AEs, raising potential growth 
over the medium term is a priority.
•   Low-income developing countries (LIDCs) 
are projected to see growth slow in 2015 
as growth in oil-exporting LIDCs drops 
off sharply before recovering in 2016. 
Where warranted, policies should remain 
focused on rebuilding fiscal and external 
buffers and achieving medium-term devel-
opment priorities. In many emerging mar-
ket and developing countries, allowing for 
exchange rate flexibility will help adjust to 
external shocks.
•   During the MDG-monitoring period, most 
emerging market and developing countries 
(EMDCs) grew at a sustained strong pace, 
notwithstanding the negative impact from 
the 2009 global financial crisis. Together 
with strong growth, per capita income dif-
ferences among countries were reduced, 
and absolute poverty was halved over this 
period.
•   For  the  SDG-monitoring  period,  pros-
pects are for global growth to trend down, 
mostly because of a decrease in global 
population growth. Developing countries 
would need to address disparate demo-
graphic evolutions with an appropriate set 
of macroeconomic and structural policies 
to enable further reductions in absolute 
poverty levels and to narrow income differ-
ences relative to more advanced economies.
Recent developments and short- 
and medium-term prospects
In 2014, global growth was 3.4 percent, 
broadly in line with the projections made 
in the Global Monitoring Report  (GMR) 
2014/15, and reflecting growth of 1.8 percent 
in AEs and 4.6 percent in EMDCs (table 3.1). 
Growth in AEs picked up as the euro area 
pulled out of recession. In contrast, growth in 
EMDCs slowed down further with the con-
tinued adjustment in many to lower potential 
growth prospects. Among EMs,  the slow-
down in 2014 was driven to a large extent 
by subdued growth  in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Growth in LIDCs 
was maintained at a robust 6.0 percent, 
even though several countries in Africa were 
severely affected by the Ebola epidemic.
In 2015, global growth is projected at 3.1 
percent—some 0.7 percentage point lower 
than the forecast made in GMR 2014/15—
with growth in AEs projected to average 2.0 
percent and in EMDCs 4.0 percent. Growth 
in AEs is projected to pick up relative to 2014 
on further strengthening of the recovery in the 
euro area and the return to positive growth in 
Japan, supported by declining oil prices. In con-
trast, growth in EMDCs is expected to decline 
again—the fifth year in a row and the low-
est since the 2009 global financial crisis. This 
reflects lower growth in both EMs and LIDCs, 
held back in many by lower commodity prices, 
tighter external financial conditions (especially 
in Latin America and the Caribbean), and dis-
tress related to geopolitical factors (in the CIS 
and in the Middle East and North Africa).
Economic conditions  in the CIS remain 
very weak. Growth in Russia and Ukraine is 
projected to be negative with adverse spill-
overs to the rest of the region. The deep reces-
sions in both countries reflect the persistent 
effects of the sharp decline in oil prices com-
bined with international sanctions in Russia 
and, for Ukraine, the continuing conflict in 
the eastern part of the country.
Growth in emerging and developing Asia 
is expected to continue its downward trend in 
2015 largely due to lower growth in China. 
Growth  in  India will  benefit  from policy 
reforms, a pick-up in investment, and lower 
commodity prices. Average growth in other 
countries in the region is projected to remain 
about unchanged.
In  emerging  and  developing  Europe, 
growth is expected to remain broadly 
unchanged from 2014. The economic con-
traction in the CIS weighs on growth, but 
low oil prices and continued recovery in the 
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Euro Area provide an offset. High corporate 
debt levels and subdued domestic demand 
will weigh on growth in Turkey.
Growth across  the Middle East, North 
Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is expected 
to remain modest, in line with growth in 
2014. Growth is expected to be negatively 
affected by low oil prices, regional conflicts, 
and social tensions.
Growth in Latin America and the Carib-
bean is expected to turn negative in 2015. In 
Brazil, the economy is expected to contract 
with a sharp drop in private sector confi-
dence, the needed tightening of the macro-
economic policy stance to contain inflation, 
along with weaker in commodity prices, with 
negative spillovers for the rest of the region. 
Venezuela is expected to enter into a deep 
recession as the oil price decline has exacer-
bated macroeconomic imbalances. Growth 
in many other countries in the region is neg-
atively affected by low metal, oil, and other 
commodity prices.
Growth in Sub-Saharan African countries 
is expected to slow down on lower growth 
in oil-exporting countries, particularly Nige-
ria. Growth is also expected to be negatively 
affected by slowing growth in China and, for 
some, a tightening of global financial condi-
tions and a retreat in other commodity prices 
besides oil.
Despite a small recovery relative to 2014, 
growth in fragile states is projected to remain 
low in 2015. This reflects continuing civil 
strife  and  conflict  in  some  countries  (for 
example, South Sudan and Yemen), and the 
continued effects of the Ebola epidemic for 
some economies in West Africa (Liberia and 
Sierra Leone).
The downward revision of the global 
growth forecast for 2015 is largely driven by 
a significant lowering of growth prospects in 
EMs (from 4.8 percent in the 2014/15 GMR 
to 3.9 percent). Indeed, some of the key down-
side risks identified in GMR 2014/15 have 
materialized—such as tighter external finan-
cial conditions and geopolitical tensions—
working on top of the sharp, unanticipated 
retreat in oil and other commodity prices. But 
growth in AEs has also been revised down 
slightly relative to GMR 2014/15, on lower 
growth in the United States and, in LIDCs, 
on account of lower growth in commodity 
exporters, including Nigeria.
Per capita growth in the median LIDC has 
been drifting lower since the strong rebound 
from the 2009 global crisis, but it remains 
above growth in the median AE country and 
median EM country (figure 3.1). With the 
concurrent slowdown in EMs and recovery 
in AEs, per capita growth in the median AE 
country and median EM country is expected 
Table 3.1 The global growth rebound has been pushed back to 2016
Global output, annual percent change
 Actual Projections
 2001–08 2009–12 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017–20
World 4.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.9
Advanced economies 2.2 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.1
Emerging market and developing countries 6.5 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.0 4.5 5.1
 Commonwealth of Independent States 7.2 1.7 2.2 1.0 –2.7 0.5 2.4
 Emerging and developing Asia 8.4 8.0 7.0 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.4
 Emerging and developing Europe 4.6 2.1 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.3
 Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 5.4 4.1 2.3 2.7 2.5 3.9 4.3
 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.6 3.2 2.9 1.3 -0.3 0.8 2.6
 Sub-Saharan Africa 6.1 5.0 5.2 5.0 3.8 4.3 5.0
 Low-Income developing countries 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.0 4.8 5.8 6.0
 Emerging Market countries 6.5 5.5 4.9 4.5 3.9 4.4 5.1
 Fragile States 5.0 6.6 4.9 1.3 1.4 6.3 6.8
 Small States 5.5 2.4 1.6 2.3 1.4 2.8 3.1
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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to converge in 2015—at about 1.5 percent—
for the first time since the early 2000s.
Global growth is expected to increase to 
3.6 percent in 2016, reflecting a growth pick-
up in all three main country groups. The 
continued recovery in AEs, averaging 2.2 per-
cent, is projected to be led by a rebound in 
the United States that is expected to be sup-
ported by lower energy prices, reduced fiscal 
drag, strengthened balance sheets, and an 
improving housing market. The pick-up in 
growth in EMs to 4.4 percent is predicated on 
an expected turnaround in growth in several 
distressed economies in the CIS, Middle East 
and North Africa, as well as a recovery in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, on a par-
tial normalization of economic growth in 
Brazil and spillovers from stronger growth in 
the United States. Growth in LIDCs is pro-
jected to return to about 6 percent growth as 
growth in oil-exporting LIDCs recovers.
Medium-term global growth is expected 
to be somewhat higher than the level pro-
jected for 2016 on higher growth in EMDCs. 
Higher growth in EMDCs is predicated on a 
return to normalcy for several countries that 
have been growing at below potential (due 
to an easing of geopolitical tensions in the 
CIS, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
on a recovery of investment confidence and 
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean).
Growth in AEs will trend down as output 
gaps are closed. 
Global  inflation  is expected to be sub-
dued, with consumer price inflation in most 
countries remaining in the low single dig-
its, partly driven by declining international 
commodity prices  (figure 3.2).  In twenty-
some countries—mainly European AEs and 
EMs—deflation took hold in 2014. With the 
exception of Switzerland, the countries with 
deflation in 2014 are expected to return to 
low inflation in 2016. In about one dozen 
countries, however—all EMs or LIDCs—
inflation is in the double digits, and for 
some—including Belarus, Iran, and Ven-
ezuela—inflation is projected to remain high 
in 2016, in part reflecting the effects of 
exchange rate depreciation.
Commodity prices—which were on a 
roller coaster during 2008–11—trended 
lower during 2012–15 against the back-
ground of increased supplies but also sub-
dued economic growth. Oil prices have fallen 
on large supply increases in the United States, 
Iraq, and, at times, Libya, while at the same 
time oil demand slowed, including because of 
weaker global activity. Prices of agricultural 
commodities eased on record or near-record 
harvests of major crops. With the sharp cor-
rection in 2015, real commodity prices have, 
to a large extent, reverted back to their levels 
of the early 2000s. The WEO projections sug-
gest a gradually increasing or broadly stable 
Figure 3.1 Steady income gains for a typical liDC continue to 
be maintained
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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path for oil and other commodity prices, 
respectively, through 2020.
Many developing countries are dependent 
on the exports or imports of a few commodi-
ties, and as the prices of such export or import 
commodities change, so do these countries’ 
terms of trade and domestic inflation (figure 
3.3). Higher commodity prices in 2010 and 
2011 were associated with terms-of-trade 
gains for the majority of EMDCs. As com-
modity prices weakened in 2012–15, these 
terms-of-trade gains were eroded. While the 
commodity price decline in 2015 is of about 
the same magnitude as in 2009, the expected 
dispersion of growth, inflation, and terms-of-
trade changes across EMDCs are projected to 
be significantly lower this year than in 2009. 
This suggests that both supply and demand 
shifts lie behind the 2015 price correction, in 
contrast to 2009 where the price correction 
was mostly driven by lower demand.
Downside risks have risen, particularly 
for EMDCs given the interaction of exter-
nal and domestic headwinds, as well as risks 
from China’s growth transition. Risks for AEs 
include disruptive asset price shifts and finan-
cial market turmoil, with adverse spillovers for 
EMDCs. In the context of weak demand and 
low inflation, the risk of secular stagnation 
and hysteresis for AEs remains, particularly 
given constraints posed by monetary policy at 
the zero lower bound and high debt levels.
Risks  for  EMDCs  have  increased  in 
the  context of  slowing growth. Although 
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commodity prices have fallen significantly, 
as discussed above, there are risks that they 
could fall further, straining balance sheets and 
growth prospects for commodity-exporting 
EMDCs. Also, adjustments  in commodity 
markets can be slow and price volatility in 
the interim high. A further dollar appreciation 
against the backdrop of asynchronous mon-
etary policy stances in major economies could 
lead to an unbalanced global recovery and 
associated capital flow reversal from EMDCs, 
and exacerbate balance sheet exposures. 
China’s ongoing growth transition is creating 
spillovers, and an abrupt growth slowdown 
in China could have major repercussions for 
growth in other economies, both directly and 
through the impact on commodity prices. 
Moreover, further increases in geopolitical 
tensions (stemming from ongoing events in 
Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East, and parts 
of Africa) could generate regional and global 
spillovers and disrupt global trade and finan-
cial activity.
For the third year in a row, world trade 
was subdued in 2014, reflecting in part, low 
economic growth. Even though AEs’ trade 
performance is expected to remain resilient, 
world trade is expected to pick up only mar-
ginally in 2015 as trade growth slows further 
in EMs (particularly in Asian EMs, such as 
China). Against the background of broadly 
stable prices of traded goods and services, 
a further modest uptick in world trade is 
expected for 2016 and beyond.
The sharp widening in global current 
account imbalances in the run up to the 2009 
financial crisis has reversed since, but recent 
progress in further lowering the imbalances 
has been slow. Global current account imbal-
ances peaked at 3 percent of global GDP in 
2006, narrowing sharply post-crisis as the cur-
rent account deficits in the United States and 
some smaller AEs narrowed, together with the 
surpluses in emerging market capital export-
ing countries (figure 3.4). However, current 
account balances are expected to remain 
broadly stable in 2015, with the contraction 
in the surpluses in oil-exporting economies 
offset by surpluses in oil importers. Moreover, 
there has been a rotation of imbalances with 
a widening of imbalances for several EMDCs. 
The downward trend in imbalances from 
2012 to 2015 is projected to continue at a 
gradual pace through 2020.
Current account imbalances in LIDCs 
remain wider than before the global finan-
cial crisis (figure 3.5). The current account 
deficit (defined here as net of foreign direct 
investments to focus attention on the residual 
deficit) for the median LIDC has increased 
from around 2 percent of GDP in 2009–11 to 
about 3–4 percent in recent years, peaking at 
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Figure 3.4 global imbalances are projected to continue to trend down, but at a more gradual pace
Source: IMFWorld Economic Outlook.
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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above 4 percent in 2014. The current account 
deficit is expected to narrow somewhat in 
2016, but still remains higher than precrisis 
averages.
Net capital inflows to LIDCs (defined here 
to include current transfers to focus atten-
tion on the net available external resources) 
have remained fairly constant in recent years 
at 10–11 percent of LIDCs’ GDP (table 3.2). 
These inflows are mostly in the form of trans-
fers. Net capital  inflows (relative to GDP) 
to EMs are significantly  lower  than those 
to LIDCs. Net inflows to EMs dropped off 
sharply in 2014 and are projected to become 
a net outflow in 2015 in part because of a fur-
ther expected tightening in external financial 
conditions. This turnaround in net capital 
inflows is being offset by an equivalent change 
in official reserve accumulation. For 2016 and 
beyond, a partial reversal is projected.
Official reserves in months of imports are 
expected to remain relatively stable in 2015 
and decrease slightly in 2016 (figure 3.6). 
The typical emerging market country holds 
somewhat larger reserves than the typical 
LIDC. The share of LIDCs that hold reserves 
of less than 3 months of imports is steadily 
increasing from about one-quarter in 2012 to 
almost one-half in 2016. These countries are 
more vulnerable if they are hit by an external 
shock.
update on recent 
macroeconomic policies
In AEs, policy makers strive for a macroeco-
nomic policy stance that can support growth, 
while at the same time buttressing private 
sector confidence and containing risks in the 
financial sector and to medium-term fiscal 
sustainability. Following sustained fiscal con-
solidation in 2014, the average fiscal deficit 
in AEs dropped to about 3½ percent of GDP, 
down from a deficit of 9 percent in the 2009 
crisis year. A further narrowing of deficits is 
projected to bring the average fiscal deficit 
down to around 2½ percent by 2016. Mone-
tary policy easing has been maintained against 
the background of well-anchored inflation 
expectations and continued low inflation.
Fiscal deficits in 2014 in both the median 
EM and the median LIDC widened (figure 
3.7). Thus, further progress toward rebuild-
ing the fiscal buffers that were used during 
the 2009 crisis has stalled. Domestic rev-
enue mobilization in EMDCs has remained 
relatively constant in recent years, and little 
change is expected for the period ahead (table 
3.3), with fiscal revenues in the median LIDC 
almost 7–8 percentage points of GDP lower 
than those in the median EM.
About 40 percent of all EMDCs—with 
similar shares among EMs and LIDCs—saw 
Figure 3.5 a typical liDC has a higher current account deficit now than before the 2009 global 
crisis
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2. FDI = Foreign direct investment.
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Figure 3.6 Share of liDCs with reserve coverage of less than three months is expected to increase
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: Bars represent the range between the 25th and 75th percentiles. Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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Table 3.2 liDC net capital inflows stay flat while eM net capital flows turn negative in 2015
Net capital inflows, weighted averages, percent of GDP
 Actual Projections
 2001–08 2009–12 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017–20
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
Emerging market countries 2.6 2.7 2.1 0.7  –1.6 0.4 1.0
Transfers, net 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3  0.4 0.4 0.4
Financial flows, net 1.4 2.0 1.7 0.4  –2.0 0.0 0.5
 Direct investment, net 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.4  1.1 1.1 0.6
 Portfolio investment, net –0.4 0.8 0.5 0.4  0.2 0.4 0.3
 Other investment, net –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 –1.5  –3.3 –1.5 –0.3
Memorandum item:         
 Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –3.9 –2.9 –2.1 –0.4  1.7 –0.2 –0.3
         
Low-Income developing countries 6.9 10.3 10.8 10.2  10.7 11.0 10.5
 Transfers, net 6.4 6.9 6.0 5.8  6.0 5.9 5.5
 Financial flows, net 0.5 3.4 4.8 4.3  4.7 5.0 5.0
 Direct investment, net 2.7 3.5 3.1 2.6  2.8 3.2 3.5
 Portfolio investment, net 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.6  0.5 0.4 0.5
 Other investment, net –2.4 –0.5 0.8 1.1  1.4 1.4 1.1
Memorandum item:         
 Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –2.1 –0.6 –0.3 –0.5  0.1 –0.2 –0.9
         
Fragile states 8.6 6.4 5.7 7.7  7.2 8.5 9.5
 Transfers, net 6.2 4.6 3.4 4.4  5.0 3.9 4.4
 Financial flows, net 2.4 1.7 2.4 3.3  2.2 4.6 5.1
 Direct investment, net 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.2  2.3 2.7 3.5
 Portfolio investment, net –0.5 –1.0 –0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.4
 Other investment, net 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0  –0.2 1.7 1.2
Memorandum item:         
 Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –6.7 –3.4 0.9 4.5  6.4 2.8 –1.3
         
Small states 2.4 1.5 0.5 2.7  3.3 3.8 2.7
Transfers, net 0.5 0.7 –0.1 –0.2  –0.4 –0.6 –0.6
Financial flows, net 1.9 0.7 0.6 3.0  3.7 4.4 3.3
 Direct investment, net 3.8 6.7 2.7 3.4  4.2 4.7 4.4
 Portfolio investment, net –2.8 3.2 0.7 –18.1  3.7 3.7 3.8
 Other investment, net 0.8 –9.2 –2.8 17.7  –4.2 –3.9 –4.9
Memorandum item:         
 Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –2.2 –1.7 –1.2 –1.0  1.2 0.9 0.0
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a loosening of monetary conditions in 2014 
(figure 3.8). In LIDCs, there was relatively less 
reliance on monetary policy loosening in the 
form of a lowering of short-term interest rates 
rather than allowing for a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, but the difference between 
EMs and LIDCs in that respect was not large.
Against the background of these policy 
measures, monetary aggregates continued to 
grow faster than nominal GDP in EMs until 
2014 (figure 3.9). These monetary trends have 
taken place in the context of low to moderate 
inflation in the vast majority of countries. 
Against the background of slower growth 
and broadly stable inflation in 2014, less than 
Figure 3.7 Fiscal deficits are higher now than before the 2009 
global crisis
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: General government balance (net lending/net borrowing) as defined in IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Manual 2001. Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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Emerging market and developing countries 24 23 23 24 24 24 24 23 23
Commonwealth of Independent States 34 32 32 32 34 33 33 30 30
Emerging and developing Asia 22 22 21 22 23 24 24 22 22
Emerging and developing Europe 35 34 34 35 35 37 36 36 36
Latin America and the Caribbean 25 24 23 25 24 24 24 24 24
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 28 26 25 25 26 25 25 23 24
Sub-Saharan Africa 18 16 18 18 18 18 18 19 19
Low-income developing countries 18 16 18 18 18 18 19 19 19
Emerging market countries 27 27 26 27 27 27 28 27 26
Fragile states 19 17 19 19 19 18 19 18 19
Small states 26 25 26 25 26 27 27 26 26
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Note: Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
Table 3.3 government revenue performance remains about constant
General government revenue excluding grants, median country, percent of GDP
 Actual Projections
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Figure 3.8 The share of emerging market countries as well as low-income developing countries 
that experienced loosening monetary conditions fell somewhat in 2014
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Note: Monetary policy loosening is based on Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) calculations. MCI is a linear combination of nominal short-term interest rates 
and the nominal effective exchange rate (with a one-third weight for the latter). Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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Figure 3.9 The growth in monetary aggregates is trending down in 2014 and early 2015
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Note: The money gap is the difference between year-on-year growth rates of M2 and nominal GDP. The sample includes emerging market countries that 
have data on both for the whole sample period shown. Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
Money gapMoney supply (M2)
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
Pe
rc
en
t
Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q2Q3Q3Q3 Q3
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 20142008 2015
Figure 3.10 The share of emerging market countries as well as low-income developing countries that loosened 
both monetary and fiscal policies fell sharply in 2014
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Note: Fiscal conditions are defined based on annual change in government balance (net lending/net borrowing) as a percent of GDP in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
Monetary conditions are based on the change in the MCI; changes are calculated Q4 over Q4. MCI is a linear combination of nominal short-term interest rates and the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate (with a one-third weight for the latter). Country groupings are defined in appendix table C5.2.
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20 percent of EMDCs loosened both fiscal 
and monetary policies (figure 3.10). A signifi-
cantly larger number of countries—about 30 
percent—tightened macroeconomic policies. 
Among countries that neither tightened nor 
loosened policies, but changed the mix of pol-
icies, more countries loosened fiscal policies 
and tightened monetary policies rather than 
the other way around.
Quality of macroeconomic 
policies in low-income countries
To gain a better perspective on the quality of 
macroeconomic policies in low-income coun-
tries, IMF country desks in these countries 
have been surveyed annually since 2003 about 
their assessment of the quality of countries’ 
economic policies.2 In the period leading up 
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to the 2009 global financial crisis, the assess-
ments became more positive, with particularly 
positive assessments of macroeconomic poli-
cies in the crisis year. While the perceived qual-
ity of macroeconomic policies has since dete-
riorated somewhat, it is generally still higher 
now than in the early part of the MDG-mon-
itoring period (figure 3.11). Selected macro-
economic indicators—the background against 
which IMF country teams have assessed poli-
cies—are shown in figure 3.12.
In 2014, the perceived consistency of mac-
roeconomic policy slipped, with the number 
of countries with unsatisfactory performance 
increasing sharply. The assessments of mon-
etary policy continue to be somewhat more 
positive than those of fiscal policy, with 
assessments of both types of policies becom-
ing less positive in 2014.
To further gauge the geographical differ-
ences in perceived quality of policies, one 
can also consider the breakdown in answers 
across geographical areas (table 3.4). These 
differences are minor over time.
Long-term convergence and 
growth trends
With the completion of the MDG-monitoring 
period and the launching of the SDGs, it is an 
opportune moment to provide a longer-term 
perspective on growth and income conver-
gence. How did outcomes during 2000–15 
compare with historical trends? And what are 
the prospects for the SDG-monitoring period 
of 2016–30?
An impressive global economic expansion 
took place in the half century leading up to 
the adoption of the Millennium Declaration 
in 2000, although with diverging income lev-
els across countries. Total GDP expanded 
sevenfold and GDP per  capita  tripled  (in 
constant U.S. dollars at market exchange 
rates). However, as the Lorenz curve, which 
provides a comprehensive representation of 
global per capita income distribution (figure 
3.13) shows, the associated Gini coefficients 
increased from 67 percent in 1950 to 75 per-
cent in 2000. Indeed, Burkina Faso and China 
were the two poorest countries in 1950 with 
income levels one-tenth of the global average; 
by 2000 one-fourth of all countries had rela-
tive incomes lower than that.
In contrast, the strong economic expan-
sion during the MDG-monitoring period was 
accompanied by greater income convergence. 
The global Gini declined from 75 percent in 
2000 to 62 percent in 2015.3 And as inter-
country income differences diminished over 
the MDG-monitoring period, per capita GDP 
growth at 2.1 percent remained about in line 
with the historical trend of 2.3 percent annu-
ally (figure 3.14).
Notwithstanding this narrowing of global 
income differences, the share of poor coun-
tries has remained high. One-seventh of all 
countries still have GDP per capita below 
one- tenth the mean global income level, and 
the countries where the poorest 40 percent 
of the world’s population live account for 
just 6 percent of global income (figure 3.15). 
Excluding China and India, per capita GDP 
in these countries increased sharply over the 
past 15 years, but their income level relative 
to mean global income is no larger now than 
in 1950.
An alternative measure of progress during 
the MDG-monitoring period is the number 
of countries that graduated into high-income 
status. About one-fourth of all countries are 
now high-income countries, as compared 
with one-fifth in 2000 (figure 3.16). The pace 
at which countries graduate from middle-
income to high-income status has picked 
up, but it trails the pace at which countries 
graduate from low-income to middle-income 
status. Although the number of high-income 
countries increased significantly from 2000 to 
2015, the share of the world’s population liv-
ing in high-income countries remained about 
constant over this period because of rela-
tively lower population growth in the richer 
countries.
Looking ahead, prospects for growth 
and  income  convergence  over  the  SDG- 
monitoring period would be influenced by 
demographic trends. The average annual 
global population increase is projected to fall to 
1 percent during 2015–30 from 1¼ percent 
during 2000–15. But population growth will 
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Figure 3.11 The quality of macroeconomic policies is lower now than during the 2009 global crisis
Quality of macroeconomic policies in low-income countries, 2003–14a,b
Source: IMF staff estimates.
a. IDA-eligible countries.
b.  IMF staff have assessed each low-income country according to a common set of criteria. Policies are assessed as unsatisfactory, adequate, and good for 
this purpose. For example, a country with an unsustainable level of public debt and a large fiscal deficit would be judged to have an unsatisfactory fiscal 
policy.
c.  Fiscal transparency data are available from 2005.
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Figure 3.12 Selected macroeconomic indicators for low-income countries,a 2000–15
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
a. IDA-eligible countries.
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differ sharply across different country group-
ings. Average annual population growth from 
2015 to 2030 in AEs, EMs, and LIDCs is pro-
jected to be 0.4 percent, 0.7 percent, and 2.0 
percent respectively. Looking only at growth in 
the working-age population (15 to 64 years), 
the differences across country groupings are 
even starker: in AEs the working-age popula-
tion will decline by 0.1 percent annually, com-
pared with increases of 0.6 and 2.4 percent 
annually in EMs and LIDCs.4 In consequence, 
there is a marked relative shift in population 
structures in the three groups of countries, as 
discussed further in part 2 of this report.
Against  the  background of  this  demo-
graphic outlook and the medium-term 
economic WEO  outlook,  global  growth 
is expected to trend down in 2016–30 rela-
tive to 2000–15. In particular, demographic 
trends in major advanced and emerging mar-
kets will be a drag on their potential growth 
TabLe 3.4 Macroeconomic policies in low-income countries, 2005–14
Percent of countries in each category, with adequate and good policy ratings
  Macroeconomic policy Years All countries Africa
Asia 
Pacific
Middle East,  
Central Asia  
and Europe
Western
Hemisphere
Fiscal policy 2005 75 66 79 92 78
2013 75 74 76 83 67
2014 76 69 76 89 89
Composition of public spending 2005
2013
2014
40
48
41
39
49
36
26
57
48
57
33
33
44
44
56
Monetary policy 2005 90 92 84 86 100
2013 91 97 76 82 100
2014 90 92 88 75 100
Consistency of macro policies 2005
2013
2014
85
88
77
79
90
77
89
90
71
86
91
88
100
67
78
Access to foreign exchange 2005 93 89 95 93 100
2013 91 92 90 83 100
2014 88 89 90 67 100
 Governance in the public sector 2005
2013
2014
71
75
71
74
67
64
68
81
71
71
75
67
67
100
100
Fiscal transparency 2005
2013
2014
75
86
83
68
82
74
79
81
90
71
100
100
100
100
89
Governance in monetary, financial
institutions
2005 84 79 78 93 100
2013 83 85 76 100 67
2014 80 82 83 78 67
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: IDA-eligible countries.
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Figure 3.13 There is a steady income convergence among 
countries from 2000 onward
Sources: UN statistical yearbooks and publications; IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World 
Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: At market exchange rates.
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(see box 3.1 and chapter 5). Other reasons 
for why one can expect a slowing of growth 
include weaknesses in investments, slower 
pace of human capital accumulation, and 
gradually diminishing growth dividends from 
information and communication technology.
Thus, increasing potential output will be 
a key policy priority in major advanced and 
emerging economies. Priorities vary across 
countries, but they include reforms to boost 
labor supply, addressing energy infrastruc-
ture bottlenecks, and improving business 
conditions. Also, open markets for goods, 
services, and capital, under appropriate safe-
guards, should be maintained so that coun-
tries can maximize inter- and intra-temporal 
gains from trade. In countries where depen-
dency ratios are expected to rise, fiscal policy 
space should be right-sized in anticipation of 
increased demand for public social services.
The demographic trends in LIDCs could, 
in contrast, induce a growth dividend, if met 
with the right set of policies, and help in driv-
ing further income convergence. To harness 
this demographic dividend while maintain-
ing macroeconomic stability is of the utmost 
importance; it also requires pursuing a broad, 
interlinked structural policy agenda. Policies 
need to focus on enhancing human capital, 
furthering financial sector development, and 
building infrastructure that lowers costs and 
better connects domestic and global markets. 
Promoting economic diversification will also 
be essential. The implementation of these pol-
icies will likely require fiscal space to repriori-
tize government spending toward social and 
infrastructure spending, and still maintain 
debt sustainability. Flexible and deep labor 
markets are essential to ensure that workers 
are matched with available jobs efficiently, 
while compensation remains aligned with 
productivity. These policy issues are discussed 
further in subsequent chapters.
Conclusion
Global  growth  remains  moderate,  with 
growth in 2015 expected to be lower than 
in 2014, with stronger growth in AEs offset 
by overall weaker growth in many EMs with 
the end of the commodity prices supercycle. 
Growth in 2016 in AEs is expected to con-
tinue to recover, and pick up as well in EMs 
supercycle. Geopolitical tensions, tightening 
Figure 3.15 The income convergence in the world’s poorest 
countries is ongoing, but income differences between poor and 
rich countries remain very large
Sources: UN statistical yearbooks and publications, IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World 
Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: At market exchange rates. The high-income country threshold indicates the division of the 
world’s income pie between the high-income countries on the one hand and middle-income and 
low-income countries on the other hand.
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Figure 3.14 The global per capita income growth in 2015–30 
is projected to be slightly lower than in 2000–15
Sources: UN statistical yearbooks and publications, IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World 
Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: At market exchange rates.
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of financial conditions, and lower commodity 
prices weigh on the outlook. While growth in 
LIDCs should slow down in 2015 on lower 
growth in oil-exporting LIDCs, it is expected 
to recover in 2016.
Downside risks have increased for EMDCs 
in the context of slowing growth, including 
from increased financial market volatility, 
a further dollar appreciation and its impact 
on balance sheet exposures, even lower com-
modity prices, an abrupt growth slowdown 
in China, and heightened geopolitical ten-
sions in Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East, 
and parts of Africa. Risks for AEs include 
disruptive asset price shifts and financial 
market turmoil.
During  the  MDG-monitoring  period 
(2000–15), most EMDCs grew at a sustained 
strong pace. Together with strong growth, 
per capita income differences among coun-
tries were reduced and absolute poverty was 
halved over this period.
For the SDG-monitoring period (2015–30), 
prospects are for global growth to trend 
down, mostly because of a decrease in global 
population growth. Poorer countries would 
need to address disparate demographic evo-
lutions with an appropriate set of macroeco-
nomic and structural policies to enable fur-
ther reductions in absolute poverty levels 
and to further narrow income differences 
relative to richer countries. Richer countries’ 
support for a global economic system with 
open markets for goods, services, and capi-
tal, under appropriate safeguards, remains 
essential.
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Figure 3.16 The share of high-income countries is expected to 
increase from one-fifth in 2000 to one-third in 2030
Sources: UN statistical yearbooks and publications; International Financial Statistics, IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook, and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Using the World Bank’s LIC/MIC and MIC/HIC income thresholds of $1,045 and $12,735 respec-
tively (in 2014 prices and exchange rates).
box 3.1 The effects of demographic factors on potential output
This box—drawing on the April 2015 World Eco-
nomic Outlook: Uneven Growth—Short- and 
Long-term Factors—assesses the effects of demo-
graphic factors on potential output for 10 advanced 
economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) and 6 major emerg-
ing market economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey).
Demographic factors can influence potential out-
put by affecting working-age population and trend 
labor force participation rates. The former is a func-
tion of the same variables as population growth more 
broadly. For example, declines in fertility rates slow 
future working-age population growth. The second 
demographic dimension is the age composition of the 
working-age population, which affects the aggregate 
participation rate, since the propensity to participate 
in the labor force starts declining steeply beyond a 
particular age threshold, typically in the early 50s. 
An increased share of older people in the population 
therefore lowers the average participation rate and 
thereby potential employment.
Figure B3.1.1 presents the evolution of potential 
growth and the effects of demographic factors over 
the period 2001–20. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
(box continues next page)
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Notes
1.  Unless otherwise noted, the analysis in this 
chapter is confined to the 188 member coun-
tries of  the  IMF and  the  World Bank. These 
countries constitute 99 percent of the world’s 
population and economic activity. This chap-
ter draws on the October 2015 WEO. The 
classification of countries follows the one used 
therein.  Emerging market  and  developing 
countries are those countries that are not des-
ignated as advanced. Low-income developing 
countries are countries eligible for IMF’s con-
cessional financial assistance with a per capita 
gross national income (measured according 
to the World Bank’s Atlas method) in 2011 
of below twice the International Development 
Association’s effective operational cutoff level, 
and Zimbabwe. Other emerging market and 
developing countries are considered emerging 
box 3.1 The effects of demographic factors on potential output (continued)
potential growth declined in both advanced and 
emerging market economies. While the largest part of 
this decline is associated with the scars of the crisis (in 
particular in advanced economies), demographic fac-
tors have also played an important role. In particular, 
demographic factors contributed to lower potential 
growth in advanced and emerging market economies 
by about 0.3 and 0.4 percentage point during 2008–
14, respectively.
Looking forward, demographic factors are 
expected to be an increasing drag on potential 
growth. In advanced economies, demographic fac-
tors are projected to reduce potential growth by 
about 0.2 percentage point in the medium term (fig-
ure B3.1.1a). Working-age population growth is likely 
to decline significantly in most advanced economies, 
particularly Germany and Japan, where it will reach 
about –0.2 percent a year by 2020. At the same time, 
rapid aging is expected to further decrease the average 
trend labor force participation rates.
In emerging market economies, demographic 
factors are expected to reduce potential growth by 
about 0.4 percentage point by 2020 (figure B3.1.1b). 
Working-age population growth  is  likely to slow 
faster, most sharply in China, and to remain negative 
in Russia. Aging is expected to accelerate, lowering 
trend labor force participation rates. Again, this effect 
is expected to be strongest in China.
Figure b3.1.1 effect of demographics on potential growth
Source: Chapter 3 of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth—Short- and Long-term Factors. April, 2015. Washington, D.C.
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market countries. Small states are emerging 
market and developing countries with a popu-
lation of less than 1.5 million. Fragile states are 
countries included in the World Bank’s list of 
fragile and conflict-affected states as of July 
2015. Appendix table C5.2 includes the list of 
all countries and the groupings to which they 
belong. In line with standard WEO practice, 
growth for country aggregates is calculated 
using purchasing power parity weights.
2.   Each low-income country has been assessed 
according to a common set of criteria. For 
example, a country’s quality of fiscal policy 
is assessed by considering its fiscal deficit and 
the sustainability of its public debt (a country 
with a large fiscal deficit and an unsustainable 
level of public debt would be judged to have an 
unsatisfactory fiscal policy).
3.  These coefficients are calculated weighting 
countries’ GDP per capita with their popula-
tions; thus they anchor the calculations to the 
mean global income level but abstract from 
inequality within countries (see chapter 5 for 
a discussion of income inequality within coun-
tries). The weighted averages  are naturally 
influenced by developments in the larger econo-
mies (for example, China, India, and the United 
States account for 41 percent of global popula-
tion and 43 percent of global output in 2015). 
On an equally weighted basis (treating each 
country as a single data point), the Gini coef-
ficient increased from 53 in 1950 to 69 in 2000 
and then fell to 63 percent in 2015.
4.  These estimates are based on the medium fertil-
ity scenario in the United Nations’ World Popula-
tion Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
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Part II
Development in an 
Era of Demographic Change
Profound changes in global demography are expected to affect the development outlook and 
policy agenda. The world population is growing more slowly and aging at unprecedented speed. 
These trends reflect past development successes—women’s empowerment; improved educa-
tion; better child, maternal, and reproductive health; and increased longevity. The working-age 
share peaked in 2012 and is now on the decline. Aging means that population increases are 
reflected in larger numbers of older people. The global count of children is already stabilizing at a 
plateau of 2 billion. Yet, underneath these global demographic trends lies significant diversity in 
the direction and pace of demographic change. Regional and subregional patterns vary signifi-
cantly across and within countries.
 Demographic change brings unique opportunities and challenges to centers of global pov-
erty (marked by high fertility) and engines of global growth (marked by rapid aging). More than 
90 percent of poverty is concentrated in pre- and early-dividend countries with young popula-
tions that lag in key human development indicators, register rapid population growth, and are 
seeing their working-age populations swell. In these countries, the demographic transition to 
lower fertility creates a golden opportunity to raise living standards. Over 85 percent of global 
economic activity and 78 percent of global growth arises in late- and post-dividend countries 
with much lower fertility rates and some of the highest shares of the elderly in the world. In 
these countries, population aging may weaken growth prospects. Neither all good nor all bad, 
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demographic change presents opportunities and challenges everywhere. In each case, policies 
will make a critical difference in how countries manage their demographic change.
Policies must recognize and respond to demographic change at the country level. To eradi-
cate persistent poverty, the centers of global poverty need to accelerate their demographic tran-
sition, invest in the young in their still-growing populations, and lay the foundations for sustained 
growth. Among other policy initiatives, better education and health services are required, as 
well as more women empowerment. Facing weakening economic dynamism, the lower-fertility, 
richer countries that make up the current engines of global growth need to address headwinds 
arising from shrinking labor forces. They also need to adapt their policies and institutions to foster 
healthy and productive aging. Selected policy priorities include mobilizing savings for produc-
tive investment in human and physical capital and designing welfare systems—pensions, health 
care, and long-term care—while ensuring fiscal sustainability and protection for the elderly and 
vulnerable. 
Freer capital flows, migration, and trade can help respond to growing demographic imbal-
ances globally. The extent of demographic diversity across countries is starker than before and 
has a large and inevitable impact on the global economy. Returns on capital and labor are 
affected. Comparative advantages in trade are altered. Given these implications, flows of capital, 
labor, and goods and services will be affected. Mutual benefits can be realized: capital can flow to 
rising consumer markets; older countries can benefit from legal immigration; younger countries 
can produce labor-intensive products. But challenges need to be managed, and international 
cooperation is key. 
With the right set of policies, this era of intense demographic change can be turned into 
one of sustained development progress. Global demography is changing and has the poten-
tial to profoundly alter the trajectory of global development. To accelerate progress, countries 
need to elevate efforts to sustain broad-based growth, invest in people, and insure the poor 
and  vulnerable against evolving risks. But they must do so by taking into account demographic 
change. Where possible, they must capture demographic dividends. Elsewhere, adaptation is 
required. Everywhere, demographic change must be turned into opportunities for development 
and improved well-being.
Part II of this report explores the connections between development and demography in the 
following sequence:
•   Chapter 4 characterizes demographic change at the global, regional, and country levels. It also 
examines the drivers of demographic change that have shaped the diversity of demographic 
patterns and trends. 
•   Chapter 5 examines how demography affects development. It develops a new global typology 
that ties demographic change to development potential and analyzes the various pathways 
through which demographic change affects the prosperity of nations. 
•   Chapter 6 analyzes how policies can leverage demographic change in support of the develop-
ment goals. It examines policy opportunities at both the country and the global level. 
Demographic Change: Disparities, 
Divergences, and Drivers
people over 64 accounting for an ever greater 
proportion of the global population. Most 
of these trends are “locked in” with a high 
degree of certainty, with the pace of declines 
in fertility in countries with persistent high 
fertility rates the main source of uncertainty 
(box 4.1). 2 
Global trends mask wide differences at 
the country level both in their current demo-
graphic profiles and in the direction and 
pace of future change. Many of today’s high-
income countries have had decades of low 
fertility rates and high life expectancies.3 In 
contrast, many developing countries have 
seen declines in their fertility rates only more 
recently, with some of the poorest countries 
still experiencing persistently high fertility. 
Global demographic trends are at a turning point: population growth is slowing markedly, and 
after increasing for five decades, the proportion of people ages 15 to 64—the typical working-
age population—peaked in 2012 and is now starting to fall again. The rise in the number of 
dependents per person of working age is driven mainly by an increase in the elderly as a share 
of the population. Beneath these global dynamics lie major differences in demographic charac-
teristics and trends at the country level. Some countries continue to experience high levels of 
fertility and population growth, while in others fertility rates have fallen below replacement lev-
els, and rapid aging and gradual population contractions are expected in the coming decades. 
Demography and development affect each other. Key dimensions of development are drivers 
of demography, accounting for much of the variation in demographic features across countries, 
and are highlighted in this chapter. The role of demography in shaping development trajectories 
is then the focus of chapter 5.
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Global demographics are on the cusp of 
significant change, with the unprecedented 
population growth of past decades slowing 
sharply and the global age structure shifting 
dramatically. Since the 1950s, the world as a 
whole has experienced substantial improve-
ments in life expectancy, accompanied by a 
rapid decline in fertility rates and a steady fall 
in the share of children in the global popula-
tion. These shifts led to continual increases 
in the share of the working-age popula-
tion (lowering the number of dependents 
per worker) until it peaked in 2012.1 With 
the stabilization of the share of the popula-
tion that is under 15, the fall in the share 
of working-age population over the coming 
decades will be driven by rapid aging, with 
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Box 4.1 Accuracy and uncertainty in population projections
Several different national and multilateral institutions 
estimate historical population data and make projec-
tions. Since 1951 the United Nations Population Divi-
sion (UNPD) has been publishing population esti-
mates, vital statistics and projections for all countries, 
currently running from 1950 to 2100. The World 
Bank Group (WBG) also prepares population projec-
tions, which draw upon the UNPD figures but include 
differences in some countries that are well identified 
and discussed with the UNPD. Several research insti-
tutions also have demography programs, such as the 
Wittgenstein Center, affiliated with the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
 A wide range of methodologies are applied to proj-
ect future populations. The dominant methodology 
for making projections has been deterministic models 
using “cohort components” based on the age struc-
ture of the population and components of change: 
births, deaths, and migration. The uncertainty of 
the future is conveyed using alternative assumptions 
on these key variables to develop different scenarios 
(Cohen 2001; Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2001).
The United Nations’ World Population Projections 
2015 Revision covers different scenarios, with vary-
ing assumptions on fertility, mortality, and migra-
tion (figure B4.1.1). With fertility variants labeled 
high (+ half child), medium, and low (- half child), the 
medium variant typically receives the most attention, 
with the other two conveying a sense of uncertainty 
about the projections, especially in the outer years. 
Uncertainty regarding population projections in this 
deterministic approach is related to the assumptions 
on fertility, mortality, and migration. 
The United Nations projections are also advanc-
ing methodologically by using parametric functions 
to model demographic change (Wilmoth 2015). Cur-
rently, total fertility rates (TFR) and life expectancy 
for a given country are modeled using a Bayesian Hier-
archical Model that draws on information from other 
countries to estimate parameters distributed around 
the world average. This method yields estimates for 
TFR, for example, where uncertainty grows over time, 
and is higher for countries with higher initial fertil-
ity. The UNPD is now using probabilistic approaches 
together with the presentation of alternative scenarios, 
to illustrate uncertainty about future trends. 
Other projections, such as those from IIASA, take a 
more structural approach by explicitly considering the 
effect of education on fertility rate. So, as populations 
in high-fertility countries become better educated, 
their fertility rates tend to fall. That is one reason 
why long-term IIASA projections tend to differ sub-
stantially from UN projections. In the former, global 
population growth has a high probability to reach a 
peak by the end of this century, while in the latter, 
global population will keep growing beyond 2100 
(Gerland and others 2014; Lutz and others 2007). The 
key source of this difference is associated with projec-
tions for Asia and Africa, where several countries have 
high fertility rates and low levels of education. 
Global population projections do not differ much 
until after 2030 because of the current age struc-
ture and population size (figure B4.1.2). Even if fer-
tility rates everywhere were to fall immediately to 
“replacement level” (about 2.1), the global popula-
tion would keep rising to 11 billion by the end of the 
century (population would not stabilize this century). 
This “population momentum” occurs because older 
cohorts differ in absolute size from those cohorts 
Figure B4.1.1 Different assumptions about future 
fertility rates can lead to vastly different population 
projections in the long run
Source: World Bank calculations, based on UN 2015 and Lutz and KC 2010.
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As a result, half of the world’s population 
will be in countries that will experience 
slowdowns in population growth with rising 
shares of the elderly over the coming decades 
(albeit at different paces). The other half will 
live in countries with relatively young popu-
lations, whose high fertility is driving global 
population growth. 
These differences in demographic pat-
terns and trends across countries closely 
reflect development progress. Population size 
and age structure are determined by three 
fundamental demographic factors—fertil-
ity, mortality, and migration. These fac-
tors are driven in large part by income and 
non-income development outcomes, such as 
improvements in health, education, and gen-
der equality. Generally, countries that have 
made solid progress in these dimensions 
experience falling rates of infant mortality 
and fertility and rising life expectancy much 
sooner than countries that were—or are—
lagging developmentally.
Characteristics of demographic 
change
This section reviews the evolution of key 
demographic features since 1950 and ana-
lyzes how the demographic landscape is likely 
to change through 2050. It describes the wide 
diversity of trends across regions and groups 
of countries with similar levels of economic 
development, illustrating how changes in fer-
tility, mortality, life expectancy, and migra-
tion explain past and future trends at the 
global level and how they are changing the 
population centers of the world. 
Box 4.1 Accuracy and uncertainty in population projections (continued)
currently bearing children, affecting the immediate 
fertility and mortality rates that together with migra-
tion determine population growth. In high-fertility 
countries, the population momentum suggests contin-
ued rapid growth, with more uncertainty regarding 
the projections than in low-fertility countries, where 
population size tends to be more stable.
At the global level, population projections have 
been relatively accurate and stable over time, despite 
differences between methodologies. For example, in 
1973 the United Nations projected a world popula-
tion of 6.400 billion in 2000 (Coale 1974). In 1984, 
the WBG projected that the world population would 
reach 6.082 billion in 2000 (World Bank 1994). Pro-
jections have in many instances also remained quite 
stable over various forecasts. In 1994, the WBG pro-
jected a global population of 9.758 billion in 2050. 
Twenty years later, in 2014 the WBG projected a 
global population in 2050 of 9.478 billion, a differ-
ence of –2.87 percent.
Figure B4.1.2 World population projections 
from different sources are relatively similar for 
the 2015–30 time frame
Source: World Bank calculations, based on UN 2015. 
Note: The figure reports only on countries for which both projections are 
available, and it refers to the population above 15 years old. The UN 2015 
projections are made for different scenarios with different assumptions 
regarding fertility and mortality.
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global trends are at a turning point
Global demographic trends are going 
through unprecedented shifts, with the 
rapid growth observed in the global popula-
tion over the past decades slowing dramati-
cally. The global population grew by 174 
percent between 1950 and 2015, from 2.5 
billion to 6.9 billion, and is almost 7.3 bil-
lion today (figure 4.1a). Population growth 
was the fastest from the mid-1950s through 
the mid-1970s, causing development policy 
discussions to be marked by concerns about 
unfettered population growth and a per-
ceived need to control the so-called “popu-
lation bomb” (World Bank 1984). Then, in 
the 1990s, population growth started to fall: 
by 2022 the average annual growth rate is 
expected to fall below 1 percent, down from 
more than 2 percent in the late 1960s (figure 
4.1b). This shift in the pace of population 
growth has also shifted the policy discus-
sion on the links between development and 
demography.
Gl
ob
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(b
ill
io
ns
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
 
b. An unprecedented period of global
population growth has ended
An
nu
al
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 (%
)
a. The global population has almost tripled since the
1950s and is expected to reach over 9 billion by 2050
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
c. The working-age share of the global population
is estimated to have peaked in 2012
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n,
 a
ge
s 1
5–
64
 (%
)
d. The aged share of the global population
is rising, while the child share is falling
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Children ages 0–14 Adults ages 65+ 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
lo
ba
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
(%
)
Figure 4.1 global demographic trends are at an inflection point
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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In parallel with the slowdown in popula-
tion growth, the global age structure is shift-
ing. After rising steadily since the 1960s, 
the working-age population reached a peak 
of 65.8 percent of the total population in 
2012 and is expected to decline to 62.7 per-
cent by 2050 (figure 4.1c). At the same time, 
children—those under age 15—represent a 
shrinking share of the global population, and 
the share of those 65 and over has been rising 
steadily (figure 4.1d). By 2050, the share of 
children in the global population is expected 
to have fallen to 21 percent, versus a peak of 
38 percent in the late 1960s, while the aged 
share of the population will have expanded 
from 5.0 percent in 1960 to 16.0 percent. As 
a result of these shifts in the dependent popu-
lation shares, the global total dependency 
ratio declined from its peak of 75.4 percent in 
1965 to a low of 52.2 percent in 2010.4 With 
the aged share of the global population now 
expanding much faster than it has in the past, 
the global total dependency ratio is expected 
to rise in the coming decades, to 59.6 percent 
in 2050.5 
The world has also seen major changes 
in other demographic dimensions, includ-
ing a halving of total fertility rates and rapid 
improvement in life expectancy. In the 1950s 
total fertility rates were about five births per 
woman, reaching a peak in the post–World 
War II period (figure 4.2).6 Since then, fertil-
ity rates have steadily declined, falling to 2.5 
births per woman as of 2015, and are pro-
jected to fall further (but remain above global 
replacement rates) through 2050.7 In parallel, 
average life expectancy at birth has risen by 
more than 25 years over the past 65 years, 
from 46.8 years in 1950 to 71.7 years in 
2015 (figure 4.3), while infant mortality has 
declined. Improvements in life expectancy 
are expected to continue, although at a much 
lower rate than in the past.
Disparities across countries shape 
global trends
The global demographic changes are mainly 
explained by the ongoing demographic tran-
sition in developing countries, especially the 
decline in mortality rates at the country level. 
Although mortality rates are still higher in 
developing than in high-income countries, 
they have fallen rapidly.8 Declining mortality 
rates have coincided with falling infant mor-
tality rates and longer life expectancies, most 
prominently for countries in East Asia and 
the Pacific and South Asia (figures 4.4, 4.5). 
In most developing regions, infant mortal-
ity rates and life expectancies are converging 
Figure 4.2 The global total fertility rate 
declined rapidly between the 1960s and 1990s
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Note: The total fertility rate is defined as the average number of births each 
woman has, assuming she lives to the end of her reproductive life. The 
replacement level of the total fertility rate is the average number of births 
each woman would need to have to hold the global population constant.
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Figure 4.3 The global population is living 
longer
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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on high-income country values, which have 
improved comparatively more slowly over 
the past few decades. Africa is the excep-
tion among developing regions. There, both 
mortality rates and life expectancies lag sig-
nificantly behind other regions, with HIV/
AIDS slowing progress (box 4.2). As of 2015, 
an average of 52 infants die for every 1,000 
born in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the average 
life expectancy is 60.98 years. In contrast, in 
South Asia, with the second-worst indicators 
of mortality and life expectancy among 
developing regions, the average infant mor-
tality rate is 31.4 (per 1,000) and the average 
life expectancy is 70.6 years.
Falling mortality and still-high fertility 
led to a “child bulge” in developing coun-
tries in the 1960s and 1970s, while popula-
tion growth slowed in high-income countries. 
In many developing countries, increasing 
numbers of children survived past infancy 
in the 1950s and 1960s, even as fertility 
rates remained persistently high (figure 4.6).9 
Together, these two trends led to rapid popu-
lation growth in developing countries (figure 
4.7). This period of high population growth 
was accompanied by a shift in age structure, 
with children accounting for an increasing 
share of developing countries’ populations. 
The exception was developing Europe and 
Central Asia, where most countries already 
had fertility profiles that were similar to those 
of high-income countries.
Falling fertility rates in developing coun-
tries led to slower population growth and in 
the 1970s–80s, to an increase in the working-
age population share. As declining fertility 
rates produced smaller cohorts of babies, the 
cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s formed 
a bulge. As the people in this bulge grew into 
the working-age population, they drove an 
increase in working-age population share in 
their home countries. The decline in fertil-
ity rates was observed mostly in developing 
countries, since aside from the mid-century 
baby booms, the high-income countries 
already had lower fertility rates.10 
The large cohorts born in the 1950s–60s 
in developing countries are now increasingly 
contributing to global aging. This change 
results from the substantial improvements 
in life expectancy, especially in developing 
East Asia and Pacific, which not only had the 
largest child and working-age cohorts but 
also registered the greatest improvements in 
health. Between 1950 and 1970, high-income 
countries accounted for 55 percent of the 
growth in the aged population while develop-
ing East Asia and Pacific accounted for 14 per-
cent. Between 1970 and 2000, however, high-
income countries’ contribution decreased to 
Figure 4.4 infant mortality has fallen significantly in all regions
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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Figure 4.5 Life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa lags that in 
other developing regions
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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33 percent, while that of developing East Asia 
and Pacific increased to 32 percent.
Falling fertility rates in developing coun-
tries have also contributed to slower global 
population growth, with populations in 
some countries even expected to shrink in 
the future. On average, fertility rates in many 
developing regions converged by 2000 to lev-
els at or below the replacement rate, that is 
the rate at which the population size would 
be constant in the long run. In many high-
income countries and in developing Europe 
and Central Asia, fertility rates have been 
below replacement rates since the 1990s. In 
some countries, the combination of a rising 
share of the aged, below-replacement fertil-
ity, and emigration are expected to lead to 
net contractions in populations between 2015 
and 2050.11 Among high-income countries, 
Germany and Japan are notable in that their 
populations are projected to shrink by 7.7 and 
15.1 percent, respectively, over this timeframe 
(map 4.1). Some of the most extreme popula-
tion contractions, however, will be in develop-
ing countries in Europe and Central Asia. For 
example, Bulgaria’s population is expected to 
shrink by 27.9 percent by 2050, owing to a 
combination of low fertility and high rates of 
net migration (World Bank 2013). 
Divergences shift population centers
With a large and growing share of the global 
population living in developing countries, 
Box 4.2 The legacy of the HiV/AiDS pandemic on southern Africa’s age structure
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa well illus-
trates the negative effects of infectious diseases on life 
expectancies and mortality. This area has the high-
est prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world. Before the 
pandemic, southern Africa experienced starkly differ-
ent demographic trends from the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa: both fertility and mortality rates began to 
decline much earlier and faster and were significantly 
lower than those in the rest of the continent. With the 
advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, mortality rates surged again and life 
expectancy at birth dropped significantly. In Leso-
tho, life expectancy at birth dropped from around 60 
years in the early 1990s to 45 years in 2005 (Moult-
rie 2015). Botswana and Swaziland followed similar 
trends. And while life expectancy dropped less in 
South Africa and Namibia, it is close to the average of 
Sub-Saharan Africa despite the higher wealth of the 
two countries. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic reduced the size of the 
working-age population and has subsequently stalled 
anticipated declines in dependency ratios since 2000. 
Half of all deaths in southern Africa in the 2005–10 
period were adults ages 20 to 49 years, compared 
with 21 percent in 1985–93. At the same time, popu-
lation growth slowed because of the loss of so many 
women of childbearing age and increased infant and 
child mortality related to mother-to-child transmis-
sion of HIV. Thus, the overall effect of the pandemic 
has been to slow down the decline in the dependency 
ratio by reducing the size of the working-age popula-
tion and by slowing the growth of the elderly popu-
lation as the cohorts most affected by the pandemic 
reach old age.
The launch of mass-scale antiretroviral (ARV) 
treatment appears to have reversed the mortality trend 
from the middle 2000s (World Bank 2015b). Fortu-
nately, the impact on HIV/AIDS on South Africa’s 
population dynamics is starting to fade. According 
to the United Nation’s Spectrum model, prevalence 
among adults of both sexes ages 15 to 49 in South 
Africa is close to its peak and is expected to decline 
slowly from 18.7 percent in 2015 to 16.2 percent by 
2050 (Moultrie 2015). The proportion of all deaths 
attributable to HIV/AIDS (as distinct from all deaths 
among those who are HIV-positive) is expected to 
stabilize at around 22 percent of all deaths between 
2015 and 2050. Total fertility rates did not rise in 
response to the surge in mortality caused by the pan-
demic. On the contrary, research has suggested that 
HIV/AIDS exerts a downward pressure on fertility in 
HIV-infected people and, to a lesser extent, on fertil-
ity in the general population in high-prevalence coun-
tries. The evidence thus suggests that the temporary 
shock might have only slowed the demographic transi-
tion rather than stopped it (Nair 2010).
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global demographic trends have been driven 
by changes in these countries (map 4.2). In 
1950, 32 percent of the global population 
lived in high-income economies. Develop-
ing East Asia and Pacific, the region that 
has seen some of the most rapid fertility 
declines and life expectancy improvements in 
recent years, accounted for 29 percent of the 
population, while Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
region with the most modest improvements, 
accounted for only 7 percent. By 2015, this 
distribution had shifted substantially, with 
high-income countries accounting for only 
19 percent of the global population and 
Sub-Saharan Africa for 14 percent, while 
the share in developing East Asia and Pacific 
has remained about the same. By 2050, Sub- 
Saharan Africa is expected to account for 
almost 25 percent of the global population.
Population growth within countries, inter-
national migration, and urbanization are all 
changing where people live. Natural popula-
tion growth—the difference between crude 
birth and death rates—is the key determinant 
of population growth in most countries. Very 
simply, countries that have higher (lower) 
natural growth rates will have increasingly 
higher (lower) concentrations of the global 
population. International migration can 
blunt the impact of natural growth, however. 
Migration occurs within countries as well, 
with rural-urban migration being one of the 
most important because it has indirect effects 
on national fertility rates as well.
Population growth within countries
Shifts in the location of the global population 
result from differences in population growth 
across countries, particularly between those 
in Africa and the rest of the world. Of the 
30 countries expected to have the fastest-
growing populations between 2015 and 
2050, 29 are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 13 
of these countries currently have total fertility 
rates of 5.0 or more. Persistently high fertility 
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa mean that the 
region will have high natural growth for sev-
eral decades and will account for more than 
half of global population growth between 
2015 and 2050 (figure 4.8). The fastest-grow-
ing ten countries in the world—Burundi, 
Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—
are expected to account for 20 percent of 
global population growth over the same 
period, with Nigeria alone accounting for 
2 percent of the global population growth. 
Africa’s high fertility and population 
growth will also make the region home to an 
increasing share of the world’s children and 
Figure 4.6 Total fertility rates have declined, though less so in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Note: The bars reflect the unweighted average of countries in a given group. The total fertility rate is 
the hypothetical number of births each woman in a given country would have, assuming she survives 
to the end of her reproductive life and experiences the age-specific birth rates of the given year. 
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Figure 4.7 Population growth in developing countries has been 
slowing since the 1970s
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MAP 4.1 The populations of europe and Central Asia will shrink substantially through 2050, while those in  
Sub-Saharan Africa will grow the most
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
MAP 4.2 Developing countries account for most of the global population in 2015
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through 2050, even as it falls to 23 percent 
or below in other parts of the world (figure 
4.9). As Africa’s children age into adulthood, 
they will help maintain the region’s posi-
tion as having the highest growth rate of the 
working-age population in the world, even as 
the working-age population in other regions 
of the world—developing regions included—
contracts significantly (figure 4.10). In the 
2015–50 period, Africa will displace East 
Asia and South Asia as the largest source of 
growth in the global working-age popula-
tion, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the 
increase over this period (figure 4.11). 
Migration
Migration directly affects the age structure of 
both sending and receiving countries because 
most international migrants are of working 
age. Approximately 74 percent of interna-
tional migrants are in the 20 to 64 age cohort, 
well above the share in that same cohort in 
the global population (UN 2013; EUROSTAT 
2015). For sending countries, the migrants’ 
departure increases the total dependency ratio 
and reduces the working-age share of the pop-
ulation. For receiving countries, the migrants’ 
entry and any subsequent births increase the 
working-age share of the population and help 
reduce old-age dependency. Rapid aging in 
Bulgaria, for example, has been accelerated 
by migration to other European countries 
(World Bank 2013). Similarly, migration from 
small island states in the Pacific to Australia 
and New Zealand has left the sending coun-
tries with extremely high total dependency 
ratios and higher average ages. In contrast, 
major destinations for migrant workers, such 
as Qatar, have the lowest total dependency 
ratios in the world despite high total fertility 
and low mortality rates. In Qatar, migrants 
account for more than three-fourths of the 
population, and 89.7 percent of migrants are 
ages 15 to 64 (UN and UNICEF 2014).
Migration, by shifting average fertility 
rates, can indirectly influence the population 
size and age structure of receiving countries. 
If the reproductive behavior of migrants per-
sists after they migrate, the fertility rates of 
Figure 4.8 More than half of global population growth through 
2050 will be in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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Figure 4.9 Between 2015 and 2050, children will account for 33 
percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population, versus 23 percent in the 
rest of the world
Sh
ar
e 
of
 re
gi
on
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
ag
es
 0
–1
4 
(%
)
High-
income
countries 
East Asia 
and 
Pacic 
Europe
and 
Central
Asia
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean 
Middle
East and
North 
Africa
1950 2015 2050 
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
South
Asia
10
20
30
40
50
working-age people. The number of children 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow by 
305 million between 2015 and 2050, whereas 
the number of children in the rest of the 
world is expected to contract by 148 million. 
The share of children in Africa’s population 
is thus expected to remain above 33 percent 
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a migrant-receiving country can be either 
raised or reduced.12 Evidence from Europe 
and the United States suggests that the aver-
age fertility rates of their migrant popula-
tions, which are predominantly from lower-
income countries, tend to be higher than the 
national average for a generation or more 
(Andersson 2004; Kahn 1988; Sobotka 
2008). But fertility behavior could persist 
even in the context of migration from higher- 
to lower-income countries. In Argentina, for 
example, the total fertility rate was 3.1 in 
the 1950s, close to the high-income country 
median of 3.6 and substantially lower than 
the median total fertility rate of 6.3 in the rest 
of Latin America.13 The low rate in Argen-
tina has been attributed to the large inflow 
of European migrants who came to Argen-
tina in after World War II and who tended to 
have lower fertility rates, as was the norm in 
Europe (Gragnolati and others 2015). 
urbanization
Rural-urban migration within countries has 
helped reduce country-level fertility rates. 
Urban households tend to have lower fertility 
rates than do rural households (figure 4.12) 
(Jaffe 1942; Kuznets 1974). The gap between 
fertility rates in urban and rural areas results 
in an observed inverse relationship between 
total fertility rates and socioeconomic devel-
opment and the fact that urban areas tend 
to have higher levels of development (Bon-
gaarts and Watkins 1996; Bryant 2007). As 
countries urbanize and populations move 
from rural to urban areas, overall total fer-
tility rates can drop as the fertility profile 
of the previously rural migrant households 
converges to that of urban households. This 
convergence is particularly evident in China, 
where urbanization is estimated to have 
accounted for 22 percent of the decline in the 
country’s total fertility rate between 1982 
and 2008.14 Lower-middle-income countries 
have experienced rapid urbanization in recent 
decades, with the share of the population liv-
ing in urban areas rising from 29.4 percent in 
1990 to 49.7 percent in 2013, with implica-
tions for their future fertility rates.
Figure 4.10 Working-age population growth is slowing globally 
but will remain high in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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Figure 4.11 Sub-Saharan Africa will account for 
more than half of working-age population growth 
through 2050
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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Generally, countries have been urbanizing 
at a steady pace, although substantial dispari-
ties exist between high-income and develop-
ing economies. High-income countries urban-
ized rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, with 
the urban share of their total populations 
rising from 47 percent in 1960 to 60 per-
cent by 1980. This share has only increased 
slightly since then. Middle-income-countries 
have also urbanized rapidly, although from 
a much lower starting point, with 40 to 45 
percent of their populations now dwelling in 
urban areas, up from about 18–20 percent in 
1960. In contrast, populations in low-income 
countries remain largely rural, with only 
slow movement into urban areas; only 22 
percent of people in these countries lived in 
urban areas as of 2014. 
Drivers of demographic change
The three fundamental factors in changing 
population size and age structure—mortal-
ity, fertility, and migration across and within 
countries—are, in turn, closely tied to devel-
opment progress. The path of birth and 
death rates—reflecting fertility and mortal-
ity rates—determines the natural growth of 
a population. But population growth is also 
affected by migration (both international 
and internal), because it influences age struc-
ture directly as people move and indirectly 
by affecting fertility in both the migrant-
sending and migrant-receiving locations. 
At the same time, the dynamics of fertility 
and mortality in a country affect how its age 
structure may change over time. Mortality 
rates are affected by the rate of infectious 
disease and the availability of health care, 
among others, while fertility is affected not 
only by access to health care but to levels of 
education and income. Migration is influ-
enced by income and non-income inequali-
ties that push migrants away from their old 
home or pull them toward a new location. 
Development progress, both income- and 
non-income-based, is thus a critical driver 
over time of changes in age structure and 
population size.
epidemiological trends alter mortality
The initial decline in mortality that occurs 
as part of the demographic transition is asso-
ciated with the start of an epidemiological 
transition. A reduction in the mortality rate 
of a population is paralleled by a decline in 
the incidence of infectious and contagious 
diseases, particularly among children under 
age five. This decline, in turn, increases the 
share of the population dying from chronic 
and degenerative diseases. Increased use of 
vaccinations against fatal diseases, together 
with improved hygiene and sanitation and 
better access to clean water, typically contrib-
ute to the initial declines in mortality rates, 
as was first observed in Europe in the 1700s 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998; Cutler, Dea-
ton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Mortality began to decline only relatively 
recently in developing countries and remains 
high in low-income countries. In low-income 
countries it is still driven by infectious dis-
eases and neonatal complications (figure 
4.13). Neonatal disorders, diarrhea, lower 
respiratory infections and other infections 
Figure 4.12 rural households tend to have 
higher fertility rates than urban households
Source: World Bank calculations, based on the latest Demographic and 
Health Survey for each country.
Note: Average total fertility rate is the average number of births per 
woman. The values are unweighted averages for countries within a given 
group. The survey years range from 1990 to 2013 and cover 71 countries. 
See appendix C.2 for additional details.
Av
er
ag
e 
fe
rt
ili
ty
 ra
te
Low-
income
countries
Lower-middle-
income 
countries
Upper-middle-
income
countries
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Rural Urban
 
G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6  d I s P A R I T I E s ,  d I v E R G E N c E s ,  A N d  d R I v E R s  149
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data documented in Wang et al. 2013. 
Figure 4.13 Neonatal complications and infectious disease drive mortality in developing countries
D
ea
th
s (
m
ill
io
ns
) 2
01
0
1 
6 
0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80+ 
Age cohort (years) 
a. Child deaths account for the vast majority of deaths in low-income countries
D
ea
th
s (
m
ill
io
ns
) 2
01
0
Neonatal and common infectious diseases  
Cancer, cardiovascular, or circulatory diseases 
HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis 
Other noncommunicable diseases 
Other communicable diseases 
Injuries 
Age cohort (years)  
d. Almost all deaths in high-income countries are due to cancer, radio or circulatory diseases, or other
noncommunicable diseases among the elderly
0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80+ 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
D
ea
th
s (
m
ill
io
ns
) 2
01
0
c. Children account for fewer deaths in upper-middle-income countries
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b. More than 2 million children under age ve died of neonatal complications in lower-middle-income countries in 2010
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are the cause of more than half of deaths in 
children under age six. In Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries, neglected tropical diseases 
(NTDs), malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis rep-
resented about 50 percent of deaths between 
1990 and 2010. 15 
Poorer countries lag behind in achieving 
the development goals related to reducing 
infant and child mortality. In countries where 
the average income per capita is less than $3 
a day, children under 5 accounted for 30.5 
percent of deaths in 2010. In the same year, 
86 percent of deaths of children under age 15 
occurred in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries. High infant mortality in low-
income countries is one reason why many of 
them are still in early stages of demographic 
transition, with high death and birth rates 
(World Bank 2015b). (Box 4.3 presents a 
model of demographic transition.)
As countries move to the later stages of 
demographic transition and average life 
expectancies rise, chronic and degenera-
tive diseases become the primary causes of 
death. The epidemiological transition thus 
continues. While noncommunicable dis-
eases are challenges for countries across the 
development spectrum, high-income country 
populations ages 64 or more accounted for 
79 percent of deaths in 2010. These deaths 
occurred almost entirely from cancer, car-
diovascular issues, and other chronic con-
ditions, and these countries accounted for 
about 43 percent of global deaths among 
individuals above 80 years old. Thus, to 
improve life expectancy, high-income coun-
tries must focus on improving health at older 
ages. Addressing the chronic diseases most 
commonly responsible for morbidity at older 
ages is much more costly than addressing the 
infectious and contagious diseases that afflict 
young children in low-income countries, 
however, especially considering the impact 
on life expectancy. 
Poor households tend to face higher mor-
tality rates and worse access to health ser-
vices than richer ones, regardless of income 
classification of the country. The bottom 40 
percent (B40) of households in the wealth dis-
tribution in a given country tends to have a 
worse morbidity profile and higher mortality 
rate than families in the top 60 percent (T60) 
(figure 4.14).16 This observation holds across 
income groupings. In low-income countries, 
for example, the infant mortality rate is 1.18 
times higher in B40 than in T60 households; 
in upper-middle-income countries, the B40 
rate is 1.45 times higher. In addition to their 
disadvantage in terms of wealth, B40 house-
holds face worse access to health facilities 
than T60 households (figure 4.15). 
Mortality differs across countries at simi-
lar income levels and across the income dis-
tribution within countries. The variation 
within high-income countries illustrates this 
point. Although the infant mortality rate in 
the United States is relatively high compared 
with that in, for example, Western European 
countries, infants born to white, college- 
educated, married women in the United 
States have similar mortality rates as infants 
in Western Europe. In the United States, 
infant mortality among non-Hispanic black 
Americans is 12.2 (deaths per 1,000 infants 
born between 2008 and 2010), more than 
double the rate for the non-Hispanic white 
population of 5.3 (Chen, Oster, and Williams 
2014; MacDorman and others 2014). The 
large variation within counties is observed 
not only at the household level but also in dif-
ferent regions. Seattle (per capita income of 
$96,400) and San Jose ($86,700), two of the 
richest cities in the United States, have two 
of the lowest infant mortality rates (3.7 and 
3.0 deaths per 1,000 infants born). Poorer 
cities, such as Cleveland ($23,400) and 
Detroit ($20,500), have much higher infant 
mortality rates (14.1 and 12.4, respectively). 
Mortality at older ages in the United States 
is also higher for people with relatively low 
long-term incomes and less education, and 
the disparity has increased in recent decades 
(Waldron 2007; Meara, Richards, and Cutler 
2008). 
Mortality rates across countries are 
strongly influenced by access to and supply 
of public health services. Different from other 
vital events that are subject to individual 
choice, death can be a consequence of sev-
eral factors that are not under an individual’s 
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control (Soares 2005). For example, East 
Asia experienced a particularly fast decline 
in child mortality, and indeed mortality at all 
ages, which led to an increase in life expec-
tancy from 61.5 to 76.6 years between 1960 
and 1992. Among the possible explanations 
for this achievement is widespread access 
to new public health programs and medi-
cal knowledge and technologies (Bloom and 
Williamson 1998). Although there is a clear 
association between individuals’ incomes 
and mortality outcomes, the access to new 
Box 4.3 The demographic transition model
The demographic transition model (DTM) describes 
the transition of populations from high to low fertility 
and mortality rates. This transition generally paral-
lels the economic development of a country (Szreter 
1993). The model consists of at least four distinct 
phases, with countries effectively moving from high 
fertility and low life expectancy to low fertility and 
high life expectancy as they move through the demo-
graphic transition. At the same time, they go from 
high proportions of children and few elderly to low 
proportions of children and many elderly.
Fertility rates and mortality rates are both high 
in the first stage, where the population tends to be 
younger and population growth stable but low (fig-
ure B4.3.1). If mortality rates fall but fertility rates 
remain high, as in the second phase, then population 
growth accelerates, with growing numbers of young 
and rising youth dependency. In the third stage, fertil-
ity rates also begin to decline, and population growth 
slows. During this time, the youth dependency ratios 
also fall and the share of the working-age population 
rises, boosting per capita income growth through 
the first demographic dividend. After a long period 
of lower fertility, the growth rate of the working-
age population slows and the aged dependency ratio 
begins to rise. When fertility rates and mortality rates 
reach low levels, population growth also stabilizes at 
a low rate, in the fourth stage of the DTM.a
a. Recently, some developed countries have reported increases in fertility. There is some evidence that when countries pass 
a threshold of human development, then fertility declines are reversed, as discussed by Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2009) 
in a cross-country analysis of the Human Development Index and total fertility rates. Luci-Greulich and Thévenon (2014) 
found that economic development is likely to induce a fertility rebound for OECD members but is not sufficient to lift fertil-
ity to a significantly higher level in all countries.
Figure B4.3.1 During the demographic transition, population growth first accelerates then slows as average 
ages rise.
Source: Bloom and Williamson 1998.
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technologies and public health improvements 
played a key role in reducing mortality rates. 
Improved nutrition, quality of and access 
to public health, urbanization, vaccination, 
and medical treatments are among the main 
sources of reduction in infectious diseases 
and child mortality (Fogel 1997; Chaturvedi, 
De Costa and Raven 2015; Cutler, Deaton, 
and Lleras-Munry 2006). 
education, income, and health  
influence fertility 
Declining infant mortality rates and increas-
ing educational attainment, life expectancy, 
and income are all associated with a reduc-
tion in total fertility (figure 4.16).17 A reduc-
tion in infant mortality rates generally has 
a lagged effect on reducing fertility, largely 
because of reproductive decisions that are 
based on “replacement” of deceased children 
and the “insurance” of having children in 
case some do not survive to adulthood. The 
intuition is that with their children more 
likely to survive infancy and childhood, par-
ents will reduce their number of births to 
maintain the same net number of children. 
Improvements in child health may thus be a 
precursor to lower rates of fertility. In con-
trast, education (especially of females) and 
household income are negatively correlated 
with fertility.
There are two potential income-related 
mechanisms that underlie the “quality” ver-
sus “quantity” trade-off that parents face 
in deciding how many children to have. 
First, as parents’ educational attainment 
Figure 4.15 The bottom 40 percent also have 
less access to health facilities
Source: World Bank calculations, using data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys. See appendix C.2 for additional details.
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fertility
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rises—particularly that of women—the 
opportunity cost of having children rises. 
That alone could encourage parents to have 
fewer children or to delay having children 
(Galor and Weil 1999, 2000). Second, as 
incomes rise, parents could choose to have 
more children and also invest more in the 
human capital of their children. Empirical 
evidence suggests however, that as incomes 
rise, families choose to have fewer but more 
highly educated children.18 
The labor-market implications of rising 
levels of education, particularly for women, 
influence fertility. As women become more 
educated, the opportunity cost of not par-
ticipating in the labor market rises, leading to 
either fewer or later births, although the pres-
ence or absence of gender empowerment also 
plays a role in the participation of women in 
the labor force (box 4.4). While higher educa-
tional attainment (especially of females) and 
higher household income are both associated 
Box 4.4 The economic benefits of gender equality
Gender equality matters not only in its own right but 
also as an instrument for development. There is vast 
potential for growth, poverty reduction, and shared 
prosperity via improved gender equality in the labor 
market, which can have large impacts on productiv-
ity. Eliminating employment segregation, as an exam-
ple, would increase labor productivity by as much 
as 3–25 percent, while equalizing access to inputs 
including land and fertilizers would increase agricul-
tural output by 2.5–4 percent (World Bank 2012). 
Gender equality can also help minimize the growth 
and fiscal impacts of aging. Gender inequality gen-
erates an average cumulative income per capita loss 
of 14–15.4 percent in OECD countries, considering 
both men and women (Cuberes and Teignier 2015). In 
developing countries, the average cumulative income 
loss is 16–17.5 percent. 
Social norms and legal restrictions that largely 
shape the agency of women and girls are key fac-
tors underlying gender-based differences in access to 
opportunity. For instance, traditional roles and asso-
ciated time-use patterns constrain women’s economic 
opportunities: housework, childrearing, and elderly 
care are often considered primarily women’s responsi-
bility. In 2013, 128 countries had at least one legal dif-
ference between men and women, ranging from barri-
ers to women obtaining official identification cards to 
restrictions on owning or using property, establishing 
creditworthiness, and getting a job (Klugman 2014; 
Klugman and others 2014). In addition, limitations in 
women’s and girls’ agency are often explained by other 
disadvantages, particularly in access to education. 
Addressing social norms will thus be critical to 
development progress. Such effort would entail both 
enhancing the aspirations of girls and women and 
changing the behavior of men and boys. Progres-
sive constitutions and legal reforms can support the 
transformation of social norms surrounding agency. 
Increased awareness of such regulations has stimu-
lated changes in norms and behaviors, for instance 
those regarding gender-based violence. Social protec-
tion and education both play major roles for women’s 
agency. Expanding women’s economic opportunities 
has potentially the largest positive effect for women’s 
agency. For example, in addition to its economic ben-
efits, Uganda’s Empowerment and Livelihoods for 
Adolescents program, which offers girls soft skills 
and vocational training, has shown positive impli-
cations for the control participants exert over their 
sexual and reproductive health rights (Klugman and 
others 2014).
A range of specific measures could help address 
prevailing gender gaps in economic opportunity 
throughout the life cycle. For children and youth, pol-
icy actions should focus on gender-specific constraints 
to schooling and boosting noncognitive and voca-
tional skills. During the productive years, active labor 
market policies that combine training, placement, and 
other support to enable women to enter or reenter the 
workforce can increase their employment and earn-
ings in the formal sector. Expanding access to formal 
child care and elder care services, and removing dis-
crimination and disincentives in laws can also help 
promote female labor market inclusion in higher pro-
ductivity areas. In older years, policy actions should 
support equitable old-age labor regulations combined 
with appropriate social protection (World Bank 
2012). Improving women’s financial access by making 
it easier to open accounts and obtain lines of credit 
would also benefit growth (Sahay and others 2015).
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with declines in fertility, the importance of 
education (particularly primary education) in 
affecting fertility seems to be more robust in 
analyses that aim to identify a causal relation-
ship between fertility and education (Murtin 
2013). The association between education 
and fertility varies across regions, however, 
with the impact among developing regions 
over the long term in Europe and Central 
Asia tending to be greater (figure 4.17).19
Increasing the educational attainment of 
girls also reduces fertility rates by increas-
ing the age of marriage and first birth. First, 
more highly educated girls marry later and 
have lower fertility. Second, higher educa-
tional enrollment rates may increase the 
opportunity cost of children for household 
work and thereby reduce the desire for large 
families. Improvements in female education 
are positively associated with lower rates of 
teenage pregnancy. B40 households, which 
tend to have lower female educational attain-
ment than T60 households, are also seen to 
have higher rates of teenage parents (figure 
4.18). Higher education also increases the 
opportunity cost of having a child due to the 
potential for income from work, and so there 
is a delay in the first birth and marriage. A 
delay in the age at first birth has the effect 
of reducing lifetime fertility. Women living 
in households in the top 60 percent of the 
income distribution tend to have a higher 
median age at first birth than households in 
the bottom 40 percent (figure 4.19). Delay-
ing the age at first birth also has immediate 
benefits beyond reducing fertility rates, such 
as improving maternal health (U.S. National 
Research Council 1989). Child marriage, in 
particular, can lead to substantially higher 
fertility (box 4.5).
Family planning and the availability of 
contraception vary across countries and 
across the income distribution but do influ-
ence fertility rates. Generally, policies that 
facilitate gender empowerment and repro-
ductive health also empower households to 
make their own decisions regarding number 
of children. Relevant policies include stron-
ger reproductive rights and ensuring ade-
quate access to reproductive health, which 
can reduce the unmet need for family plan-
ning (UN 2014). Successful interventions 
that include the whole community, includ-
ing men and community leaders, can change 
gender norms and support the sexual health 
and rights of girls and women (Klugman 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys. See appendix C.2 for additional details. 
Note: Data for B40 refers to households in the bottom 40 percent of the 
wealth distribution, while T60 refers to households in the top 60 of the 
wealth distribution.
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Figure 4.18 B40 households have higher rates 
of teenage parents than T60 households
Source: Murtin 2013.
Note: Results are based on Murtin (2013) using a system GMM estimator. 
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planning programs alone may reduce fertility 
by around 0.5 to 1 birth per woman (Miller 
and others 2014). Poor households, however, 
not only have higher fertility rates but also 
tend to have less access to contraceptives 
(figures 4.20 and 4.21). This relatively lower 
access to contraceptives and contraceptive 
methods could thus be a possible explanation 
for the higher rates of unplanned children in 
B40 households relative to T60 households, 
suggesting that they may have less ability to 
take action to implement their reproductive 
decisions.
Spatial contrasts drive migration
Migration, which can change age struc-
ture and population growth substantially, 
is driven by a range of “push” and “pull” 
factors. Push factors include incentives that 
encourage migration away from a given 
place (be it a country or subnational region), 
while pull factors are those that encourage 
migration to a given place. Push and pull 
factors include economic inequalities (dif-
ferences in wages, employment prospects, or 
access to services) and inequalities defined 
more broadly (such as differences regarding 
security from physical harm, violation of 
human rights, and limitations on religious or 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys. See appendix C.2 for additional details. 
Note: Data for B40 refers to households in the bottom 40 percent of the 
wealth distribution, while T60 refers to households in the top 60 of the 
wealth distribution.
Figure 4.19 Females in B40 households tend to 
have children at a younger age than those in T60 
households
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and others 2014; Azevedo and others 2012). 
Numerous other policies that play a critical 
role in economic development have the added 
benefit of also being closely associated with 
falling fertility rates. For example, family 
Box 4.5 economic and demographic impact of child marriage 
Child marriage, defined as marrying before the age 
of 18, is a practice that affects mostly girls and often 
leads to violations of human rights for the girls who 
have to marry early. UNICEF (2014) estimates that 
over the next decade 140 million girls will marry 
early. Analysis of child marriage trends suggests that 
child marriage is declining, albeit only slowly. In 30 
years the incidence of child marriage fell by only 11 
percentage points, and the incidence is still high in 
several countries (figure B4.5.1). 
Child marriage has a wide range of negative 
impacts on the girls who marry early, their children, 
communities, and society as a whole. First, child mar-
riage and pregnancies account for a fifth of dropouts 
among girls in secondary schools. Each additional 
year of delay in the age of marriage increases school-
ing by 0.22 years and the likelihood of literacy by 
5.6 percentage points, suggesting that reducing child 
marriage could have a significant impact, particularly 
in Africa (Field and Ambrus 2008; Lloyd and Mensch 
2008; Nguyen and Wodon 2015).
Ending child marriage could result in substan-
tially lower fertility rates for women. This, in turn, 
would have a large effect on demographic patterns 
(box continues next page)
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personal freedoms) (Hansen and Spilimbergo 
1999; Harris and Todaro 1970; Mayda 2010; 
Molho 1986).
Rural-urban migration flows can be 
expected to decelerate as rural-urban wage 
differentials diminish over time. Rural areas 
tend to have a surplus of labor, in that they 
have more workers than can be absorbed by 
the rural economy, as well as higher fertility 
rates and younger populations than urban 
areas. The surplus labor thus moves to urban 
areas where labor demand and thus wages 
are higher, until there is no surplus labor sup-
ply in rural areas or surplus labor demand in 
urban areas.20 High-income countries went 
through this process in previous decades, 
while middle-income countries like China are 
experiencing it now.21 
As migrant-sending countries develop and 
inequality within recipient countries declines, 
Box 4.5 economic and demographic impact of child marriage (continued) 
and thereby on income growth. In countries with a 
high incidence of child marriage such as Niger, ending 
the practice would increase growth in gross domestic 
product per capita by 0.25–0.35 percentage points 
each year until at least 2030, thereby contributing 
to faster reductions in extreme poverty. Through its 
impact on education and fertility rates, ending child 
marriage could increase labor force participation and 
earnings for women, thereby further contributing to 
the reduction of extreme poverty through the genera-
tion of higher incomes for households.
The elimination of child marriage would also have 
strong intergenerational effects, through a reduction 
in child mortality and stunting. Lower prevalence 
of stunting as well as better educated mothers will 
in turn improve the education of children and their 
productivity and earnings later in life. Finally, end-
ing child marriage will generate potentially impor-
tant budget savings for governments in areas such as 
health and education, owing to the smaller popula-
tion to be served (Nasrullah and others 2014).
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Median age (years) at rst marriage for women in rural areas
Figure B4.5.1 in some developing countries, women 
in rural areas still tend to marry in their teens
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from Demographic and Health 
Surveys. 
Note: The age of first marriage is based on the response provided by women ages 
25 to 49 when interviewed.
Figure 4.20 Fertility rates are higher in B40 
households than in T60 households
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys. See appendix C.2 for additional details.
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the economic incentives for migration could 
become less pronounced. High-income coun-
tries tend to be the most popular destina-
tions for migrants, and most migrants come 
from developing countries (figure 4.22). The 
broader impact of development on migration, 
however, depends on the patterns of growth. 
If economic development does not promote 
employment growth, then it has the poten-
tial to exacerbate the push factors to migrate 
out.22 If, on the other hand, growth in a 
country is on a path of eventual convergence 
with incomes in the high-income countries, 
there may be a reduction in the pull factors. 
In parallel, as fertility rates fall and working-
age population growth slows in develop-
ing countries, push pressures for emigration 
might also decline. 
Conflict presents another major driver of 
internal and international migration, with 
the number of forced migrants now at the 
highest level since World War II. Armed 
conflict—civil war as well as more general-
ized violence—can lead to migration, with 
people becoming refugees or asylum seek-
ers if they are moving internationally, or 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) if they are 
moving within a country. As of 2014, there 
were 59.5 million forcibly displaced people 
in the world. Approximately two-thirds of 
these people were IDPs, while one-third were 
refugees. More than half of all refugees under 
the mandate of the United Nations are con-
centrated in only 10 countries, in descend-
ing order of refugee population size: Turkey, 
Pakistan, Lebanon, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Chad, Uganda, and 
China (UNHCR 2015). Turkey and Lebanon 
for example, have seen rapid increases in their 
refugee populations as a result of the armed 
conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Forced 
migration also presents a development chal-
lenge, since 90 percent of refugees are hosted 
in developing countries (World Bank 2014).
Conclusion
Development has a profound impact on 
demographic change at both the country and 
global level. In many countries, development 
has influenced the key demographic driv-
ers of fertility, mortality, and migration. In 
particular, successes in infant mortality, edu-
cational attainment, poverty reduction, and 
gender equality have accelerated the demo-
graphic transition in many countries. These 
developing countries in turn have shaped 
the global trends. However, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, continuing challenges to improving 
human development outcomes have left the 
region lagging behind the rest of the world in 
its demographic transition. 
Demographic differences between coun-
tries are substantial, presenting tremendous 
scope for demography-driven spillovers as 
well as what is known as “chronological 
arbitrage.” Because countries are in different 
stages of demographic transition, global eco-
nomic integration gives them the opportunity 
both to take advantage of demography-driven 
spillovers originating in other countries and 
to benefit from greater globalization. Chap-
ter 5 examines how these demographic dif-
ferences are reflected in economic differences 
between countries and identifies the major 
channels for spillovers. Identifying these 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from Demographic and 
Health Surveys. See appendix C.4 for additional details. 
Note: Unmet need for family planning is defined as the percentage  
of women who do not want to become pregnant but are not using  
contraception. 
Figure 4.21 unmet needs for family planning 
are also higher in B40 households 
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channels is an important first step in harness-
ing these differences through chronological 
arbitrage, such as through trade, migration, 
and capital flows between countries in differ-
ent demographic phases. Chapter 6 examines 
how chronological arbitrage through these 
channels could be facilitated.
Notes
 1.  This report considers the working-age popu-
lation to be people ages 15 to 64. Recent 
evidence, however, suggests that in aging 
economies, the definition of a dependent may 
be changing (Sanderson and Scherbov 2010). 
The standard definition of the working-age 
population may not apply to rural, informal, 
or poor workers who often have to work 
beyond age 64 (World Bank 2015a). The issue 
of dependency is taken up in greater detail in 
chapter 5.
 2.  Unless specified otherwise, all popula-
tion estimates and projections are based on 
United Nations data (UN 2015). From 2015 
onward, the data are projections based on the 
database’s medium fertility scenario. Box 4.1 
explores how these global trends differ across 
scenarios and projection sources.
 3.  Unless specified otherwise, descriptions of 
countries as high-income, upper-middle-
income, lower-middle-income, low-income, 
or developing are based on the World Bank 
Group’s income classification for 2016–17.
 4.  The total dependency ratio is commonly 
defined as the ratio of the dependent popula-
tion, composed of children (ages 0–14) and 
elderly (ages 65+), to the working age popula-
tion (ages 15–64).
 5.  Estimates of elderly dependents are subject to 
uncertainty arising from two sources: popula-
tion projections and the definition of the age 
boundary for the working-age population. 
Unless stated otherwise, this chapter defines 
the working-age population as individuals 
ages 15–64. Other chapters consider alterna-
tive approaches. 
 6.  The postwar increase in fertility is commonly 
referred to as the baby boom and was most 
easily recognized in the United States, peak-
ing in the mid-1950s (Klein 2004). Other 
Figure 4.22 Most migrants tend to be from developing countries but living in high-income 
countries
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2013b.
Note: LIC is low-income countries, LMI is lower-middle-income countries, UMI is upper-middle-income countries, and HIC is high-income countries, follow-
ing the standard World Bank Group income based classification.
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industrial countries experienced their own 
baby booms at different times before the 
1970s.
 7.  Espenshade, Guzman, and Westoff (2003) 
suggest that the replacement fertility rate 
is about 2.1 in industrial countries and can 
range slightly higher in developing countries 
where mortality rates are higher. The replace-
ment fertility rate is the total fertility rate at 
which there would be no change in population 
size in the long run.
 8.  Lee (2003) provides a historical review of the 
health transition contributing to the demo-
graphic transition.
 9.  Falling mortality and infant mortality rates 
have a lagged impact on total fertility rates, as 
discussed in Reher (2011). A key factor is that 
as more children survive infancy and child-
hood, parents reduce the number of births 
to maintain the same number of surviving 
children.
10.  While fertility-rates remain low in most high-
income countries, there is some evidence from 
OECD countries that countries with high lev-
els of human development and family-friendly 
policies have recently seen improvements in 
their fertility rates (Luci-Greulich and Théve-
non 2013, 2014; Day 2012).
11.  Transition economies in Europe and Cen-
tral Asia are idiosyncratic in that they expe-
rienced a sharp drop in life expectancies 
from the 1990s until recently and a resulting 
increase in mortality rates (Cornia and Pan-
iccià 2000; Kennedy, Kawachi, and Brainerd 
1998; Shkolnikov and others 1998). 
12.  Hervitz (1985) and Majelantle and Nava-
neetham (2013) provide reviews of the alter-
native perspectives on the impact of migration 
on fertility, including the idea that migration 
disrupts reproductive decisions, leading to 
lower fertility in the migrant family than in 
their home country.
13.  The World Bank Group’s high-income coun-
try grouping includes high-fertility countries 
like Saudi Arabia. If only high-income OECD 
countries were considered, the median fertil-
ity rate would be lower.
14.  Guo and others (2012) found the impact of 
rural-urban migration on fertility to be sig-
nificant at both the national and provincial 
levels in China. China’s implementation of the 
one-child policy is often discussed as being 
the main factor responsible for the sharp drop 
in fertility since the 1980s, although its fer-
tility rates were already declining before the 
one-child policy was in effect.
15.  NTDs refer to a group of diseases that thrive 
mainly among the poorest populations 
(WHO 2015). These diseases mainly result 
from four pathogens: protozoa, parasites, 
bacteria, and viruses.
16.  The Demographic and Health Survey data 
used for these estimates are harmonized 
across countries and have extensive data on 
demographic and health variables. Their eco-
nomic data are limited, however, and cover 
only household wealth rather than income.
17.  Reher (2011), Soares (2005), and Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2007) discuss the importance 
of infant mortality for fertility. The empiri-
cal literature testing the suggested three main 
determinants of long-term demographic tran-
sition does not converge in its conclusions, 
however. Murtin (2013) finds that education 
is more robust than infant mortality, income, 
and other variables in determining a fertil-
ity transition. Herzer, Strulik, and Vollmer 
(2012), on the other hand, suggest that mor-
tality changes and income growth are the 
most important drivers of changes in fertil-
ity rate, while Angeles (2010) suggests that 
reductions in fertility rate are driven mostly 
by reductions in mortality rate.
18.  This behavior would suggest that parents’ 
elasticity of demand for quality is higher than 
for quantity. A large literature covers this 
topic, starting with Becker (1960) and Becker 
and Lewis (1973). 
19.  World Bank (2015b) argues that improve-
ments in health, particularly child and mater-
nal health, need to be a priority development 
goal and a precursor to any policy discussion 
regarding fertility. Improving the educational 
attainment of girls also helps in reducing 
the rate of teenage pregnancies, immediately 
improving health outcomes as well. 
20.  Lewis (1954) discussed the contribution of 
migration or surplus rural labor to urban 
areas driving growth up to a turning point 
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(referred to in the literature as the Lewis turn-
ing point).
21.  In the case of China, reaching the Lewis 
turning point may also have implications for 
future growth since its urban manufacturing 
sector-led growth has benefited from the rela-
tively low-cost labor supply from rural areas. 
The implications of reaching this turning 
point are examined more fully in Cai (2010); 
Das and N’Diaye (2013); and Zhang, Yang, 
and Whang (2011).
22.  Massey (1988) provides examples of how 
economic development characterized by rapid 
structural transformation has the potential 
to create unemployment in rural—primarily 
agriculture-dependent—areas, increasing the 
incentives to migrate. Some of this migration 
reflects rural-urban movements as part of the 
urbanization process, but the rest reflects eco-
nomic motives.
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Implications of 
Demographic Change: 
Pathways to Prosperity
The world can be currently classified into 
four types of countries when viewed through 
the lens of demographic characteristics and 
future development potential. In the first 
group are high-fertility countries that are 
lagging in many key human development 
indicators. These are all low-income coun-
tries. In the second group are mostly low- 
and lower-middle-income countries where 
fertility rates have started falling recently 
and where changes in age structure offer tre-
mendous opportunity for growth in the fore-
seeable future. The third group comprises 
mostly upper-middle-income countries that 
experienced rapid fertility declines in the 
1960s, and where working-age people will 
be a shrinking share of the population in the 
coming decade. The last group is made up 
of mostly high-income countries that have 
some of the highest shares of elderly in the 
Development opportunities and challenges 
stemming from demographic change vary 
with country circumstances. Countries with 
high fertility rates and low life expectancy 
tend to have relatively young populations 
with rising proportions of working-age peo-
ple (between 15 and 64 years of age). How-
ever, these countries tend to have high pov-
erty rates and face the challenge of providing 
services for their growing populations and 
ensuring productive employment for their 
expanding labor force. In countries where 
fertility rates have been below replacement 
level since at least the 1980s, life expectancy 
is typically high, and the elderly account for 
increasing proportions of their populations. 
These countries face the challenge of meeting 
the increasing demand for pension and health 
care services, while their overall economic 
growth may be slowing. 
Changing age structures of populations are shaping the trajectories of development in many 
countries, bringing both opportunities and challenges. Rapid population growth is set to con-
tinue in the poorest countries over the coming decades, raising the share of the population that 
is working-age and bringing strong potential to boost growth and poverty reduction. The chal-
lenge in these centers of global poverty lies in improving human development outcomes and job 
creation. In contrast, countries with low fertility rates, including most high-income countries, 
have aging population structures. Together with opportunities to consolidate development 
gains, these engines of global growth are increasingly facing challenges associated with aging, 
including the importance of ensuring fiscal sustainability to support a growing pool of elderly. 
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world and fertility rates that have been below 
replacement level since at least the 1980s 
(appendix C.3 discusses the typography in 
more detail).
Demographic change can boost prosperity 
when a greater proportion of the population 
is working and saving. Countries where the 
share of the working-age population is still 
rising can benefit from more workers and 
savers. To capitalize on these opportunities, 
however, policies and institutions need to be 
in place related to the domestic and external 
channels through which demography affects 
development. These policies relate to labor 
markets, human capital, savings and invest-
ment, and transfers supporting the dependent 
population (box 5.1).
Shifts in the population age structure 
can have welfare implications since the 
demand for public services and the patterns 
Box 5.1 Changing concepts of dependency
The total dependency ratio (TDR) is the ratio of the 
dependent population (children and elderly) to the 
working-age population that supports total con-
sumption (working-age).
For purposes of international comparability, the 
working-age population is commonly defined as 
those aged 15–64. However, these age thresholds do 
not necessarily capture variations across time and 
regions on child-labor practices, time in school, or 
labor supply at older ages. For example, child labor 
was a common practice in the initial stage of indus-
trialization in Europe and is still present in several 
developing countries (Cunningham and Viazzo 
1996). Also, accumulating evidence casts doubts on 
a mechanical link between chronological age and the 
dependency rate for the elderly, and labor supply at 
older ages varies widely, in part reflecting the avail-
ability of public pensions and their incentive struc-
tures (Börsch-Supan 2013). Moreover, the 15–64 
definition of the working-age does not necessarily 
identify the age cohorts that effectively support total 
consumption. 
An alternative approach to defining the depen-
dent population considers the age span when people 
do not earn enough to meet their material needs. 
This approach offers a more accurate measure of the 
share of the population that needs support to fund 
their consumption. It is also useful in shaping public 
policies, because it takes into account public transfers 
(such as spending on health and education). A new 
set of economic accounts, called National Transfer 
Accounts (NTAs), provides comprehensive informa-
tion about how those at every age acquire and use 
economic resources to meet their material needs, to 
provide for the future, and to support others through 
public and private institutions (Lee and Mason 2011; 
UN 2013). To date these accounts have been con-
structed for about 40 countries.
The NTAs quantify the economic life-cycle pat-
tern using consumption and labor income at each age. 
Results suggest that the ages at which people earn 
more through their labor than they consume varies 
greatly depending on economic conditions and pub-
lic policy. In both high- and low-income countries, 
the earnings surplus begins at age 26 and ends at age 
59, on average—a much shorter span than the tradi-
tional 15–64 age span (figure B5.1.1). Moreover, the 
extent to which those under 26 or over 59 are sup-
porting themselves through their labor is highly vari-
able. Consumption includes both private and public 
consumption. Labor income includes the earning of 
employees, the self-employed, and estimates of the 
value of labor of unpaid family workers.
The NTA-based approach suggests that rich, low-
fertility countries differ from poor, high-fertility 
countries in four important ways:
•   Children in rich countries have higher consump-
tion than children in poor countries, even after 
controlling for differences in levels of income. The 
consumption values shown in figure B5.1.1 include 
public and private spending on health and educa-
tion, which accounts for a substantial portion of 
the consumption advantage of children in rich, low-
fertility countries. 
•   The elderly in rich countries consume more than 
they do in poor countries. In rich countries, con-
sumption patterns are driven noticeably higher at 
(box continues next page)
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of consumption vary dramatically across 
a  person’s life. Shifting age structures can 
create imbalances between the resources of 
working-age people, for whom labor income 
typically exceeds consumption, and the 
young and old, who often produce less than 
they consume. The magnitude of these imbal-
ances depends not only on demography but 
also on the institutions and mechanisms soci-
eties rely on to intermediate resources to the 
young and the old, including through family 
ties, government provision of services, and 
financial markets.
Building on the global demographic trends 
and the country-level differences discussed 
in chapter 4, this chapter examines the links 
between demography to development. It 
presents a demographic typology that clas-
sifies countries into four categories based on 
their fertility rates and working-age popula-
tion shares. It then discusses the economic 
and development challenges that countries in 
each of the four groups face, with a particu-
lar focus on poverty and aging populations. 
The analysis illustrates that development 
progress varies with key demographic char-
acteristics. Finally, the chapter examines how 
demographics impact economic growth, the 
achievement of development goals, and the 
nature of public transfers. 
From demography to 
development: A global typology
Demographic characteristics can help or hin-
der economic activity, so understanding a 
country’s demographic trends offers insight 
to its development prospects. Changes in the 
Box 5.1 Changing concepts of dependency (continued)
older ages because of rising spending on health 
care. In poor countries, consumption does not 
turn up at older ages. Consumption among adults 
is much flatter in low-income countries, and the 
elderly consume less than do prime-age adults. 
•   Labor income is more highly concentrated in rich 
countries, with later entry to and earlier departure 
from the labor force. In low-income countries, labor 
income is noticeably higher among children and the 
elderly. The differences, however, are not as great 
as expected. Employment opportunities for teens 
and young adults in many low-income countries are 
quite limited. In addition, the elderly in low-income 
countries are much more likely to be in the labor 
force but often in very low-productivity jobs.
•   The gaps between consumption and labor income 
for the young and elderly are substantially greater 
in high-income countries than in low-income coun-
tries. Dependents are more costly in high-income 
countries because they consume more and earn 
less than in low-income countries, which leads to 
higher life-cycle deficits. The better health of the 
elderly in higher-income countries does not cause 
them to work more or to spend less on health care 
than the elderly in low-income countries. 
Labor income, low-income countries
Consumption, low-income countries
Labor income, high-income countries
Consumption, high-income countries
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Figure B5.1.1 Consumption and labor income by 
age for high and low-income countries 
Source: National Transfer Accounts.
Note: All values are expressed relative to the average per capita labor income 
of persons 30-49 years of age to facilitate comparison across countries. Low-
income and high-income values are based on the bottom and top quintile of 
NTA countries based on per capita GDP. Low-income countries: Cambodia,  
Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and Vietnam. High-
income countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden, 
and the United States. All values are for a year ranging from 2003 to 2009. 
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working-age share of the population can affect 
growth and savings and, subsequently, income 
per capita. For example, rising working-age 
population shares could lead to proportion-
ally more income earners in the economy and 
thus greater growth per capita. Changes in 
the age structure also affect the resource con-
straints faced by households and the state for 
social spending, with potential second-order 
effects. For example, if households have fewer 
children, they would have more resources to 
spend on human capital and consumption. In 
contrast, if the share of the aging is increas-
ing, there would not only be fewer potential 
workers but also higher demand for some ser-
vices like health care. The exact impact of the 
demographic change depends on how the age-
structure is changing. A typology based on the 
channels of impact and demographic trends 
can thus be used to characterize a country’s 
development potential.
Demographic trends can produce two 
types of dividends
The development impact of changes in 
age structure occur through two mecha-
nisms and can be classified as either a first 
or a second demographic dividend (Lee and 
Mason 2006). The first dividend is a direct 
and immediate consequence of the rise in 
the working-age share of the population. If 
a larger share of the population is working, 
average standards of living will be higher.1 
The potential benefits for poverty reduction 
are twofold. First, in low-income households 
that reduce their fertility, standards of living 
will rise by increasing the number of effective 
producers per household member. Second, 
improvements in public finances resulting 
from an increase in the number of workers 
in the economy will allow more resources to 
be devoted to low-income households. The 
second dividend arises when faster growth of 
the working-age population leads to greater 
savings in the short run and higher invest-
ment in human capital and investment per 
worker in the long run.
The first demographic dividend could per-
sist for decades but is ultimately transitory. 
As fertility rates decline, child-dependency 
ratios fall both within households and within 
a population, while the share of the working-
age population rises and remains high for 
a few generations. If the increasingly larger 
working-age population is productively 
employed, there is potential for an increase in 
economywide living standards. The first divi-
dend is in large part a consequence of a given 
(growing) labor force supporting fewer chil-
dren. For some countries, estimates suggest 
that the contribution of the first demographic 
dividend explains 9.2–15.5 percent of their 
per capita economic growth over the 1960–
2000 period (Mason and Kinugasa 2008).
 The second demographic dividend arises 
if changes in age structure create space for 
higher savings and lead to increased invest-
ment in human and physical capital. An 
increase in the share of workers in the 
economy with respect to the total popula-
tion leads to higher production and more 
resources available in the economy, which 
at the same time can facilitate an increase 
in savings, investment, and accumulation of 
physical and human capital. These decisions 
subsequently influence the productivity of 
the workforce. Providing capital for a grow-
ing labor force is costly, and as labor force 
growth declines, a given level of investment 
will lead to greater capital per worker. Demo-
graphic change pushes countries toward sup-
plying more capital, further enhancing labor 
productivity (Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding 
2003). Because personal assets accumulate 
over the lifetime of individuals, per capita 
household wealth rises as a population ages. 
Moreover, gains in life expectancy have led 
to an extended period of retirement, provid-
ing a powerful incentive to accumulate assets 
in countries where the elderly rely on funded 
pensions and other assets to support at least 
part of their old-age needs. 
Countries that are too early in the demo-
graphic transition face challenges to activat-
ing the first demographic dividend, while 
countries late in the transition face chal-
lenges in sustaining the second dividend. 
Where total fertility rates are high, the child-
dependency ratio will likely be too high and 
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the working-age population share too low to 
realize the first demographic dividend, as in 
the case of some high-fertility, low-income 
countries. In contrast, countries with rapidly 
shrinking working-age population shares 
face the challenge of maintaining the pace 
of physical and human capital accumula-
tion needed to maintain labor productiv-
ity growth. In such countries—as in many 
low-fertility, high-income countries today—
demographic conditions can strain public ser-
vices, especially health and pension. 
Trends and potential form basis of a 
new typology 
Viewed through the lens of demography, 
the world has four types of countries, each 
type with measures it can take to maximize 
future economic potential (map 5.1).2 Pre-
dividend countries lag in key human devel-
opment indicators and have fertility rates 
greater than four births per woman. Their 
high dependency ratios are expected to 
decline as the fertility transition proceeds. 
Early-dividend countries have progressed 
further in the fertility transition, with fertility 
rates below four births per woman and the 
working-age share in the population likely to 
rise considerably in the future. Priorities for 
these countries are realizing the first demo-
graphic dividend and laying the groundwork 
for the second dividend. Late-dividend coun-
tries have shrinking working-age shares, but 
their overall age structures are still favorable 
for the first demographic dividend. However, 
they may experience rapid aging in coming 
decades, so realizing the second dividend is 
key. Finally, post-dividend countries are those 
where fertility transitioned below replace-
ment levels three decades ago and that have 
shrinking working-age population shares and 
high shares of elderly. They are too late in the 
transition to gain additional benefits from the 
first demographic dividend but could still be 
realizing the second dividend.
MAp 5.1 World through the lens of the demographic typology
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
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The demographic typology reflects the 
different stages of demographic transition. 
The first demographic indicator consid-
ered in the typology, fertility rate, is a main 
determinant of demographic transition (see 
chapter 4). At the start of demographic tran-
sition, countries typically have high fertility 
and mortality rates. As transition proceeds, 
the mortality rate begins to decline while 
the fertility rate remains high, resulting in 
rising life expectancy. Later, the birth rate 
begins to decline as well, until finally fertil-
ity and mortality rates both level off at low 
rates. Indeed, the pre-dividend countries 
have the low life expectancy and high fertil-
ity rates of countries of the early stages of 
demographic transition, post-dividend coun-
tries have the high life expectancy and low 
fertility of countries in the final stages of 
demographic transition, and early- and late-
dividend countries lie somewhere in between 
(figure 5.1). The second indicator considered 
in the demographic typology developed in 
this report, working-age population share, 
is an outcome of demographic transition and 
the conceptual basis of the demographic div-
idend model.
More than half of the global population 
lives in pre- and early-dividend countries, 
and more than a third lives in late-dividend 
countries (figure 5.2). Interestingly, most of 
Figure 5.2 income level is correlated with the stage of demographic transition
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015. LIC is low-income countries, LMC is lower-middle-income countries, UMC is upper-middle-
income countries, and HIC is high-income countries. These are based on the World Bank Group classifications (see appendix C.5).
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Figure 5.1 The different demographic country 
types correspond to countries in different stages 
of demographic transition
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015.
Note: The total fertility rate is the average number of births a woman in a 
given country has, assuming she lives to the end of her reproductive life. 
Details on the typology can be found in appendix C.3.
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the early-dividend population lives in lower-
middle-income countries, which includes 
Bangladesh and India. Similarly, most of 
the late-dividend population lives in upper- 
middle-income countries, which include 
China. Pre-dividend countries, which 
account for less than 11 percent of the global 
population, are mostly low-income countries 
and are mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Post-
dividend countries, accounting for another 
11 percent of the global population, are pre-
dominantly high-income countries, mostly in 
North America and Europe. 
Pre-dividend countries will account 
for most of the global population growth 
through 2050. The fertility rates of pre- 
dividend countries will remain above replace-
ment for several decades, leading to rapid 
population growth and slower changes in age 
structure. By definition, the total fertility rate 
of pre-dividend countries is currently above 
four. The rate is falling only slowly in the 
countries in this group, and their younger age 
cohorts will continue to swell in the coming 
decades. As a result, the population of this 
group of countries will grow by 49 percent 
(or 413 million people) by 2030 and by 132 
percent (or 1.1 billion people) by 2050. Chil-
dren as a share of the population will remain 
above 40 percent until 2030 and above 34 
percent until 2050. 
Challenging starting points
Cross-country differences in development 
are reflected by differences in demograph-
ics. As figure 5.2 suggests, poorer countries 
tend to be earlier in their demographic tran-
sition, while richer countries tend to be fur-
ther along. Pre- and early-dividend countries 
are earlier in their demographic transition 
and they tend to perform poorly in several 
development indicators, including the pov-
erty headcount rate. At the same time, late-
and post-dividend countries tend to be richer, 
have larger economies, and are currently 
major sources of global economic activity. 
This section describes development progress 
and then the distribution of economic activity 
across the different demographic-types.
poverty persists in pre- and  
early-dividend countries 
About 87 percent of the world’s poor live in 
pre- and early-dividend countries (figure 5.3). 
Pre-dividend countries, where 44 percent of 
the population lives below the poverty line on 
average, account for 37 percent of the global 
poor. Early-dividend countries have a much 
lower poverty rate of 16 percent but account 
for 50 percent of the global poor, largely 
because this group includes Bangladesh and 
India, which together are home to 33 percent 
of the world’s poor. The late-dividend group 
of countries has an average poverty head-
count of only 3 percent, but one member of 
this group, China, accounts for almost 10 
percent of global poverty. 
The pre- and early-dividend countries with 
the highest poverty rates also face extremely 
fast population growth, with populations 
expected to double in coming decades. The 
five countries expected to have the most rapid 
population growth between 2015 and 2050 
Figure 5.3 pre- and early-dividend countries 
account for most global poverty
Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Data are for 2012 and are based on a poverty line of $1.90 a day 
for all countries listed in appendix table C5.1 The average poverty 
headcount rate is the unweighted average across countries in a given 
group. The sample of countries depicted in the figure includes 31 
pre-dividend countries, 48 early-dividend countries, 34 late-dividend 
countries, and 4 post-dividend countries.
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are all pre-dividend countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Angola, Mali, Niger, Uganda, and 
Zambia. These countries are very poor, with 
2012 poverty rates that ranged from 29 to 
62 percent. Without improvements in their 
poverty headcount rates, these countries will 
experience even greater concentrations of 
poverty in the future.
Early- and late-dividend countries, where 
much of the global poverty reduction over 
the past two decades occurred, also experi-
enced a fertility transition over this period. 
Between 1990 and 2012, the global pov-
erty headcount rate fell from 37.1 percent to 
12.8 percent, representing a reduction in the 
number of global poor by more than 1.04 
billion. By virtue of their large populations 
and high poverty headcount rates, China and 
India accounted for much of the reduction 
in global poverty. These countries now not 
only have lower poverty headcounts but also 
lower population growth rates, having low-
ered their fertility rates over time. Bangladesh 
and Indonesia, which together accounted for 
another 10 percent of global poverty in 2012, 
have also experienced slowing population 
growth rates. Poverty reduction successes in 
these countries would thus have a diminish-
ing impact on global poverty reduction.
Ninety percent of countries that met the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) tar-
get of halving poverty rates were early- and 
late-dividend countries.3 As of 2012, 40 
percent of early-dividend and 68 percent of 
late-dividend countries were able to halve 
their poverty headcount rates from their 
1990 levels. In contrast, only 2 percent of 
pre-dividend countries were able to achieve 
similar reductions in their poverty rates. 
Given that pre-dividend countries also typi-
cally have faster population growth rates 
than countries at more advanced stages of 
demographic transition, a reduction in the 
poverty headcount rate may not necessarily 
imply a reduction in the absolute number of 
poor people (Herrmann 2015). For example, 
Mali reduced its poverty headcount rate by a 
third between 1990 and 2012, but because 
of its high population growth, the number of 
poor still rose by 13 percent. The countries 
that have had the most success in reducing 
poverty are those where the working-age 
share of the population has peaked or is close 
to peaking and where population growth has 
decelerated in parallel to improvements in life 
expectancy, infant mortality, and fertility.
Progress on other development goals also 
varies across countries at different stages of 
demographic transition. On MDG 4, only 
17 and 25 percent of pre- and early-dividend 
countries were able to reduce under-five child 
mortality rates by three-fourths from 1990 to 
2013. Late-dividend countries were slightly 
more successful in this regard. On MDG 5, 
only 10 percent of the countries succeeded 
in reducing the maternal mortality rate by 
three-fourths between 1990 and 2013. Prog-
ress has been made toward MDG 6 on com-
bating HIV/AIDS, especially with the wider 
access to retrovirals in the new millennium. 
As more and more people live in urban 
areas, progress in reducing the shares of 
urban populations living in slums has been 
modest (box 5.2). Overall, the shares of 
populations in pre-, late-, and post-dividend 
countries living in urban areas stayed rela-
tively stable between 1990 and 2013 (figure 
5.4). However, early-dividend countries have 
seen rapid urbanization over this period, 
a shift that is driving global urbanization 
trends. Rising urbanization has been paral-
leled by an increase in the number of those 
living in slums (figure 5.5). Large cities in 
developing countries, such as Baghdad, Cara-
cas, Johannesburg, Karachi, Lagos, Lima, 
Mumbai, Nairobi, and Rio de Janeiro, have 
large slums, some of them with estimated 
populations of more than 500,000. Lack 
of access to public services in these slums 
has the potential to lead new generations 
of urban slum residents into poverty traps 
(Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2013).
Low educational attainment in pre- 
dividend countries has implications for the 
future global labor supply. In pre-dividend 
countries, just 35 percent of those enrolled 
completed lower-secondary education, com-
pared with 72 percent in early-dividend coun-
tries and 90 percent in late-dividend coun-
tries.4 These pre-development countries will 
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Box 5.2 rapid urbanization connected to demographic change presents a development 
challenge 
Internal migration and the rise of large urban 
agglomerations in developing countries are essential 
parts of the story of demographic change. Higher 
population growth in rural areas tends to translate 
into rural-urban migration. Studies suggest that 
about half of the urbanization growth in the world 
results from the internal rural-to-urban migration 
and area reclassifications (UN 2008). People moving 
to cities are attracted by the various job opportuni-
ties, higher (real) wages, the many local amenities 
such as cultural and recreational offerings, and the 
availability of public utilities and transportation 
facilities. The existence of very large cities around 
the world suggest that these attractions more than 
compensate for the congestion that arises in densely 
populated areas (Krugman 1991). Urbanization is 
rising fast in developing countries, where 7 of the 
10 largest urban areas in the world are currently 
located, including Cairo, Jakarta, Karachi, and 
Mexico City (UN-Habitat 2003).
In many developing countries, big cities are char-
acterized by the presence of very large slums (figure 
B5.2.1). About a third of the urban population in 
developing countries lives in slums. These slums can 
be transitory if they are the by-product of rapidly 
growing economies, but many of them are located 
in countries with slow or stagnant growth. Overall 
living conditions can be worse than in rural areas 
(Bradley et al. 1992; Duflo, Galiani, and Mobarek 
2012).
By 2030, around 2 billion people will be living in 
slums—twice as many as today and a direct conse-
quence of unprecedented urban growth. About 90 
percent of the urban growth in the next 15 years will 
be concentrated in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Already home to most of the world’s slum population, 
these two regions are expected to see a significant 
increase in those numbers. 
The presence and persistence of these slums pose 
many challenges to the process of urbanization and 
development in general (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 
2013). Improving the quality of life of the people liv-
ing in slums requires policies that cover many dimen-
sions, from access to potable water and sanitation to 
continuous access to electricity, transport infrastruc-
tures, and job opportunities (Banerjee, Pande, and 
Walton 2012). An additional challenge is to prevent 
these slums from expanding. Policies to remove or 
relocate slums or to upgrade the services available 
have shown limited success in reducing their size or 
limiting their sprawl. Improving local governance, 
engaging in land reform, and launching major public 
investments in urban areas may be the most promis-
ing policies for limiting the sprawl of slums.
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN-Habitat Urban Data.
Figure B5.2.1 Substantial shares of urban populations in major developing countries still live in slums
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account for most of the global growth in the 
working-age population over the next few 
decades; if their education attainment rates do 
not improve, the global average skill level of 
the working-age population will be in doubt.5
Pre- and early-dividend countries pres-
ent a high demand for services for children, 
including education. Education is a critical 
component of early childhood development, 
with long-term implications not only for 
human capital accumulation and future 
income, but also for socialization and health 
(Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013).6 How-
ever, low- and middle-income countries gener-
ally have lower public spending per capita on 
education, while having substantially greater 
child-dependency ratios than high-income 
countries (figure 5.6). These countries thus face 
the challenge both of increasing the quality of 
their education through improvements in per 
capita spending and expanding their spending 
to accommodate a larger child population in 
the near future. In pre-dividend countries, in 
particular, children as a share of the popula-
tion are projected to stay almost the same (or 
rise in some cases) for several decades.
economic dynamism is weakening in 
late- and post-dividend countries
Late-dividend countries have experienced 
demographic change at a much faster pace 
than many post-dividend countries did. By the 
1940s, most post-dividend countries already 
had low fertility rates, which briefly rose in 
the post-war period but then fell and gener-
ally remained low. In the 1950s, late-dividend 
countries had almost double the fertility rates 
of post-dividend countries, and average life 
Figure 5.4 early-dividend countries are 
urbanizing rapidly
Source: World Bank calculations, based on World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators, Millennium Development Goals database, and UN 2015.
Note: Data reflect unweighted averages for the different country groups. 
Figure 5.6 education expenditure per capita is 
negatively correlated with child-dependency ratio
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015 and World 
Bank World Development Indicators.
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Figure 5.5 A large share of the population of 
early- and late-dividend countries still lives in 
slums
Source: World Bank calculations, based on World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators, Millennium Development Goals database, and UN 2015.
Note: Data reflect unweighted averages for the different country groups. 
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expectancies were shorter by nine years (fig-
ures 5.7, 5.8). However, late-dividend coun-
tries have since made substantial improve-
ments in these metrics, with extremely rapid 
improvements in life expectancy. Several 
factors fed into this faster pace of improve-
ment, all having to do with the importance 
of these countries in the global economy. As a 
result, late-dividend countries are expected to 
have the same age structure as post-dividend 
countries by 2050 (figure 5.9).
At the same time, late-dividend countries 
accounted for 36 percent of global GDP 
growth in 2000–14 (figure 5.10). Growth 
in many of these countries was rapid. Brazil 
and China alone, for example, contributed 
Figure 5.7 Fertility rates in late-dividend 
countries have converged to those of post-
dividend countries since the 1950s
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators, Millennium Development Goals database, and 
UN 2015.
Note: Data reflect unweighted averages for the different country groups. 
The total fertility rate is the average number of births per woman. 
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Figure 5.8 Differences in life expectancy across 
typologies of countries have narrowed 
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Figure 5.9 Late-dividend countries are aging rapidly
Source: World Bank calculations, based on UN 2015 and World Bank World Development Indicators.
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a quarter of global growth over the period. 
Brazil and China grew at average annual real 
GDP growth rates of 3.5 and 10 percent, 
respectively, over this period. However, in 
late-dividend countries, both the number of 
working-age people and their share of the 
population will contract over the next few 
decades, suggesting demographic change is 
likely to dampen their contribution to future 
global growth.
Post-dividend countries’ contributions 
to global growth have been slowing down, 
with potential spillovers for other countries 
(chapter 3 of this report; IMF 2015). These 
countries account for 59.8 percent of global 
economic activity in 2014, and 42 percent 
of global GDP growth. Post-dividend econo-
mies are also the major export destinations 
for pre- and early-dividend countries and 
account for two-thirds of global import 
demand. While other post-dividend and late-
dividend countries meet most of this demand, 
the post-dividend countries are the preemi-
nent markets for exports from pre- and early-
dividend countries, mainly textiles, clothing, 
and other light manufactures, as well as com-
modities. If growth in post-dividend coun-
tries slows, early- and pre-dividend countries 
will need to find alternative export markets. 
In addition, as post-dividend economies age, 
their national savings rates are expected to 
fall, leading to a possible slowdown in capital 
flows to the rest of the world.7
In some late- and post-dividend countries, 
pension systems are increasingly stressed as 
the number of beneficiaries rises relative to the 
numbers the systems were designed to support 
(Bogetic et al. 2015). Late- and post-dividend 
countries will have a combination of shrink-
ing shares of working-age population com-
bined with an increase in the share of aged 
people, potential candidates for public pen-
sion (Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005). As popu-
lations age, pension systems need to adapt 
to demographic and occupational changes to 
avoid generosities and incentives that encour-
age early retirement and thus long retirement 
periods (World Bank 2015b). In 2012, one-
fourth of the European Union’s (EU’s) popu-
lation—130 million people—received at least 
one pension. The EU spent about €1.71 billion 
on pensions in 2012, which represents about 
13.3 percent of its GDP. 
Some high-income countries are expe-
riencing a rapid rise in health care costs as 
their populations age (figure 5.11). Health 
care spending generally increases with age, 
with a notable jump in spending between 
the ages of 55 and 60, reflecting changes in 
morbidity (EC 2015). In Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, health care spending on 
those 65 and older is expected to jump from 
40 percent in 2010 to 60 percent by 2060 (de 
la Maisonneuve and Martins 2013). In the 
United States, health spending is expected 
to rise faster than GDP and account for 19.6 
percent of GDP by 2024, up from 17.4 per-
cent in 2013 (CMS 2015a). The cost of Medi-
care (the public health insurance for people 
65 or older) is expected to increase substan-
tially, moving from $256.5 billion in 2002 
to $489.4 billion in 2010 (CMS 2015b). The 
aging of baby boomers in the coming years 
will lead to an unprecedented increase in the 
size and composition of the elderly popula-
tion in the program (Lassman et al. 2014). 
pathways to future prosperity
Demographic change can affect future pros-
perity in three ways. The first way is through 
changes in the working-age share of the 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from UN 2015 and World 
Bank World Development Indicators.
Figure 5.11 Health expenditure per capita is 
positively correlated with aged dependency ratio
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population that affect income growth and 
savings. The second way is through changes 
in the age structure of households that 
directly affect poverty, human capital invest-
ments, and decisions about how dependents 
will be supported. In poor households with 
high fertility, these changes in age structure 
typically involve behavioral changes that lead 
to lower fertility. The third way is through the 
changes in the means by which aging popu-
lations support themselves around the world. 
This section addresses each of these pathways 
to future prosperity in further detail.
rising working-age shares can raise 
growth
An increase of 1 percentage point in the 
working-age population share is estimated to 
boost GDP per capita by 1.1 to 2.0 percent-
age points, on average (see appendix C.4 for 
details). More generally, growth in the work-
ing-age share is associated with higher per 
capita income growth (see also figure 5.12).8 
The causality underpinning this association is 
complex and occurs through multiple path-
ways, including through an increase in the 
supply of workers relative to the total popu-
lation; a rise in the capacity to save, which 
leads to a higher capital per worker ratio; 
and more investment in human capital (table 
5.1).9 While these channels can work simulta-
neously, the differentiation between the first 
and second dividends is informed not only by 
the transmission mechanisms but also by the 
time horizon through which they are at work. 
The contribution of the second demo-
graphic dividend to growth is potentially 
greater than the first (Mason 2005). For 
example, for East Asia, during the 1970–
2000 period, the contribution from the sec-
ond demographic dividend on GDP growth 
was 2.22 times larger than the first demo-
graphic dividend. For some countries, esti-
mates suggest that the contribution of the 
first demographic dividend explains between 
9.2 and 15.5 percent of their per capita eco-
nomic growth over the 1960–2000 period 
(Mason and Kinugasa 2008). 
An increase of 1 percentage point in the 
share of working-age population is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.6 to 0.8 percent-
age point in savings (appendix C.4). National 
private-savings rates have been found to 
depend on the age composition of the popu-
lation: individuals are typically net savers 
when they are working age and continue to 
save in old age, on average, but they tend to 
be predominantly consumers when they are 
children. This outcome is associated with the 
second demographic dividend, where declin-
ing dependency ratios, led by a lower share 
of children in the population, tend to boost 
domestic savings and investment.10
Increases in aged dependency ratios do 
not necessarily lead to lower savings. Since 
people expect to live longer, they tend to save 
more during the economically active portion 
of their lives (Kinugasa and Mason 2007). 
Retirement lengthens with gains in life 
expectancy, increasing demand for pension 
wealth. In countries where funded pensions 
are important, pension assets have increased 
very substantially (Towers Watson 2012; 
Saez and Zucman 2014). This positive effect 
on savings associated with aging could lead 
to capital deepening, although the net effect 
of aging on savings is unclear.11
Changes in age structure can lead to higher 
investment in human capital, a key condition 
for realizing the second demographic divi-
dend. The quantity-quality trade-off is one of 
Figure 5.12 A rising working-age population 
share is positively correlated with gDp per capita 
growth
Source: World Bank calculations, based on World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators and UN 2015.
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the most widely confirmed linkages between 
population and economic decision mak-
ing (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973). 
People who have fewer children spend more 
per child. The quantity-quality trade-off is 
particularly strong when it comes to human-
capital spending. Moreover, the quantity-
quality trade-off was found to be as strong for 
public spending as for private spending. The 
increased spending on education can take the 
form of both improving coverage of children, 
as well as increasing spending per child. 
The correlates between demography and 
development are strong, but favorable demo-
graphic change does not guarantee improve-
ment in development conditions. A rising 
working-age population share, for instance, 
has the potential to improve the welfare of 
the poorest members of society (box 5.3). 
Early- and pre-dividend countries, where 
TABLe 5.1 Demographic dividends in a nutshell
  Channel Transmission mechanisms
Demographic 
dividend
Stage of 
demographic transition
Labor force Increase in the support ratio (ratio of effective 
labor to effective consumers) holding constant 
other factors, including saving and income per 
effective worker.
First Early stage 
(pre- and early-dividend 
countries)
Savings Changes in saving and capital per effective 
worker influence income, from labor and assets, 
per effective worker.
Second Late stage 
(late- and post-dividend 
countries)
Human capital Lower fertility and the quantity-quality  
trade-off lead to greater spending on health  
and education for children.
Second Late stage 
(late- and post-dividend 
countries)
Source: GMR team elaboration, based on Lee and Mason 2006.
Note: For both the first and second demographic dividends, changes in the factor given in the first column of the table, through the transmission  
mechanism described in the second column, results in a boost to growth.
Box 5.3 Making the most out of demographic change
An increase in the share of the working-age popu-
lation has the potential to boost economic growth 
through a range of channels and to help a country reap 
demographic dividends. First, a rising working-age 
population has the potential to increase the number of 
people employed as a share of the population. Second, 
it has the potential to increase national savings and 
hence the investment rate, since income-earners would 
become a greater share of the population. Third, it can 
lead to faster productivity growth since households 
might have more resources to invest in fewer children, 
and it might be easier for mothers with lighter child-
rearing responsibilities to enter the labor market. 
However, certain enabling conditions are neces-
sary for an increase in the share of the working-age 
population to boost economic growth (Barro 2003; 
Kremer 1993; Lucas 1988). These conditions include 
measures that help new labor market entrants find 
productive employment and that facilitate invest-
ments in human and physical capital. Under a base-
line scenario that considers the impact of projected 
demographic change on the working-age population 
and on savings and investment, simulation results 
suggest an average annual GDP per capita growth 
rate for the global economy of 2.1 percentage points 
over 2015–30 (figure B5.3.1). 
Demographic change can boost per capita income 
growth in pre- and early-dividend countries, but it 
may dampen growth prospects in aging countries and 
for the global economy. In pre- and early-dividend 
countries, where the share of working-age population 
will increase, demographic change could account for 
0.5 to 0.8 percentage point of annual GDP per capita 
growth, over 2015–30 given the right enabling condi-
tions. At the same time, even though per capita growth 
is expected to be high in late-dividend  countries, 
(box continues next page)
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Box 5.3 Making the most out of demographic change (continued)
including China, demographic change in the absence of 
countervailing policies could reduce annual growth by 
0.2 to 0.4 percentage point in late- and post-dividend 
countries, where working-age population shares are 
expected to decline.a Aging in post-dividend countries 
is expected to slow both their own growth and global 
growth, because post-dividend countries account for 
such a high share of global economic activity.
Global poverty could thus drop from 11.4 per-
cent in 2015 to 4.4 percent in 2030 if potential ben-
efits from demographic change are realized (figure 
B5.3.2). This reduction is equivalent to a drop in the 
number of poor from 729.2 million in 2015 to 325.9 
million by 2030. Even without these benefits, poverty 
would likely drop in pre- and early-dividend countries 
where the child share of the population is expected to 
decline and the share of income earners to rise. These 
age shifts can reduce poverty regardless of changes 
in average income. The demographic dividend has 
the potential to help to lift an additional 38.7 million 
people in pre-dividend countries and 24.4 million peo-
ple in early-dividend countries out of poverty by 2030. 
Added together, the extreme poverty headcount would 
be 16.2 percent lower in 2030 than it would have been 
without changes in age structure and the benefits of 
enabling conditions (figure B5.3.3). 
Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: See appendixes D.1 and D.2 for details. Poverty estimations are based on the $1.25 poverty line and the 2005 PPP prices. The differences in poverty headcount 
in 2030 due to age-structure changes and the contribution of enabling condition are estimated by comparing the baseline scenario with counterfactuals changing 
the structure of the population (2015 versus 2030) and the number of jobs. Age-structure effect measures the difference in the poverty rate by assuming the same 
population structure as in 2015. Contribution of enabling conditions is the impact of job growth keeping pace with growth in the share of working-age population 
and aggregate savings being converted to investment. 
a. This result is broadly in line with those of other studies. Manyika et al. (2015) consider the impact of demographic change on growth for a longer time horizon and 
estimate that the declining working-age population share could reduce the global average income per capita by 20 percent over 2015–65. Simulation analysis by 
Batini, Callen, and McKibbin (2006) finds that the demographic transition can help raise developing countries’ GDP 2 percent higher by 2025 than if demographic 
transition does not occur. This compares with our estimates of 1.1 percent increase in developing-country GDP from demographic transition over 2015–30. McKibbin 
(2006) conducts a similar analysis for several economies and finds that demographic change can lead to lower GDP for many high-income countries. For example, 
Japan’s GDP in 2050 is projected to be 28 percent smaller than it was in 1985. Our estimate for Japan is a decline of 6 percent over 2015–30. Tyers and Shi (2007) find 
that demographic transition could increase GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa by 15 percent over 1995–2030. This is in line with our estimates of 8 percent over 2015–30. 
Figure B5.3.1 Demographic change could account 
for substantial growth in pre- and early-dividend 
countries if enabling conditions help create jobs and 
convert savings to investment
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Figure B5.3.2 global poverty rate could fall 
substantially but not enough to reach the 3 percent 
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Figure B5.3.3 global poverty headcount could be 
16.2 percent lower due to demographic change
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fertility rates are still falling to replace-
ment levels and where working-age popula-
tion shares are still rising, are in precisely 
this position. They will experience the first 
demographic dividend, however, only if they 
are able to successfully absorb new entrants 
to the labor force—that is, if growth in the 
number of jobs is at least as high as growth in 
labor supply, and if people with the necessary 
skills for available jobs are able to find those 
jobs. Similarly, the second demographic divi-
dend can be obtained by post-dividend coun-
tries only if they are able to mobilize savings 
that their current cohorts of elderly had saved 
and invested when they were younger. 
Changing demographics can step up 
development
As fertility rates fall, the demographic struc-
tures of households change and directly affect 
poverty and shared prosperity, particularly 
in poor households. Because of the associa-
tion between fertility and education, income, 
and life expectancy, households in the top 60 
percent (T60) of the income distribution tend 
to have lower child-dependency ratios and 
to pass through the demographic transition 
before households in the bottom 40 percent 
(B40) in almost all countries (figure 5.13). 
A reduction of 1 percentage point in the 
child dependency ratio is associated with a 
reduction of 0.38 percentage point in the 
poverty rate (figure 5.14).12 An increase in 
the share of working-age population can also 
lead to a decline in the poverty rate. If fertility 
declines are concentrated among the B40, the 
economic benefits of lower dependency rates 
and more income earners as a share of the 
population will accrue to the poorest. As the 
household’s child-dependency ratio falls and 
the share of working-age people increases, 
per capita income is likely to increase, which 
relaxes the social and household budget con-
straints. Families who have fewer children will 
have more per capita resources at their dis-
posal for consumption, as well as investment. 
The realization of the first demographic 
dividend, led by a reduction in the child-
dependency ratio, could facilitate the eradi-
cation of global poverty. In 1990, East Asia 
had a higher average poverty headcount than 
South Asia (figure 5.15). As it reduced its 
child-dependency ratio, it was able to reduce 
its poverty more than the other regions. Evi-
dence from Bangladesh suggests that demo-
graphic factors, including age structure, 
gender, and regional distributions of popu-
lations, accounted for a quarter of the rapid 
reductions in poverty that occurred between 
2000 and 2010 (World Bank 2013b). Ban-
gladesh halved its fertility rate between 1971 
and 2004, going from more than six chil-
dren per woman to about three, and is on 
track to reach replacement rates in the com-
ing decades. Bangladesh has also managed 
to reverse the infamous gender inequality 
in infant mortality that characterizes most 
South Asian countries.
Aging populations are changing what it 
means to be dependent
While children’s consumption relies most on 
transfers from within the household, elderly 
people’s consumption is supported by trans-
fers from a range of sources, including their 
own income (box 5.4). Aged individuals can 
support their consumption by dissaving or 
extending their working life. The capacity 
to generate savings is associated with their 
productivity during their working life. Indi-
viduals with low human capital who have (or 
had) low-paid jobs, or who experienced long 
periods of unemployment during their work-
ing life, would have challenges in supporting 
their own consumption in later years. The 
greater the investment in human capital, and 
the earlier that investment begins, the higher 
return to society throughout a worker’s pro-
ductive life (Heckman 2008). 
It is not unusual for labor income to sup-
port half or more of a person’s consumption 
at age 65 (figure 5.16).13 That is not the case 
in high-income economies such as Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, Slovenia, and Taiwan, 
China. But low reliance on labor income does 
not necessarily mean that those over 65 have 
left the labor market. In Japan, for example, 
labor force participation among the 65-year-
old population is quite high, although labor 
income per worker is low. By age 75 labor 
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Figure 5.13 T60 households tend to have lower child-dependency ratios than B40 households in 
countries in all income categories
Source: World Bank calculations, based on data from household surveys, circa 2012, but including the latest available data from 2004–13.
Note: The sample covers 34 high-income; 24 upper-middle-income; 32 lower-middle-income; and 22 low-income countries. 
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income as a share of consumption drops sub-
stantially across countries for which data are 
available. Labor income at age 75 is close to 
or greater than 20 percent of consumption 
in only a few early- and late-dividend coun-
tries, including China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, and the Philippines. Increases in life 
expectancy in these countries would require 
increased reliance on either labor income 
(retiring at a later age) or asset-based flows 
(saving more while working or reducing 
bequests) if current levels of labor income 
and asset-based flows are to be maintained. 
The importance of net public transfers 
varies greatly across countries, with the high-
est levels found in Europe and Latin America 
and in China, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea in Asia.14 At age 65 private transfers 
are important in many economies, but the 
elderly are providing support rather than 
receiving it. At age 65 net public transfers 
are equivalent to less than 15 percent of con-
sumption in China; Mexico; Taiwan, China; 
and the United States. For several develop-
ing countries—India, Indonesia, the Phil-
ippines, South Africa, and Thailand—the 
elderly pay more in taxes than they receive in 
benefits.15 By age 75, net public transfers are 
more important in almost every country. The 
regional patterns persist, however, with the 
largest net public transfers found in Europe 
and Latin America. In several countries, 
including South Africa and early-dividend 
Asian countries, the elderly receive very little 
in the way of public support even at age 75. 
In most late- and post-dividend countries, 
the elderly rely heavily on assets to support 
their consumption. Asset-based realloca-
tions tend to be more important in the early- 
dividend countries where on average they 
support almost 60 percent of consumption. 
In late-dividend countries, asset-based flows 
amount, on average, to 40 percent of con-
sumption by the elderly, and in post-dividend 
countries to approximately 25 percent. At 
age 75, asset-based inflows are nearly as high 
in early-dividend countries as they are at 
age 65. In late- and post-dividend countries, 
these flows are equal to about 30 percent of 
consumption. 
Because the elderly support their consump-
tion through multiple sources and at different 
shares of those sources, the growing cohort 
of elderly will have diverse fiscal impacts 
Figure 5.15 Lower child-dependency ratios are associated with 
lower poverty rates
Source: World Bank calculations.
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Figure 5.14 Demographic change can have 
substantial impacts on poverty
Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: Data are from UN (2015), Penn World Tables, and WDI. Results are 
based on the first-difference estimator over the 1980-2012 period (5-year 
average), covering 103 countries. Specification 1 has changes in the 
poverty headcount rate as a function of changes in the child-dependency 
ratio (CDR), controlling for regional and time-fixed effects. Specification 2 
also controls for changes in the GDP per capita, latitude, and institutions 
(e.g., former colonies). The same exercise is repeated with the working-
age share of population (WAsP), instead of the child-dependency ratio. All 
estimates are significant at the 5 percent level. The bars show the change 
in the poverty headcount rate associated with a 1 percentage point 
reduction on CDR or WAsP.
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from country to country. In countries with 
generous public pension systems, such as 
Finland, Germany, and Sweden, net public 
transfers are sufficient to fund all or nearly all 
consumption by the elderly, while in Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
the elderly rely more on private assets to fund 
their old-age needs. In Asian countries like 
Box 5.4 Funding the difference between consumption and production over the life cycle 
The life-cycle deficit, the gap between what is con-
sumed and what is produced, must be funded. For 
children, the support system is dominated by public 
and private transfers. Public transfers to children rise 
with the level of a country’s income (figure B5.4.1 
compares public transfers in Germany and the Philip-
pines). The identification of the sources of transfer to 
support the consumption of the dependent population 
across the life cycle is a key information to analyze 
the potential effect of demographic change on public 
finance (Lee et al. 2014).
Support systems are generally more complex for 
the elderly than for children. The elderly rely on assets 
in addition to public and private transfers to fund 
their life-cycle deficits. The elderly may own their 
own home, a farm, or business, or participate in a 
funded pension system. 
Old-age support systems are highly varied around 
the world. Among high-income countries, net  private 
transfers to the elderly are very small and often nega-
tive—the elderly as a group provide more to their 
descendants than they receive. The key trade-off for 
the elderly is between relying on net public transfers 
and relying on assets. In some European countries, 
such as Finland, Germany, and Sweden, net public 
transfers are sufficient to fund all or nearly all of their 
old-age life-cycle deficits. The elderly in other rich 
countries, such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States rely much less on public transfers and 
much more on assets to fund their old-age needs. 
Variation is also great among low- and middle-
income countries. The elderly in developing countries 
in Asia, such as India, the Republic of Korea, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand, are more likely to depend on 
private transfers and on assets than on public trans-
fers. The elderly in many Latin American countries 
rely much more heavily on public transfers and less on 
private transfers and assets.
Figure B5.4.1 Public transfers to dependents are greater in germany than in the Philippines
Source: National Transfer Accounts.
Note: Philippines, 1999; Germany: 2003. Positive transfers suggest that a person of a given age is a net recipient of transfers. Positive life-cycle deficit suggests that 
consumption at a given age is supported mostly by transfers and asset income. Values all expressed relative to the average labor income of persons ages 30–49. 
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China, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, 
private transfers are the major source of fund-
ing for old-age support.16 In these latter two 
groups of countries where old-age support 
is financed privately, the growing shares of 
elderly place a smaller burden on fiscal bal-
ances than they do in other countries with 
more mature public-pension systems.
Conclusion
Demographic change presents both oppor-
tunities and challenges to development. 
Although demography is by no means the only 
force that shapes the economy, it has direct 
effects on the availability of key resources for 
development and, at the same time, impacts 
the demand for public services. Slow prog-
ress in human development in pre-dividend 
countries has contributed to persistently high 
fertility rates, which in turn limit these coun-
tries to increase investment in human capital. 
Pre- and early-dividend countries also face 
the challenge of creating enough jobs for the 
growing working-age population share and 
in investing sufficiently in raising their skill 
levels. Late- and post-dividend countries face 
possible growth slowdowns as a growing 
share of the working-age progresses to retire-
ment, requiring an increasingly large share of 
capital simply to maintain or improve their 
welfare. 
Demographic transition in large econo-
mies can have substantial spillovers to the 
Figure 5.16 Labor income still supports substantial consumption for 65-year olds, while 75-year-olds 
rely mostly on public transfers or asset-based flows
Source: World Bank calculations, based on the National Transfer Accounts database.
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global economy. There is evidence that aging 
in late- and post-dividend countries could 
slow potential future growth, leading to neg-
ative global spillovers through channels such 
as the demand for imports and foreign direct 
investment (see chapter 3). At the same time, 
the realization of demographic dividends in 
large economies can have positive spillovers 
to other economies. For example, China’s 
rapid GDP growth has been supported not 
just by a larger share of working-age popula-
tion but also by deeper integration into the 
global economy through trade links. 
The realization of demographic dividends 
stands to have global environmental exter-
nalities, another critical spillover (box 5.5). 
An increase in the consumption per capita 
associated with the realization of demo-
graphic dividends will lead to an increase of 
carbon dioxide emissions, keeping constant 
Box 5.5 Current demographic trends could lead to greater greenhouse gas emissions in 
some countries
Population growth is a central factor that affects 
greenhouse gas emissions and subsequently climate 
change. The relevance of population trends for envi-
ronmental policy has been increasingly acknowl-
edged, and empirical research on these interactions 
has grown in recent years (Harper 2013). Models 
used in climate-change studies are based on the prem-
ise that greenhouse gas emissions growth is the prod-
uct of population growth, economic growth, and the 
carbon intensity of energy consumption in the econ-
omy (Pachauri and Reisinger 2007).
Various statistical analyses confirm that popula-
tion growth has driven emissions growth over the 
past several decades (O’Neill et al. 2010). A 1 per-
centage point increase in population has been asso-
ciated with a similar increase in carbon emissions 
(O’Neill 2009). As a result, and based on UN projec-
tions, if the world’s population follows a low, rather 
than a medium, growth path, global emissions could 
be expected to fall by 15 percent in 2050 and by 40 
percent in 2100. On the other hand, a high popula-
tion growth path could increase emissions by 17 per-
cent in 2050 and by 60 percent in 2100 (O’Neill et al. 
2012). Other estimates show that slower population 
growth could account for as much as 16–29 percent 
of the reduction in emissions that would be necessary 
to avoid dangerous climate change by 2050 (O’Neill 
et al. 2010).
Demographic characteristics beyond population 
size will also play a more relevant role for future car-
bon emissions in the future. These include the age, 
education, and sex distribution of the population; the 
place of residence; and household size (O’Neill et al. 
2010; Lutz and Striessing 2015). It has been found, 
for instance, that shifts in the age and cohort compo-
sition of the population drove some of the observed 
increase in carbon emissions in high-income coun-
tries in the past (Menz and Welsch 2012). China, 
India, and other developing countries are expected 
to experience the most pronounced shift toward 
urbanization, while countries in the European Union 
and Latin America will undergo significant changes 
in the age composition of households (O’Neill et al. 
2010).
In the future, population trends will largely shape 
each country’s contribution to global greenhouse gas 
emissions. As an example, and based on the expected 
demographic trends highlighted above, projections 
show that aging could reduce emissions in the long 
term by up to 20 percent, particularly in industrial-
ized country regions. At the same time, urbanization 
could increase projected emissions by more than 25 
percent, particularly in developing countries (O’Neill 
et al. 2010). However, urbanization is also associ-
ated with higher income growth, which in turn may 
lead to a reduction in emissions. Thus a better under-
standing of possible changes in consumption prefer-
ences associated with income growth and the urban-
ization process, as two potentially offsetting forces, 
will be required to adequately assess future global 
and country patterns in greenhouse gas emissions 
(O’Neill et al. 2012).
The emission intensity of growth varies across 
countries and explains differential contributions to 
global environmental changes moving forward (map 
B5.5.1). Countries with low population growth can 
(box continues next page)
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technology and consumers’ behavior. The 
growth in per capita consumption in large, 
fast-growing, emerging-market economies 
has increased the global demand for goods 
and services, with subsequent implications 
for environmentally sustainable growth. 
If per capita consumption of renewable 
and nonrenewable resources (such as fossil 
fuels, water, forest resources) in developing 
countries follows the same profile as that in 
developed countries, then there may be chal-
lenges to the sustainability of global growth.
Countries can take advantage of not just 
their own demographic contexts but also 
demographic disparities across countries. The 
opportunities to be realized depend on the 
demographic stage of the country, however. 
Whatever the stage of transition, policies will 
be needed to provide the necessary conditions 
for an effective and productive allocation of 
Indicators). However, in general, environmental deg-
radation is associated with the development stage of 
countries, following a U-shaped inverted curve. In 
largely agricultural economies and highly developed 
countries, environmental damage is minimal, while in 
industrializing countries pollutant emissions are high-
est (Aznar-Marquez and Ruiz-Tamarit 2005).
Box 5.5 Current demographic trends could lead to greater greenhouse gas emissions 
in some countries (continued)
still account for increasing shares of emissions if their 
economic growth model is highly dependent on fos-
sil fuels–based energy consumption. For instance, 
annual emissions per capita were much higher in the 
United States (17.6 tons in 2010–14) than in China 
(slightly above 6 tons), and above the world average 
of 4.5 tons per person annually (World Development 
MAp B5.5.1 High-income countries with slower population growth have higher greenhouse gas emissions 
intensities
World CO2 emissions per capita, metric tons per capita
Source: World Development Indicators.
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these resources. Chapter 6 focuses on policy 
recommendations that will be useful in this 
regard.
Notes
 1.  Assuming a constant output per worker, if 
the effective number of producers (work-
ers) grows at the same rate as the number of 
effective consumers (total population), there 
would be no change in welfare in per capita 
terms. For example, pre-dividend countries 
with very high fertility rates might have a 
positive growth in their GDP that does not 
lead to improvements in their welfare per 
capita, because the dependent population 
could be growing faster than the working-age 
population. 
 2.  Appendix C3 discusses the specifics of how 
the typology is constructed.
 3.  Based on the $1.90 a day poverty line data 
from Povcalnet. The sample of countries 
included 31 pre-dividend countries, 48 early-
dividend countries, 34 late-dividend coun-
tries, and 4 post-dividend countries.
 4.  Based on data for 191 countries from World 
Development Indicators; the data are for the 
latest year available between 2011 and 2012.
 5.  This projection is equivalent to the constant 
enrollment rate assumption in the most pes-
simistic education projection scenarios of 
KC et al. (2010).
 6.  Early childhood development consists of mea-
sures beyond education with clear implica-
tions for multidimensional poverty reduction 
(World Bank 2015a).
 7.  Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2002) and 
the World Bank (2013a) suggest that capital 
flows from fast-aging economies to younger 
economies could be substantial in the future. 
 8.  The extensive literature on this includes but 
is not restricted to Bloom and Williamson 
(1998), Bloom et al. (2009), Bloom and Can-
ning (2004), Higgins and Williamson (1997), 
Eastwood and Lipton (2011), Kelley and 
Schmidt (1995, 2005, 2007), and Rosenzweig 
(1990).
 9.  National private-savings rates have been 
found to depend on the age composition of 
the population: individuals are typically net 
savers when they are working age but tend to 
be predominantly consumers when they are 
young or old. Empirically, declining depen-
dency ratios tend to boost domestic savings 
and investment (Loayza, Schmitt-Hebel, and 
Servén 2000).
10.  An extensive literature on this includes Kelley 
and Schmidt (2005), Higgins (1998), Higgins 
and Williamson (1997), and Kinugasa and 
Mason (2007).
11.  Several studies suggest that declining depen-
dency ratios tend to boost domestic savings 
and investment (Loayza, Schmitt-Hebel, and 
Servén 2000), but others suggest that some of 
these findings are not plausible within the life-
cycle savings model on which this empirical 
analysis relies. Lee et al. (2003) and Kinugasa 
and Mason (2007) suggest that some impact 
of the dependency ratio on saving is most 
pronounced in countries experiencing rapid 
fertility decline, rapid economic growth, and 
shifts away from reliance on family transfers 
for old-age support.
12.  Due to the potential endogeneity issues 
described in appendix C.4, the economet-
ric results showing the association between 
demographic change and the poverty rate 
should be interpreted cautiously, as correla-
tions may not reflect causality.
13.  The analysis in this section is based on data 
from the National Transfer Accounts (NTAs).
14.  Net public transfers are defined in NTAs as 
public transfer inflows less public transfer 
outflows. Public transfer inflows are broadly 
defined to include cash and all in-kind trans-
fers, such as education, publicly funded health 
care, and other forms of public consump-
tion. Public transfer outflows are defined as 
the taxes imposed, including indirect taxes, 
to fund public transfer inflows. Inflows and 
outflows are assigned to age groups using 
administrative records, household surveys, and 
tax-incidence rules that are described in more 
detail in Lee and Mason (2011) and UN (2013)
15.  Employment-based pensions paid to retirees, 
including payments to public sector retir-
ees, are not transfers. They are a form of 
deferred compensation. To the extent that 
the elderly are supported through transfers, 
it is in the form of health and other in-kind 
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transfers. Taxes assessed on pension income 
may be small in a country, but transfer out-
flows include taxes on profits, rent, inter-
est, and consumption including value added 
taxes.
16.  Based on these differences, World Bank 
(2015b and Bussolo, Koettle, and Sinnott 
(2015) argue that countries with less mature 
public-pension systems have an opportunity 
to reform these systems before the beneficia-
ries grow old.
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Policy Priorities in an 
Era of Demographic Change
dwindling. In these countries, policies will 
need to be adapted to these demographic 
changes if welfare is to be maintained or 
improved. It is worth noting that demo-
graphic change has significant implications 
for the political economy of policy making 
because changing age structures affect both 
political pressures and preferences (box 6.1). 
Country-level priorities will depend on the 
country’s stage of demographic transition. 
In terms of the country typology set out in 
chapter 5, policies in pre-dividend countries 
need to spark demographic transition by 
addressing human development challenges 
and speeding up the fertility declines neces-
sary to raise the working-age share of the 
population and boost economic growth. In 
early-dividend countries, the priority is to 
accelerate job creation by investing in human 
Demographic change can support develop-
ment if governments implement demography-
informed policies. As detailed in chapter 5, 
countries moving from high to low fertil-
ity can benefit from a growing working-
age population share. These countries have 
the potential to realize the first and second 
demographic dividends beneficial to poverty 
reduction and shared prosperity, as well as to 
overall growth and development. Half of the 
world’s population—and most of the world’s 
poor—lives in countries where the working-
age population share is rising. Whether a ris-
ing working-age share is beneficial depends 
on the extent to which governments ensure 
that policies and institutions take advantage 
of these trends. The other half of the world’s 
population lives in countries where the popu-
lation is aging, and the working-age share is 
Demographic change is a major factor shaping the trajectory of development for countries at 
all income levels. It offers opportunities where the share of working-age people in the popu-
lation is rising. It can pose challenges where fertility rates are persistently high or where the 
population is aging rapidly. Navigating these dynamics will require sound policies informed 
by a long-run perspective and tailored to a nation’s demographic context. Effective policies 
will leverage demographic transitions both within a country and across borders. Demography-
informed policies can cover a wide range of areas, including human, private sector, financial 
development, and governance. Such policies can play important parts in achieving the devel-
opment goals.
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Box 6.1 The impact of demographic change on political economy 
Demographic change may exert a powerful impact 
on political forces. The nascent fields of “political 
demography” and “political economy of demog-
raphy” seek to deepen the understanding of these 
impacts, and how policy choices, especially those that 
have distributional implications, will be affected by 
changes in demographic patterns (Null 2015). At the 
country level, three channels of impact are salient: the 
impact of a “youth bulge” on politics, the effect of an 
increase in the age of the median voter on demands 
for more open democratic representation, and the role 
of aging in shaping the prospects for pension reform. 
At the international level, cross-border spillovers 
from country-level effects of demographic change 
can be significant, and global economic and security 
arrangements may become less stable because of the 
aging and anticipated declines in the populations of 
countries that have played a pivotal role in uphold-
ing these frameworks in the past. Finally, the effect 
of demographic change on political preferences also 
plays a role in shaping the prospects for implement-
ing policies that will be central to making the most 
of opportunities while mitigating the risks associated 
with evolving demography. 
Impact on political economy at the  
country level
Ensuring that the youth bulge—relatively large 
cohorts of youth entering the labor force—is pro-
ductively employed is essential for political stability. 
While accelerating demographic transitions to low 
fertility and mortality give rise to potential demo-
graphic dividends, these can be realized only if the 
youth bulge can find gainful employment. If employ-
ment opportunities are limited because of labor 
market rigidities or other factors, the risk of discon-
tent grows. In countries within the “demographic 
arc of instability,” defined as having a population 
with a median age of less than 25, the chances of 
conflict are 2.5 times higher than for other countries 
(Cincotta 2010). Based on the projection of popula-
tion age structures to 2030, elevated risks of fragility 
and conflict become concentrated in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (where the median age remains low), poten-
tially jeopardizing decades of hard-won development 
gains.
Populations with higher median ages tend to press 
for more political openness. Political demography 
suggests that, when the median age of the popula-
tion reaches 25–35, the tolerance for authoritarian-
ism to ensure stability falls, and the demand for lib-
eral democracy and more openness grows (Cincotta 
2011). The focus shifts to improving the investment 
climate and increasing openness, enabling business, 
and boosting employment creation.
The evidence on the impact of aging on political 
pressures for generous pensions is mixed. Rapid aging 
of populations in many countries is heightening con-
cerns about the sustainability of pension and social 
protection systems, especially if a graying of the 
median voter bolsters political preferences for more 
pension spending at the expense of other priorities. 
The evidence for this is mixed. For example, older 
age cohorts in Europe tend to prefer more spending 
on pensions and less on education (Bussolo, Koettl, 
and Sinnott 2015). In the United States, this prefer-
ence for lower spending extends to lower spending on 
a per child basis (Cattaneo and Wolter 2007; Ober-
ndorfer and Steiner 2006; Poterba 1996). While the 
success of “gray interest” political parties across 
Europe has been mixed, older people are also more 
likely to vote and may increasingly frustrate pen-
sion reforms aimed at ensuring sustainability. Other 
evidence from OECD countries, however, suggests 
that an aging median voter does not lead to higher 
benefits per retiree, including health benefits (Hol-
landers and Koster 2012). Well-designed systems can 
also be implemented that cut across particular politi-
cal interest groups (Góra 2013). In developing East 
Asia and Pacific, aging does not pose insurmountable 
challenges for public spending, especially where it is 
addressed through proactive public policy and politi-
cal leadership (World Bank 2015b). 
Impact on political economy at the  
global level 
The contributions of demographic change to conflict, 
pressure for liberal democracy, or increased pension 
spending can lead to significant international spill-
overs. The potential for such spillovers is more pro-
nounced than ever before given increasing intercon-
nectedness and the accelerating pace of globalization 
(box continues next page)
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capital and ensuring an enabling environment 
for private sector development to help realize 
the first demographic dividend and lay the 
groundwork for the second dividend. In late-
dividend countries, in which fertility rates are 
low and the working-age share of the popula-
tion is high (but shrinking), the key challenge 
is to sustain productivity growth by mobiliz-
ing savings for productive investment while 
also preparing for aging. Finally, in post-divi-
dend countries, the policy priority is to adapt 
to aging through efforts to maintain welfare 
and accommodate changing demands for ser-
vices while encouraging a rise in fertility rates 
toward the replacement level. 
Countries face opportunities to arbitrage 
demographic differences across borders. 
Taking cross-country demographic differences 
into account adds to the benefits of liberaliz-
ing trade in goods, services, and capital, as 
well as ensuring that supplies of migrant labor 
can meet demands through transparent and 
legal channels. Realizing these benefits may 
require closer international economic coop-
eration, as well as appropriate domestic inter-
ventions on trade, migration, and capital flow 
issues. These measures will permit countries 
to take advantage of opportunities arising 
from the heterogeneous demographic trends 
across countries by ensuring that cross-border 
economic exchange reflects the comparative 
advantages that are shaped by demography. 
Building on the exposition of demographic 
trends and their channels of impact in 
Box 6.1 The impact of demographic change on political economy (continued)
in recent decades. For example, whether stemming 
from countries with low median ages in conflict, 
or countries with intermediate median ages in the 
throes of establishing more open political systems, 
the instability in the Middle East and North Africa 
has prompted a large influx of migrants and refugees 
to Western Europe. Similarly, increased demands for 
pension spending—in countries with aging popula-
tions that are typically higher income—affect the sav-
ings available for investment in emerging markets and 
sharpens the competition official development assis-
tance faces for public funds.
Demographic change may have implications for 
international trade and security arrangements. Popu-
lation aging may be weakening support for interna-
tional systems in many countries that traditionally 
played an important role in upholding these arrange-
ments. For example, the workforces of Germany, 
Japan, and the Russian Federation are shrinking 
and the demands for entitlement spending are ris-
ing, helping reduce their relative economic heft and 
shift national spending priorities. These trends will 
affect their capacity to bolster international political 
and economic systems (Goldstone, Kauffman, and 
Toft 2012). The shift in influence and responsibil-
ity toward developing countries for ensuring strong 
global economic and political relationships is already 
evident with the establishment of additional multilat-
eral development banks led by the largest emerging 
market economies. 
Implications for policy implementation 
The feasibility of implementing policies informed 
by demography is affected by demographic change, 
but as noted, the findings are mixed. With the aging 
of the median voter, there are concerns that imple-
menting key policies to reflect demographic change 
may become more difficult, “locking in” unsustain-
able pension systems, for example. However, in some 
cases the maturing median age voter appears to prefer 
the needed policies, such as investing in human capi-
tal, ensuring labor market flexibility, and promoting 
job creation in early-dividend countries. The role of 
demographic change is mixed even regarding politi-
cally charged issues like immigration. For example, 
there is strong evidence that today’s elderly hold less 
favorable views of immigration than the average sur-
vey respondent in much of Europe; however, there 
is no strong reason to think that today’s younger 
cohorts, will become less supportive of migration in 
the future when they become the elderly (Bussolo, 
Koettl, and Sinnott 2015). Hence, with leadership 
and a strong evidence base, sound policies that reflect 
demographic considerations may find the necessary 
political support to move forward.
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chapters 4 and 5, this chapter highlights key 
policy priorities tailored to demographic fea-
tures. The chapter first identifies policies to 
realize opportunities and mitigate risks from 
demographic change at the country level. It 
then discusses those interventions that can 
help make the most of the varieties of demo-
graphic change around the world.
Leveraging demographic change 
within countries
Analytical work and evidence from country 
experiences show that demographic change 
can inform the policies countries implement 
to boost growth and reduce poverty.1 A brief 
summary of policy priorities within countries 
is presented in table 6.1. These policies enable 
countries to absorb additional labor in the 
case of the first demographic dividend and 
to facilitate investment in human and physi-
cal capital in the case of the second dividend. 
For example, in the 1960s, policies in support 
of investment in human capital along with 
openness to trade and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) helped East Asia take advantage 
of its rapid demographic transition (Bloom 
and Williamson 1998). 
Sparking demographic transition in 
pre-dividend countries
Pre-dividend countries are characterized by 
deprivations in human development that have 
contributed to their slow demographic transi-
tion. Most pre-dividend countries are in Sub-
Saharan Africa (see appendix C.3 for a list of 
countries by typology). For these countries, 
TaBLe 6.1 Policy priorities for leveraging demographic change at the country level
  Country type Issues Recommendations
Pre-dividend Sparking demographic transition 
Improving human development outcomes to 
reduce fertility rates.
Improve maternal and child health by strengthening provision of basic 
health care services. 
Expand education without letting girls fall behind. 
Empower women, and give them access to comprehensive family 
planning services.
Early-dividend Accelerating job creation
Creating productive jobs for the growing share 
of the population in working age to reap the first 
demographic dividend. 
Invest in human capital, including vocational and technical training.
Enhance labor market mobility.
Reduce barriers to female labor force participation.
Strengthen conditions conducive to savings and job creation (public 
services underpinning private sector activity, contract enforcement, 
financial inclusion, protection of labor rights).
Late-dividend Sustaining productivity growth 
Creating conditions necessary to reap the 
second demographic dividend and beginning 
to prepare for aging.
Continue mobilization of savings for productive investment.
Ensure that public policies across the board encourage labor-force 
participation of both sexes.
Design cost-effective and sustainable systems for welfare and human 
development that address current needs (including health, child 
care, education, and support to vulnerable elderly) and that can be 
adapted to meet the needs that emerge as aging proceeds.
 Post-dividend Adapting to aging 
Maintaining and improving welfare in the 
context of a declining working-age share and 
growing old-age share.
Complete reforms of welfare systems—including pensions, health care, 
and long-term care—that ensure fiscal sustainability and, as part 
of integrated approaches, protection of the vulnerable, elderly and 
others, and encouragement of work among those who are able.
Raise labor force participation and productivity (including incentives 
for participation targeted at women and older cohorts; and lifelong 
learning for all).
Pursue policies that encourage a rebound of fertility, among other 
things by making it easier for men and women to combine child 
rearing and participation in the labor market.
Source: GMR team elaboration.
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current outcomes are discouraging accord-
ing to most development indicators, includ-
ing poverty, infant mortality, educational 
attainment, health, and labor productivity. 
Because of high youth-dependency ratios, 
high fertility rates, and other factors, their 
projected population growth is high (World 
Bank 2015a). 
 Policy action focused on human develop-
ment may help pre-dividend countries prog-
ress to the next stage in the demographic 
transition. Fertility (and child mortality) 
rates are influenced by policies that improve 
maternal and child health services, expand 
education coverage (particularly to girls), 
and empower women in the household and 
in the labor force (Bloom et al. 2009; Soares 
and Falcão 2008; World Bank 2015a). Given 
their potential to reduce total fertility rates 
and lower child mortality, these policy areas 
can be considered “interactive accelerators” 
of demographic transition, in addition to 
being important development goals in their 
own right. Concluding the unfinished Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) agenda 
related to these policies should be considered 
a priority for pre-dividend countries. Simula-
tions for Niger, a pre-dividend country, point 
to the costs of inaction that stalls fertility 
decline: if total fertility remains at the 2015 
rate of around 7 children per woman through 
2050 instead of gradually declining to 4.7, 
the extreme poverty rate in 2050 would be 
substantially higher, 20 percent instead of 
14 percent. (Additional analysis of Niger is 
found in the Country Spotlights at the end of 
this chapter.)
A first area of policy focus for pre- 
dividend countries is the improvement of 
health outcomes, particularly for women and 
children. The exact mechanisms by which 
maternal and child health can be improved 
depend on the country context. Broadly, 
they include measures to strengthen national 
health systems, including improvements in 
their human resource and infrastructure 
capacity for service delivery. Priority ser-
vices areas include immunization programs, 
enhanced growth monitoring of children, and 
services targeted at women during pregnancy 
and after giving birth.2 Several multilat-
eral initiatives embrace such a multipronged 
approach, as illustrated by the multilateral 
African Road Map for reducing maternal 
and newborn mortality. A number of coun-
tries are strengthening the newborn compo-
nents of existing child health plans as part 
of the World Health Organization’s Every 
Newborn Action Plan (WHO and UNICEF 
2015). Immunization coverage can also be 
expanded by taking advantage of multilat-
eral initiatives, such as the Global Vaccine 
Action Plan, and public-private partnerships 
such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunizations. 
A second area of policy focus is to improve 
educational outcomes, paying particular 
attention so that girls do not fall behind. 
Given low levels of educational attainment in 
pre-dividend countries, gains in educational 
attainment yield a future labor force that bet-
ter contributes to accelerated growth by being 
more productive in a wider range of sectors. 
Schooling of girls is particularly important 
since improvements in their educational 
attainments are also associated with lower 
fertility rates. For example, in Ethiopia, a 
country that recently proceeded to the early-
dividend stage, women with more education 
have lower fertility rates than women who 
are less educated. The scope for improving 
female education, reducing fertility, and low-
ering child-dependency ratios is particularly 
large among poorer households, thus offering 
a path toward accelerated poverty reduction 
for these groups and faster per capita growth 
overall as the working-age share of the popu-
lation is increased. 
A third area of policy focus is that of giv-
ing females greater agency and voice. These 
are valuable development goals on their own, 
and they can also contribute to lower fertil-
ity. Surveys often find that women in Africa 
would prefer to have fewer children than their 
male partners (Voas 2003). Access to compre-
hensive family-planning services is important 
for women to achieve their desired fertility 
levels (World Bank 2014d). Yet imbalances 
in household bargaining power reduce use 
of contraceptives and family planning, 
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raising fertility rates above levels preferred 
by women. These power imbalances are also 
linked to the incidence of child marriage. 
For example, about 75 percent of girls ages 
18 or younger are married in Niger, 68 per-
cent in Central African Republic and Chad, 
and more than 50 percent in Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, Malawi, Mali, and South Sudan 
(World Bank 2014a). Since early marriage is 
associated with, and most likely contributes 
to, weaker educational outcomes, delayed 
marriage may help improve education of girls, 
with potential growth and poverty reduction 
payoffs (see the section on Niger in the Coun-
try Spotlights at the end of this chapter).
accelerating job creation in early-
dividend countries
Early-dividend countries have growing 
working-age population shares, and their 
total fertility rates have been steadily declin-
ing in recent decades. These countries cur-
rently have average fertility rates of under 4 
births per woman, and many are expected to 
approach the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 
births per woman by 2030. These predomi-
nantly middle-income countries—including 
several large economies, such as India and 
Mexico—are home to a third of the global 
population. Declining fertility and mortal-
ity rates and growing working-age popula-
tion shares in early-dividend countries cre-
ate the conditions needed to realize the first 
demographic dividend: a transitory boost to 
growth as labor supply, labor participation, 
and per capita savings increase.
To realize and maximize demographic 
dividends, early-dividend countries need to 
focus on interventions that help absorb new 
workers into productive jobs. The first demo-
graphic dividend arises only to the extent 
that the economy is able to create productive 
jobs at a rate that exceeds the rate of popula-
tion growth. Such job creation may be sped 
up by progress in several areas: investments 
in human capital (including vocational and 
technical training), maintenance of mac-
roeconomic stability, financial inclusion, 
and labor-market policies that allow all 
socioeconomic groups to benefit from favor-
able population dynamics (Fox and Sohnesen 
2012; Lee and Mason 2006; Troiano 2015). 
Policies that improve labor mobility, for 
example, will make it easier for workers to 
find jobs where they are most needed, con-
tributing to rural-urban migration and relo-
cation from regions with labor surpluses to 
regions with shortages (World Bank 2009). 
Policies and institutions also need to 
ensure that supply and demand for work-
ers are consistent with rapid employment 
growth. Scenario analysis for Ethiopia, an 
early-dividend country, was used to assess 
the likely effects of a policy package aimed 
at making better use of the country’s rap-
idly growing labor force through improved 
education, higher private savings, and more 
rapid total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
during the period 2015−30 (see the section 
on Ethiopia in the Country Spotlights at the 
end of this chapter). The results indicate that, 
over a 15-year horizon, higher private savings 
(channeled into higher private investment) 
and more rapid TFP growth can make a sig-
nificant difference.
In many countries, persistent low female 
labor-force participation is an obstacle to the 
realization of the first demographic dividend. 
Gender gaps in labor force participation have 
generally persisted (based on figure 6.1, the 
gender gap in labor-force participation is 
smaller in 2013 than in 1990), especially in 
some demographic types and in some regions. 
In the Middle East and North Africa region, 
for example, the average female participa-
tion rate is 32 percent, and several countries 
have rates below 20 percent, including Alge-
ria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and 
Jordan. Facilitating the access of females to 
the labor market has simultaneous effects 
on demography, human capital, and growth, 
and is needed to realize the first demographic 
dividend (Galor 2012). Causality may also 
go in other directions because high fertility 
rates may limit female education and labor-
force participation: studies suggest that a 
single birth reduces a woman’s labor supply 
by almost 2 years during her reproductive life 
(Bloom et al. 2009).
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Early-dividend countries also need to 
implement policies that will facilitate the 
second demographic dividend in the future. 
Such policies should encourage savings and 
their channeling into productive invest-
ments in human and physical capital. Their 
potential payoffs start to become signifi-
cant when the decline in fertility rates sets 
in; that is, even though policies in this area 
remain important at later demographic 
stages, a late start may come at the cost of 
foregone growth. In the case of human capi-
tal, family planning programs that have been 
found to contribute to fertility declines are 
also positively associated with increases in 
human capital investment (Joshi and Schultz 
2013). For physical capital investment and 
asset accumulation in general, policy should 
ensure that when the population begins to 
age, those retiring workers who will be the 
future elderly have been saving and accu-
mulating assets throughout their lives. If 
governments wait until the population has 
already begun to age before encouraging and 
facilitating saving, then it may be too late, 
since the retiring and retired workers may 
not have as many assets and will have to rely 
on family or public transfers, coming out of 
current labor income.3 
Sustaining productivity growth in  
late-dividend countries
Thanks to their still large (albeit often shrink-
ing) working-age population shares, late- 
dividend countries have the ability to extract 
a substantial second demographic dividend.4 
Many countries in Eastern Europe, East Asia, 
and Latin America belong to this group. The 
reasons for projected growth-dampening 
declines in the working-age share of the 
population vary across countries. In most 
Eastern European countries, these declines 
have been driven mainly by declining fertility 
and, to a lesser extent, by increases in lon-
gevity. For countries in Latin America and 
East Asia, fertility declines and increased lon-
gevity have both been important. East Asia 
is aging more rapidly than any other region 
in history, with Vietnam and Thailand, two 
late-dividend countries, representing extreme 
cases (Cotlear 2011; World Bank 2015a). 
However, a slowdown in economic growth 
resulting from shrinking working-age shares 
FIgure 6.1 gender gaps in labor-force participation have persisted since the 1990s across all countries
Source: World Bank calculations, based on UN 2015 and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database for 2015.
Note: Labor-force participation includes both men and women ages 15–64. 
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is not inevitable if countries boost produc-
tivity growth through the second demo-
graphic dividend. Because of their still sizable 
working- age shares, high aggregate savings 
and investment are feasible. The fact that lon-
gevity typically is increasing in these coun-
tries adds to the incentives for people to save 
for their retirement (Lee and Mason 2006). 
Policies in support of higher aggregate sav-
ings to facilitate greater investments in human 
and physical capital is a top priority for late-
dividend countries. A financial sector that is 
inclusive, reaching across regions and income 
groups, and that provides adequate incentives 
is needed to raise savings and channel them 
to productive investments in physical capital. 
Investments in human capital may similarly 
be facilitated by incentives in the form of wage 
gains in a well-functioning labor market and 
the presence of a financial sector that encour-
ages savings for future education; however, 
the latter would need to be underpinned by a 
strong educational sector, typically including 
a mix of public and private services. The real-
ization of the second dividend is particularly 
important since it may add to the future pro-
ductivity of an increasingly scarce labor force 
in at least two ways: by directly adding to its 
skills and flexibility and by reducing the ratio 
of labor to physical capital.
The long-run benefit of increased physi-
cal and human capital accumulation may be 
reinforced by complementary labor and com-
mercial policies. The policies that most effec-
tively support growth are context specific. 
However, increased education for females 
often may boost female labor-force participa-
tion. So too can improved access to formal 
child and elderly health care, given the typical 
role of women as family caregivers (Bussolo, 
Koettl, and Sinnott 2015). For the growing 
old-age population, labor-force participation 
may be encouraged by policies that contribute 
to better health (enabling them to work) and 
by supportive incentives (encouraging them 
to work, for example by carefully designed 
pension systems) (World Bank 2015a). For 
countries (especially in Eastern Europe) that 
experience significant emigration by young 
workers despite increased aging and labor 
scarcity, many policies that make it attrac-
tive for women and elderly to work may 
also, to the extent that they involve a general 
improvement in work incentives, discour-
age emigration and encourage immigration 
by returning nationals and others (Bussolo, 
Koettl, and Sinnott 2015). 
Population aging will also generate grow-
ing demands for pensions, health care, long-
term care, and social protection (for the vul-
nerable), long-term care, and health services. 
Given that the share of the elderly is still 
relatively small, the short-run repercussions 
of the specific policy choices in this area are 
relatively limited. Given that the share of the 
old will grow, however, the initial design of 
policies in this area is extremely important 
considering their fiscal consequences and the 
difficulty of changing behavioral and institu-
tional patterns. The lessons from countries 
that currently have reached the post-dividend 
stage suggest that it may be particularly 
important to ensure that long-term care is, as 
much as possible, offered at home or within 
the community, rather than in nursing homes 
and hospitals, which tend to be costlier. In 
addition, rules for pension systems should be 
consistent with working at an older age as life 
expectancy increases (raising overall living 
standards) (World Bank 2015a). 
Policies that influence savings, labor force 
participation, and labor productivity may 
also yield substantial long-run gains. Brazil, 
for example, faces the challenge of finding 
ways to increase output per worker while 
protecting the living standards of its rapidly 
growing elderly population and maintaining 
sustainable fiscal balances. Scenario analy-
sis suggests that, by boosting savings to the 
levels of comparable countries, ensuring 
increased labor-force participation and mod-
erately raising labor-specific productivity, the 
country could raise average annual GDP per-
capita growth between 2016 and 2050 by 1 
percentage point (doubling the growth rate) 
and improving other development outcomes 
(see the section on Brazil in the Country 
Spotlights at the end of this chapter). 
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adapting to aging in post-dividend 
countries
For post-dividend countries, characterized 
by a large share of the population age 65 
or older, the challenge is to adapt to aging 
so that living standards can be maintained 
and improved.5 Post-dividend countries are 
characterized by a substantial decline in mor-
tality and fertility rates, leading to a fall in 
their working-age population and its share in 
the total population. The dependent popula-
tions have shifted from the young to the old 
and inactive. These trends are likely to exert 
upward pressure on public spending while 
slowing potential output growth. Despite the 
major challenges that an aging population 
presents, increased longevity can be an eco-
nomic boon if it translates into longer work-
ing lives and higher productivity per worker. 
A top priority for these countries is to 
fine-tune welfare, health, and education poli-
cies to ensure successful adaptation to aging 
while enhancing and maintaining fiscal sus-
tainability. Given considerable lags in the 
adaptation of policies, behavior, and insti-
tutions to new realities, this task is urgent. 
The job is easier where countries have inher-
ited good policies and their effects from 
earlier stages of demographic transition. 
The reforms that may be of high priority 
will vary from one country to another and 
may be guided by analysis of how a coun-
try, considering its median age, performs 
compared with other countries according to 
indicators such as expected years of healthy 
life at birth, labor force participation rates 
for different groups, savings, net migration, 
labor productivity, relative old-age poverty, 
total fertility rate, and public debt (Bussolo, 
Koettl, and Sinnott 2015).
Policies will need to help raise employ-
ment rates among those who are above 
today’s typical retirement ages and encour-
age savings channeled to productive physical 
investments. The design of policies in a wide 
range of areas, including education, health, 
and pensions, may contribute to the long-
run achievement of this objective (box 6.2 
discusses pension reform from a European 
perspective). In education, a comprehen-
sive high-quality system is needed both for 
the young and, in a manner integrated with 
work, for adults throughout the life cycle. 
Among the elderly, a strong educational 
background will likely increase the incen-
tives to work since it tends to raise wages and 
improve employment prospects. In health, 
preventive care, and a healthy living style 
help ensure that people age in good health 
and remain able to work. Pension systems 
may be designed to encourage late retirement, 
by imposing higher minimum retirement ages 
and offering incentives to delay retirement. 
In a setting with a well-functioning financial 
system, high employment rates among the 
elderly, and the expectation of living long, 
aging need not be associated with a decline in 
private savings rates.
Public policy may also help raise low fer-
tility rates by making it easier to combine 
child rearing and labor-market engagement 
and by reducing financial burdens of having 
children. Given that low fertility rates are 
the main source behind the emerging aging 
challenge, it is important to design policies 
that can change this situation. In fact, there 
is no strong reason to take for granted that 
the societies that today have rates below 
replacement rates are destined to remain 
in this situation forever: fertility rates have 
recently changed drastically during a short 
time period, countries at similar income lev-
els show significant differences, and in some 
post-dividend countries, increases have been 
recorded in recent years. In Europe, countries 
with the highest female labor-force partici-
pation and employment rates also have high 
fertility rates, demonstrating that parenthood 
can be reconciled with work (Myrskylä et al. 
2009). Compared with observed total fertil-
ity rates for 1985–90, the projected rates for 
2015–20 show increases of more than 0.1 for 
7 post-dividend countries, all in Europe: Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands (UN 2015).
Scenario analysis for Japan up to the year 
2100 demonstrates the importance of some 
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of the policy interventions discussed here. 
Japan’s experience exemplifies the difficul-
ties of raising fertility rates; evaluations of its 
pronatalist initiatives since the early 1990s 
found that they had almost no effect on fer-
tility.6 Nevertheless, learning from experi-
ence and continuing the pursuit of policies 
in this area are critical given that Japan must 
raise fertility in the very long run if it wants 
to avoid a constantly shrinking population. 
Scenario analysis analyzes effects of a com-
bination of policy interventions, including 
increases in fertility, migration, and labor-
force participation up to 2100, indicating 
that they may increase both total and per 
capita GDP substantially (see the section on 
Japan in the Country Spotlights at the end of 
this chapter). 
While higher labor force participation 
may have a lasting impact on GDP per capita 
and total GDP, greater legal migration and 
fertility primarily affect total GDP and not 
GDP per capita, since they result in increases 
in total population. One way to alleviate 
the labor market pressures is to a focus on a 
better allocation of skills by fostering inter-
nal mobility (an issue that may be especially 
important within Europe); a better use of 
migrants’ skills; and the development of 
migrants’ skills (box 6.3).
The age composition of the population is 
not the only determinant of living conditions 
Box 6.2 Pension System reform: The perspective of european countries
Population aging, driven by increasing longev-
ity and low fertility, poses a persistent long-term 
challenge.a Many European countries, already facing 
an increased debt burden resulting from the economic 
crisis, have adopted reforms to deal with this chal-
lenge and, as a result, public pension spending as a 
share of GDP is expected to remain more or less sta-
ble in Europe (EU28) until 2060. 
Many of the reforms lengthened working lives so 
that individuals contribute more to improve the sus-
tainability of the system. Some countries implemented 
increases in minimum contributory periods while 
limiting the effect of career breaks and part-time 
work. Most pension reforms, however, are focused 
on prolonging working lives at the end of the career 
through increases in the statutory retirement age; a 
tightening of early retirement provisions, including 
higher penalties for early benefit withdrawals; and 
greater financial incentives to work beyond the pen-
sionable age.
Retirement age is probably the most contentious 
pension parameter. Increasing it is a politically sensi-
tive issue in many countries, and winning approval for 
it has generally been difficult. Still, Hungary, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom have all raised retirement ages, sometimes 
beyond 65, generally the norm in most countries 
for the past decade. A few countries—Greece, Italy, 
 Slovenia, and Poland—have equalized the retirement 
age of men and women. The majority of the legislated 
increases are phased in over several years and often 
apply to future cohorts of workers. 
Some countries, including France and Luxem-
bourg, have increased the minimum periods workers 
must contribute to a pension plan before being per-
mitted to draw benefits. Other countries have opted 
for automatic adjustment of pension systems based 
on gains in life expectancy, or in some cases on eco-
nomic developments. Automatic adjustments can be 
politically appealing, but their design benefits can be 
a challenge if financial sustainability is enhanced at 
the expense of lower benefits for already financially 
precarious population groups. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain 
have all made access to early retirement more restric-
tive. Access to disability pensions has been tightened 
in Finland, Hungary, and Poland. Financial incen-
tives to encourage people to work longer have been 
strengthened in the Netherlands, Portugal, and Swe-
den and have often been accompanied by increasing 
flexibility to combine pension benefit withdrawal 
with work. In contrast, full pension benefits (without 
penalties) will be awarded below the legal retirement 
age to people who started their career early in France 
and Germany. 
a. This box was contributed by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, and is based on 
OECD 2014. 
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for post-dividend countries. The policies 
that determine how countries adapt to aging 
may in fact be far more important. With 
proper incentives and good health at higher 
ages (already experienced by many in post- 
dividend countries), nothing prevents people 
from working and saving beyond the age 
limits that have been observed to date. The 
changing roles of women in the labor mar-
ket in recent decades show that gender dif-
ferences need not be significant. Contrary 
to common perceptions, the share of the 
population in different age cohorts is not a 
good predictor of health costs. In fact, the 
highest annual costs are incurred during the 
last few years (especially the last year) in the 
Box 6.3 Migration and labor-market-policy reform from the perspective of high-income 
countries
All the members of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) are con-
fronted with the effects of population aging, but the 
European Union (EU) and Japan will be affected first 
and most severely.a The EU28 working-age population 
(15–64) is projected to decline by 2.2 percent between 
2013 and 2020. Without migration, the working-
age population of the 28 EU countries is expected to 
decline by more than 11 million by 2020 (80 million 
by 2050). Under this scenario, the working-age popu-
lation in Germany, Italy, and Poland will shrink by 
more than 1.5 million by 2020. Similar trends will be 
observed in Japan (-8 million) and, to a lesser extent, 
Canada (–1 million). In the United States and Austra-
lia, the working-age population will remain stable. 
The short- and medium-term effects of demographic 
changes on the labor force are not clear-cut however, 
because of changes in labor-participation rates by 
gender, age, and education level. Further progress in 
tackling the gender gap in employment, addressing 
the problems of disadvantaged youth, and increasing 
the employment rates of older workers would signifi-
cantly increase the labor force.
Taking migration into account transforms the pic-
ture. At current projected levels of net migration and 
participation, the European labor force will increase 
slightly by 1.2 percent between 2010 and 2020. More-
over, if immigrants participated at the same rates as 
their native-born counterparts with similar charac-
teristics, an additional 1 million workers would be 
added to the rolls in the EU.
To reap the full potential of migration, a three-
pronged approach is needed: a focus on a better allo-
cation of skills by fostering internal mobility, notably 
within Europe; a better use of migrants’ skills; and 
the development of migrants’ skills. Given the large 
differences in labor-market conditions across Euro-
pean countries (which were further amplified dur-
ing the financial crisis), internal labor mobility could 
make a significant contribution to overall employ-
ment growth. To improve the use of the potential 
of intra-EU migration, efforts to reduce barriers to 
mobility need to be stepped up. As part of a broader 
mobility strategy, skills-matching tools within the EU 
need to be strengthened and the learning of relevant 
languages promoted. 
Immigrants tend to be overrepresented on both 
ends of the qualification scale, but on average they 
have slightly fewer years of education than the native-
born. Labor market disparities between the foreign-
born and their native-born peers widen with educa-
tional attainment, however, and returns to foreign 
qualifications are lower than returns to host-country 
qualifications, in terms of employment, job quality, 
and earnings.
Not only are the skills of immigrants often under-
utilized but so too are those of their children who 
have been raised and trained in the host country. 
Strengthening integration and antidiscrimination pol-
icies will be necessary to address this issue. Efficient 
use of the skills of immigrants and development of 
their potential requires a series of measures, including 
increasing the availability of information and recog-
nition of foreign qualifications; ensuring that immi-
grants have access to effective, active, labor-market 
programs; putting immigrants more directly in con-
tact with employers; making sure that children of 
immigrants have access to early childhood education 
and care; and providing language training adapted to 
migrants’ skills in destination countries. 
a. This box was contributed by the OECD and is based 
on OECD-EU 2014.
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lives of most of the aging. Moreover, health 
costs are to a large extent a function of the 
choices that society and individuals have 
made during several decades, influencing 
the health of the aging, which depends on 
lifestyle choices and the organization of the 
health system. However, time lags in health 
and education may be long, and it is diffi-
cult to quickly adapt policies to match new 
realities. 
The welfare system and human develop-
ment policies should be designed to pro-
vide adequate protection for the vulnerable, 
including the elderly poor. The welfare sys-
tem should aim to ensure that no one is left 
behind throughout the different stages of the 
life cycle: provision of child care to reconcile 
work and parenthood; education at different 
stages of life; health care; and long-term care 
complementing the care provided by fami-
lies, pensions, and a social safety net that 
catches those that otherwise would risk fall-
ing into poverty (OECD 2013b).
Decisions to maximize service coverage 
in a wide range of areas, including a strong 
welfare system, must carefully consider the 
fiscal consequences of different options. The 
choices that are made should reflect societal 
preferences and awareness of the conse-
quences of different decisions. Fortunately, 
a rich set of options is available in many 
areas. The different institutional options 
for health and long-term care already avail-
able in the late-dividend stage are also rel-
evant for post-dividend countries, where 
these options may have vastly different 
cost implications. In several areas, different 
degrees of targeting of public spending on 
groups that are particularly needy may be 
considered. In this context, it is important to 
reiterate that costs tend to be easier to con-
trol over time if the initial design is fiscally 
sound and avoids the creation of behavior 
and expectations that cannot be sustained. 
For example, pension systems with mini-
mum retirement ages that increase with life 
expectancy may offer an effective means of 
containing costs, in contrast to systems that 
permit retirement after a certain number of 
service years irrespective of age and without 
any penalty. 
Leveraging demographic 
differences across countries
Variation in demographic change among 
countries creates opportunities for cross- 
border exchanges and international coopera-
tion. Differences in the demographic dynamics 
at the country level are producing important 
spillovers, changing the comparative advan-
tages that underpin trade and the returns 
to labor and capital. To benefit from these 
changes, countries typically need to imple-
ment policies that enhance trade in goods and 
services and promote greater factor mobility.7 
As a result, some labor-intensive production 
may shift from East Asia to South Asia and 
Africa, or migration may increase from coun-
tries with growing working-age populations 
to countries where the number of workers is 
falling, with migrants often helping deliver 
nontradable services, such as elderly care. 
A brief summary of policy priorities across 
countries is presented in table 6.2. Global 
demographic change is also related to environ-
mental sustainability, a crucial challenge that 
countries must tackle together (box 6.4).
The complementary relationship among 
migration, trade, and capital flows implies 
that all of these factors may play a role in 
the adjustment to changing demographic 
patters. The World Bank Africa-Asia Trade 
and Investment Survey, as well as business 
case studies, clearly identify such comple-
mentarities in China and India’s trade and 
investment ties with African countries.8 Most 
studies also find a mutually reinforcing effect 
between trade and investment flows on the 
one hand and technology transfers on the 
other, suggesting that policies facilitating 
cross-border flows are likely to accelerate the 
pace of technological diffusion, contributing 
to growth and poverty eradication.9
Supporting international trade 
Supported by policies that facilitate trade, 
developing countries could benefit from dif-
fering demographic trajectories that are con-
tributing to shifts in trade patterns. Countries 
at the early stage in their demographic transi-
tion are expected to raise their share of global 
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Box 6.4 environmental sustainability and demographics 
The global demographic transition under way has 
been influenced by a parallel environmental transition 
that may slow down development progress. Changes 
in the size, composition, density, and distribution of 
the population over the past three centuries in com-
bination with the associated shift toward industri-
alization, urbanization, and higher consumption 
throughout the world have important implications 
for environmental sustainability. For instance, it has 
been shown that greenhouse gas emissions increase 
with population size, and that these emissions vary 
depending on the stage of a country’s development.a 
In turn, environmental changes can slow development 
progress through a wide range of channels including 
health, water supply, food security and agriculture, 
infrastructure, and services provision, thus affecting 
demographics, especially migration patterns. Such 
negative effects already can be observed in different 
parts of the world, including countries in Asia and 
Central America.b 
Urbanization and aging deserve greater attention 
in emissions projections. Population aging, urbaniza-
tion, household size, land and energy use, technology, 
and climate policy may have a more significant impact 
on emissions in the future than population growth 
per se.c Urbanization and aging may be especially 
important in China, India, the United States and the 
European Union.d Urbanization will also become 
increasingly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
almost half of the population is expected to live in cit-
ies by 2030.e Projections suggest that household size 
decreases as populations age, a change that leads to 
higher emissions due to a loss in economies of scale 
in energy consumption.f The effects of urbanization, 
however, are less clear. This trend increases economic 
activity through a higher concentration of production 
and consumption but also allows for economies of 
scale and greater energy efficiency.g
(box continues next page)
TaBLe 6.2 Policy priorities for leveraging the differences in demographic change across countries
  Area of focus Issues Recommendations
International  
trade
Promoting foreign provision of education services 
to boost educational opportunities in countries 
with a high share of young population or to 
facilitate lifelong learning for aging countries.
Using foreign providers to meet demand for health 
services in aging countries.
Supporting comparative advantage in producing 
labor-intensive products in labor-abundant 
countries.
Ease visa requirements for the free flow of international students 
and academics; address qualification recognition issues; reduce 
limits on foreign ownership; and increase transparency of 
government education regulations.
Address restrictions affecting the physical presence of foreign 
suppliers, foreign equity ceilings, or barriers on the movement of 
health care professionals across borders.
Streamline customs, border, and transit performance; improve 
logistics and transport services and extend physical 
infrastructure; tackle remaining tariff and nontariff barriers on 
goods trade.
Migration Promoting legal migration flows to counteract the 
decline in working-age populations in aging 
countries and to mitigate labor market pressures 
in labor-abundant countries.
Reducing the burden of brain drain in sending 
countries.
Formulate clear migration policies; enforce minimum wage laws; 
provide adequate information to migrants about their rights 
and obligations; facilitate their contribution to and benefits from 
social protection schemes and public services; sanction potential 
abuses by firms.
Develop comprehensive and targeted policies to retain, and attract 
talent; encourage return migration.
International  
finance 
Attracting international capital flows to young, 
labor-abundant countries. 
Addressing challenges posed by large and volatile 
capital flows to developing countries.
Supporting opportunities for capital-abundant 
countries to increase returns and diversify 
investment portfolios.
Create favorable investment climate; strengthen macroeconomic 
stability, the financial sector, and governance. 
Undertake measures to relax investment barriers at the domestic, 
regional, and global level.
Introduce macroeconomic policies to address risks from volatile 
capital inflows, supervision, regulation, and strong institutions.
Provide investment guarantees or technical assistance.
Source: GMR team elaboration.
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of their demographic transition. The average 
annual economic growth rates of pre- and 
early-dividend countries are expected to be 
higher than those of late- and post-dividend 
countries, which will contribute to a further 
decline in the importance of the latter groups 
as global export destinations. Post-dividend 
countries’ share of global exports is expected 
to decline from 61 percent in 2015 to 52 per-
cent in 2030, with the bulk of the matching 
increases shared evenly between early- and 
late-dividend countries (figure 6.2).10 How-
ever, post-dividend countries are expected to 
remain the most important export market in 
the world, in part reflecting the fact they will 
still account for more than half of global eco-
nomic activity in the future. 
Differences in demographic change among 
countries contribute to changes in compara-
tive advantages that, in turn, influence trade 
patterns. Countries with relatively slow 
Box 6.4 environmental sustainability and demographics  (continued)
In short, demographic trends and related policies 
will have implications for the global environment 
and for the effectiveness of adaptation and mitiga-
tion strategies. Family planning and reproductive 
health policies may help mitigate the negative effects 
of climate change by reducing population growth, 
especially in pre- and early-dividend countries. Edu-
cation is not only likely to lower fertility, it can also 
have a major impact on the effectiveness of measures 
aimed at tackling the negative effects of climate 
change. Among other things, it may improve the 
adaptive capacity of individuals and raise awareness 
of the implications of consumption patterns, lead-
ing to changes in lifestyles and behaviors. In rapidly 
urbanizing areas, the next decades offer a window 
of opportunity for mitigation through policies that 
improve access to public transport and consider envi-
ronmental aspects of the location of high-density resi-
dential and employment areas. 
The links between demography, environmental 
sustainability, and development goals raise complex 
issues that have to be taken into account in policy 
making. Global efforts may be the only way to ade-
quately address most of these issues. Reaching agree-
ments on the best way forward is challenging, how-
ever; outcomes that are seen as equitable may have 
the highest potential to be adopted. Developing coun-
tries that have high fertility rates or undergo rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, or both, have con-
tributed least to climate change and are dispropor-
tionately affected by its negative consequences. They 
often have limited capacity to develop and implement 
adaptation and mitigation strategies. Indeed, poor 
and vulnerable populations are particularly exposed 
to climate risks through higher temperatures, water 
stress, rising sea levels, loss of agricultural produc-
tion, and the spread of diseases.
 
a. Liddle 2011, 2013; Liddle and Lung 2010; O’Neill 
et al. 2012; Zagheni 2011.
b. Harper 2013.
c. IPCC 2014; Jiang and Hardee 2009; Stephenson et al. 
2013.
d. O’Neill 2009; O’Neill et al. 2012.
e. Black et al. 2008.
f. Dalton et al. 2008; Jiang and O’Neill 2007; Zeng 
et al. 2008.
g. Sadorsky 2013.
trade, which can boost incomes if supported 
by appropriate policies. Facilitating and 
enabling trade in products and services that 
are growing in importance, especially those 
that are most closely related to demographic 
change, such as health care and education, 
can play an important role. Knowledge trans-
fers from trade in health and education prod-
ucts and services contribute significantly to 
the achievement of development goals, while 
medical imports are systematically associated 
with lower mortality rates (Papageorgiou, Sav-
vides, and Zachariadis 2007; World Bank and 
WTO 2015). Trade openness in general is pos-
itively linked with faster mortality reduction 
in developing countries (Jamison, Sandbu, 
and Wang 2001; Owen and Wu 2007). 
How does trade relate to demography?
Global trade flows are projected to shift 
toward countries that are in the early stages 
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population growth tend to become relatively 
more capital abundant over time, while coun-
tries with relatively faster population growth 
become relatively more labor abundant. As 
a result, pre-dividend countries’ exports 
are mainly concentrated in agricultural and 
natural resource products, which accounted 
for 75 percent of their total exports in 2015. 
By 2030, their specialization in agricultural 
goods and labor-intensive manufacturing is 
expected to increase at the expense of natu-
ral resource products. In 2015, manufactured 
and natural resource goods accounted for 
46 and 36 percent, respectively, of early- 
dividend exports, whereas the respective 
shares of late-dividend countries were 71 
and 19 percent. By 2030, exports of manu-
factured goods and services are projected to 
represent a larger share in both early- and 
late-dividend countries (figure 6.3). 
How can trade policy leverage demographic 
differences?
Trade policy measures can be powerful tools 
as countries adapt to the opportunities and 
challenges brought about by demographic 
change. Agricultural trade is still distorted by 
significant barriers, such as high tariffs, non-
tariff barriers, export subsidies, and domestic 
support measures (WTO 2014). These mea-
sures harm poor rural producers by eroding 
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their competitiveness and reducing the prices 
they receive in international markets (Ander-
son, Ivanic, and Martin 2013). While aver-
age tariffs on manufactured goods have been 
declining over time, significant tariff and 
nontariff barriers continue to slow or block 
the free flow of goods between countries 
(UNCTAD 2013; WTO 2012). Out of non-
tariff measures, technical barriers to trade 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures are 
the most commonly used, affecting on aver-
age about 30 and 15 percent of trade, respec-
tively. The high incidence of such barriers 
affects the exports of developing countries 
disproportionally more because the cost of 
compliance is higher (UNCTAD 2013). 
Demographic change is expected to affect 
capital-labor ratios across the globe, helping 
developing countries to specialize in labor-
intensive goods. Reductions of trade barri-
ers, coupled with policy measures to improve 
trade facilitation, could create incentives 
for firms to relocate production to relatively 
more labor-abundant countries and allow 
developing countries to take full advantage of 
their growing labor forces. Rising wages and 
product upgrading in China that could lead 
to the relocation of labor-intensive produc-
tion create opportunities for African coun-
tries to double employment in manufacturing 
(Chandra, Lin, and Wang 2012). By reducing 
the cost of trade in pre- and early-dividend 
countries, substantial potential improve-
ments in trade flows, income, and poverty 
reduction can be achieved (box 6.5). 
Countries that take steps to reduce the 
costs of trade may be able to achieve substan-
tial increases in exports and income. Improv-
ing connectivity, making trade-related institu-
tions and policy frameworks more effective, 
and providing a supportive enabling environ-
ment can help improve gains from trade for 
the poor, especially in rural areas. Efforts to 
integrate markets are critical, using measures 
in key areas, such as tariff and nontariff bar-
riers, infrastructure and trade facilitation, 
access to trade-related technology, and trade 
finance (World Bank and WTO 2015). 11 
While there is a vast empirical literature on 
supporting international trade in developing 
countries, covering policy recommendations 
in each of the above areas, this section has 
a narrow focus on policy recommendation 
in health and education services as they are 
directly linked to the changing demographic 
structure of the world population.
Trade can help meet the demand for health 
services in aging countries and the demand 
for education services in young countries. 
Both health care and education are only 
lightly traded across borders, in part because 
of policy constraints on service providers 
and on the movement of people across bor-
ders. Cross-border supply of health services 
(Mode 1 of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services) is still quite small, although 
increasing numbers of people are seeking 
medical treatment abroad (Mode 2), and sig-
nificant numbers of health professionals are 
practicing somewhere other than their home 
country (Mode 4) (Blouin, Drager, and Smith 
2006; Smith, Chanda, and Tangcharoen-
sathien 2009). Given the links with other 
service sectors, such as telecommunications 
and audiovisual services, as well as with the 
movement of people across borders, the lib-
eralization of education services should be 
addressed as part of an effort to liberalize 
services more generally. 
Domestic services liberalization and inter-
national law regulating health and education 
services are needed to ensure further expan-
sion of international trade. In the case of 
health services, efforts are urgently needed to 
lower barriers affecting the physical presence 
of foreign suppliers, the maximum share of 
equity that can be owned by foreigners, and 
the movement of health professionals across 
borders. International agreements on vari-
ous regulations, such as those pertaining to 
licensing and qualification requirements, 
could play a key role in enabling interna-
tional providers to supply health services in 
domestic markets. The most significant mea-
sures affecting trade in education services 
are barriers to using the Internet and restric-
tions on the import of educational mate-
rials (Mode 1); visa requirements against 
the free flow of international students and 
qualifi cation recognition issues (Mode 2); 
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Box 6.5 Trade facilitation can help leverage demographic transition
Simplifying and harmonizing international trade pro-
cedures can help countries take greater advantage of 
their demographic differences through trade. In both 
developed and developing countries, there is substan-
tial scope for this simplification and harmonization 
(trade facilitation) to reduce costs. In developed coun-
tries, simplification of procedures could account for 
5.4 percent of potential trade cost savings, followed 
by advance rulings (3.7 percent), automation (2.7 per-
cent), and fees and charges (1.7 percent). In developing 
countries, the contribution of each indicator varies, 
but total trade cost reduction amounts to 14.5 per-
cent for low-income countries, 15.5 percent for lower-
middle-income countries, and 13.2 percent for upper-
middle-income countries (Moïsé, Orliac, and Minor 
2011; Moïsé and Sorescu 2013). This box explores the 
growth and poverty impacts of reducing trade costs by 
15 percent in pre- and early-dividend countries.
By reducing the costs of trade for pre- and early-
dividend countries, substantial potential increases in 
trade flows and expansion of labor-intensive manu-
facturing can be achieved. Lower trade costs result 
in additional income gains in pre- and early-dividend 
countries, amounting, respectively, to 3.6 percent 
and 2.5 percent of GDP in 2030 (figure b6.5.1). The 
benefits could lift an additional 13 million people out 
of poverty (figure b6.5.2).a Faster income growth is 
driven by substantially higher values of trade and 
some production upgrading. In pre-dividend coun-
tries, the share of low-skilled and high-skilled labor-
intensive manufacturing products in total exports 
could increase, at the expense of agriculture and 
natural resources, by an additional 8 and 3 percent-
age points, respectively. In early-dividend countries, 
reduced trade costs could boost the share of these 
products in total exports by 5 and 10 percentage 
points, respectively.
Trade facilitation entails streamlining customs, 
border, and transit procedures; improving logistics 
and transport services; and extending physical infra-
structure. In developed countries, the policy areas 
that could have the greatest impact on trade perfor-
mance are related to advanced rulings in determining 
classification and value of goods, fees and charges, 
processes, and procedures. Low-income countries 
would benefit most from simplifying documentation 
requirements, automating processes, and making 
trade-related information available. Lower-middle-
income countries are expected to gain the most from 
the simplification of documentation formalities, 
streamlining of procedures, and automation. Finally, 
upper-middle-income countries would benefit most 
from streamlining procedures, automation, and 
advance rulings.
Source: UN 2013a; Medium Fertility Scenario; and World Bank calculations (see appendix D).
Note: Pre-, early-, late- and post-dividend refer to stages of demographic transition of countries. 
FIgure B6.5.1 Trade facilitation can boost income 
growth in pre- and early-dividend countries
FIgure B6.5.2 Lowering trade costs can contribute 
to poverty reduction
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limits on foreign ownership and lack of 
transparency of government education regu-
lations (Mode 3); and visa requirements on 
the free flow of academics (Mode 4). 
Facilitating legal international 
migration
Legal migration can help the world adjust to 
uneven demographic change. Given the gen-
erally high level of restrictions on the move-
ment of people from one country to another, 
the potential for gains from more regular and 
safe migration is large. Demographic dispari-
ties are amplifying these potential gains. 
How does migration relate to demography?
Demographic differences contribute to migra-
tion flows. Although South-South migration 
flows have grown rapidly, the major migra-
tion flows are from young developing coun-
tries to aging high-income countries. Between 
1990 and 2013, the stock of migrants from 
pre- and early-dividend countries residing in 
late- and post-dividend countries increased by 
more than 150 percent. In 2013, close to 55 
percent of all international migrants (slightly 
more than 125 million people) lived in post-
dividend countries, while 21 percent lived 
in early-dividend countries and 19 percent 
in late-dividend countries (figure 6.4). Post- 
dividend countries are host to the most 
diverse group of migrants. Most migrants in 
pre- and early-dividend countries come from 
countries in the same group.12 As early- and 
pre-dividend countries make development 
progress, the impetus to migrate from these 
countries may fall. The broader impact of 
development on migration, however, depends 
on the patterns of growth. Economic devel-
opment that does not promote employment 
growth has the potential to exacerbate the 
factors that push people to migrate out of 
their home countries (Massey 1988).
International migration flows may miti-
gate the decline in working-age population 
shares in aging countries. Younger immi-
grants can help rebalance the decline in the 
working-age population relative to the num-
ber of older people in late- and post-dividend 
countries, as several aging, high-income 
countries have already experienced (see box 
6.3). Migration flows can thus play a central 
role in improving the growth prospects and 
ensuring the sustainability of public finances 
in destination countries. Existing estimates 
suggest that the potential net benefits from 
reducing barriers to international migration 
are large (Borgy et al. 2010; Tyers and Shi 
2007; Walmsley, Winters, and Ahmed 2007; 
World Bank 2006) and a multiple of the gains 
from further trade liberalization (Anderson 
and Winters 2008, Clemens 2011). A rise 
in migration sufficient to increase the labor 
force of high-income countries by 3 percent 
phased in over a 10-year period would yield 
a global gain of real income of $674 billion 
(World Bank 2006).
How can migration leverage demographic 
differences?
Countries of origin and countries of des-
tination could implement a wide range of 
policies to facilitate legal and mutually ben-
eficial migration. During the past 10 years, 
many countries have revised their migration 
laws in response to changes in labor market 
FIgure 6.4 Post-dividend countries tend to 
receive the most migrants
Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from UN 2013c.
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conditions, demography, and political con-
texts (OECD 2013a). Different types of poli-
cies affect different stages of the migration 
process (before departure, during migration, 
and return), as well as different aspects under 
each stage (financial and social protection, 
employment, and remittances). Pre-departure 
orientation and training programs, measures 
that protect the rights and prevent the abuse 
of migrants, integration and language pro-
grams, and policies that lower remittance 
costs or remove regulatory and bureaucratic 
barriers against return migration are all 
important in enhancing the development 
benefits and reducing the potential costs 
associated with international migration. Sev-
eral developed countries have implemented 
temporary migration programs with varying 
degrees of success (UN 2013b).
Policies have the potential to make migra-
tion more beneficial for all parties involved.13 
These include the formulation of clear migra-
tion policies in consultation with all relevant 
parties, foreign-worker levies paid by com-
panies rather than workers, enforcement of 
minimum wage laws, provision of adequate 
information to migrants about their rights 
and obligations, facilitation of their contri-
bution to and benefits from social protec-
tion schemes and public services, and sanc-
tions against abuses by employers (Ahsan 
et al. 2014). Measures aiming to reduce the 
transfer cost of remittances are motivated 
by mounting empirical evidence on the posi-
tive impacts remittances have on develop-
ment (Adams and Page 2005).14 Financial 
education can also reduce the risk of using 
or switching to costlier remittance products 
(Gibson, McKenzie, and Zia 2014). Bilat-
eral or multilateral migration agreements 
between countries of origin, transit, and des-
tination can help achieve policy coherence 
across countries (Naik, Koehler, and Laczko 
2008; World Bank 2006). 
Migration benefits sending countries 
through social as well as financial remit-
tances, but policy actions are needed to help 
reduce the burden of brain drain. Social 
remittances include transfers of knowledge 
back to the home country, the application 
of newly acquired skills from abroad, and 
the development of networks that facilitate 
trade and political links between countries. 
The benefits of remittances are not auto-
matic, however, and outward migration can 
have negative effects, especially in countries 
where large numbers of high-skilled work-
ers emigrate. In these cases, a combination 
of comprehensive and targeted polices may 
be able to retain, attract, or reattract talent. 
Comprehensive policies that boost productiv-
ity and growth are critical, especially educa-
tion policies that foster the supply of skills 
and growth policies that boost the demand 
for skills.15
encouraging global capital flows
International capital flows benefit countries 
in different ways, depending where they are 
on the demographic dividend continuum. 
Countries in the early stages of their demo-
graphic transition need to boost investment, 
while those in the later stages seek higher 
returns on investment than may be available 
domestically, creating a potential win-win 
situation. The benefits of these flows will not 
be automatic. Appropriate policies, includ-
ing efforts to enhance institutional quality, 
deepen the financial sector, and introduce 
sound financial supervision and regulation, 
along with making greater use of interna-
tional investment agreements can all help 
ensure the full realization of benefits of capi-
tal flows. Together, such policies could help 
catalyze FDI and other forms of financing 
that are essential for reaching development 
goals. 
How do capital flows relate to demography?
Facilitating international capital flows would 
allow young, labor-abundant countries to 
attract much-needed capital. In the initial 
stages of demographic transition, countries 
with relatively high dependency ratios tend 
to have excess demand for investment rela-
tive to savings, stimulating current account 
deficits. In countries in more advanced stages 
of demographic transition, higher life expec-
tancy increases savings for retirement, while 
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shrinking labor forces reduce investment 
demand, encouraging net capital outflows. 
In addition to these fundamental drivers of 
capital flows, lower working-age population 
shares, typical for countries in earlier stages 
of demographic transition, are associated 
with current account deficits (figure 6.5).16 
Capital flows could generate an increase in 
labor productivity and wages, and thus spur 
faster growth in young, labor-abundant 
countries. For sending countries, increas-
ing investment in “young” economies can 
provide much-needed opportunities to raise 
capital returns and diversify investment port-
folios, especially if labor-abundant countries 
create favorable investment climates, ensure 
macroeconomic stability, deepen their finan-
cial sectors, and strengthen governance.
How can capital flows leverage 
demographic differences?
Improvements in institutional quality and 
financial sector development could con-
tribute significantly to capital flows to pre-, 
early- and late-dividend countries. Poten-
tial increases are driven by rapid economic 
growth, demographic changes that support 
growing consumer and investment demand, 
and improvements in the business environ-
ment (World Bank 2013a).17 With rapid 
improvements in the business environment, 
the net capital flows to pre-, early- and late-
dividend countries could increase to $13.4 
trillion in 2030 (up from $6.4 trillion with no 
policy changes) and could account for 62 per-
cent of total capital flows, up from 26 percent 
of the total in 2011 (figure 6.6).18 Low- and 
middle-income countries would be the main 
beneficiaries of the increased capital flows 
under this rapid convergence scenario.19 
Countries early in the demographic transi-
tion are expected to account for a growing 
share of gross capital inflows. These coun-
tries tend to register net capital inflows if 
they offer opportunities for healthy economic 
growth along with strong institutions, favor-
able business environment, and potential 
for financial sector deepening. For example, 
India and Sub-Saharan Africa are projected 
to run current account deficits averaging 2.4 
FIgure 6.5 Countries with low working-age 
population shares tend to run current account 
deficits
Source: World Bank calculations, based on World Bank World Development 
Indicators database.
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percent and 3.2 percent of GDP, respectively, 
over 2015–30 (World Bank 2013a). These 
capital inflows will likely come from post-
dividend countries, but the contributions 
from early- and late-dividend East Asian 
countries, most notably China, are likely to 
continue to rise.
Countries early in their demographic tran-
sition could promote foreign direct invest-
ment by reducing the economic, political, and 
legal risks facing investors. To attract FDI, 
host countries need to relax investment bar-
riers. These come in many forms: the exclu-
sion of foreign investors from certain eco-
nomic activities, quantitative limitations in 
the form of quotas, foreign ownership caps, 
joint venture requirements, and discrimina-
tory tax treatment. Home countries can fur-
ther promote outflows of FDI with policies 
such as investment guarantees or technical 
assistance.
At the global level, reforms are needed to 
take full advantage of international invest-
ment agreements. Although an estimated 
3,271 international investment agreements 
were in place in 2015, many of these required 
additional reforms (UNCTAD 2015). Other 
important areas for policy making include 
protections of a country’s right to regulate 
investment (such as clarifying most-favored-
nation treatment provisions); more efficient 
dispute-settlement procedures; greater com-
pliance with domestic laws and corporate 
social responsibility requirements; improving 
the consistency of the international invest-
ment agreements; and linking reforms of the 
agreements with the domestic policy agenda 
would also be useful. Measures in these areas 
could be further complemented with the con-
solidation and harmonization of multilateral 
investment rules. 
In addition to sound financial supervision 
and regulation and strong institutions, mac-
roeconomic policies need to play a key role in 
addressing risks from volatile capital inflows. 
Under certain circumstances, capital flow 
management measures can be useful. They 
should not, however, be a substitute for war-
ranted macroeconomic adjustment. In addi-
tion, macroprudential measures are at times 
necessary to address the challenges posed by 
large and volatile capital flows.20 Financial 
and institutional development can reduce the 
riskiness of financial liberalization (Sahay 
and others 2015), although a sequenced 
approach that builds resilience to large and 
volatile capital flows through macroeconomic 
policies and regulation is preferred (IMF 
2012). Furthermore, international regulatory 
coordination would be beneficial both at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels, including 
measures such as strengthening and institu-
tionalizing the swap lines that provide liquid-
ity for less commonly traded currencies. 
As pre-, early-, and late-dividend countries 
are expected to account for a growing share 
of capital flows, their policies on exchange 
rates and capital flows will become more 
important. Reliance on fixed exchange rates 
pegged to a single currency could pose dif-
ficult choices for countries with increasing 
inflows, whereas an exchange rate pegged to 
a basket of currencies may be better able to 
smooth currency volatility. In addition, the 
accumulation of reserves among developing 
countries is expected to decelerate as more 
adapt floating exchange rate regimes and 
capital markets become more open (World 
Bank 2013a). 
Conclusion
Demographic change can shape development 
trajectories, and policies that reflect a coun-
try’s specific circumstances can help it to 
benefit from opportunities that are offered. 
Policies also need to respond to the significant 
differences across countries in the direction 
and speed of demographic change. The chal-
lenge, at both the country and global levels, 
is to prepare for the demographic landscape 
of the future. At the country level, policy 
makers and stakeholders need to address 
expected demographic advantages and chal-
lenges, depending on whether their countries 
are pre-dividend, early-dividend, late-divi-
dend, or post-dividend. Collectively, all coun-
tries—from low- to high-income—can benefit 
from pronounced differences in demographic 
change through enhanced trade, migration, 
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and capital flows across borders. Collective 
action is also needed to meet the global envi-
ronmental sustainability challenge.
Policies can improve development out-
comes by taking advantage of demographic 
factors. Strong economic growth that is eco-
nomically, socially, and environmentally sus-
tainable is a prerequisite for achieving devel-
opment goals. Demographically informed 
policy can both add to and take advantage 
of economic growth through policies in sev-
eral critical areas: labor markets, education, 
health, pensions and other social transfers, 
international migration, trade, and capital 
flows. A number of policy interventions have 
significant fiscal costs, requiring that atten-
tion be paid to fiscal sustainability. Getting 
policies right in light of demographic trends 
could well be the difference between eliminat-
ing extreme poverty, boosting shared pros-
perity, and reaching broader development 
goals by 2030 and falling short and leaving 
major gaps in the development agenda for the 
next generation. 
213
This spotlight presents analyses of major poli-
cy challenges facing four countries, each repre-
sentative of the demographic group to which it 
belongs: Niger (pre-dividend), Ethiopia (early-
dividend), Brazil (late-dividend), and Japan 
(post-dividend). The analysis is based on simu-
lations with a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, applied to country databases 
developed for this report.a 
Sparking demographic transition 
in Niger: Child marriage and 
fertility
As indicated by its low per-capita income, high 
poverty, low human development, and fragile 
environment (physical, political, and military), 
Niger, a pre-dividend country faces a long list 
of challenges. Between 1991 and 2015, its 
population more than doubled (from 8 to 19 
million) and is expected to reach 69 million 
by 2050. Its current total fertility rate (TFR) 
of 7 (average births per woman) is among 
the highest in the world and is expected to 
fall to 4.7 by 2050. This current high rate is 
both a cause and a consequence of Niger’s 
low scores on most development indicators. 
It is partly driven by one of the highest rates 
of child marriage in the world—74 percent of 
Nigerien girls marry before turning 18 (World 
Bank 2014b)—high adolescent fertility rates, 
low per-capita incomes, and low levels of 
education (including high female school drop-
out rates). Figure 6.7 illustrates the dramatic 
trends in total fertility and dependency rates 
facing Niger.
To determine the effects of reduced child 
marriage on fertility, female labor-force par-
ticipation, and female education in Niger, a 
set of scenarios was analyzed for the period 
2015–50. Under the base scenario, GDP per 
capita is projected to grow at an average rate 
of around 2 percent a year; for the indica-
tor most directly affected by child marriage, 
the fertility rate (FR) of women ages 15–19, 
the United Nations (UN) medium-variant 
projection of a decline is used (from around 
0.20 births a year per woman ages 15–19 in 
2015 to 0.08 in 2050). Three non-base simu-
lations are used to test effects of alternative 
trajectories to the base for the 15–19 FR: a 
gradual cut to zero by 2050 (f-), an immedi-
ate cut (in 2016) to zero (f--), and no cut (the 
2015 rates stay in place up to 2050; fconst). 
The case of a gradual cut is combined with 
a 10 percentage point increase in the rates of 
labor force participation for women who de-
lay their marriages (f-l+), and a 10 percentage 
point increase in the share within this group 
of women who achieve 9 or more years of 
education (f-l+e+).b
Reducing the fertility rates for women ages 
15–19 can lead to improvements in several 
FIgure 6.7 Fertility and dependency rates in 
Niger, 2015–50 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on medium variant in UN (2013b).
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human development indicators, such as health 
and education, while also benefiting overall 
income. Compared with the base scenario, 
gradual and immediate cuts in FR (f- and f--) 
raise average growth in GDP per capita by 0.2 
and 0.3 percentage point respectively, while a 
constant FR reduces this growth rate by 0.2 
percentage point (fconst) (figure 6.8). Per-
capita household consumption in 2050 is 15 
percent higher for f-- compared with fconst. 
The main reason for the gain is that a lower 
FR accelerates growth in per capita labor and 
capital endowments; for example, for f-- the 
percentage point increases are 0.2 for labor 
and 0.4 for capital. By comparison, the likely 
macroeconomic impact of plausible changes 
in labor-force participation and education 
rates due to reduced fertility is minor from 
the perspective of the economy as a whole, 
but likely very important for the individuals 
who are able to have fewer children. Extreme 
poverty declines from 49 percent in 2015: by 
2030, poverty rates fall to 29 percent under 
the base scenario, compared with 23, 26, and 
30 percent for f--, f-, and fconst, respectively.
The policies needed to speed up the decline 
in child marriage and adolescent fertility in 
Niger and other countries in a similar situa-
tion include actions aimed at improved edu-
cation outcomes for girls at the primary and 
secondary levels and greater access to repro-
ductive health services (ICRW 2007; World 
Bank 2014d). Irrespective of concerns related 
to child marriage and fertility, such actions 
should already be on the agenda. Their payoff 
depends on the broader context, including the 
ability of the economy to generate growth suf-
ficient to offer jobs with attractive wages.
accelerating job creation in 
ethiopia: education, savings,  
and productivity 
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has managed 
to maintain rapid per capita growth, delivered 
by appropriate policies and facilitated by a 
strong fertility decline. For 2004–13, Ethio-
pia’s average annual GDP per capita growth 
was very high, at 8.1 percent. Since 2000, 
per-capita growth has likely been boosted by 
a strong decline in the total dependency rate 
(TDR), driven by a declining total fertility 
rate; these demographic trends will continue 
up to 2030 and beyond (Ahmed et al. 2014; 
figure 6.9). Growth has been driven to a large 
extent by public investment while private in-
vestment has been low (Moller and Wacker 
2015). Judging from the record of other suc-
cessful countries, Ethiopia faces the  structural 
FIgure 6.8 Niger’s gDP per capita growth under 
alternative scenarios, 2016–50 
Source: World Bank estimates using MAMS simulation results.
Note: Base = benchmark (no change), f- = gradual elimination of 15–19 
year fertility, f-- = immediate elimination of 15–19 year fertility, fconst = 
constant 15–19 year fertility (2015 rate), f-l+ = f- plus increased labor-force 
participation, f-l+e+ = f-l+ plus increased education. 
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FIgure 6.9 Fertility and dependency rates in 
ethiopia, 1990–2030
Source: World Bank calculations, based on medium variant in UN (2013b).
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challenge of finding a prominent role for 
the private sector.c The World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators show that Ethiopia does 
well in general but lags in the areas of credit 
access in the private sector and contract en-
forcement, the two indicators that may matter 
most for growth (Hanusch 2012; World Bank 
2014a).
The scenarios for Ethiopia assess effects of 
a policy package aimed at making good use 
of its rapidly growing labor force through im-
proved education, higher private savings, and 
more rapid total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth during the period 2015–30. The base 
scenario, which serves as a benchmark, repre-
sents business-as-usual conditions, including a 
projected annual per capita GDP growth rate 
of 4.0 percent up to 2030; this rapid growth 
is fueled by a projected continuing decline in 
the total dependency rate and 3 percent an-
nual growth of the labor force. The scenario 
educ+, is based on an projection for a “fast-
tracked” improvement in educational attain-
ment, generating by 2030 an increase in the 
number of workers with nine or more years 
of education by 7 percent compared with the 
base.d Under this scenario, the share of total 
labor force with nine years of education or 
more in 2030 increases modestly to 9.0 per-
cent, compared with 8.4 percent for the base. 
To close part of Ethiopia’s private savings gap 
compared with similar countries, the savings 
scenario (sav+) gradually raises private sav-
ings by roughly 4 percent of GDP between 
2015 and 2030, a change that replicates in-
creases in the national savings rate during the 
last few years. In the scenario with increased 
TFP growth (tfp+), annual factor-neutral TFP 
growth is increased by 0.5 percentage point 
(which may be compared to an annual TFP 
growth rate of 1.9 percent under the base sce-
nario). In the final scenario, changes in these 
three areas are introduced together (combo+). 
While interventions in each of the three 
areas would accelerate growth, poverty re-
duction, and shared prosperity, the strongest 
impacts would stem from TFP growth and 
private investment. Compared with the base, 
higher educational attainments raise annual 
GDP growth by a mere 0.1 percent, reflect-
ing the fact that feasible additional changes in 
labor force educational composition within a 
15-year period are quite limited (figure 6.10). 
The growth gains are higher (0.5–0.7 percent-
age point) for tfp+ and sav+, because they im-
mediately add to stocks of employed factors 
and their productivity. Combo+ brings about 
a growth gain of 1.3 percentage points. Under 
the base, extreme poverty declines drastically, 
from 27.8 percent in 2015 to 9.6 percent in 
2030; the strongest additional decline is for 
combo+, with a poverty rate of just 5.5 per-
cent in 2030. 
These findings suggest that, in the long run, 
continued rapid growth may require stronger 
emphasis on the private sector. While recog-
nizing the impressive progress that Ethiopia 
has made in recent years, recent World Bank 
analysis (Eden and Kraay 2014; Gable, Lof-
gren, and Osario-Rodarte 2015; Moller and 
Wacker 2015) suggests that, as public invest-
ment manages to close the most urgent infra-
structure gaps over time, a rebalancing with 
increased emphasis on private investment may 
be most conducive to continued rapid growth. 
The results indicate that growth and shared 
prosperity could benefit strongly from policies 
that raise and effectively channel private sav-
ings to productive investment and improve the 
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FIgure 6.10 ethiopia’s gDP per capita growth under alternative 
scenarios, 2016–30
Source: World Bank calculations, based on MAMS simulation results.
Note: Scenarios include base = benchmark (no change), educ+ = improved education, sav+ = 
higher savings, tfp+ = higher total factors of production, combo+ = combination of all three.
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business climate for the private sector, making 
continued productivity gains feasible; togeth-
er, such steps could make it easier to absorb 
the growing labor force at improving wages.
Sustaining productivity growth 
in Brazil: Savings, labor, and 
pensions 
Brazil, a country in the late-dividend group, 
faces the challenge of increasing output per 
worker while protecting the living standards 
of its rapidly growing elderly population. 
Around 2020, Brazil’s total dependency rate 
is expected to end more than 50 years of de-
cline as the increase in the elderly dependency 
rate begins to exceed the decline in the youth 
dependency rate. After a longer period of de-
cline, the total fertility rate is expected to sta-
bilize well below the replacement level (figure 
6.11). The population ages 15–64 is expected 
to peak around 2020, and the total popula-
tion some time before 2050 (at around 230 
million). To improve living standards, output 
per worker will have to rise. That will re-
quire increases in the private capital stock per 
worker and improved worker skills. 
The scenarios for Brazil use a policy pack-
age that helps increase private savings, labor 
force participation, and labor productivity to 
test how growth might be sustained for the 
period 2015–50. The benchmark base scenar-
io assumes relatively unchanged GDP shares 
for private investment, taxation, and govern-
ment spending, the latter requiring pension 
reform given rapid aging. A GDP per capita 
growth rate of 1 percent is imposed for this 
scenario, an improvement from growth rates 
near zero during the past few years. In the al-
ternative scenarios, the private savings rate is 
raised gradually to match the GDP shares of 
peer country comparators starting by 2030 
(sav+); the labor force participation rate (la-
bor force as a share of population ages 15–64) 
is raised from 77 to 87 percent, enough to per-
mit labor force growth to match population 
growth (lfp+); and a moderate increase of 0.5 
percent in labor-specific productivity growth 
is imposed (lprd+), sufficient to bring about a 
moderate increase in TFP growth of 0.3 per-
centage point (to 0.8 percent a year). The sce-
nario combo+ combines all of these changes. 
The results suggest that changes in savings, 
labor force participation, and labor produc-
tivity combine to raise the annual GDP per 
capita growth rate by 1 percentage point in 
the 2016–50 period. The results show levels 
for 2015–50 and growth for 2016-50 (since 
growth by definition is compared to a preced-
ing year. An increase in private savings and 
investment of around 7 percent of GDP, suffi-
cient to close Brazil’s savings gap (IMF 2013), 
generates an increase in annual GDP growth 
of 0.3 percentage point (sav+; figure 6.12). 
Similar growth gains follow from increases 
in labor productivity (lprd+) and labor force 
participation (lfp+); the required participa-
tion increase could be almost fully realized 
if female participation rose to the male level 
(which already is close to 87 percent), but a 
delayed retirement age could also contribute. 
The impact of combining the three shocks is 
a doubling of GDP per capita growth from 1 
to 2 percent, with two-thirds of the gain due 
to increased factor employment and one-third 
due to increases in TFP. In the base scenario, 
population in extreme poverty declines from 
4.8 percent in 2015 to 3.6 in 2030 and to 2.2 
FIgure 6.11 Fertility and dependency rates in 
Brazil, 1990–2030
Source: World Bank calculations, based on medium variant in UN (2013b).
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in 2050. For combo+, a mere 0.7 percent re-
main extremely poor in 2050. Per capita con-
sumption growth ranges between 0.9 percent 
for base and 1.6 percent for combo+.
These gains require reforms in the pension 
and education systems, the labor market, and 
the business environment. The reforms in the 
pension system, implicit in the freezing of pub-
lic pension spending at the 2015 GDP share, 
may be the most difficult challenge since it 
may imply a considerable decline in pension 
per beneficiary toward levels comparable to 
that of major OECD economies (Economist 
2012). If current benefits were kept in place 
and adjusted for per capita consumption 
growth, likely increases in spending and taxa-
tion would exceed 10 percent of GDP. A mi-
croeconomic perspective is needed to assess 
the impact of higher taxes and redistribution 
on growth, including savings.e A substantial 
body of research looks at potential reforms 
that could address policies related to aging 
(Gragnolati et al. 2011) and other areas, in-
cluding Brazil’s educational system (Bruns, 
Evans, and Luque 2012; OECD 2012), and 
business environment, indicated by a rank-
ing of 40 among the 51 upper-middle-income 
countries covered by the Doing Business Indi-
cators (World Bank 2014a).
adapting to aging in Japan: 
Labor force participation and 
immigration 
The demography of Japan, a post-dividend 
country that has reached an advanced stage of 
aging, imposes severe challenges to maintain-
ing its high living standards. Japan’s total fer-
tility rate is 1.3 percent, one of the lowest in the 
world, and its aging population (65 and over) 
stands at 26 percent, the largest in the world. 
Although fertility is projected to increase, Ja-
pan’s population is expected to shrink from a 
current level of around 125 million to 85 mil-
lion in 2100 (figure 6.13). Dependency ratios 
will not change over this period, reflecting a 
convergence of the growth rates of each popu-
lation group to negative values.
The scenario analysis for Japan assesses the 
impact of a policy package that includes ac-
tions aimed at raising the total fertility rate, 
labor force participation, and immigration 
for the period 2015–2100. The base scenario 
is designed to represent a business-as-usual 
case, with no change in government poli-
cies.21 Labor force participation and savings 
depend on age-specific and, for labor, gender-
specific rates. In the alternative scenarios, the 
FIgure 6.12 Brazil’s per capita gDP growth 
under alternative scenarios, 2016–30
Source: World Bank calculations, based on MAMS simulation results.
Note: Scenarios include base = benchmark (no change), sav+; Lfp+; 
Lprd+; and combo+ = combination of all three.
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FIgure 6.13 Fertility and dependency rates in 
Japan, 1990–2100
Source: World Bank calculations, based on medium variant in UN (2013b).
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TFR is increased to the replacement level of 
2.1 percent (fert+), and labor force participa-
tion is raised by bringing females to the male 
level and delaying by a decade the decline 
that starts at age 55 (lfp+); both fertility and 
labor force changes are introduced gradu-
ally from 2016 to 2035. During the same 
period, the scenario migr+ brings an annual 
flow of around 200,000 immigrants in their 
20s—a number slightly above what is needed 
to eliminate the projected population decline 
for this age group and proposed in a recent 
government report (Economist 2014; Japan 
Times 2014). Starting in 2036, the number 
of new immigrants declines gradually, becom-
ing insignificant by 2100. The immigrants are 
evenly split between men and women, and 
they take on the demographic and economic 
characteristics of the resident population ex-
cept for that they remit 10 percent of their 
incomes to their home country.
The results indicate that such a policy 
package could both improve living standards 
and limit the decline in Japan’s share in the 
world economy in the long run. In the long 
run, higher fertility (fert+) or immigration 
(migr+) reduce the total dependency ratio 
and raise the population; together, they bring 
about positive population growth (figures 
6.14, 6.15) and raise total GDP. However, 
the impact of these two scenarios on GDP 
per capita is insignificant given similar gains 
in population and labor force growth, leaving 
population growth in excess of labor growth 
(figure 6.16). Higher labor force participation 
(lfp+) raises growth in employment and GDP 
without affecting population growth, thereby 
FIgure 6.14 Higher fertility and migration rates 
would reduce total dependency rates in Japan 
Source: World Bank calculations, based on MAMS simulation results.
Note: base = benchmark (no change), fert+ = increased fertility; migr+ = 
increased immigration; combo = combination of the two.
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FIgure 6.15 Combined, higher fertility rates and 
immigration could raise Japan’s population
Source: World Bank estimates based on MAMS simulation results. 
Note: Base = benchmark (no change), fert+ = increased fertility rate; 
migr+ = increased immigration; combo = combination of the two.
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FIgure 6.16 Higher labor force participation in 
Japan could have the biggest impact on gDP per 
capita growth
Source: World Bank calculations, based on MAMS simulation results.
Note: base = benchmark (no change), fert+ = increased fertility rate; 
migr+ = increased immigration; combo = combination of the two.
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raising GDP per capita. In the background, 
the changes in age composition and labor 
force participation raise savings and capital 
accumulation, with the strongest impact for 
the scenario lfp+.
The changes in fertility, labor force par-
ticipation, and migration that underpin these 
simulations may be difficult to realize and 
depend on changes in behavior and policy. 
Japan’s demographic challenges are a long-
standing concern. Policy measures tend to 
stress the need to encourage work, reduce 
financial and career-related burdens of child 
rearing, and facilitate integration of immi-
grants into Japanese society.f Limited success 
to date in bringing about these changes sug-
gests that the issues are difficult and depend 
on attitudes and social processes that respond 
to policy only very slowly.
Notes for Country Spotlights
a.  The model that is used, MAMS, is described in 
appendix D. For a basic reference, see Lofgren, 
Cicowiez, and Diaz-Bonilla 2013.
b.  The parametric changes in labor force participa-
tion and educational attainment are based on 
findings from ongoing research (Wodon 2015).
c.  In 2011, Ethiopia had the 3rd highest public 
investment level in the world and the 6th lowest 
private investment rate in the world, 18.6 and 
6.9 percent of GDP, respectively; these figures 
reflect the pursuit, since the late 1990s, of a 
development strategy based on a “big push” in 
public infrastructure investment as the engine of 
growth (World Bank 2013c).
d.  The International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis has produced alternative projections 
for educational attainment up to 2050 for 120 
countries, including Ethiopia with a scenario 
that reflects current trends (part of base) and 
a fast-track scenario with accelerated but still 
plausible gains in educational attainments (part 
of educ+); see KC et al. (2010).
e.  Research is not settled in these areas and there 
may be trade-offs between growth and equity. 
For different findings on savings in Brazil, com-
pare Rocha 2010 and Jorgenson 2011; for a 
cross-country perspective on taxes, see Ostry, 
Berg, and Tsangarides 2014.
f.  Among international institutions, the IMF and 
the OECD have produced an extensive body of 
research on issues related to growth, the labor 
market, and gender issues in Japan. For an up-
to-date perspective, see for example Botman, 
Danninger, and Schiff 2015.
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Notes
 1.  This section draws heavily on recent World 
Bank reports on demography with a regional 
or country focus, including Cotlear 2011; 
Gragnaloti et al. 2011, 2015; Bussolo, Koettl, 
and Sinnott 2015; World Bank 2015b, 2015c, 
2015d. 
 2.  The first 1,000 days, starting from concep-
tion, are critical for infant and child health. 
Improving the nutrition and health of expect-
ing mothers reduces the incidence of health 
complications for newborns and infants. 
 3.  World Bank (2015b) argues that developing 
countries that have just started to age and 
that do not already have well-established pub-
lic pension systems have an opportunity to 
develop fiscally sustainable support systems. 
In this, they are at an advantage compared 
with high-income countries at an advanced 
stage of aging that often have to undertake 
politically difficult reforms in costly and 
unsustainable aged-support systems.
 4.  Issues related to demography in late-dividend 
countries are addressed in detail in Grag-
naloti and others 2011, 2015; Bussolo, Koettl, 
and Sinnott 2015; and World Bank 2015a, 
2015d.
 5.  Issues related to demography in post-dividend 
countries are addressed in detail in Bussolo, 
Koettl, and Sinnott 2015 and World Bank 
2015a, 2015d.
 6.  For surveys of issues related to fertility and 
policy in East Asia, including Japan, see 
Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010, and Abbasi-
Shavazi and Gubhaju 2014.
 7.  Under perfect competition, the removal of 
impediments to the movement of factors 
and trade goods across countries creates 
opportunities for mutual gain as agents take 
advantage of price differences and reallocate 
resources across and within countries. In the 
presence of imperfect competition or various 
market failures, however, the domestic policy 
needs to play a significant role in improving 
institutions, infrastructure, human capital, 
and the like.
 8.  Broadman 2007 found that accelerating 
Asian trade and investment in Africa can 
have significant impacts on Africa’s economic 
growth and development.
 9.  Long-term trends in trade, migration, and 
capital flows are discussed in Solimano and 
Watts 2005 and WTO 2014. 
10.  These results were obtained through a simu-
lation of the World Bank’s LINKAGE model. 
Appendix D discusses the methodology and 
model results.
11.  Measures in all of these areas are also key in 
supporting the integration of Sub-Saharan 
Africa into global value chains (IMF 2015). 
12.  From a regional perspective, migration in 
Africa, Asia, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States is predominantly within 
each region; for example, intraregional flows 
account for two-thirds of all migration within 
Sub-Saharan Africa and for two-thirds 
within Europe and Central Asia (Ratha and 
Shaw 2014; WTO 2013).
13.  Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
individual policy measures on migration is 
generally limited (McKenzie and Yang 2015).
14.  Some studies also caution about the risk of 
Dutch Disease (Acosta, Lartey, and Mandel-
man 2009; Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta 
2012).
15.  Malaysia provides two examples of tar-
geted approaches: A returning expert pro-
gram offers Malaysian professionals work-
ing abroad a (lower) flat income tax rate of 
15 percent for 5 years if they return to work 
in Malaysia. A second program, targeted at 
migrants to Malaysia, offers foreign work-
ers residence passes for up to 10 years, which 
allow these workers to freely change employ-
ers (World Bank 2011).
16.  Several studies have examined this, includ-
ing Attanasio and Violante 2000; Chinn and 
Prasad 2003; Feroli 2003; Higgins 1998); 
IMF 2004; and Luhrmann 2003.
17.  These are key features under the “rapid con-
vergence scenario” of World Bank 2013a 
and Bussolo et al. 2014, in which half of 
the gap in structural determinants of capital 
flows between developing countries and the 
United States is closed by 2030. This scenario 
implies, for example, that financial develop-
ment in Brazil, India, and the Middle East in 
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2030 reaches the level of financial develop-
ment in the United States in the 1980s.
18.  The simulation results do not distinguish 
between FDI and portfolio flows. Full details 
of these simulations are provided in Bussolo 
et al. 2014.
19.  In the absence of frictions, most theoreti-
cal models will render net capital flows in a 
North-South direction, a result of the higher 
marginal product of capital in developing 
countries. In reality, capital has, somewhat 
paradoxically, been flowing from the South 
to the North (Lucas 1990). This paradox is 
explained by the differences in fundamentals 
affecting the production structure of the econ-
omy on the one hand and international capi-
tal market imperfections on the other. The 
rapid convergence scenario leads to a reversal 
of the deficit (surplus) position of high-income 
(developing) countries, which suggests a mod-
est reversal of the Lucas paradox.
20.  Macroprudential measures include tools to 
address threats to financial stability arising 
from excessive credit expansion and asset 
price booms, to address key amplification 
mechanisms of systemic risk linked to lever-
age and maturity mismatches, and to miti-
gate structural vulnerabilities in the system 
and limit systemic spillovers in times of stress 
(Financial Stability Board 2011; IMF 2014). 
Capital flow management policies can be 
residency-based (capital controls), or they 
can be structured not to discriminate based 
on residency but still aim to influence cross-
border capital flows (such as reserve require-
ments on foreign exchange deposits).
21.  The business-as-usual scenario is calibrated 
to replicate IMF growth projections up to 
2020, after which annual per capita growth 
continues at a rate of 0.8 percent.
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Goals and Targets from the Millennium Declaration
GOAL 1 ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER
Target 1.A Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day
Target 1.B Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people
Target 1.C Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
GOAL 2 ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION
Target 2.A  Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling
GOAL 3 PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN
Target 3.A Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015
GOAL 4 REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY
Target 4.A Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
GOAL 5 IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH
Target 5.A Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
Target 5.B Achieve by 2015 universal access to reproductive health
GOAL 6 COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, AND OTHER DISEASES
Target 6.A Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 6.B Achieve by 2010 universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it
Target 6.C Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
GOAL 7 ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
Target 7.A  Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources
Target 7.B Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in the rate of loss
Target 7.C Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
Target 7.D Have achieved a significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
GOAL 8 DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT
Target 8.A  Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system (including a 
commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally)
Target 8.B  Address the special needs of the least-developed countries (including tariff- and quota-free access for exports 
of the least-developed countries; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries and cancellation of 
official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to reducing 
poverty)
Target 8.C  Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (through the 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of 
the 22nd special session of the General Assembly)
Target 8.D  Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international 
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
Target 8.E  In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing 
countries
Target 8.F  In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information 
and communications
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(such as targets related to child malnutrition, 
primary completion, child mortality, and 
maternal mortality), the population growth 
within the age groups can make it more diffi-
cult to achieve the target. The growth in pop-
ulations of school-age children and women 
of child-bearing age has been significant in 
the past quarter century, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The MDGs have been instrumental in 
spurring a push for better data and enhanced 
monitoring. One important aspect of the 
MDGs has been their focus on measuring 
and monitoring progress; this focus has pre-
sented a clear challenge to improve the qual-
ity, frequency, and availability of relevant sta-
tistics. Much has been done to strengthen the 
national statistical systems where most data 
originate, but weaknesses remain in the cov-
erage and quality of many indicators in the 
poorest countries, where resources are scarce 
and careful measurement of progress may 
matter the most. Based on the most recent 
data available, the MDG Report Card in this 
appendix presents a goal-by-goal analysis 
on the progress toward the MDGs, which is 
complemented by online progress charts at 
http://data.worldbank.org/mdgs.
Since the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) were articulated in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000, 
substantial progress has been made, but a 
large unfinished agenda remains. The global 
target on poverty was met five years ahead of 
the 2015 deadline, and several other MDGs 
have been met or are likely to be met, such 
as gender parity in primary and secondary 
school enrollment. MDGs covering other 
areas like maternal mortality, however, are 
out of reach and will not be met this year, nor 
are they expected to be met globally in the 
near future. Progress has also been uneven 
across countries and regions (Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region that will not meet 
any of the targets by 2015) and socioeco-
nomic boundaries.
In many developing countries, popula-
tion growth has made it more difficult to 
achieve some goals and targets. Many targets 
are specified as proportions or rates, using 
the ratio of two numbers. The population, 
or a subgroup of the population, is often 
the denominator—so when the population 
grows, achieving a fall in the rate will require 
a correspondingly large fall in the numerator. 
If a target is mainly for specific age groups 
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Evaluated at $1.25 a day in 2005 purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the world met the MDG target of halv-
ing the proportion of the population in extreme pov-
erty five years ahead of the 2015 deadline (World 
Bank 2015). The proportion of people in the world 
living on less than $1.25 a day fell from 36.4 percent 
in 1990 to 14.5 percent in 2011. Forecasts based on 
country-specific growth rates over the past 10 years 
indicate a fall in the global extreme poverty rate to 
11.5 percent by 2015 (figure A.1), a drop of more 
than two-thirds from the baseline.
Progress toward reducing poverty across regions 
has been uneven. East Asia and the Pacific experi-
enced the fastest rate of poverty reduction, slashing 
its share of people living on less than $1.25 a day 
from 58.2 percent in 1990 to 7.9 percent in 2011 and 
reaching the target well ahead of the deadline. Europe 
and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and the Middle East and North Africa all reached 
the target by 2010. South Asia achieved the target 
by 2011, following a strong acceleration after 2008. 
This reduction was mainly brought about by popu-
lous India, whose poverty trajectory strongly influ-
enced the trend for the whole South Asian region. By 
contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind and is 
not expected to meet the target by 2015.
Progress in reducing the absolute number of poor 
people was weaker, especially in regions and coun-
tries with rapid population growth. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the number of extremely poor people actually 
increased from 290 million in 1990 to 415 million in 
2011, as a result of a very fast-growing population 
(figure A.2).
The global achievement of the MDG 1 poverty 
target was aided by the strong performance of China 
and India, the two countries in the world in 1990 
with the highest population and also the largest 
number of extreme poor. China has been a driving 
force for poverty reduction worldwide as well as in 
its own region. China’s extreme poverty rate declined 
from 60.7 percent in 1990 to 6.3 percent in 2011. 
Still, it had 8.3 percent of the world’s extreme poor 
in 2011, the world’s third-largest share. India more 
than halved its extreme poverty rate, reducing it from 
51.4 percent in 1990 to 24.7 percent in 2011. Still, 
it was home to nearly a third of the world’s total of 
extremely poor people in 2011. While these countries 
have achieved the poverty target, their task of eradi-
cating extreme poverty remains critical, especially 
when confounded by population growth.
Based on current trends, nearly half of the 145 
developing countries have already achieved the pov-
erty target of MDG 1. However, 27 countries are 
seriously off track, meaning that at the current pace 
of progress, they will not be able to halve their 1990 
extreme poverty rates even by 2030. All but six of 
these 27 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa (World 
Bank MDG Data Dashboard).1
MDG 1 also aims to halve hunger and malnutri-
tion rates by 2015. The prevalence of malnutrition 
among children under age five in developing coun-
tries has dropped substantially, falling from 25 
percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2014. However, 
developing countries as a whole may not be able to 
meet the target by 2015, nor will South Asia or Sub-
Saharan Africa (figure A.3). In part, the target will 
be missed because of the significant growth in the 
under-five population in Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
grew nearly 75 percent between 1990 and 2014. 
In other developing regions, the under-five popula-
tion either dropped considerably (East Asia and the 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean) or grew only moderately (Middle 
East and North Africa and South Asia). Sub-Saharan 
Africa is also the only developing region that has 
seen a steady upward trend in the number of under-
weight children under the age of five, from 27.5 mil-
lion in 1990 to 31.4 million in 2014 (one-third of 
the developing world’s underweight children under 
age five).
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
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FiGurE A.1 Share of people living on less than $1.25 a day, by region, 1990–2015
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Source: World Bank PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet). 
Note: Based on 2005 purchasing power parity.
FiGurE A.2 Number of people living on less than $1.25 a day, 
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FiGurE A.3 Percentage of children under five who are underweight, by region,  
1990–2015 
East Asia and Pacic
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Developing countries
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015target
Sh
ar
e 
of
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
un
de
r a
ge
 
ve
 (%
) Forecast
Source: UNICEF, WHO, and World Bank 2015.
232
MDG 2 focuses solely on the effort to ensure that 
all children, boys and girls alike, can complete a full 
course of primary education by 2015. This target is 
measured by the primary school completion rate—
the proportion of children completing the last grade 
of primary education, regardless of age—and is not 
likely to be met by developing countries as a whole 
by 2015.
The primary completion rate in developing coun-
tries increased from about 79 percent in 1990 to 91 
percent in 2013 (figure A.4). This is an impressive 
gain, especially when considering that the number 
of students in the last grade of primary education in 
developing countries grew from 88 million in 1990 
to 103 million in 2013. This increase means that, 
during the past two decades or so, nearly 25 million 
more children were able to complete a full course of 
primary education. Even though the primary comple-
tion rate has remained at 91 percent since 2009 for 
developing countries, 1 million more children were 
added to the group of primary school graduates over 
the past five years.
Among the six developing regions, East Asia and 
the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean have reached the tar-
get. However, the other regions are not expected 
to reach the target. The challenge faced by Sub- 
Saharan Africa is especially daunting: despite a sub-
stantial increase in the primary completion rate, from 
54 percent in 1990 to 69 percent in 2013, it is still 
the lowest among all regions; in 2013 it was nearly 
20 percentage points below the average rate for all 
developing countries. At the same time, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the fastest-growing population of pri-
mary-school-age children among all regions, placing 
more pressure on its education system.
Regional averages often conceal variations in per-
formance across countries. For example, although 
East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean have achieved 
the MDG 2 target, 18 countries in these regions are 
seriously off track and are unlikely to achieve the tar-
get even by 2030. On the other hand, the target has 
been achieved in 9 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
although the region as a whole has lagged (World 
Bank MDG Data Dashboard).
Variations are captured not only across countries 
but also within countries—between the rich and the 
poor and between urban and rural residents. Chil-
dren in poor families and those living in rural areas 
are less likely to enroll or remain in school. In Sen-
egal, for example, 73 percent of children from house-
holds whose incomes were in the richest quintile com-
pleted primary education in 2012, compared with 51 
percent of children from the poorest quintile. While 
83 percent of children in urban areas completed pri-
mary school, only 57 percent of children in rural 
areas did so (figure A.5). Ensuring equitable access 
to education is a key challenge in achieving universal 
primary education.
To complete a course of education, children need 
to enroll and stay in school. However, many children 
either never attend school, start school but attend 
intermittently, or drop out before completion. The 
number of primary-school-age children not attending 
school has been halved to 56 million since peaking in 
1997. South Asia substantially reduced the number 
of primary-school-age children not in school, driven 
by significant progress in India. Sub-Saharan Africa 
decreased the number of out-of-school children by 
about 8 million between 1990 and 2013. But the 
population growth of primary-school-age children in 
the region—a 77 percent increase from 87 million to 
153 million during the same period—made it all the 
more challenging for countries in the region to make 
a larger reduction. Consequently, about 60 percent of 
the developing world’s out-of-school children live in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (figure A.6).
Achieve universal primary education
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FiGurE A.4 Primary school completion rate, by region, 1990–2013
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics. 
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FiGurE A.5 Primary completion rate by income 
quintile and residence, Senegal, 2012 
Source: World Bank EdStats Database. World Bank calculations, based on 
Demographic and Health Surveys. 
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FiGurE A.6 Number of primary-school-age children out of school, by region, 1990–2013
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics. 
MDG 3 is aimed at promoting gender equality and 
empowering women by enhancing women’s social, 
economic, and political participation. Expanding 
opportunities for girls and women in these areas ben-
efits them directly as well as society as a whole.
The target associated with MDG 3 is to eliminate 
gender disparity at all levels of education by 2015. 
Developing countries as a whole are likely to reach 
gender parity in primary and secondary enrollment, 
defined as having a ratio of girls to boys in primary 
and secondary at 97–103 percent, according to 
UNESCO (2004). The ratio of girls to boys enrolled 
in primary and secondary schools increased from 83 
percent in 1990 to 97 percent in 2013 (figure A.7). 
The ratio in tertiary education has increased even 
more, from 72 percent to 103 percent in the same 
period.
Nearly half of the 145 countries have achieved 
gender parity in primary and secondary enroll-
ment. However, 25 countries are seriously off target. 
While 11 countries are in the Middle East and North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 are in Europe 
and Central Asia and Latin America and the Carib-
bean, regions that have achieved gender parity on the 
whole (World Bank MDG Data Dashboard).
Across developing regions, there are substantial 
differences in progress. Besides economic and policy 
factors that influence gender parity in education (such 
as economic growth, investment in infrastructure 
and education, and more direct policy interventions), 
demography and the evolution of school-age popula-
tions in each region may also underlie some of the 
uneven progress. South Asia made the most remark-
able progress among regions, closing the gender gap 
in primary and secondary enrollment by more than 
30 percentage points between 1990 and 2013 to 
reach gender parity. In 1990, South Asia’s ratio of 
girls to boys in school enrollment was only 68, 12 
percentage points lower than in the Middle East and 
North Africa (the next lowest region). South Asia 
achieved parity even though the region added 47 mil-
lion school-age boys and 41 million school-age girls 
in the period, pressuring school systems to educate 
more children. East Asia and the Pacific and Europe 
and Central Asia had already reached gender par-
ity in primary and secondary school enrollment by 
2013. These regions have experienced a decline in the 
school-age population since the early 2000s, which 
may have enabled them to make more resources 
available for children. Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East and North Africa saw fast progress, but 
they continue to have the largest gender disparities in 
primary and secondary enrollment rates among all 
developing regions and are unlikely to meet the tar-
get of eliminating these disparities by 2015. The task 
has been more challenging for Sub-Saharan Africa 
because its school-education age population has 
grown steadily since 1990, imposing increased pres-
sure on its educational systems.
While tremendous progress was made regard-
ing gender parity in tertiary education (figure A.8), 
regional disparities are quite stark. Four of the six 
regions have achieved gender parity in tertiary edu-
cation, including the Middle East and North Africa, 
which is struggling to achieve gender parity in pri-
mary and secondary education. South Asia has made 
accelerated progress since 2010 and is on track to 
reach gender parity in tertiary enrollment. As of 2013, 
however, the female-to-male tertiary enrollment ratio 
remained very low in Sub-Saharan Africa (73 percent).
Gender disparities in the labor market and in the 
political arena are also critical, and associated indica-
tors are used for monitoring progress there as well. 
Women work long hours and contribute consider-
ably to their families’ economic well-being, but many 
engage in low-paying and less productive jobs. The 
share of women’s paid employment in the nonagricul-
tural sector is less than 20 percent in the Middle East 
and North Africa, having risen only marginally over 
the years. The share of women in wage employment is 
the highest in Europe and Central Asia, almost equal 
to men’s at 45 percent (figure A.9).
Women also lag men in participating in public life 
and decision making at the highest levels, as mea-
sured by the proportion of parliamentary seats held 
by women. As of 2014, Latin America and the Carib-
bean led developing-country regions, with 29 per-
cent of the seats held by women, followed closely by 
Sub-Saharan Africa at 22 percent. Overall, women’s 
presence has improved compared with 1990 levels. 
The biggest change has occurred in the Middle East 
and North Africa, where the proportion of seats held 
by women more than quadrupled between 1990 and 
2014 (figure A.10).
Promote gender equality and empower women
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FiGurE A.9 Share of women in wage employment in the 
nonagricultural sector, 2009–13 
Source: International Labour Organization.
Note: The percentage for each region is the median for the region’s countries for the most 
recent year available between 2009 and 2013. 
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FiGurE A.7 ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary 
education, by region, 1990–2013
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.
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FiGurE A.8 ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education,  
by region, 1990–2013 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics. 
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FiGurE A.10 Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliaments, by region, 2000–14
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
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In the past two decades, the number of children 
across the globe who die each year before their fifth 
birthday has been cut more than in half, falling from 
13 million in 1990 to 6 million in 2015. At the end 
point of the MDGs, at least 16,000 fewer children 
die each day compared with 1990.
In 2015, the global average rate of child mortal-
ity declined to 43 deaths per 1,000 live births, about 
half its 1990 level of 91 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Although a significant achievement, based on the 
current trend, the world as a whole fell short of the 
MDG 4 target of reducing the under-five mortal-
ity rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015. The 
average annual rate of decline of the global under-
five mortality rate accelerated from 1.8 percent over 
1990–2000 to 3.9 percent over 2005–15. If the more 
recent rate of decline had started in 1990, the target 
for MDG 4 would likely have been achieved by 2015. 
And if this recent rate of decline continues, the tar-
get will be achieved in 2026 (United Nations Inter-
agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation 2015). 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia bear the high-
est child mortality rates, despite rapid improvements 
since 2000 (figure A.11). In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the rate declined by more than half between 1990 
and 2015 but still remained high at 83 deaths per 
1,000 live births. At the same time, the number of 
under-five deaths declined by only 24 percent largely 
because of the large increase (nearly 76 percent) in 
the under-five population in the region.
East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and 
the Caribbean have achieved the MDG 4 target. 
Among the 145 countries evaluated, 57 have already 
met the child mortality target by 2015. Based on 
recent trends, 35 countries are seriously off track, 
and more than one-third of these countries are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank MDG Data 
Dashboard).
 In 2015 around 4.3 million under-five deaths, 
or about 73 percent of all such deaths worldwide, 
occurred in 20 developing countries. Most of these 
countries are characterized by large populations, 
often with high birthrates. Many have substantially 
reduced mortality rates over the past two decades. 
Of these 20 countries, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania and Uganda 
achieved a two-thirds reduction in their under-five 
mortality rate by 2015. Had the mortality rates of 
1990 prevailed in 2015, 4.2 million more children 
would have died in these 11 countries, and another 
6.9 million would have died in the remaining 9 coun-
tries (figure A.12).
Urbanization is associated with lower levels of 
child mortality (World Bank 2013). Figure A.13 
shows that child mortality rates tend to be lower in 
countries with a larger share of the population liv-
ing in urban areas. These lower rates may be because 
urban residents tend to be more affluent or have bet-
ter access to health facilities and more cost-effective 
interventions. In urban areas, women also tend to 
be better educated and have better access to contra-
ceptive methods than their rural counterparts, which 
in turn contributes to lower fertility rates and better 
health for the mother and child (Müller et al. 2015). 
This is not always the case, however. Child mortality 
tends to be very high in countries where the majority 
of the urban population lives in slums.2
reduce child mortality
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FiGurE A.12 Number of deaths of children under age five in 2015, selected countries 
Source: World Bank calculations. 
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FiGurE A.13 Child mortality and urbanization, 2015
Source: World Development Indicators database. 
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FiGurE A.11 under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), by region, 1990–2015 
Source: United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation.
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Every day, around 800 young women lose their 
lives before, during, or after childbirth. Most of 
these deaths are avoidable (WHO 2014b]. Maternal 
deaths are heavily concentrated in poor areas of the 
world. Globally, an estimated 289,000 women died 
from maternal causes in 2013, 99 percent of which 
occurred in developing countries. Sub-Saharan 
Africa experienced disproportionately high mater-
nal deaths, accounting for 62 percent of the global 
total, followed by South Asia, which accounted for 
24 percent.
The MDG 5 target calls for reducing the mater-
nal mortality ratio (MMR) by 75 percent between 
1990 and 2015, the highest percentage reduc-
tion among all MDG targets. The MMR is calcu-
lated based on the number of maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births. During the period 1990–2013, 
the MMR came down substantially in developing 
countries as a whole, declining from 430 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 230 mater-
nal deaths in 2013 (figure A.14). Despite this very 
significant progress, most developing countries are 
not likely to achieve this MDG target. According 
to recent data, only 18 countries (12 percent) have 
already achieved or are likely to achieve the target 
(World Bank MDG Data Dashboard). The majority 
of developing countries (88 countries, 61 percent) 
are seriously off target.
Even though many countries are unlikely to 
achieve the target, most of these countries have 
experienced a large reduction in their MMR since 
1990. A decline in the MMR itself, however, does 
not necessarily mean that the number of mater-
nal deaths has declined. In Niger, for example, 
the MMR declined by 37 percent between 1990 
and 2013, but the number of maternal deaths 
increased by 30 percent. Because the number of 
reproductive-age women (15–49 years) more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2013, and because the 
total fertility rate remained very high at 7.6 births per 
woman, the number of live births not only increased 
rapidly but also outpaced the decline of the MMR. 
Improved maternal health care is found to be asso-
ciated with lower maternal mortality. However, less 
than 50 percent of women in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa are able to meet the World Health 
Organization’s recommendation of at least four pre-
natal care services during each pregnancy. More-
over, only half of all births in these two regions are 
assisted by skilled birth attendants such as doctors, 
nurses, and trained midwives (figure A.15).
Reducing maternal deaths requires a comprehen-
sive approach to women’s reproductive health ser-
vices, particularly through better access to contra-
ception. Women with more than four children tend 
to have an increased risk of maternal deaths (WHO 
2013). A higher prevalence of contraceptive use can 
reduce the number of pregnancies, leading to a lower 
risk of maternal deaths. Moreover, contraceptive use 
can reduce the likelihood of unwanted pregnancies 
and therefore unsafe abortions, which are one of the 
main causes of maternal deaths. There is a negative 
correlation between the MMR and the contracep-
tive prevalence rate (CPR) (Ahmed and others 2012) 
(figure A.16). Most Sub-Saharan African countries 
have low CPRs and very high MMRs compared with 
other developing countries.
Lower fertility rates for adolescent women (ages 
15–19 years) are also associated with lower maternal 
mortality ratios (Conde-Agudelo, Belizán, and Lam-
mers 2005). Women who give birth at early ages are 
likely to bear more children and are at greater risk 
of death or serious complications from pregnancy. 
The adolescent fertility rate remained high in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, although it declined by about 26 per-
cent between 1990 and 2014, from 140 to 103 per 
1,000 adolescent women (figure A.17). In contrast, 
during the same period in South Asia, the adolescent 
fertility rate declined by two-thirds, from 103 to 35 
per 1,000 adolescent women.
improve maternal health
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FiGurE A.17 Adolescent fertility rate, by region, 1990–2014 
Source: United Nations Population Division.
FiGurE A.16 Comparison of contraceptive prevalence rate (CPr) and maternal mortality ratio  
(MMr), by region
Source: United Nations Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group, United Nations Children’s Fund, and household surveys (including 
Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys).
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FiGurE A.15 Share of births attended by skilled health staff,  
by region 
Source: United Nations Children’s Fund and household surveys (including Demographic and Health 
Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys).
Note: The percentage for each region is the average for the region’s countries for the most recent 
year available between 2008 and 2014.
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Source: United Nations Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group, modeled estimates. 
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Developing countries
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are among the 
world’s deadliest infectious diseases. The targets of 
MDG 6 are to halt and begin to reverse the spread 
and incidence of these diseases by 2015. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the spread of HIV/AIDS brought to 
a standstill decades of steady increases in life expec-
tancy: the region’s average life expectancy at birth 
increased from 40 years in 1960 to 50 years in 1990 
but stagnated in the 2000s. HIV/AIDS has also left 
millions of children orphaned. Tuberculosis killed 
1.1 million people worldwide in 2013, most of them 
ages 15–45, and sickened millions more. Malaria has 
taken a large toll as well, being one of the leading 
causes of death among young children, and at the 
same time it has undermined the health of millions of 
adults at a high cost to their productivity.
Across the world, an estimated 37 million people 
were living with HIV/AIDS in 2014. The number 
of people newly infected with HIV is continuing to 
decline in most parts of the world: 2 million people 
contracted the disease in 2014, down 33 percent 
from 2001 and 13 percent from 2011. The spread of 
new HIV infections has slowed, in line with the tar-
get of halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS 
by 2015. However, the proportion of adults living 
with HIV worldwide has stayed around 0.8 percent 
since 2000. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the center of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with about 70 percent of the 
world’s adults living with HIV. The HIV prevalence 
rate was 4.5 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014, 
compared with less than 1 percent in other regions 
that have data available.
Despite the progress in stabilizing the propor-
tion of adults living with HIV worldwide, continued 
population growth means that the absolute number 
of adults with HIV is increasing (figure A.18). Their 
number increased from 29 million in 2005 to 34 mil-
lion in 2014 worldwide, and from 20 million to 24 
million in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. This dynamic 
poses additional challenges to expanding coverage 
in access to antiretroviral drugs, which have dra-
matically improved the survival rates for those liv-
ing with HIV. In 2015, 15 million people worldwide 
are receiving antiretroviral drugs. The percentage of 
people living with HIV who are not receiving anti-
retroviral therapies has fallen from 90 percent in 
2006 to 60 percent in 2014 (UNAIDS 2015). 
Slowing and reversing the HIV epidemic require 
changes in behaviors based on understanding the 
causes and transmission mechanisms of the disease, 
as well as on effective steps to avoid infection. Survey 
results show that wide knowledge gaps persist. Many 
young people appear to be ill-informed about HIV 
and engage in risky behaviors. Of the 10 countries 
with the highest HIV prevalence rates, 2013 survey 
participants in Namibia and Swaziland were the most 
informed, with more than 50 percent of the sampled 
men and women ages 15–24 able to list two ways to 
prevent HIV, as well as to reject three common mis-
conceptions about HIV. In Kenya and Mozambique, 
men scored above 50 percent, but women fell short, 
while in Zimbabwe the opposite was the case. In the 
remaining five countries (Lesotho, Malawi, South 
Africa, Uganda, and Zambia), both men and women 
scored less than 50 percent.
In 2013, there were 9 million new tuberculosis 
cases in the world and 1.1 million deaths. However, 
the incidence and prevalence of tuberculosis, as well 
as the rate of deaths resulting from it, are falling: inci-
dence fell 41 percent between 1990 and 2013, and 
the death rate fell 45 percent (WHO 2014a). Glob-
ally, the target of halting and reversing tuberculosis 
incidence by 2015 has been achieved. Despite popu-
lation growth, the absolute numbers of tuberculosis 
cases and deaths have dropped because of the decline 
in the incidence and death rates (figure A.19).
Globally, an estimated 214 million cases of malaria 
occurred in 2015, which led to 438,000 deaths. An 
estimated 3.2 billion people are at risk of being 
infected with malaria and developing the disease.
Since 2000, there have been substantial reductions in 
both the number of malaria cases and deaths. It is evi-
dent that the target of halting and reversing the inci-
dence of malaria has been met (WHO and UNICEF 
2015). Country-level data suggest that there has been 
progress against malaria over time, although consis-
tent data needed to monitor trends globally are lim-
ited. Malaria occurs in all regions, but the most lethal 
form of the malaria parasite is concentrated mainly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Insecticide-treated bed nets 
have proven an effective preventative, and their use by 
children in the region is growing (figure A.20). Better 
testing and the use of combination drug therapies are 
improving the effectiveness of treatment. 
Combat HiV/AiDS, malaria, and other diseases
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FiGurE A.18 Prevalence of HiV in adults and number of adults living with HiV, by region, 1990–2014
Sources: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and World Development Indicators Database.
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FiGurE A.19 rate and numbers of tuberculosis prevalence, incidence, and death in the world, 1990–2013
Sources: World Health Organization and World Development Indicators Database.
Note: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear-positive, and extrapulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence 
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FiGurE A.20 use of insecticide-treated bed nets, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: Household surveys (including Demographic and Health Surveys, Malaria Indicators Surveys, and Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys). Data are compiled by UNICEF.
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MDG 7 seeks to promote environmental sustain-
ability by focusing on several key targets: reversing 
the loss of natural resources, preserving biodiversity, 
increasing access to safe water and sanitation, and 
improving the living conditions of people in slums. 
The aim is to achieve these goals in a sustainable 
manner, whereby people’s lives can improve without 
depleting natural and manmade capital stocks.
The loss of forests threatens the livelihood that 
poor people depend upon, destroys the habitat that 
harbors biodiversity, and eliminates an important 
carbon sink that helps moderate the climate. Net 
losses since 1990 have been substantial, especially in 
Latin American and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The losses have only been partly compen-
sated by gains elsewhere, mainly in the East Asia and 
Pacific region and in high-income countries (figure 
A.21). The rate of deforestation has slowed over the 
past decade, but with current trends, zero net losses 
will not be reached for another two decades.
The protection of forests and other terrestrial and 
marine areas is essential to preserving plant and ani-
mal habitats, as well as the diversity of species.3 By 
2012, more than 14 percent of the world’s land and 
more than 12 percent of its oceans were protected, an 
improvement of 6 percentage points in both catego-
ries since 1990 (figure A.22).
Failure to limit greenhouse gas emissions leaves 
billions of people vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change, with developing countries being 
hit hardest. Higher temperatures, changes in precipi-
tation patterns, rising sea levels, and more frequent 
weather-related disasters pose risks for agriculture, 
food, and water supplies. Carbon dioxide emissions 
rose by about 60 percent between 1990 and 2013, 
reaching an unprecedented level of 36 billion metric 
tons. The average annual growth rate in emissions 
has slowed to 2.3 percent since 2010, slightly lower 
than the annual average growth rate of 3 percent 
during the 2001–11 period (figure A.23).
The water target of MDG 7 calls for halving 
the proportion of the population without access to 
improved water and sanitation sources by 2015. 
The share of people worldwide without access to an 
improved water source declined from 23.9 percent 
in 1990 to 9.0 percent in 2015, achieving the target 
ahead of time (figure A.24). The result is especially 
impressive given that world population grew from 
5.3 billion to 7.3 billion during this period, creating 
more demand for improved water access. Not only 
was coverage extended to more than half of the 1.3 
billion people without access in 1990, but a large 
portion of newly added population was also able to 
access improved water sources. By 2015, the absolute 
number of people without access to improved water 
sources worldwide dropped to 658 million people—a 
48 percent reduction compared with 1990. Progress 
varies across regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa con-
tinuing to lag—about 32 percent of its population 
lacks access. East Asia and the Pacific managed to 
make impressive improvements, moving from a start-
ing position of only 69 percent coverage in 1990 to 
94 percent in 2015. The other regions have access 
rates of more than 92 percent.
In 1990, only 53 percent of the world’s population 
had access to improved sanitation facilities. By 2015, 
this proportion had risen to 68 percent, but this still 
leaves 2.4 billion people worldwide lacking access to 
improved sanitation facilities. For the world to meet 
the 2015 MDG target on sanitation, 76 percent of 
the population needs access to improved sanitation. 
This target was not met on time. Coverage is worse in 
rural areas, where 50 percent of the world population 
lacked access in 2015, compared with 18 percent in 
urban areas. This large disparity, especially in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, is the main reason that 
the sanitation target was not met on time. Given the 
connections between sanitation and other MDGs, 
such as infant mortality, expanding access to sanita-
tion remains a critical part of the development agenda.
Ensure environmental sustainability
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FiGurE A.21 Change in forest area, by region, 1990–2012
 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database and Food and Agriculture Organization.
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FiGurE A.22 Territorial and marine protected areas, by country 
income group, 1990–2012 
Source: World Development Indicators Database derived from UNEP and WCMC databases.
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MDG 8 focuses on the need to create a global envi-
ronment that is conducive to promoting development 
and eliminating poverty. Consequently, this goal high-
lights the need to establish a fairer multilateral trad-
ing and financial system, deal comprehensively with 
debt problems of developing countries, and address 
the special needs of low-income countries, includ-
ing landlocked and small island developing states. 
The goal recognizes that building and sustaining a 
partnership is an ongoing process that does not stop 
on a given date or when a specific target is reached. 
Moreover, the goal highlights the need to support 
infrastructure development and to provide affordable 
access to new technologies and essential medicines.
Official development assistance (ODA) by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) reached a high of $135 bil-
lion in 2013, 6.1 percent higher than in 2012 in real 
terms. This increase came after two successive years 
of decreases in 2011 and 2012 in real terms (figure 
A.25). The rebound in 2013 happened because sev-
eral members stepped up spending on foreign aid, 
despite continued budget pressures, and five new 
member countries joined the DAC: the Czech Repub-
lic, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slove-
nia. The 0.7 percent target of ODA as a share of gross 
national income (GNI) was met and exceeded only 
by Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden, 
while the Netherlands fell below this target for the 
first time since 1974. On the other hand, the top five 
ODA contributors by volume were the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and France.
The debt burden of developing economies, mea-
sured as the proportion of external debt service to 
export receipts, fell to half its 2000 levels in 2013. 
This improvement is linked to greater external debt 
servicing capacity due to increased export earnings, 
better debt management, and enhanced debt restruc-
turing, as well as to more favorable borrowing con-
ditions on international capital markets in recent 
years. The poorest and most highly indebted coun-
tries have also benefited from extensive debt relief: 35 
of the 39 countries eligible for the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country Initiative and the Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative have completed the process. The debt 
 service to export ratio averaged 11 percent in 2013, 
half its 2000 level, but with wide disparity across 
regions (figure A.26). The ratio is likely to rise going 
forward because of the fragile global economic out-
look, soft commodity prices, and projected 20 per-
cent rise in developing countries’ external debt ser-
vice over the next two to three years, following the 
33 percent increase in their combined external debt 
stock since 2010.
With the rapid development and adoption of 
mobile telephone services and the global expan-
sion of the Internet, information and communica-
tion technologies are recognized as essential tools of 
development, contributing to global integration and 
enhancing public sector effectiveness, efficiency, and 
transparency. Further spreading the use of advanced 
technology for reducing disaster risk, managing com-
municable disease outbreaks, and addressing the 
impacts of climate change carries enormous promise.
Global partnership also includes cooperation with 
the private sector, and making available the benefits 
of new technologies, especially information and com-
munications. Mobile cellular subscriptions reached 
almost 7 billion worldwide in 2014. Developing coun-
tries’ share of global mobile cellular subscriptions rose 
from 26 percent in 2000 to 75 percent in 2014. High-
income economies had more than 1 mobile cellular 
subscription per person in 2014, with 123 subscrip-
tions per 100 people, and upper-middle-income econ-
omies also reached 101 subscriptions per 100 people. 
For lower-middle-income economies, the number is 
87, while low-income economies lagged with 57 sub-
scriptions per 100 people in 2014 (figure A.27). In 
part, mobile cellular phones have replaced fixed-line 
telephone systems: the fixed telephone subscription 
rate in the world has been falling gradually, from 19 
in 2005 to 15 subscriptions per 100 people in 2014.
Similarly, Internet use in developing countries 
appears to be increasing quickly. Internet use spread 
rapidly in high-income economies in the 1990s but 
was barely under way in developing-country regions. 
Since 2000, the number of Internet users per 100 
Develop a global partnership for development
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FiGurE A.25 Official development assistance from 
Development Assistance Committee members, 1990–2013
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, StatExtracts.
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people in developing countries has grown an average 
of 26 percent a year. The percentage of the population 
with Internet access more than doubled in South Asia 
between 2010 and 2014, with 17 percent of the popu-
lation having access in 2014. However, large gaps still 
exist around the world. For example, the low-income 
countries of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
alone account for about half of the approximately 
4 billion people who are not yet using the Internet 
(figure A.28).
Notes
1.  MDG Dashboard is available at: http://data 
.worldbank.org/mdgs.
2.  As in Angola, Central Africa Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea- 
Bissau, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, and 
Somalia, for example.
3.  Protected areas are defined as terrestrial, fresh-
water, or marine areas that are recognized, 
dedicated, and managed, through legal or 
other effective means, to achieve the long-term 
conservation of nature with associated ecosys-
tem services and cultural values. This defini-
tion includes, for example, national parks and 
nature reserves (United Nations Environmen-
tal Programme—World Conservation Moni-
toring Centre).
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country circumstances. Still, several themes 
emerge that will be useful to inform efforts 
toward the SDGs. With so much of develop-
ment driven by country-level stakeholders, 
ensuring that they retain full ownership is 
essential. Given the range of country circum-
stances, the approach to the MDGs needs to 
be country specific. Finally, implementation 
arrangements, including adequate policy 
focus and financing (the MDBs have made 
commitments of over $400 billion for the 
period 2016–18) are key to progress. These 
lessons and others will facilitate the transfor-
mative progress envisioned by the SDGs. 
The World Bank Group
The World Bank Group has worked closely 
with clients endeavoring to achieve the 
MDGs and, building on this experience, 
seeks to contribute strongly to the SDG 
agenda. Through numerous MDG-related 
engagements at the global and country lev-
els, the World Bank Group has supported a 
broad range of client efforts. Based on contin-
ual assessment of this experience, the World 
Bank Group has implemented institutional 
and financial changes aimed at enhancing 
effectiveness and deepening engagement on 
the 2030 agenda. 
In reflecting on the role of policies and insti-
tutions needed to make progress toward 
development goals, it is useful to consider 
the contributions made by the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs). Development 
hinges on the efforts of multiple stakeholders 
at the country and global levels, including the 
engagement of the MDBs. This appendix con-
veys reflections from the World Bank Group, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) on their experiences with 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
and describes lessons learned for the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). Each MDB 
section answers two questions:
•   How  has  it  been  supporting  progress 
toward the MDGs?
•   What lessons can be drawn from its expe-
rience with the MDGs, in terms of what 
worked and what was less effective, for 
designing our future engagements on the 
SDGs?
The experience of the MDBs in support-
ing efforts toward the MDGs spans the globe 
and is highly contextual, based on specific 
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Supporting progress toward the MDGs 
Numerous findings emerge from the World 
Bank Group’s extensive MDG-related activi-
ties, which will help shape the institution’s 
engagement on the SDG agenda. The com-
plexity of development and the wide range 
of stakeholders make attribution and identi-
fication of cause and effect difficult. Still, a 
review of the World Bank Group’s strategies, 
partnerships, and institutional changes dur-
ing the MDG period yields five key findings 
(World Bank 2015):
•   The World Bank Group  integrated  the 
MDGs into its strategies at both at the cor-
porate and the country levels. 
•   The analytical and advisory services pro-
vided by the World Bank Group contrib-
uted meaningfully to the evolution of 
development thinking in support of the 
MDGs. 
•   The country-based model was essential to 
ensure that the MDGs agreed upon at the 
global level are fully reflected in country 
development programs. 
•   Given that development is a collaborative 
effort, the World Bank Group has sought 
to work closely with other development 
partners and stakeholders in supporting 
the MDGs. 
•   More needs to be done to articulate a results 
chain than translates the World Bank 
Group’s activities and approaches into con-
tributions toward progress on the MDGs.
Integrating the MDGs into World Bank 
Group Strategies
The World Bank integrated MDG-related 
initiatives into its core strategies, while 
increasing emphasis on institutions, gover-
nance, and global public goods. It formally 
endorsed the MDGs through the 2001 Stra-
tegic Framework Paper, emphasizing the 
importance of the results-based framework 
of the MDGs in helping to monitor develop-
ment impact, as well as the role of the MDGs 
in facilitating enhanced donor coordination 
and engagement with country counterparts. 
In the course of the MDG period, the World 
Bank Group boosted MDG-related activi-
ties, scaling up engagement on basic educa-
tion, agriculture, and infrastructure, while 
focusing on results management and put-
ting more resources into impact evaluations. 
In the process, the institution developed a 
selectivity framework that sought to chan-
nel its resources into areas where additional 
resources were urgently needed and could 
best make a difference, mindful that other 
entities may be better placed to support 
development efforts in various areas. 
The share of World Bank Group lending 
for the MDGs has remained broadly stable 
at about 40 percent (figure B.1). This level 
reflects a prioritization of development objec-
tives that was broadly consistent with the 
MDGs already in the 1990s, and with the 
expansion of total commitments, the World 
Bank Group continued to focus on MDG 
areas, especially the social sectors. The bulk 
of lending commitments were in the form of 
investment loans, rather than budget sup-
port. In many instances, the World Bank 
Group sought to implement multisectoral 
approaches, emphasizing public administra-
tion in many education and health projects, 
for example. In other cases, even if a mul-
tisectoral approach was not evident at the 
project level, the majority of countries with 
health and nutrition projects also had water 
and sanitation projects. More work is needed 
to ensure that multisectoral approaches 
deliver expected results. 
Contributing to the knowledge base 
underpinning the MDGs
The World Bank Group’s analytical work 
been a central part of the institution’s engage-
ment on development, influencing strategy 
and the results agenda. The share of analyti-
cal and advisory work related to the MDGs 
has grown steadily during the MDG period 
(figure B.2). The nonlending technical assis-
tance component has risen particularly 
quickly. The production of impact evalu-
ations also rose strongly during the MDG 
period, and more needs to be done to put 
good feedback loops in place to ensure ade-
quate learning from these outputs. 
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The application of a combination of World 
Bank Group instruments at the country level 
can generate synergies for good results. In 
Bangladesh, the program of analytic work, 
policy-based lending (in support of policy 
and institutional reforms), investment lend-
ing, and capacity-building nonlending tech-
nical assistance played a meaningful role in 
achieving better social protection outcomes. 
Similarly, in Brazil, broad-based engagement 
helped the government target social policies, 
and then monitor results. 
Supporting progress toward the MDGs 
through the country-based model
The country-based model has been at the cen-
ter of the World Bank Group’s engagement 
on the MDGs, but it can complicate integra-
tion of sector and corporate strategies. The 
2002 Monterrey Consensus notes that “each 
country has primary responsibility for its 
own economic and social development” (UN 
2002). This is essential for country owner-
ship and underpins the World Bank Group’s 
country-based model. To better deliver on 
FIGure B.1 MDG-related World Bank Group commitments and composition
 a. MDG-related commitments by type b. Composition of MDG-related commitments
Percent
 Fiscal Fiscal 
 1990–2001 2002–14
MDG 1 9 7
MDG 2 5 10
MDG 3 7 11
MDG 4 1 2
MDG 5 1 1
MDG 6 1 3
MDG 7 31 27
MDG 8 45 38
Total  100 100
Source: Business Warehouse, World Bank 2015.
Note: MDG-related commitments are determined using Operations Policy and Country Services classification, which maps the Bank’s theme codes to specific MDGs. 
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FIGure B.2 MDG-related analytical and advisory activities and composition
 a. MDG-related analytical and advisory activities b. Composition of MDG-related analytical and 
advisory activities
Percent
 Fiscal Fiscal 
 1990–2001 2002–14
MDG 1 2 10
MDG 2 12 3
MDG 3 14 8
MDG 4 0 1
MDG 5 0 1
MDG 6 2 3
MDG 7 22 23
MDG 8 48 51
Total  100 100
Source: Business Warehouse World Bank 2015.
Note: MDG-related analytical and advisory activities are determined using Operations Policy and Country Services classification, which maps the Bank’s theme codes to specific MDGs. 
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this approach, several key organizational 
changes were implemented during the MDG 
period, including extensive decentralization 
of staff to the field and matrix management. 
MDG themes were reflected in country 
strategies. While the MDGs were not always 
explicitly noted, closer analysis of a cross- 
section of 40 country engagements shows 
that more than 80 percent of the strate-
gic pillars underpinning the World Bank 
Group’s country strategies were related to 
MDG themes (World Bank 2015). In some 
instances, the strategy focused explicitly 
on supporting efforts toward MDGs that 
the country was not expected to meet, for 
example in relation to education and gender 
equality in the Republic of Yemen. While the 
country-based model has proven effective, it 
could be strengthened further to ensure inte-
gration with sector and corporate strategies.
Building partnerships for achieving  
the MDGs
The complexity of development means that 
effective progress depends on partnerships 
and selectivity based on institutional com-
parative advantage. The global endorsement 
of the MDGs provided a platform to help 
align the efforts of the development com-
munity toward shared objectives. To support 
this improved alignment, the World Bank 
Group prepared a selectivity framework that 
emphasizes comparative advantage, strategic 
relevance, and expected benefits. It has also 
sought to deepen partnerships at numerous 
levels, although more could be done. Strong 
partnerships boosted trust-funded activities 
to complement various World Bank Group 
efforts toward the MDGs, centered on spe-
cific thematic areas. For example, the Educa-
tion for All – Fast Track Initiative channeled 
funds into primary education, and enabled 
the World Bank Group to put its resources 
into other aspects of service delivery and con-
nections between education and the labor 
market. In some cases, the funds managed 
and supervised by the World Bank Group far 
exceeded its own resources. For example, the 
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, disbursed about $26.7 billion from 
2002 to 2014, nearly five times the World 
Bank Group’s related commitments during 
this period. 
Articulating a results chain for the  
World Bank Group
While the World Bank Group has consistently 
sought to increase its results focus, including 
by supporting statistical capacity building in 
client countries, connecting specific interven-
tions to MDG outcomes remains challeng-
ing. The focus on results is mainstreamed 
in the activities of the World Bank Group, 
as reflected in results-based country strate-
gies and the deployment of new financing 
instruments, such as the Program for Results, 
which links financing to predetermined 
results in stages. In support of sound moni-
toring frameworks, the World Bank Group 
provided assistance for statistical capacity 
building in many client countries. Establish-
ing a clear results chain from interventions 
to intermediate outcomes to results remains 
difficult, and more needs to be done to put 
in place effective feedback loops that sharpen 
the focus on specific MDG areas that may 
need additional attention at the country level. 
Supporting progress toward the SDGs 
with learning from the MDGs
Translating the SDGs articulated at the global 
level into effective development programs at 
the country level is the central implementa-
tion challenge. It will be challenging for many 
governments and other stakeholders to bring 
the wide-ranging and integrated SDG agenda 
into effective development programs that also 
match country-level priorities. The World 
Bank Group will seek to support clients in 
this process, based on lessons learned from 
the MDG experience and recommendations 
from assessments (Schmaljohann, Prizzon, 
and Rogerson 2015; World Bank 2015). The 
institution will focus on its core strengths, 
including the provision of long-term country 
level engagements, integrated development 
solutions, a full menu of services (knowl-
edge and financing), and platforms for cross- 
border initiatives (World Bank 2015). 
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The World Bank Group supports the inte-
grated set of SDGs and will intensify efforts 
on four cross-cutting “prerequisites” that are 
essential enablers for the wider SDG agenda 
in many countries. These prerequisites 
include supporting countries to transition 
from fragility and conflict to development, 
to scale up infrastructure investment, to 
mitigate climate change, and to join the data 
revolution (World Bank 2015). Making gains 
in these cross-cutting areas generally hinges 
on working at the international level with a 
wide range of stakeholders. The World Bank 
Group will seek to contribute meaningfully 
on related initiatives.
The World Bank Group is implementing 
institutional and financing changes to boost 
effectiveness and impact. While still applying 
the country-based model, the World Bank 
Group seeks to support progress on the SDGs 
with better knowledge flows and integrated 
development solutions, as well as new opera-
tional instruments. Stretched and leveraged 
balance sheets are enabling greater financ-
ing volumes to clients. These efforts will 
also be essential to making progress toward 
the World Bank Group’s goals of eliminat-
ing extreme poverty and boosting shared 
prosperity. 
African Development Bank
Progress toward MDG attainment
Despite a weak start, the pace of progress 
toward the attainment of the MDGs in 
Africa accelerated after 2003. The continent 
started from a relatively low base on virtu-
ally all MDGs, requiring large investments 
and much effort to catch up with compara-
tor regions. Despite these efforts, progress 
has been slow in a number of countries. Dur-
ing the new SDG era, the AfDB’s overarch-
ing goal will remain poverty reduction, but 
the institution will also seek to ensure that 
growth is more inclusive. Inclusive growth 
will be underpinned by enhancing the capac-
ity of Africans to sustainably manage and 
leverage their natural resources to drive their 
development efforts in a peaceful manner. 
The AfDB supports progress toward the 
MDGs through country-level interventions 
that are directly aligned with the countries’ 
national development efforts. The analysis 
presented here is based on the AfDB’s 2014 
Annual Report, its 2014 Development Effec-
tiveness Review, and data from the 2014 
MDG report jointly produced with the Afri-
can Union, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, and the United 
Nations Development Programme, where it 
was found that Africa’s progress toward the 
achievement of MDGs has been mixed. The 
analysis found variations across countries 
and regions, with some countries making 
significant progress toward the targets while 
others have not. Table B.1 highlights the best-
performing countries for selected targets and 
indicators. 
AfDB’s engagements during the new 
SDG era
Africa has enjoyed high levels of average 
growth—above 5 percent—during the MDG 
era, but with wide variations at the country 
level. In 2015 and beyond, the prospects for 
Africa are significantly brighter than they 
were at the turn of the millennium. Its per-
formance on MDGs has been muted, how-
ever, with the continent off track in achiev-
ing five of the eight MDGs by 2015. The new 
era of SDGs presents a unique opportunity 
for Africa to articulate its common priori-
ties, opportunities, and challenges. African 
governments need to develop a strong vision 
for monitoring and accountability, with clear 
plans for financing and implementation of 
the strategies. 
The AfDB remains a significant financier 
of infrastructure projects, with a cumula-
tive contribution of $45 billion from 1967 
to 2014. In line with its Ten-Year Strategy 
(2013–22), and through its lending, techni-
cal expertise, and policy advocacy, the AfDB 
plans to support Africa’s development in 
five priority areas: infrastructure, regional 
integration, private sector development, 
skills and technology, and governance and 
accountability. The institution’s support will 
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TABle B.1 Africa’s recent MDG performance: Selected targets and indicators 
  Goals Targets and indicators Best-performing countriesa
Goal 1:
Eradicate extreme
poverty and hunger
Target 1A: Halve (between 1990 and 2015), the proportion 
of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day per 
person.
Target 1B: Achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all, including women and young people.
Target 1C: Halve (between 1990 and 2015) the proportion 
of people who suffer from hunger.
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Gabon, Guinea; Morocco; 
Tunisia.
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Togo, Zimbabwe.
Algeria; Benin; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Ghana;
Guinea-Bissau; Mali; South Africa; Tunisia.
Goal 2:
Achieve universal primary
education
Indicator 2.1: Increase net enrollment ratio in primary. 
education by 1.5 percent annually.
Indicator 2.2: Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who 
reach last grade of primary education.
Algeria; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Rwanda; São Tomé 
and Príncipe.
Ghana, Morocco, Tanzania, Zambia.
Goal 3:
Promote gender equality  
and empower women
Indicator 3.1: Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary 
and tertiary education.
Indicator 3.2: Share of women in wage employment in 
the non-agricultural sector.
Indicator 3.3: Proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliament.
The Gambia; Ghana; Mauritius; Rwanda;  
São Tomé and Príncipe.
Botswana, Ethiopia, South Africa.
Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
South Africa.
Goal 4:
Reduce child mortality  
by two-thirds
Indicators 4.1 and 4.2: Under-five mortality and infant 
(under-one) mortality rates.
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Ethiopia; Liberia; Libya; Malawi; 
Rwanda; Seychelles; Tanzania; Tunisia.
Goal 5:
Improve maternal health
Target 5A: Reduce by three-quarters, the maternal 
mortality ratio between 1990 and 2015.
Target 5B: Achieve by 2015 universal access to 
reproductive health.
Equatorial Guinea; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Eritrea; 
Libya; Mauritius; Rwanda; São Tomé and 
Príncipe; Tunisia.
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; 
Rwanda; South Africa; Swaziland.
Goal 6:
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria,  
and other diseases
Target 6A: To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases.
Target 6B: Achieve by 2010 universal access to treatment 
of HIV/AIDS for all those who need it.
Target 6C: To have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe.
Botswana, Comoros, Namibia, Rwanda.
Algeria; Cabo Verde; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Libya; 
Mauritius; São Tomé and Príncipe; Sudan; 
Tunisia.
Goal 7:
Ensure environmental 
sustainability
Target 7A: Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and programs and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources.
Target 7C: Reduce by half the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation, by 2015.
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Gabon; Morocco; Nigeria.
Algeria; Botswana; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Libya; Mali; 
Mauritius; Namibia; Rwanda; Swaziland.
Goal 8:
Global partnership for 
development
Target 8F: In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, especially
information and communications technology.
Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Uganda, Zambia.
Source: African Development Bank Group 2014 Annual Report. 
a. Those countries that, with respect to each target/indicator, have made the greatest improvements from their initial conditions (not necessarily those that have 
reached the targets).
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help to create the conditions in which Afri-
cans can identify and implement innovative 
solutions to their development challenges. 
Infrastructure
Infrastructure remains the AfDB’s high-
est priority, absorbing the lion’s share of its 
resources. The AfDB invests heavily in trans-
port infrastructure, helping to put in place 
the backbone highway network to link Afri-
can countries to each other and the feeder 
roads that link businesses and households 
to markets and services. Over the past two 
years, the AfDB has built or rehabilitated 
over 6,000 kilometers of road and provided 
32 million people with improved access to 
transport. Projects like the 175-kilometer 
road between Wacha and Maji in Ethiopia 
have dramatically reduced transportation 
costs for farmers, raising rural incomes. The 
AfDB is also investing in railways, airports, 
and port facilities. In the energy sector, it 
has funded over 1.3 gigawatts of new power- 
generation capacity, while providing 10 mil-
lion people with electricity connections. The 
AfDB is also making substantial investments 
in renewable energy, such as Africa’s larg-
est wind power project in Lake Turkana in 
Kenya, and is helping African countries to 
access international climate funds and lever-
age private sector finance for clean energy 
projects. The AfDB’s investments in water 
and sanitation have benefited more than 
4 million people. To boost water security, the 
AfDB also has a strong focus on the manage-
ment of water resources. 
regional integration
Under its new Strategy for Regional Integra-
tion 2014–23, the AfDB is prioritizing the 
development of regional infrastructure (along 
with the institutions required to manage it) 
and the promotion of industrialization and 
trade. In the past two years, it has built 680 
kilometers of cross-border roads, together 
with improved border infrastructure. It has 
ongoing investments in cross-border power 
transmission lines, and is helping to link 
national power grids into more efficient 
regional power pools. Many AfDB regional 
initiatives have an explicit focus on promot-
ing peace and security, such as the support 
for the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region. 
Private sector development 
The AfDB also aims to build an environment 
in which African businesses can innovate and 
flourish. Its Private Sector Strategy 2013–17 
focuses on improving Africa’s business cli-
mate and promoting enterprise development. 
Through its budget support operations and 
technical assistance, the AfDB is helping 
African countries to modernize their busi-
ness regulations and to make their tax sys-
tems more effective. Improved governance 
allows for more frequent use of public-private 
partnerships as an effective methodology to 
deliver critical infrastructure, with a good 
number of successful transactions recently 
completed, such as the Henri Konan Bédié 
Bridge in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The AfDB is 
also helping to create a sustainable market in 
microfinance for household enterprises and 
small businesses. Over the past two years, it 
has provided 17,900 microcredits and created 
1.2 million jobs, of which 340,000 were for 
women. The AfDB’s private sector window 
continues to provide finance so that African 
businesses can innovate and flourish through-
out the continent.
Skills and technology
The AfDB is investing in the technical and 
vocational skills of young Africans to equip 
them for gainful employment and success-
ful entrepreneurship. Its support has a strong 
focus on science and technology to promote 
more innovative, knowledge-based econo-
mies. Over the past two years, the AfDB has 
provided vocational training to 5,430 young 
people and constructed over 1,480 class-
rooms and educational support facilities. It is 
rapidly expanding its investments in this area 
with projects to transform systems of voca-
tional training in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda, Tan-
zania, and Zimbabwe. It is also supporting a 
network of centers of excellence in biomedi-
cal science to help address the skills gap. 
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Governance and accountability
The AfDB’s new Governance Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan 2014–2018 sets 
out how it will help tackle Africa’s gover-
nance deficits. Its main focus is on economic 
and financial governance. The AfDB is also 
helping to strengthen the business environ-
ment through improved regulation. For 
example, it helped Mozambique to establish 
a one-stop shop for business registration. In 
this way, the AfDB is investing in more inclu-
sive and sustainable financial systems, sup-
porting many African countries on budgeting 
and financial management, and helping them 
to raise revenues and to target their spend-
ing on development priorities, guided by the 
principles of transparency and accountabil-
ity. In the Comoros, for example, the AfDB 
helped to strengthen the management of the 
energy sector, while supporting the work of 
anticorruption agencies. In Sierra Leone, it 
is supporting wide-ranging public financial 
management reforms, including improved 
governance of the energy and extractive 
sectors. The AfDB’s projects are promoting 
innovations in governance, such as the use of 
e-governance and improved engagement with 
civil society and communities.
In addition to these five core priorities, 
during the new SDG era, the AfDB will also 
place special emphasis on issues related to 
fragility, food security, and women’s eco-
nomic empowerment. 
Asian Development Bank
ADB’s support to the MDGs
The ADB has been supporting the MDGs 
since their adoption in 2000. Successive 
corporate-level strategies, individual country 
partnership strategies, and lending and non-
lending operations have helped integrate sup-
port for MDGs at both the strategic and the 
operational levels at the ADB, complement-
ing efforts of its developing member coun-
tries toward progress and monitoring their 
achievement.
The ADB’s Poverty Reduction Strategy of 
1999 guides the bank’s mandate on poverty 
reduction (MDG 1) in the East Asia and 
Pacific region. Poverty reduction remained 
the ADB’s key mission under its Long-Term 
Strategic Framework of 2001, which also 
emphasized inclusive social development, 
basic social services, gender empowerment, 
and environmental sustainability—prior-
ity areas in alignment with the MDGs. The 
ADB’s Enhanced Poverty Reduction Strategy 
of 2004 and its Medium-Term Strategy II for 
2006–08 continued to emphasize poverty 
reduction and progress on the MDGs. 
The ADB’s Strategy 2020, approved in 
2008, delivered a vision of an East Asia and 
the Pacific free of poverty and underlined that 
progress on poverty reduction in the region 
was critical for meeting the MDGs (ADB 
2008). The three key complementary agen-
das of Strategy 2020—inclusive economic 
growth, environmentally sustainable growth, 
and regional integration—are closely linked 
to MDG achievement. Strategy 2020 under-
lined the need for mobilization of resources 
and made the commitment that the ADB, 
in addition to providing financial and other 
assistance, would closely monitor and track 
the progress of its developing member coun-
tries on the MDGs. To that end, the ADB’s 
corporate results framework, put in place in 
2008, with successive periodic refinements, 
reports annually on progress made by the East 
Asia and the Pacific region on the achievement 
of the MDGs. A Midterm Review of Strategy 
2020 completed in 2014 committed the ADB 
to expand support to sectors and areas of 
direct relevance to the MDGs (ADB 2014). 
A country partnership strategy—the main 
articulation of ADB strategic directions and 
support at the country level—aligns ADB 
assistance with country priorities, the ADB’s 
corporate strategic directions, and interna-
tional development agreements (including on 
MDGs). Each strategy presents agreed priori-
ties for the ADB’s support that will help the 
country reduce poverty and achieve inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth. The strat-
egy also provides for monitoring and report-
ing on progress toward the MDGs. 
Pursuant to the country partnership 
strategies, the ADB provides lending and 
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nonlending support to developing member 
countries. A large part of its lending assis-
tance supports development of sustainable 
infrastructure. In 2011–13, infrastructure 
projects—which contributes directly to 
MDG 1 by promoting inclusive economic 
growth, supporting reduction in poverty, and 
creating employment and other economic 
opportunities—accounted for $24.8 billion, 
or 69 percent, of sovereign approvals. Sup-
port for agriculture and irrigation projects 
contributes to poverty reduction through its 
impact on farm productivity, food security, 
and mitigation of malnutrition. The volume 
of ADB-assisted education projects, which 
support progress on MDG 2, is projected to 
increase from 4 percent during 2011–13 to 6 
percent during 2015–17. The ADB also plans 
to increase health sector operations to meet 
its target of 3–5 percent of annual approvals. 
Clean energy and sustainable transportation 
projects directly support MDG 7 by strength-
ening environmental sustainability and man-
aging climate change by lowering carbon 
emissions. In 2014, the ADB already sur-
passed its 2016 targets to incorporate climate 
change in 45 percent of its operations and in 
50 percent of its operations to support envi-
ronmental sustainability. The ADB also assists 
with water supply and sanitation-related proj-
ects in urban and rural areas, which directly 
support MDG 7 by increasing the proportion 
of the population with access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation facilities. 
In addition to direct support, infrastruc-
ture projects also indirectly support progress 
on other non-income MDGs. For example, 
ADB-supported transport projects, includ-
ing rural roads, improve access to schools 
and hospitals across genders, necessary for 
progress on MDG 2 on universal primary 
education, MDG 3 on eliminating gender 
disparities in education, and MDGs 4 and 5 
on reducing child mortality and improving 
maternal health. ADB-assisted water sup-
ply and sanitation projects also contribute to 
progress on the health-related MDGs (ADB 
2015a). A number of examples of ADB sup-
port are presented in the ADB publication 
Together We Deliver. 
To raise awareness about the MDGs in the 
region, support regular monitoring and prog-
ress, and develop the institutional capacity of 
developing member countries to achieve the 
MDGs, the ADB entered into a long-term 
partnership with the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, which produces the regular 
series of regional MDG reports (UNESCAP, 
ADB, and UNDP 2015). The reports show 
that the region has made big gains in reduc-
ing poverty—as measured by the reduction 
in the number and share of people living on 
less than $1.25 a day purchasing power par-
ity—and has made good progress on other 
MDGs. Some MDGs have been achieved 
ahead of 2015, the target year: gender equal-
ity in education, reducing HIV prevalence, 
stopping the spread of tuberculosis, increas-
ing forest cover, reducing consumption of 
ozone-depleting substances, and halving the 
proportion of people without access to safe 
drinking water. 
lessons from east Asia and the Pacific 
and the post-2015 agenda
The MDGs were effective in East Asia and 
the Pacific in influencing local priorities, 
shaping national budgets, and protecting 
social expenditures. Many countries in the 
region have adapted the goals to meet their 
specific needs. The MDGs have influenced 
national development planning frameworks 
in nine East Asia-Pacific countries including 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongo-
lia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu (ADB, 
UNESCAP,  and UNDP 2013). However, 
the articulation of the MDGs as stand-alone 
goals led to a fragmented approach to public 
policy and planning, monitoring, and assess-
ing contributions toward achieving the goals. 
Moreover, some development challenges, like 
unplanned urbanization and the rising threat 
of climate change, were not considered when 
the MDGs were formulated. Data require-
ments that escalated with MDG monitoring 
were inadequately backed by resources. The 
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post-2015 development goals should recog-
nize the importance of customization and that 
their inherent interdependence will require 
coordinated action across ministries, the 
importance of data for monitoring, the cross- 
cutting nature of infrastructure, and the key 
role of policy and knowledge support for sus-
tainable development. 
While strong economic dynamism has 
driven regional success in income poverty 
reduction, challenges remain on inclusion-
related issues in the region and within devel-
oping member countries. High levels of hun-
ger remain, fast-growing developing member 
countries continue to lose shocking numbers 
of children before their fifth birthday, and 
thousands of mothers die in childbirth. Strik-
ing disparities remain between and within 
subregions, countries, and even social groups 
in their progress toward the MDGs. For 
instance, South Asia as a whole is on track 
for just nine MDG indicators, but Sri Lanka 
is on track for 15 and generally outperforms 
the subregion. Within developing mem-
ber countries, disparities between men and 
women, between social and ethnic groups, 
and between regions hold back large sections 
of the population from achieving the MDGs. 
Issues that remain important—and should 
therefore help define the Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda—include inequality, lack 
of decent and productive jobs, continuing 
hunger and food insecurity, gender discrimi-
nation, limited achievements in health, low-
quality education, heightened vulnerability 
and economic insecurity, rapid demographic 
change, unplanned urbanization, pressure on 
natural resources, exposure to disasters, and 
the rising threat of climate change. 
The changing development finance land-
scape makes it clear that all sources of 
finance, public and private, need to be har-
nessed to achieve sustainable development. 
Growing domestic public resources in the 
region will continue to be the most important 
source of development finance. At the same 
time, international public flows—like official 
development assistance—are critical for low-
income and fragile countries and a signal of 
the development community’s commitment 
to shared development agendas. The larg-
est sums are increasingly in private hands, 
however, and are not directly programmable 
or available for development. While gov-
ernments have the primary role in drawing 
in these funds, as well as in influencing the 
course of private activities on economies, 
societies, and the environment in line with 
sustainable development, they will need assis-
tance to create a supportive environment to 
mobilize private investment. 
While MDG monitoring in the region 
reveals improvement in the availability of 
data in recent years, it also highlights large 
data gaps that strain national capacities for 
producing, disseminating and using quality 
statistics for MDG monitoring. The post-
2015 agenda will bring renewed demand for 
new indicators to measure other dimensions 
of environmental, economic and social prog-
ress. Resources will be needed to increase 
support for national statistical systems along 
with actions to promote open access and use 
of data.
ADB focus and preparedness for the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda
The ADB has taken early steps in readying for 
the proposed SDGs in line with priorities iden-
tified in its Strategy 2020 Midterm Review. 
The mid-term review of the ADB’s corporate 
Strategy 2020 confirms alignment with the 
new SDGs to be finalized in September 2015 
by United Nations member states, including 
ADB clients and shareholders (ADB 2014). 
The review concluded that Strategy 2020 
remains valid in its broad strategic directions 
to address the development challenges of a 
transforming Asia and Pacific. It found that 
the ADB’s 10 strategic priorities respond to 
the SDGs in a manner consistent with reali-
ties of country-level implementation. The 10 
priorities are poverty reduction and inclusive 
economic growth, environment and climate 
change, regional cooperation and integration, 
infrastructure development, middle-income 
countries, private sector development and 
operations, knowledge solutions, financial 
resources and partnerships, delivering value 
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for money, and organizing to meet new chal-
lenges. The ADB has also initiated work on a 
new strategy to guide it over the longer term 
and that will reflect the SDGs once approved. 
The ADB recognizes that the new global 
sustainable development agenda will need 
new thinking on financing and the capacity 
to tap all sources of funds. In its 2015 report 
Making Money Work: Financing a Sustain-
able Future in Asia and Pacific, ADB offers 
insights on the scale of the region’s increased 
financing needs and the importance of har-
nessing all sources of finance, public and 
private (ADB 2015b). The report looks at 
both sides of making money work: shifting 
money toward investments in sustainable 
development, and boosting the ability of 
developing member countries to attract more 
money from a wider range of sources for such 
investments. 
The ADB is enhancing its own capacity to 
provide finance for poverty eradication and 
sustainable development. The ADB Board of 
Governors recently approved a groundbreak-
ing initiative to combine the lending opera-
tions of the bank’s Asian Development Fund 
with its ordinary capital resources balance 
sheet. The merger will boost ADB’s total 
annual lending and grant approvals to as high 
as $20 billion—50 percent more than the cur-
rent level. ADB assistance to poor countries 
will rise by up to 70 percent. Together with 
cofinancing, the ADB’s annual assistance will 
reach as high as $40 billion in coming years, 
up from $23 billion in 2014. Poor countries 
currently eligible for development fund loans 
will continue to receive concessional loans 
from expanded ordinary capital resources 
on the same terms and conditions as current 
Asian Development Fund loans. The fund 
will be retained as a grant-only donor fund to 
provide assistance to eligible countries.
In addition to making more funds avail-
able, the ADB is also helping to strengthen 
the capacity of its developing member coun-
tries to draw in money toward sustain-
able development. The Asia Pacific Project 
Preparation Facility approved in November 
2014 will help prepare a pipeline of “ready 
to finance” infrastructure investments and 
place these with investors for public-private 
partnerships. The ADB is also assisting its 
developing member countries to access cli-
mate finance sources from funds such as the 
Global Environment Facility, Climate Invest-
ment Funds, and the Green Climate Fund 
for projects with sustainable development 
benefits.
In responding to the financing needs of the 
proposed SDGs, the ADB’s priority will be to 
direct resources to human needs, infrastruc-
ture, and cross-border public goods. These 
categories are synergistically interlinked 
and together can strengthen sustainable 
development results. While infrastructure 
deficits are a continuing bottleneck affect-
ing most MDGs, matters related to financ-
ing, implementation, accountability, and the 
role of partnerships are claiming center stage 
as developing member countries and their 
development partners explore the Post-2015 
Development Agenda. 
european Bank for 
reconstruction and 
Development
With their focus on poverty reduction and 
social development, the MDGs have limited 
overlap with the EBRD’s economic transition 
and private sector–focused mandate. Never-
theless, there are links between the EBRD’s 
activities and the MDG targets in the areas 
of gender equality, water and sanitation, and 
environmental sustainability. 
Gender equality (MDG 3)
With its commitment to gender equal-
ity through its Strategic Gender Initia-
tive, approved in April 2013, the EBRD 
has contributed to the overarching gender 
equality goal, particularly with respect to 
the economic empowerment dimension of 
MDG 3, which is the EBRD’s niche within 
gender equality. During the implementation 
of the initiative, the EBRD has contributed 
to an increase in the share of women in non-
agricultural wage employment. Through the 
development of Equal Opportunities projects, 
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solutions have been designed to respond 
to the challenges of barriers for women in 
employment, especially in countries where 
labor force participation is low (such as Tur-
key) and even declining such as in Jordan and 
the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Of the 16 new projects signed in the past 
two years, 94 percent are in the initiative’s 
target regions (Central Asia, the Middle East, 
and Turkey); 50 percent develop measures to 
improve women’s access to finance; and 20 
percent improve women’s access to employ-
ment and skills. The remaining 30 percent 
are projects to provide solutions to improve 
women’s access to services.
With respect to increasing access to 
resources, and finance in particular, three 
teams within the EBRD developed a new prod-
uct called the “Women in Business Frame-
work.” Launched first in Turkey, and subse-
quently in the Western Balkans and Egypt 
(with Croatia, the Eastern Partnership, and 
Kazakhstan under development for 2015), the 
framework brings together three critical com-
ponents to support women’s access to finance: 
donor financing to partner banks for the 
provision of dedicated financing for women, 
including a first loss guarantee for women-led 
small and medium enterprises; technical assis-
tance to support the partner banks to adjust 
their business models and delivery mecha-
nisms and to develop new financial products 
for women; and an advisory services compo-
nent targeting women entrepreneurs, who in 
turn will become the partner banks’ potential 
client base. Overall, e460 million of credit 
lines are expected to be channeled through up 
to 40 partner banks in 16 EBRD countries of 
operation for on-lending to eligible women-led 
small and medium enterprises.
Water and sanitation (MDG 7)
The EBRD aims to achieve the sustainable 
delivery of essential services, notably in water 
and wastewater, public transport, urban 
roads and lighting, solid waste management, 
and district heating and energy efficiency, 
throughout its region. To reach this goal, the 
EBRD centers its operations on decentral-
ization of decision making to the local level, 
commercialization of services for affordabil-
ity and effectiveness, and improvement of the 
environment. 
From 2010 to 2014, the EBRD’s Munici-
pal and Environmental Infrastructure team 
invested in 177 projects worth a collective 
e2.9 billion. In 2013 and 2014, water and 
wastewater projects contributed to a reduc-
tion of a combined 166,000 tons of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) equivalent. Over the same 
period, solid waste projects achieved a reduc-
tion of 197,000 tons of CO2 equivalent.
environmental sustainability (MDG 7)
The EBRD addresses the challenges of cli-
mate change and energy efficiency by inte-
grating these issues into all of its operations 
as a core strategic component and com-
petence. Through its work, it helps coun-
tries from Central Europe to Central Asia 
secure sustainable energy supplies, and it 
finances the efficient use of energy that will 
cut demand and imports, reduce pollution, 
and mitigate the effects of climate change. 
The focal point for these operations is the 
Sustainable Energy Initiative. Launched in 
May 2006, this initiative addresses the twin 
challenges of energy efficiency and climate 
change in the EBRD region—which is one of 
the most energy intensive in the world. The 
initiative is assisted by strong funding sup-
port from donor governments and the EBRD 
Shareholder Special Fund. Since 2006, the 
EBRD has invested e8.8 billion under the ini-
tiative through 464 projects in 29 countries 
with a total project value of e46.9 billion. 
The EBRD is now building on the initiative’s 
success by expanding its remit to include not 
only energy but also water and material effi-
ciency projects. As part of its policy dialogue 
activities, the Sustainable Energy Initiative 
also works with governments to support the 
development of strong institutional and regu-
latory frameworks that are the prerequisite to 
deliver sustainable resource investments.
The EBRD implements its environmental 
and sustainable development mandate by
•   Incorporating environmental and social 
requirements into the appraisal and 
G l o b a l  m o n i t o r i n G  r e p o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6   t h e  r o l e  o f  m u l t i l a t e r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  b a n k s   259
implementation of all EBRD-funded proj-
ects based on EU standards and interna-
tional best practice;
•   Providing finance and technical assistance 
specifically aimed at environmental issues 
such as sustainable energy, climate change, 
environmental infrastructure, and nuclear 
safety;
•   Promoting social inclusion through invest-
ment and other forms of support for 
microenterprises and by increasing access 
to community services such as water and 
public transport;
•   Supporting projects that promote gender 
equality; and
•   Encouraging public participation for pre-
investment consultation and disclosure, 
together with maintaining regular strategic 
dialogue with civil society organizations.
The broader SDG agenda, to be agreed 
in 2015, is likely to broaden the scope of the 
EBRD’s involvement in the global develop-
ment agenda. Many of the headline goals, 
such as those involving infrastructure, agri-
culture, climate change, and access to energy, 
represent areas of work in which the EBRD 
has been engaged for years. In some cases, 
there is significant room for scaling up activi-
ties that can have real development impact. 
Given its unique mandate, the EBRD is eager 
to share lessons learned in how to approach 
and mobilize private sector finance. Together, 
MDBs can also forge joint initiatives in this 
regard, building upon their competitive 
advantages built from decades of regional 
experience.
Inter-American Development 
Bank
The conclusion of the MDG target period at 
the end of 2015 and the initiation of a new, 
more ambitious set of SDGs in 2016 will be a 
milestone for all nations, but in particular for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The region 
has made significant social progress since the 
MDGs were established in 2000. The region 
has achieved several MDGs and several oth-
ers are expected to be achieved by the end of 
2015. Indicators of social development have 
shown impressive results since the beginning 
of the millennium—including poverty, the 
size of the middle class, income inequality, 
education, child malnutrition, and maternal 
and infant mortality. While these achieve-
ments were facilitated by favorable terms 
of trade, the responsible management of 
domestic economic policies, and reforms 
of social policies over a two-decade period, 
commitment to the well-defined MDGs was 
an important determinant as well. Moving 
forward, the region now faces the double 
challenge of achieving the new SDGs while 
sustaining and deepening recent social 
achievements.
The Inter-American Development Bank 
made its own contribution to meeting the 
MDGs through technical assistance, opera-
tional tools, socioeconomic research, country 
strategies, dialogue with governments, and 
other instruments and activities. The IDB’s 
Institutional Strategy closely mirrored the 
MDGs. In 2010 the Ninth General Increase 
in the Resources of the IDB established two 
overarching objectives: poverty and inequal-
ity reduction, and sustainable growth. The 
institutional strategy also placed a high prior-
ity on tracking results and promoting devel-
opment effectiveness in all of the IDB’s work. 
The IDB’s Corporate Results Framework 
serves as the primary tool for monitoring 
and measuring the IDB’s performance and 
the achievement of its strategic objectives. 
To assist the region in facing new challenges 
going forward, the IDB recently updated its 
Institutional Strategy, approved by the Board 
of Governors in 2015, again placing spe-
cial emphasis on reduction of poverty and 
inequality and on sustained growth.
 The Social Strategy for Equity and Pro-
ductivity provides a set of detailed guidelines 
designed to assist countries in responding 
more effectively to the challenges of sus-
tainability and inclusiveness. It focuses on 
increasing access to comprehensive child 
development services (essential nutrition, 
early stimulation, family education) for 
children from poor households  in order to 
prevent developmental delays and prepare 
children for entry into the school system; 
increasing the quality, equity, and relevance 
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of education; equitably improving health out-
comes; protecting households against risks; 
redistributing income effectively while foster-
ing increases in labor productivity; enhancing 
labor market performance, as indicated by 
the capacity to create jobs with higher wages 
and social security coverage; building a new 
generation of social programs that foster 
equality of opportunities regardless of labor 
status, race, ethnicity or gender; and tackling 
cross-cutting gender and diversity issues. 
Recognizing that governments alone can-
not tackle the many remaining development 
challenges, the IDB has encouraged and par-
ticipated in a number of public-private part-
nerships aimed at tapping resources from 
a variety of sources, including nonprofit 
groups, company foundations, donor-nation 
funds, and local governments. Emblematic of 
this new form of collaboration is the Meso-
american Health  Initiative, an  innovative 
partnership designed to narrow the equity 
gaps in health experienced by population 
segments in extreme poverty. It was jointly 
created in 2010 by the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Instituto Carlos Slim de la 
Salud, the governments of Spain, Belize, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Panama, and Costa Rica, the Mexican state 
of Chiapas, and the IDB. Its goal is to sup-
port regional governments’ efforts in achiev-
ing the health-related MDGs through invest-
ments in interventions of proven effectiveness 
among the poorest 20 percent of the popula-
tion, focusing on women and children under 
five years of age. 
This partnership implements transforma-
tive solutions through extending the cover-
age, quality, and use of basic reproductive 
health services for mothers, newborns, and 
toddlers as well as by promoting maternal 
and child nutrition and vaccination. This 
collaboration has allowed the IDB to lever-
age valuable knowledge and experience from 
different partners to tackle the challeng-
ing issues of maternal and child health care 
service delivery in the region’s most remote 
areas. Further, the partnership has allowed 
for the application of results-based financ-
ing mechanisms that use predetermined 
performance indicators and independent 
measurement of achievements to help drive 
country performance. 
Despite recent progress in reducing 
inequality, it remains high in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The MDGs measure 
progress in terms of country-level averages; 
however, averages can mask steep differences 
within countries. For example, in Guatemala 
almost 50 percent of children are chroni-
cally malnourished, and the fraction of chil-
dren who are malnourished is five times as 
high among children in the poorest income 
quintile as it is among children in the rich-
est income quintile. As inequality continues 
to present significant challenges in the region, 
looking beyond averages is crucial to ensur-
ing that no one is left behind.
To support these efforts, the IDB plans to 
support countries in building statistical capac-
ity, including the ability to disaggregate data 
by such characteristics as subnational geog-
raphy or gender. Along with other MDBs, 
the IDB has signed a memorandum of under-
standing with the United Nations to enhance 
collaboration in supporting the strengthen-
ing of country statistical capacity. The IDB 
is also working to support governments in 
the region in adopting evidence-based poli-
cies and in monitoring progress in meeting 
post-2015 development goals. Emphasis is 
being placed on four areas: strengthening 
the institutional capacity of national statis-
tics offices; strengthening the quality of basic 
statistics (population and housing censuses, 
agricultural censuses, household surveys and 
administrative records); promoting the use 
of statistics in decision making and in the 
design and management of interventions by 
strengthening the end-users’ data capabilities; 
and optimizing the use of modern technolo-
gies in production processes, access, and dis-
semination of statistical information.
The IDB also will help to close financing 
gaps by exploring ways to improve domestic 
resource mobilization, tap innovative sources 
of finance, and better leverage the private 
sector. Finally, as the leading source of devel-
opment financing in the region, the IDB can 
utilize its strong relationships with diverse 
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stakeholders (such as ministries of finance, 
planning and development, and civil soci-
ety organizations) to facilitate country and 
regional dialogues to translate the SDGs into 
targets and interventions at the country level.
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Table C.1 Shared prosperity estimates by country based on the latest surveys available from the Global Database of 
Shared Prosperity
  Mean consumption or income per capitac
Annualized growth  
per capitac,d Baseline Most recent year
  Country Perioda Typeb Bottom 40 %
Total  
population
(%)
Bottom 40%
$ a day (PPP)
Total population
$ a day (PPP)
Bottom 40%
$ a day (PPP)
Total population
$ a day (PPP) PPP year
Albania 2008–12 C –1.22 –1.31 4.28 7.81 4.08 7.41 2011
Argentinae 2007–12 I 6.43 3.13 5.62 18.16 7.67 21.19 2011
Armenia 2008–13 C –1.49 –1.05 3.40 6.28 3.15 5.95 2011
Australia 2003–10 I 4.39 4.65 — — — — 2011
Austria 2007–12 I 0.37 0.39 27.78 52.68 28.31 53.73 2011
Bangladesh 2005–10 C 1.73 1.37 0.83 1.59 0.91 1.70 2005
Belarus 2006–11 C 9.13 8.14 6.51 11.65 10.08 17.23 2011
Belgium 2007–12 I 1.14 0.44 25.79 46.88 27.29 47.92 2011
Bhutan 2007–12 C 6.53 6.47 2.57 5.88 3.53 8.04 2011
Bolivia 2007–12 I 10.10 4.29 2.29 9.82 3.70 12.12 2011
Brazil 2007–12 I 6.93 4.54 3.45 13.99 4.82 17.46 2011
Bulgaria 2008–13 I 1.29 1.37 6.77 14.70 7.22 15.73 2011
Cambodia 2007–12 C 8.53 4.09 1.10 2.35 1.65 2.88 2005
Canada 2004–10 I 2.14 1.93 — — — — 2011
Chile 2006–11 I 3.87 2.83 5.49 18.14 6.63 20.86 2011
China 2005–10 C 7.23 7.86 — — — — 2011
Colombia 2008–12 I 5.99 3.59 2.79 11.57 3.52 13.32 2011
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004–12 C 7.81 7.20 0.33 0.89 0.58 1.50 2011
Congo, Rep. 2005–11 C 7.22 4.29 1.00 2.96 1.52 3.81 2011
Costa Rica 2010–13 I 1.33 3.15 6.62 20.34 6.88 22.32 2011
Croatia 2004–10 C 1.59 0.25 11.67 21.85 12.83 22.18 2011
Cyprus 2007–12 I –2.75 –1.58 27.10 50.79 23.57 46.91 2011
Czech Republic 2008–13 I 0.15 0.37 15.70 25.81 15.82 26.30 2011
Denmark 2007–12 I –0.75 0.32 28.65 48.29 27.58 49.05 2011
Dominican Republic 2007–12 I 1.79 –0.20 3.83 11.93 4.19 11.82 2011
Ecuador 2007–12 I 5.51 0.97 2.87 10.74 3.75 11.27 2011
El Salvador 2007–12 I 0.21 –1.49 3.60 9.89 3.64 9.17 2011
Estonia 2008–13 I –2.10 –1.24 12.84 24.56 11.55 23.07 2011
Ethiopia 2004–10 C –1.45 –0.09 1.51 2.69 1.38 2.68 2011
Finland 2007–12 I 1.55 1.07 26.72 46.79 28.86 49.35 2011
France 2007–12 I 0.19 0.39 26.58 51.51 26.83 52.53 2011
Georgia 2008–13 C 2.91 2.63 2.12 5.34 2.45 6.08 2011
Germany 2006–11 I 1.35 0.14 26.51 52.41 28.35 52.79 2011
Greece 2007–12 I –10.02 –8.40 16.32 34.68 9.63 22.36 2011
Guatemala 2006–11 I –1.85 –4.57 2.75 10.87 2.50 8.60 2011
Honduras 2007–12 I –3.22 –2.68 2.10 8.92 1.78 7.79 2011
Hungary 2008–13 I –1.93 –0.67 10.89 19.32 9.88 18.69 2011
Iceland 2007–12 I –3.85 –4.56 33.07 58.69 27.17 46.47 2011
India 2004–11 C 3.20 3.70 1.46 2.81 1.82 3.63 2011
Indonesia 2011–14 C 3.82 3.39 2.11 4.82 2.36 5.33 2011
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2009–13 C 3.05 –1.20 2.63 17.41 2.96 16.59 2011
Iraq 2007–12 C 0.33 0.98 — — — — 2011
Ireland 2007–12 I –4.38 –3.88 26.17 50.03 20.92 41.05 2011
Israel 2005–10 I 1.88 2.46 — — — — 2011
Italy 2007–12 I –2.86 –1.82 21.24 43.54 18.37 39.72 2011
Jordan 2006–10 C 2.70 2.57 3.21 6.37 3.58 7.05 2005
Kazakhstan 2009–13 C 8.92 7.56 5.06 8.96 7.13 11.99 2011
Kyrgyz Republic 2008–12 C –0.13 –2.35 3.33 6.62 3.31 6.02 2011
Lao PDR 2007–12 C 1.25 1.96 0.98 1.98 1.04 2.18 2005
Latvia 2008–13 I –3.04 –4.33 9.69 22.38 8.31 17.94 2011
(Table continues next page)
1. Shared prosperity data
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  Mean consumption or income per capitac
Annualized growth  
per capitac,d Baseline Most recent year
  Country Perioda Typeb Bottom 40 %
Total  
population
(%)
Bottom 40%
$ a day (PPP)
Total population
$ a day (PPP)
Bottom 40%
$ a day (PPP)
Total population
$ a day (PPP) PPP year
Lithuania 2008–13 I –1.77 –1.16 10.14 20.99 9.28 19.79 2011
Luxembourg 2007–12 I –2.67 –0.54 38.29 72.80 33.44 70.85 2011
Madagascar 2005–10 C –4.49 –3.52 0.78 1.74 0.62 1.45 2011
Malawi 2004–10 C –1.84 1.27 0.78 1.77 0.70 1.90 2011
Mali 2006–09 C 2.25 –1.47 1.10 2.53 1.20 2.38 2011
Mauritania 2008–14 C 3.25 1.62 2.36 5.47 2.86 6.03 2011
Mauritius 2006–12 C 0.76 0.86 5.31 11.02 5.54 11.56 2011
Mexico 2008–12 I 1.15 –0.22 3.39 11.27 3.54 11.17 2011
Moldova 2008–13 C 4.99 1.81 4.23 8.77 5.40 9.59 2011
Montenegro 2008–13 C –4.81 –3.64 8.86 16.35 6.92 13.59 2011
Nepal 2003–10 C 7.47 4.08 1.21 2.97 2.00 3.91 2011
Netherlands 2007–12 I –0.01 –0.99 28.06 51.72 28.05 49.21 2011
Nigeria 2003–09 C 0.12 1.12 0.93 2.33 0.94 2.49 2011
Norway 2007–12 I 3.17 2.39 33.37 58.45 39.00 65.77 2011
Pakistan 2004–10 C 3.76 2.69 1.82 3.40 2.27 3.99 2011
Panama 2008–12 I 4.14 3.63 4.58 17.18 5.39 19.82 2011
Paraguay 2007–12 I 7.21 5.20 3.39 11.75 4.80 15.15 2011
Peru 2007–12 I 8.57 3.99 3.06 11.19 4.62 13.61 2011
Philippines 2006–12 C 1.15 0.41 2.05 5.58 2.20 5.72 2011
Poland 2007–12 C 1.99 1.44 7.57 15.21 8.35 16.34 2011
Portugal 2007–12 I –1.99 –2.14 12.89 27.97 11.65 25.11 2011
Romania 2008–13 C 0.58 –0.28 4.81 8.89 4.95 8.76 2011
Russian Federation 2007–12 C 5.86 5.27 7.60 19.42 10.10 25.11 2011
Rwanda 2005–10 C 5.04 3.89 0.72 2.27 0.92 2.75 2011
Senegal 2005–11 C –0.23 0.31 1.31 3.10 1.29 3.16 2011
Serbia 2007–10 C –1.76 –1.33 7.32 13.37 6.94 12.84 2011
Slovak Republic 2008–13 I 5.48 6.67 12.46 20.27 16.27 28.00 2011
Slovenia 2008–13 I –0.84 –0.28 20.64 33.44 19.79 32.97 2011
South Africa 2006–11 C 4.09 4.38 1.73 9.50 2.12 11.78 2011
Spain 2007–12 I –1.32 0.00 17.14 36.25 16.04 36.25 2011
Sri Lanka 2006–12 C 2.21 1.66 2.96 6.80 3.37 7.51 2011
Sweden 2007–12 I 2.04 2.25 26.22 45.14 29.01 50.46 2011
Switzerland 2007–12 I 2.43 0.93 30.49 63.18 34.38 66.19 2011
Tanzania 2007–11 C 3.54 1.59 1.01 2.40 1.20 2.58 2011
Thailand 2008–12 C 4.78 3.95 5.15 12.45 6.21 14.54 2011
Togo 2006–11 C –2.17 0.95 0.99 2.50 0.89 2.63 2011
Tunisia 2005–10 C 3.45 2.63 3.72 8.44 4.40 9.61 2011
Turkey 2007–12 C 4.33 4.81 5.40 12.92 6.67 16.34 2011
Uganda 2009–12 C 3.90 2.95 1.23 3.14 1.39 3.43 2011
Ukraine 2008–13 C 3.47 2.27 6.81 11.60 8.08 12.97 2011
United Kingdom 2007–12 I –1.67 –2.78 23.89 51.10 21.96 44.38 2011
United States 2007–13 I –0.16 –0.43 — — — — 2011
Uruguay 2007–12 I 7.87 4.33 6.00 18.63 8.75 23.03 2011
Vietnam 2004–10 C 6.22 7.81 2.13 5.03 3.07 7.89 2011
Source: Global Database of Shared Prosperity 2015.
Note: — = Not available.
a.  Refers to the years in which the underlying household survey data were collected; in cases for which the data collection period bridged two calendar years, the 
year in which most of the data were collected is reported. The initial year refers to the nearest survey collected five years before the most recent survey available; 
only surveys collected between three and seven years before the most recent survey are considered. The final year refers to the most recent survey available 
between 2010 and 2014. 
b. Denotes whether the data reported are based on consumption (C) or income (I) data. Capital letters indicate that grouped data were used. 
c.  Based on real mean per capita consumption or income measured at 2011 and 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) using the PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank 
.org/PovcalNet). For some countries, means are not reported because of grouped and/or confidential data. 
d. The annualized growth rate is computed as (Mean in year 2/Mean in year 1)^(1/(Year 2 – Year 1)) – 1. 
e. Covers urban areas only.
Table C.1 Shared prosperity estimates by country based on the latest surveys available from the Global Database of 
Shared Prosperity (continued)
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Part II of this report draws extensively on the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs). 
These are nationally representative household 
surveys that provide data for a wide range of 
monitoring and impact evaluation indica-
tors in the areas of population, health, and 
nutrition. 
The analyses presented in this report use 
only the latest data available in the DHS pro-
gram, which have survey-year ranges from 
1985 to 2014. The DHS database included 88 
countries as of May 2015.1 For certain indi-
cators, some countries may not be included. 
For the figures in chapter 4 that use the DHS 
data, a simple average was used to aggregate 
selected indicators by income level and by 
typology.  
The DHS wealth index was used to illus-
trate the difference between the bottom 40 
(B40) percent and the top 60 (T60) percent 
of the income distribution in a country. The 
wealth index, which measures a household’s 
composite living standard, has five levels and 
is calculated using easy-to-collect data on 
a household’s ownership of selected assets, 
such as televisions and bicycles; materials 
used for housing construction; and types of 
water access and sanitation facilities. To illus-
trate the demographic difference between 
the B40 and T60 percent, we combined the 
DHS’s “lowest” and “second” levels as the 
B40 percent and its “middle,” “fourth,” and 
“highest” as the T60 percent. 
To illustrate within-country demographic 
variance, the following indicators are used in 
each figure: 
Figure 4.12 compares the total fertility 
rate in rural and urban areas. The values 
refer to the total fertility rate for the three 
years preceding the survey (DHS indica-
tor: 20171000). Similarly, figure 4.20 uses 
the same fertility indicator but compares 
the rates for the B40 and T60 populations 
according to the DHS wealth index.
Figure 4.14 compares the infant mortality 
rate for the B40 and T60 of the same wealth 
index. Infant mortality rate (DHS indicator: 
70254002) refers to the probability of dying 
before the first birthday in the period 1–60 
months (and 1–120 months for background 
characteristics) preceding the survey per 
1,000 live births.2
Figure 4.15 compares health facility access 
for the B40 and the T60 of the DHS wealth 
index. Live births delivered at health facilities 
(indicator: 77282000) denotes the percentage 
of live births in the three/five years preceding 
the survey delivered at a health facility.3 
Figure 4.18 compares the share of teen-
agers who are mothers (DHS indicator: 
29169000) for the B40 and the T60 of the 
DHS wealth index. This variable is defined 
as percentage of women ages 15–19 who are 
mothers or pregnant with their first child by 
selected background characteristics. 
Figure 4.19 compares women’s median 
age at first birth (DHS indicator: 55166000) 
for the B40 and the T60 of the wealth index. 
This variable refers to women between 25 
and 49 years of age. 
Figure 4.21 compares unmet needs for 
family planning (DHS indicator: 216236002) 
for women in the B40 and T60. This vari-
able is defined as the percentage of women 
who do not want to become pregnant but are 
not using contraception following the DHS 
definition.4
Figure B4.5.1 shows the median age at 
first marriage for women in rural areas 
for selected countries (DHS indicator: 
55166000). The age at first marriage is based 
on the responses provided by women ages 25 
to 49 when interviewed. 
Notes
1.  Albania; Angola; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Ban-
gladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Camer-
oon; Cabo Verde; Central African Republic; 
Chad; Colombia; Comoros; Congo, Rep.; 
Congo, Dem. Rep.; Cote d’Ivoire; Dominican 
Republic; Ecuador; Egypt, Arab Rep.; El Sal-
vador; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia, The; 
2. Demographic and health surveys
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Georgia; Ghana; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; 
Haiti; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Jamaica; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kyrgyz Republic; 
Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mal-
dives; Mali; Mauritania; Mexico; Moldova; 
Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; 
Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Para-
guay; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Rwanda; 
São Tomé and Príncipe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; 
South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Timor-Leste; 
Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; Uzbeki-
stan; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; Zambia; Zim-
babwe. DHS surveys are carried out only in 
less-developed countries and/or countries 
receiving U.S. foreign aid. Further details on 
country coverage of DHS surveys are available 
at http://dhsprogram.com/.
2.  The Gambia was not included because of lack 
of data.
3.  Botswana, The Gambia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Tunisia were not included because of lack of 
data.
4.  Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, The Gambia, Georgia, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thai-
land, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia were 
not included because of lack of data.
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Evidence shows that changes in age struc-
ture can affect GDP, with the exact impact 
depending on the nature of the change. Lee 
and Mason (2006), among others, have 
identified two “demographic dividends” 
associated with changes in the working-age 
population share in different stages of demo-
graphic transition. After an initial decline in 
mortality, countries tend to transition from 
high to low fertility. During this phase, the 
population share of children declines and 
the share of people of working age increases, 
while the share of elderly remains small. As 
a result, these countries potentially experi-
ence a boost to aggregate economic growth, 
a phenomenon referred to as the “first demo-
graphic dividend.” Subsequently, as the pop-
ulation share in working age continues to 
increase, countries are in a position to realize 
high rates of savings and investment, build-
ing up large stocks of human and physical 
capital. The contribution of this capital to 
production, which may be long term, is con-
sidered a “second demographic dividend.” 
The demographic dividends are potential 
economic outcomes associated with a coun-
try’s demographic context. The extent to 
which countries reap these dividends var-
ies. The demographic typology in this report 
classifies countries on the basis of the eco-
nomic implications of their demographic 
characteristics.
A few criteria are used to identify whether 
the potential for a first demographic divi-
dend is in a country’s past, present, or future. 
The first criterion is whether the working-
age share is likely to be rising or not during 
2015–30—the time horizon for several devel-
opment goals. This criterion differentiates 
two broad groups of countries. 
The first broad group is made up of coun-
tries for which the working-age share is pro-
jected to decrease or stay unchanged during 
2015–30; for this group of countries, the 
potential for the first demographic dividend 
has either already passed or is passing. To dis-
tinguish two subgroups within this broader 
group, the fertility rate from 1985, 30 years 
ago, is used to identify how far along coun-
tries are in the final phase of demographic 
transition, which is characterized by low 
rates of both fertility and mortality. Thirty 
years describes the ballpark length of a gen-
eration from the birth of a parent to the birth 
of a child, although the exact length would 
vary by country and across time. Coun-
tries whose fertility rate in 1985 was below 
replacement are most likely to be the furthest 
along in their demographic transition, with 
the potential for a first demographic dividend 
being part of their past. These countries are 
classified as post-dividend. Countries whose 
fertility rate in 1985 was at or above replace-
ment are likely to have entered the final phase 
of demographic transition more recently; they 
may still be reaping the first demographic 
dividend but are at the tail end of that win-
dow. These countries are classified as late-
dividend countries. 
The second broad group includes coun-
tries whose working-age population shares 
are growing. On the basis of the current 
total fertility rate, two subgroups are con-
sidered: those for which the window for the 
first demographic dividend was open recently 
and those for which it will open in the future. 
If a country’s total fertility is below four 
births per woman, then it is likely that the 
country has been progressing through the 
demographic transition model and will be 
experiencing rapid reductions in the popula-
tion share of its youth. These are the early-
dividend countries. Countries whose current 
fertility rates are four births per woman or 
higher are most likely at an earlier stage of 
demographic transition and have yet to expe-
rience most of the decline in the child popula-
tion share that makes the first demographic 
dividend possible. These are the pre-dividend 
countries. It should be noted that the selec-
tion of the specific value of four births per 
woman as the cutoff is arbitrary and that the 
classification of some countries would change 
if a slightly different value had been selected. 
3. Demographic typology
G L o B a L  M o N I t o r I N G  r e P o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6   d a t a  s o u r c e s    269
These criteria—summarized in table 
C.2—are applied to 191 economies covered 
by both the United Nations World Popula-
tion Prospect: The 2015 Revision (WPP) 
(UN 2015) and the World Development 
Indicators, to yield the typology illustrated 
in map 5.1 and listed below in table C.3. 
The population data for 1950–2013 are the 
historical estimates of the WPP. The popu-
lation data from 2013 onward are from the 
WPP’s medium-fertility scenario. As noted in 
box 4.1, population projections differ across 
alternative databases and WPP scenarios, so 
the typology of countries may vary slightly 
depending on the source of the projections 
because of possible differences in growth of 
the working-age populations in 2015–30. As 
also noted in box 4.1, however, substantial 
changes in working-age population growth 
across countries are unlikely because of the 
short time horizon.
Table C.2 Criteria for typology 
   Growth of working-age population 
share, 2015–30 Total fertility rate, 1985 Total fertility rate, 2015
< 2.1 ≥ 2.1 < 4 ≥ 4
≤ 0 Post-dividend Late-dividend
> 0 Early-dividend Pre-dividend
 
Note: The working-age population is defined as the share of the population aged between 15 and 64 years. Total fertility rate is the average 
number of births per woman in her lifetime.
Table C.3 economies by World bank Group classification and demographic typology
  Name
World Bank Group 
income classification Demographic type
Percent change in 
working-age population 
share, 2015–30
Total fertility 
rate, 1985–90
Total fertility 
rate, 2015–20
Afghanistan LIC Pre-dividend 17.53 7.47 4.25
Albania UMC Late-dividend –10.69 3.15 1.78
Algeria UMC Early-dividend 0.99 5.3 2.62
Angola UMC Pre-dividend 6.56 7.25 5.79
Antigua and Barbuda HIC Post-dividend –2.78 2.07 2.03
Argentina HIC Early-dividend 1.13 3.05 2.27
Armenia LMC Late-dividend –8.09 2.58 1.51
Aruba HIC Late-dividend –8.13 2.3 1.62
Australia HIC Post-dividend –6.42 1.86 1.86
Austria HIC Post-dividend –9.17 1.45 1.53
Azerbaijan UMC Late-dividend –7.88 2.95 2.22
Bahamas, The HIC Late-dividend –6.78 2.65 1.83
Bahrain HIC Early-dividend 1.45 4.08 1.98
Bangladesh LMC Early-dividend 6.15 4.98 2.08
Barbados HIC Post-dividend –8.53 1.77 1.8
Belarus UMC Post-dividend –8.41 2 1.64
Belgium HIC Post-dividend –6.77 1.56 1.83
Belize UMC Early-dividend 4.65 4.7 2.46
Benin LIC Pre-dividend 7.60 6.88 4.5
Bhutan LMC Early-dividend 4.47 6.11 1.93
Bolivia LMC Early-dividend 4.99 5.09 2.83
Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC Post-dividend –9.86 1.91 1.23
(Table continues next page)
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  Name
World Bank Group 
income classification Demographic type
Percent change in 
working-age population 
share, 2015–30
Total fertility 
rate, 1985–90
Total fertility 
rate, 2015–20
Botswana UMC Early-dividend 4.39 5.11 2.67
Brazil UMC Late-dividend –1.41 3.1 1.74
Brunei Darussalam HIC Late-dividend –3.21 3.72 1.82
Bulgaria UMC Post-dividend –4.91 1.95 1.6
Burkina Faso LIC Pre-dividend 8.18 7.07 5.23
Burundi LIC Pre-dividend 3.67 7.59 5.66
Cabo Verde LMC Early-dividend 4.30 5.63 2.19
Cambodia LIC Early-dividend 2.39 5.99 2.53
Cameroon LMC Pre-dividend 8.25 6.6 4.46
Canada HIC Post-dividend –10.27 1.62 1.56
Central African Republic LIC Pre-dividend 7.15 5.9 4.02
Chad LIC Pre-dividend 7.99 7.21 5.79
Chile HIC Late-dividend –4.98 2.6 1.73
China UMC Late-dividend –7.12 2.75 1.59
Colombia UMC Late-dividend –0.93 3.18 1.83
Comoros LIC Pre-dividend 6.34 6.7 4.23
Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC Pre-dividend 7.15 6.98 5.66
Congo, Rep. LMC Pre-dividend 6.23 5.55 4.64
Costa Rica UMC Late-dividend –2.89 3.31 1.76
Côte d’Ivoire LMC Pre-dividend 4.49 6.85 4.77
Croatia HIC Post-dividend –6.58 1.72 1.48
Cuba UMC Post-dividend –9.04 1.85 1.58
Cyprus HIC Late-dividend –5.01 2.43 1.42
Czech Republic HIC Post-dividend –5.85 1.9 1.54
Denmark HIC Post-dividend –5.12 1.54 1.76
Djibouti LMC Early-dividend 4.93 6.18 2.99
Dominican Republic UMC Early-dividend 2.71 3.65 2.38
Ecuador UMC Early-dividend 1.28 4 2.44
Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Early-dividend 3.29 5.15 3.16
El Salvador LMC Early-dividend 2.51 4.17 1.87
Equatorial Guinea HIC Pre-dividend 1.32 5.89 4.52
Eritrea LIC Pre-dividend 12.43 6.51 4.02
Estonia HIC Late-dividend –5.97 2.2 1.66
Ethiopia LIC Early-dividend 12.05 7.37 3.99
Fiji UMC Late-dividend –0.28 3.47 2.48
Finland HIC Post-dividend –7.05 1.66 1.77
France HIC Post-dividend –5.44 1.81 1.99
French Polynesia HIC Late-dividend –5.51 3.64 1.99
Gabon UMC Early-dividend 7.18 5.58 3.68
Gambia, The LIC Pre-dividend 6.25 6.14 5.53
Georgia LMC Late-dividend –7.19 2.26 1.82
Germany HIC Post-dividend –10.74 1.43 1.44
Ghana LMC Early-dividend 6.42 5.88 3.95
Greece HIC Post-dividend –2.46 1.53 1.3
Grenada UMC Early-dividend 0.92 4.14 2.08
Guam HIC Late-dividend –4.48 3.14 2.32
Guatemala LMC Early-dividend 8.10 5.5 3.03
Table C.3 economies by World bank Group classification and demographic typology (continued)
(Table continues next page)
G L o B a L  M o N I t o r I N G  r e P o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6   d a t a  s o u r c e s    271
  Name
World Bank Group 
income classification Demographic type
Percent change in 
working-age population 
share, 2015–30
Total fertility 
rate, 1985–90
Total fertility 
rate, 2015–20
Guinea LIC Pre-dividend 6.57 6.63 4.73
Guinea–Bissau LIC Pre-dividend 6.01 6.68 4.56
Guyana LMC Late-dividend –3.02 3.77 2.47
Haiti LIC Early-dividend 6.11 5.7 2.85
Honduras LMC Early-dividend 7.02 5.37 2.25
Hong Kong SAR, China HIC Post-dividend –17.53 1.36 1.3
Hungary HIC Post-dividend –4.48 1.86 1.4
Iceland HIC Late-dividend –6.25 2.12 1.9
India LMC Early-dividend 3.11 4.27 2.34
Indonesia LMC Early-dividend 1.40 3.4 2.36
Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Early-dividend 1.48 5.62 1.62
Iraq UMC Pre-dividend 5.10 6.09 4.35
Ireland HIC Late-dividend –1.78 2.18 2
Israel HIC Early-dividend 0.27 3.07 2.93
Italy HIC Post-dividend –7.83 1.35 1.49
Jamaica UMC Late-dividend –3.36 3.1 1.99
Japan HIC Post-dividend –5.68 1.66 1.46
Jordan UMC Early-dividend 7.74 6.02 3.2
Kazakhstan UMC Late-dividend –2.03 3.03 2.53
Kenya LMC Pre-dividend 8.34 6.54 4.1
Kiribati LMC Early-dividend 2.21 4.8 3.58
Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. LIC Late-dividend –1.47 2.36 1.94
Korea, Rep. HIC Post-dividend –13.45 1.6 1.33
Kuwait HIC Late-dividend –2.00 3.15 2.04
Kyrgyz Republic LMC Late-dividend –0.74 4.02 2.93
Lao PDR LMC Early-dividend 6.81 6.27 2.77
Latvia HIC Late-dividend –5.61 2.13 1.55
Lebanon UMC Late-dividend –1.84 3.23 1.71
Lesotho LMC Early-dividend 4.97 5.14 3.01
Liberia LIC Pre-dividend 7.82 6.72 4.47
Libya UMC Early-dividend 7.10 5.71 2.32
Lithuania HIC Post-dividend –7.62 2.06 1.63
Luxembourg HIC Post-dividend –6.68 1.47 1.61
Macao SAR, China HIC Post-dividend –16.77 1.94 1.34
Macedonia, FYR UMC Late-dividend –6.94 2.27 1.55
Madagascar LIC Pre-dividend 4.74 6.3 4.21
Malawi LIC Pre-dividend 9.24 7.3 4.88
Malaysia UMC Late-dividend –1.75 3.59 1.9
Maldives UMC Early-dividend 3.66 6.66 1.98
Mali LIC Pre-dividend 8.38 7.15 5.92
Malta HIC Post-dividend –7.59 2.01 1.49
Mauritania LMC Pre-dividend 5.82 6.09 4.39
Mauritius UMC Late-dividend –5.64 2.31 1.44
Mexico UMC Early-dividend 2.42 3.75 2.14
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC Early-dividend 1.22 5.2 3.08
Moldova LMC Late-dividend –7.08 2.64 1.23
Mongolia UMC Late-dividend –1.48 4.84 2.54
Table C.3 economies by World bank Group classification and demographic typology (continued)
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  Name
World Bank Group 
income classification Demographic type
Percent change in 
working-age population 
share, 2015–30
Total fertility 
rate, 1985–90
Total fertility 
rate, 2015–20
Montenegro UMC Late-dividend –4.46 2.11 1.65
Morocco LMC Late-dividend –0.95 4.45 2.38
Mozambique LIC Pre-dividend 7.28 6.33 5.12
Myanmar LMC Early-dividend 3.22 3.8 2.13
Namibia UMC Early-dividend 4.45 5.55 3.31
Nepal LIC Early-dividend 10.01 5.33 2.09
Netherlands HIC Post-dividend –8.89 1.55 1.77
New Caledonia HIC Late-dividend –2.95 3.03 2.04
New Zealand HIC Post-dividend –6.56 2.03 1.99
Nicaragua LMC Early-dividend 4.70 5 2.16
Niger LIC Pre-dividend 1.75 7.69 7.46
Nigeria LMC Pre-dividend 6.15 6.6 5.41
Norway HIC Post-dividend –5.43 1.8 1.81
Oman HIC Late-dividend –4.18 7.85 2.51
Pakistan LMC Early-dividend 5.51 6.3 3.38
Panama UMC Early-dividend 0.27 3.24 2.36
Papua New Guinea LMC Early-dividend 6.18 4.97 3.58
Paraguay UMC Early-dividend 2.65 4.77 2.45
Peru UMC Early-dividend 1.69 4.1 2.35
Philippines LMC Early-dividend 2.40 4.53 2.87
Poland HIC Late-dividend –8.38 2.16 1.33
Portugal HIC Post-dividend –5.92 1.62 1.24
Puerto Rico HIC Late-dividend –3.09 2.26 1.59
Qatar HIC Late-dividend –2.27 4.41 1.95
Romania UMC Late-dividend –3.79 2.22 1.53
Russian Federation HIC Late-dividend –8.60 2.12 1.72
Rwanda LIC Early-dividend 11.47 7.99 3.62
Samoa LMC Early-dividend 3.99 5.35 3.9
Saudi Arabia HIC Early-dividend 3.09 6.22 2.59
Senegal LMC Pre-dividend 7.23 6.88 4.83
Serbia UMC Late-dividend –4.38 2.23 1.59
Seychelles HIC Late-dividend –2.97 2.94 2.21
Sierra Leone LIC Pre-dividend 10.04 6.66 4.28
Singapore HIC Post-dividend –12.12 1.7 1.26
Slovak Republic HIC Late-dividend –8.71 2.15 1.44
Slovenia HIC Post-dividend –10.57 1.65 1.65
Solomon Islands LMC Early-dividend 9.87 6.13 3.76
Somalia LIC Pre-dividend 4.81 7.26 6.12
South Africa UMC Early-dividend 2.73 4 2.28
South Sudan LIC Pre-dividend 6.75 6.83 4.73
Spain HIC Post-dividend –6.41 1.46 1.38
Sri Lanka LMC Late-dividend –1.84 2.64 2.03
St. Lucia UMC Late-dividend –0.91 3.65 1.82
St. Vincent and the 
 Grenadines UMC Late-dividend –1.32 3.1 1.9
Sudan LMC Pre-dividend 7.27 6.3 4.13
Suriname UMC Early-dividend 0.37 3.42 2.28
Table C.3 economies by World bank Group classification and demographic typology (continued)
(Table continues next page)
G L o B a L  M o N I t o r I N G  r e P o r t  2 0 1 5 / 2 0 1 6   d a t a  s o u r c e s    273
  Name
World Bank Group 
income classification Demographic type
Percent change in 
working-age population 
share, 2015–30
Total fertility 
rate, 1985–90
Total fertility 
rate, 2015–20
Swaziland LMC Early-dividend 5.15 6.13 3.06
Sweden HIC Post-dividend –4.42 1.91 1.93
Switzerland HIC Post-dividend –8.81 1.55 1.57
Syrian Arab Republic LMC Early-dividend 11.32 5.87 2.77
Tajikistan LMC Early-dividend 0.33 5.41 3.32
Tanzania LIC Pre-dividend 6.70 6.36 4.92
Thailand UMC Late-dividend –7.29 2.3 1.46
Timor–Leste LMC Pre-dividend 7.27 5.21 5.33
Togo LIC Pre-dividend 7.63 6.62 4.35
Tonga UMC Early-dividend 7.86 4.74 3.58
Trinidad and Tobago HIC Late-dividend –2.76 2.75 1.73
Tunisia UMC Late-dividend –3.50 4 2.07
Turkey UMC Early-dividend 0.90 3.35 2.01
Turkmenistan UMC Early-dividend 1.49 4.55 2.22
Uganda LIC Pre-dividend 10.18 7.1 5.46
Ukraine LMC Post-dividend –7.37 1.9 1.56
United Arab Emirates HIC Late-dividend –4.19 4.83 1.73
United Kingdom HIC Post-dividend –5.18 1.84 1.91
United States HIC Post-dividend –7.77 1.91 1.9
Uruguay HIC Late-dividend –0.61 2.53 1.98
Uzbekistan LMC Early-dividend 1.46 4.4 2.33
Vanuatu LMC Early-dividend 4.95 5.04 3.22
Venezuela, RB HIC Early-dividend 0.78 3.65 2.28
Vietnam LMC Late-dividend –3.84 3.85 1.95
Virgin Islands (U.S.) HIC Late-dividend –10.79 3.02 2.18
West Bank and Gaza LMC Early-dividend 6.24 6.76 3.95
Yemen, Rep. LMC Early-dividend 10.13 8.8 3.79
Zambia LMC Pre-dividend 7.43 6.68 5.14
Zimbabwe LIC Early-dividend 10.51 5.66 3.65
Source: UN World Population Prospects (2015) and World Bank 2015.
Note: This table uses the World Bank Group income classification of July 2015. LIC = low-income countries. LMC = lower-middle-income 
countries. UMC = is upper-middle-income countries. HIC = high-income countries.
Table C.3 economies by World bank Group classification and demographic typology (continued)
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The basic association between demographic 
changes and growth is described by Bloom 
and Canning (2004) through an accounting 
identity:
 
= ⋅ ⋅
Y
N
Y
L
WAP
N
L
WAP  (1)
where Y is income, N is total population, 
WAP is the working-age population, and L 
is the number of workers. Equation (1) shows 
that income per capita (Y/N) equals out-
put per worker (Y/L) times the share of the 
working-age population (WAP/N) times the 
participation rate (L/WAP). The equation 
suggests that, everything else constant, an 
increase of the output per worker (Y/L), or 
an increase in the share of working-age popu-
lation (WAP/N), or in the participation rate 
(L/WAP) is associated with higher GDP per 
capita. Taking the log of the variables in 
(1) and presenting the relation in terms of 
growth leads to:
 
= + +g g g gy z w l  (2)
where (gy) is income per capita growth, (gz) 
is productivity growth per worker, (gw) is the 
growth of the share of working-age popula-
tion, and (gl) is the growth in labor force par-
ticipation rate.
Assuming that productivity growth per 
worker is a function of X variables, such that 
gz = b f(X) and growth of labor force par-
ticipation is constant, such that gl = a, the fol-
lowing functional form is produced:
 gy = a + b f(X) + gw + e. (3)
where e is the error term.
Equation (3) suggests that, keeping every-
thing else constant, an increase in the share of 
working-age population leads to higher GDP 
per capita growth. The main issue behind this 
association is that, because (3) is derived from 
an accounting identity, a set of assumptions 
are necessary to suggest a causal relationship 
between changes in the share of working-age 
population and growth. 
Over a short- to medium-term horizon, it 
is reasonable to assume that the working-age 
population is given in absolute terms, and 
that it is a function of past and current fertil-
ity, mortality, and migration rates. However, 
the current fertility rate also affects gw, by 
changing the size of the total population (N). 
Increasing life expectancy and migration also 
affect N. An issue in the estimation of (3) is 
that unobservable factors (omitted variables) 
that affect per capita income growth can 
simultaneously affect the share of working-
age population, leading to an endogeneity 
issue. In addition, it might be that changes 
in per capita income lead to demographic 
changes instead, a reverse causality problem.
Several studies attempt to analyze the 
effect of demographic change on economic 
growth (Bloom and Canning 2004; East-
wood and Lipton 2011; IMF 2004; Kelly 
and Schmidt 2005, 2007). Overall, their 
findings converge on a positive association 
between GDP per capita  growth and the 
share of working-age population. These stud-
ies adopted different approaches to address 
the potential endogeneity issues previously 
described. One such approach is to use the 
lag of the change of the share of working-
age population (gw(t–1)) as an instrument for 
gw. The intuition is that current income per 
capita growth does not affect the growth rate 
of the share of working-age population in 
the past. Although it can be argued that this 
approach deals with reverse causality, it does 
not necessarily address the omitted variable 
problem.  
This report uses different approaches to 
deal with the problem of endogeneity. First, 
it shows the association between gw and gy by 
providing the results based on ordinary least 
squares estimation. Then, in order to deal 
with time-invariant unobservable factors that 
could simultaneously affect gyand gw, a panel 
fixed effects estimation is used. Finally, to deal 
4. Data and econometric estimations
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population is associated with an increase of 
0.6 to 0.8 percentage point on savings (figure 
C.4.2).1
Note
1.  Because of potential endogeneity issues 
described in this appendix, the econometric 
results should be interpreted cautiously. The 
analysis using panel fixed effects and system-
GMM estimators aims to address these issues.
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with other potential endogeneity issues related 
to omitted variables that could simultaneously 
affect gyand gw, a procedure was adopted sim-
ilar to that in Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
That paper uses a system-GMM estimation to 
identify a causal relationship between inter-
national aid and growth. Similar approaches 
were adopted to estimate the effect of change 
in the share of the working-age population 
on growth and savings. The results under dif-
ferent specifications suggest that an increase 
in the share of working-age population has a 
positive effect on GDP per capita growth. An 
increase of 1 percentage point in the working-
age population share is estimated to boost per 
capita GDP by 1.1 to 2.0 percentage points, 
on average (figure C.4.1). Also, an increase of 
1 percentage point in the share of working-age 
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5. economies of the world
Table C.5.1 World bank Group classification of economies by region and income, fiscal year 2016
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America 
and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
High-income  
OECD economies
Other high-income 
economies
American Samoa UMC Belize UMC Angola UMC Australia Andorra
Cambodia LIC Bolivia LMC Benin LIC Austria Antigua and Barbuda
China UMC Brazil UMC Botswana UMC Belgium Argentina
Fiji UMC Colombia UMC Burkina Faso LIC Canada Aruba
Indonesia LMC Costa Rica UMC Burundi LIC Chile Bahamas, The
Kiribati LMC Cuba UMC Cabo Verde LMC Czech Republic Bahrain
Korea, Dem. Rep. LIC Dominica UMC Cameroon LMC Denmark Barbados
Lao PDR LMC Dominican Republic UMC Central African Republic LIC Estonia Bermuda
Malaysia UMC Ecuador UMC Chad LIC Finland Brunei Darussalam
Marshall Islands UMC El Salvador LMC Comoros LIC France Cayman Islands
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC Grenada UMC Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC Germany Channel Islands
Mongolia UMC Guatemala LMC Congo, Rep. LMC Greece Croatia
Myanmar LMC Guyana LMC Côte d’Ivoire LMC Hungary Curaçao
Palau UMC Haiti LIC Eritrea LIC Iceland Cyprus
Papua New Guinea LMC Honduras LMC Ethiopia LIC Ireland Equatorial Guinea
Philippines LMC Jamaica UMC Gabon UMC Israel Faeroe Islands
Samoa LMC Mexico UMC Gambia, The LIC Italy French Polynesia
Solomon Islands LMC Nicaragua LMC Ghana LMC Japan Greenland
Thailand UMC Panama UMC Guinea LIC Korea, Rep. Guam
Timor-Leste LMC Paraguay UMC Guinea-Bissau LIC Luxembourg Hong Kong SAR, China
Tonga UMC Peru UMC Kenya LMC Netherlands Isle of Man
Tuvalu UMC St. Lucia UMC Lesotho LMC New Zealand Kuwait
Vanuatu LMC St. Vincent and the Liberia LIC Norway Latvia
Vietnam LMC Grenadines UMC Madagascar LIC Poland Liechtenstein
Suriname UMC Malawi LIC Portugal Lithuania
Mali LIC Slovak Republic Macao SAR, China
Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa Mauritania LMC Slovenia Malta
Albania UMC Algeria UMC Mozambique LIC Sweden New Caledonia
Armenia LMC Djibouti LMC Namibia UMC Switzerland Northern Mariana Islands
Azerbaijan UMC Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Niger LIC United Kingdom Oman
Belarus UMC Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Nigeria LMC United States Puerto Rico
Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC Iraq UMC Rwanda LIC Qatar
Bulgaria UMC Jordan UMC São Tomé and Príncipe LMC Russian Federation
Georgia LMC Lebanon UMC Senegal LMC San Marino
Kazakhstan UMC Libya UMC Sierra Leone LIC Saudi Arabia
Kosovo LMC Morocco LMC Somalia LIC Seychelles
Kyrgyz Republic LMC Syrian Arab Republic LMC South Africa UMC Singapore
Macedonia, FYR UMC Tunisia UMC South Sudan LIC Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
Moldova LMC West Bank and Gaza LMC Sudan LMC St. Kitts and Nevis
Montenegro UMC Yemen, Rep. LMC Swaziland LMC St. Martin (French part)
Romania UMC Tanzania LIC Taiwan, China
Serbia UMC South Asia Togo LIC Trinidad and Tobago
Tajikistan LMC Afghanistan LIC Uganda LIC Turks and Caicos Islands
Turkey UMC Bangladesh LMC Zambia LMC United Arab Emirates
Turkmenistan UMC Bhutan LMC Zimbabwe LIC Uruguay
Ukraine LMC India LMC Venezuela, RB
Uzbekistan LMC Maldives UMC Virgin Islands (U.S.)
Nepal LIC
Pakistan LMC
Sri Lanka LMC
Note: This table uses the World Bank Group income classification of July 2015. LIC = low-income countries. LMC = lower-middle-income countries.  
UMC = is upper-middle-income countries. HIC = high-income countries.
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Table C.5.2 iMF member countries as classified in the World economic Outlook, 2015
advanced economy countries (35 countries)
Australia France Latvia Singapore
Austria Germany Lithuania Slovak Republic
Belgium Greece Luxembourg Slovenia
Canada Iceland Malta Spain
Cyprus Ireland Netherlands Sweden
Czech Republic Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Denmark Italy Norway United Kingdom
Estonia Japan Portugal United States
Finland Korea, Republic of San Marino
emerging market and developing countries (153 countries)1
emerging and Developing europe (12 countries)       Sub-Saharan africa (45 countries)
Albania FYR Macedonia Angola2 Madagascar*
Bosnia and Herzegovina* Montenegro** Benin Malawi2
Bulgaria Poland Botswana Mali*,2
Croatia Romania Burkina Faso2 Mauritius**
Hungary Serbia Burundi*,2 Mozambique2
Kosovo* Turkey Cameroon Namibia
Cabo Verde** Niger2
Central African Republic*,2 Nigeria2
emerging and Developing asia (29 countries) Chad*,2 Rwanda
Bangladesh Myanmar* Comoros*,** São Tomé and Príncipe**
Bhutan** Nepal Congo, Dem. Rep. of*,2 Senegal
Brunei Darussalam**2 Palau** Congo, Rep. of 2 Seychelles**
Cambodia Papua New Guinea2 Côte d’Ivoire* Sierra Leone*,2
China Philippines Equatorial Guinea**,2 South Africa2
Fiji** Samoa** Eritrea*,2 South Sudan*,2
India Solomon Islands*,**,2 Ethiopia Swaziland**
Indonesia Sri Lanka Gabon2 Tanzania
Kiribati*,** Thailand Gambia, The* Togo*
Lao People’s Democratic Republic Timor-Leste*,**,2 Ghana Uganda
Malaysia Tonga** Guinea2 Zambia2
Maldives** Tuvalu*,**,2 Guinea-Bissau*,2 Zimbabwe*,2
Marshall Islands*,** Vanuatu** Kenya
Micronesia, Federated States of*,** Vietnam Lesotho
Mongolia Liberia*
latin america and the Caribbean (32 countries)
Middle east, North africa, afghanistan, 
and Pakistan (23 countries)
Commonwealth of independent  
States (12 countries)
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 2 Armenia Antigua and Barbuda** Paraguay2
Algeria2 Azerbaijan2 Argentina Peru
Bahrain**2 Belarus Bahamas, The** St. Kitts and Nevis**
Djibouti** Georgia3 Barbados** St. Lucia**
Egypt, Arab Rep. Kazakhstan2 Belize** St. Vincent and the Grenadines**
Iran, Islamic Republic of2 Kyrgyz Republic Bolivia2 Suriname**,2
Iraq*2 Moldova Brazil Trinidad and Tobago**,2
Jordan Russian Federation2 Chile2 Uruguay2
Kuwait2 Tajikistan Colombia Venezuela2
Lebanon* Turkmenistan2 Costa Rica
Libya*2 Ukraine Dominica**
Mauritania2 Uzbekistan2 Dominican Republic
Morocco Ecuador2
Oman2 El Salvador
Pakistan Grenada**
Qatar2 Guatemala
Saudi Arabia2 Guyana**,2
Somalia* Haiti*
Sudan*,2 Honduras
Syrian Arab Republic* Jamaica
Tunisia Mexico
United Arab Emirates2 Nicaragua
Yemen, Republic of *2 Panama
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015. World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth—Short and Long-term Factors. April. Washington, D.C.
1.  60 countries in bold typeface are low-income developing countries (LIDC) and 94 countries in regular typeface are emerging market countries (EMC). The LIDCs are 
countries eligible for the IMF’s concessional financial assistance with a per capita gross national income (measured according to the World Bank’s Atlas method) in 2011 
of below twice the IDA’s effective operational cut-off level, and Zimbabwe. The EMCs are the non-LIDC emerging market and developing countries. 34 countries, with 
an asterisk, are included in the World Bank’s list of countries in fragile situations, as of July 2015. 36 emerging market and developing countries, with two asterisks, are 
countries with a population of less than 1.5 millions in 2013. The two latter country groupings are denoted as fragile states and small states, respectively.
2.  56 emerging market and developing countries are fuel or primary commodity exporters.
3.  Georgia, which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.
Methodology
Asia; and early-, late-, and post-dividend 
high-income countries. The sectors are disag-
gregated into agriculture, natural resources, 
low-skill manufacturing, low-skill services, 
high-skill manufacturing, and high-skill 
services.
The core specification of the model rep-
licates a standard global dynamic CGE 
model.2 Production is specified as a series 
of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
functions for the various inputs—unskilled 
and skilled labor, capital, land, natural 
resources (sector-specific), energy, and other 
material inputs. LINKAGE uses a vintage 
structure of production that allows for new 
vintages of capital to be more substitutable 
with other factors of production than old vin-
tages. In the labor market, the unemployment 
rate is fixed and labor may migrate between 
rural and urban areas. 
Demand by each domestic agent is speci-
fied at the so-called Armington level, that 
is, demand for a bundle of domestically 
produced and imported goods. Arming-
ton demand is aggregated across all agents 
and allocated at the national level between 
domestic production and imports by region 
of origin. 
The standard scenario incorporates three 
closure rules. First, government expenditures 
LINKAGE: A dynamic global CGE 
model for policy analysis 
LINKAGE is a dynamic, multiregion com-
putable general equilibrium model (CGE), 
initially designed for trade policy but later 
extended to address a wider range of policy 
areas. The main features of LINKAGE are 
described here, while a full description is pro-
vided in van der Mensbrugghe (2011, 2013). 
The current version of LINKAGE relies on 
the GTAP version 9, a global database for 
2011.1 The data include social accounting 
matrices and bilateral trade flows for 140 
regions (countries or country aggregates) and 
57 sectors. The version employed in this study 
includes the following regions: Brazil, China, 
India, Japan, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, 
Sri Lanka, and the United States; the Euro-
pean Union and the European Free Trade 
Association; pre-dividend countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa; early-dividend countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and 
Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Middle 
East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub- 
Saharan Africa; late-dividend countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe 
and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific, and 
the Middle East and North Africa; post-
dividend countries in Europe and Central 
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are held constant as a share of GDP and 
direct taxes adjust to cover revenue changes 
needed to keep government savings (the fis-
cal balance) at an exogenous level. The sec-
ond closure rule determines the investment-
savings balance. Households save a portion 
of their incomes, with the average propen-
sity to save influenced by elderly and youth 
dependency rates, as well as GDP per capita 
growth rates. The savings function specifica-
tion follows Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and 
Servén (2000) with different coefficients for 
developed and developing countries. For 
China and Russia, we impose projections of 
investment or savings rates up to 2030 from 
World Bank regional reports. The third sav-
ings component, foreign savings (or current 
account deficit), is exogenous. Given this, 
and the above-stated rules for household and 
government savings, investment is savings-
driven. The last closure determines the exter-
nal balance: the real exchange rate adjusts to 
maintain the fixed foreign savings. We first 
generate the long-term baseline, then run a 
number of counterfactual scenarios. By com-
paring the two, we can isolate the impacts of 
various policy changes.
The GTAP database is benchmarked to 
2011. In model runs, key macroeconomic 
aggregates from the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects (World Bank 2015) 
report are replicated up to 2017.3 Popula-
tion growth is based on the medium fertility 
variant of the United Nation’s 2012 popula-
tion projections. Labor force growth follows 
the growth of the working-age population, 
defined here as the demographic cohort ages 
15 to 64. The evolution of supply of skilled 
and unskilled workers is consistent with the 
constant educational trends scenario of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, in which supply growth is faster for 
skilled workers than for unskilled workers. 
In each period, capital stocks are defined as 
the previous period’s (depreciated) stocks plus 
investment. Up to 2017, productivity growth 
in the baseline is “calibrated” to achieve the 
growth rates for the baseline scenario (as in 
World Bank 2015); then we fix the produc-
tivity growth for 2018–30 at the 2017 rate. 
These productivity growth rates remain fixed 
in the counterfactual scenarios. 
Demographic change affects the econ-
omy through two channels: the labor force 
and savings. In the baseline scenario, all 
new labor market entrants find produc-
tive employment. It is a neoclassical growth 
model; hence, increases in the labor force 
translate into higher output. Savings respond 
to changes in the demographic structure of 
the population, with declines in youth and 
elderly dependency rates increasing savings 
(and investment).
In the scenario that is designed to permit 
a lower-bound assessment of the impact of 
demographic change, we assume that ben-
efits (losses) that are attributable to changes 
in the size of the labor force and savings 
(hence investment) do not materialize. More 
specifically, in this scenario, total population 
in each region changes at the same rate as in 
the baseline, but the share of the working-age 
population in total population remains fixed 
at the 2015 level over 2016–30. This scenario 
is beneficial to late- and post-dividend coun-
tries since their working-age populations 
increase at a faster rate than in the baseline, 
leading to more rapid labor-force growth 
and higher savings rates. It is detrimental to 
pre- and early-dividend countries since their 
working-age population growth rates are 
slower than in the baseline, leading to slower 
labor-force growth and lower savings rates. 
In short, in this scenario we reverse the ben-
efits of demographic change in pre- and early-
dividend countries, while we eliminate losses 
from the demographic change in late- and 
post-dividend countries. This approach per-
mits us to isolate the impacts of demographic 
change on growth and poverty reduction, 
already embodied in the baseline scenario. 
GIDD: A global microsimulation 
model of poverty and shared 
prosperity
The analysis on the effect of these different 
scenarios on poverty and income distribu-
tion is done using the Global Income Distri-
bution Dynamics (GIDD) model. The GIDD 
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combines a consistent set of price and volume 
changes from a global CGE model (in this 
case LINKAGE) with household surveys at 
the global level (Bussolo, de Hoyos, and Med-
vedev 2010). Developed by the World Bank’s 
Development Prospects Group, the GIDD 
was inspired by previous efforts involving 
simulation exercises (Bourguignon and Bus-
solo 2012; Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva 
2003; Davies 2009). 
Counterfactual global and country-level 
income distributions are obtained by apply-
ing four changes to the initial distribution 
estimated from the household data. These 
include demographic changes (considering age 
structure and shifts in education); changes in 
sector of employment; changes in relative 
wages across skills and sectors; and growth 
in consumption per capita. Data on demo-
graphic changes are based on the popula-
tion projections of the United Nations World 
Population Prospect and are consistent with 
those considered in LINKAGE. Data on the 
latter three pieces of information are based 
on the scenario analysis results from LINK-
AGE. Examples of earlier analyses using 
LINKAGE and GIDD include examinations 
of the effect of agriculture distortions in the 
global economy (Dessus, Herrera, and de 
Hoyos 2008), the effect of climate change on 
poverty and inequality (Bourguignon, Bus-
solo, and Pereira da Silva 2008), the effect 
of demographic change on Africa (Ahmed 
et al. 2014), and external and internal shocks 
in Africa (Devarajan et al. 2015).
For analyzing the impact of different 
demographic scenarios on poverty and 
income distribution, we employ a sample 
of 90 household surveys, covering approxi-
mately 90 percent of global population and 
global GDP. The GIDD model allows the 
analysis of macroeconomic shocks on pov-
erty and sharing prosperity. Also, the rich-
ness of the microeconomic data can provide 
insights into regional and demographic char-
acteristics of the most affected households, 
which can be useful for defining contingent 
policies.
In addition to incorporating the key 
changes in the variables derived from the 
CGE scenarios, the GIDD methodology 
updates the household survey data for the end 
year of our simulation, 2030. This update is 
done by reweighting the population charac-
terized by the most recent available house-
hold survey in GIDD using nonparametric 
cross-entropy methods, but keeping it con-
sistent with the UN population projections. 
For the skill-unskilled breakdown, the GIDD 
defines as skilled anyone with more than nine 
years of education.
MAMS: A country-level CGE 
model for policy analysis
The Maquette for Millennium Development 
Goal Simulations (MAMS) is an economic 
simulation model designed for analyzing 
medium- and long-run development policies. 
It is a country-level CGE model made up of 
a set of simultaneous linear and nonlinear 
equations. The model is economywide, pro-
viding a comprehensive and consistent view 
of the economy, including linkages between 
production and the income it generates, 
households, the government (its budget and 
fiscal policies), and the balance of payments. 
The model is solved dynamically into the 
future, providing a view of the economy in 
every year for a given scenario.
It thus considers interactions between four 
groups of agents: producers, households, 
governments, and the nation in its dealings 
with the outside world. In each period, the 
different agents are subject to budgets and 
their constraints. For each agent, receipts 
and spending, the latter including savings 
and net borrowing, are equal by construc-
tion. Producers maximize profits; households 
maximize utility. The government follows 
rules specified by the analyst. For the nation, 
adjustments in the real exchange rate ensure 
that its external accounts are in balance. 
Wages, rents, and prices play a crucial role 
by clearing markets for factors, goods, and 
services. For commodities that are traded 
internationally (exported and/or imported), 
domestic prices are influenced by interna-
tional price developments. Unless the coun-
try has a large share of the global market, 
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it assumed that international markets will 
demand and supply the exports and imports 
of the country at given world prices. 
For MAMS analyses in this report, a new 
population module was developed. In this 
module, a detailed population scenario is gen-
erated on the basis of base-year population 
data by age (single-year-age-group) and gen-
der, and projections for age- and gender-spe-
cific fertility, mortality, and migration rates. 
Over time, production growth is determined 
by growth in factor employment and changes 
in total factor productivity (TFP). Growth in 
capital stocks is endogenous while exogenous 
growth is imposed for labor and other fac-
tors. For capital, stock growth depends on 
investment and depreciation. For labor, stock 
growth is determined by the evolution of the 
population in labor-force age and an aggre-
gate labor force participation rate which may 
change over time; the labor unemployment 
rate is endogenous, leading to a distinction 
between stock and employment levels. TFP 
growth is made up of two components: one 
that responds positively to growth in govern-
ment capital stocks and one that is exogenous. 
MAMS includes a module in which poverty 
results are computed on the assumption that 
each household type in the model has a fixed 
log-normal consumption distribution (defined 
using the Gini coefficient).
In this report, MAMS is applied to Brazil, 
Ethiopia, Japan, and Niger. For this purpose, 
new databases were developed with base 
years between 2009 and 2013. Each database 
consists of a Social Accounting Matrix and 
various complementary data, primarily data 
on stocks (factors, debt, and population by 
single-year age group and gender), elasticities 
(in trade, production, and consumption), and 
projections for GDP, population, and other 
indicators. Given the interest of this report 
in forward-looking analysis, the analysis is 
based on simulation results starting from 
2015. The end year for the simulations varies 
across the applications, ranging from 2030 
to 2100. For more on MAMS, see Lofgren, 
Cicowiez, and Diaz-Bonilla (2013) and www 
.wordbank.org/mams.
Notes
1.  The GTAP database was developed and is 
maintained by the Global Trade Analysis Pro-
gram, based at Purdue University (www.gtap 
.org). The pre-release candidate 2 of version 9 
database is used here.
2.  Other well-known models in this class include 
the GTAP model (Hertel 1998) and CEPII’s 
Mirage (Decreux and Valin 2007).
3.  For China, we replicate the growth projections 
of World Bank (2014).
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The Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change details the progress toward 
the global development goals and examines the impact of 
demographic change on achieving these goals. 
Part I examines global development progress, the unfinished 
development agenda, and the policy opportunities ahead.  The 
report assesses progress toward ending extreme poverty by 
2030 and in promoting shared prosperity, and it outlines the 
measures necessary to scale up impact over the horizon of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
The report unveils the new poverty line of $1.90 a day and 
provides updated estimates for the number of people living in 
extreme poverty, which shows further declines.  In 2015 the 
global poverty rate is forecast to decline to 9.6 percent of the 
world’s population, the fi rst time it has reached single digits.  At 
the same time, the report makes the case that the depth of 
remaining poverty, the unevenness in shared prosperity, and the 
persistent disparities in non-income dimensions of development 
call for urgent action.
Part II analyzes how profound demographic shifts could alter the 
course of global development. Global demography is at a turning 
point: the world’s population is growing m ore slowly, while it is 
aging at an unprecedented rate. Within these broader global 
trends considerable diversity can be found across regions and 
countries. While the higher-income countries that drive global 
growth are rapidly aging, the lower-income countries comprising 
the centers of global poverty are much earlier in their 
demographic transition and continue to grapple with high 
fertility rates and rapid population growth. 
Demographic changes bring both opportunity and risk; the 
report argues for demography-informed policy approaches to tilt 
demographic change in favor of achieving the development 
goals. With the right policies, demographic change can become 
one of the most consequential development opportunities of 
our time. 
The Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016 is written jointly by the 
World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, with 
substantive inputs from the African Development Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
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